Pangandaman vs. Casar

A warrant of arrest may validly issue upon a finding of probable cause after the first phase of preliminary investigation (preliminary examination), without need of completing the entire procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112; however, a warrant of arrest against unidentified "John Does" is void as a general warrant for violating the constitutional injunction that warrants particularly describe the persons to be seized.

The petitioners are fourteen individuals named in a criminal complaint for multiple murder filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Poonabayabao, Tamparan and Masiu, Lanao del Sur, presided by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar. The complaint arose from a shooting incident on July 27, 1985 in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two wounded. At the time, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure had recently taken effect on January 1, 1985, governing the conduct of preliminary investigations by municipal trial court judges for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, leaving at least five persons dead and two others wounded. What actually transpired remained unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties. Another version held that a group traveling to Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed.

The following day, July 28, 1985, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, requesting a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by parties on both sides—none of whom was identified—and promised supporting affidavits would follow. The Provincial Fiscal immediately issued a "1st indorsement" to respondent Judge Casar, transmitting the letter and requesting that all cases relative to the incident be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases."

No case was presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan filed a criminal complaint for multiple murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1748. On that same day, the respondent Judge personally examined all three witnesses brought by the sergeant under oath through his "closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions propounded and the witnesses' answers. Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the fourteen petitioners—named by the witnesses—and fifty "John Does."

On August 14, 1985, Atty. Batuampar, joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti, filed an ex-parte motion for reconsideration seeking recall of the warrant and a subsequent thorough investigation, on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis," prompting the present petition.

The three witnesses to the complaint—Misandoning Monasprang, a student; Lawandato Ripors, an engineering graduate; and Sanny Monib, a farmer—gave mutually corroborative accounts. Under separate questioning, they declared that they were members of a party passing by Pantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, at about 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which included the petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons. Five of the party were killed and two wounded. The witnesses identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush group and named the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang, Macacrao Guiling Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman Ripors, and Malabato Diator.

• Procedural Violation and Due Process: Petitioners argued that the respondent Judge failed to conduct the preliminary investigation in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, and that this failure constituted a denial of due process nullifying the proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
• Insufficient Time: Petitioners contended that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., making it hardly possible for the respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty-four persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree within a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest on the same day.
• Undue Haste and Lack of Searching Questions: Petitioners asserted that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions, the Judge having relied mainly on supporting affidavits obviously prepared beforehand and presented by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.
• Disregard of Provincial Fiscal: Petitioners maintained that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal, who had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation.
• Unconstitutional General Warrant: Petitioners argued that the issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty "John Does" transgressed the constitutional provision requiring that warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

• Denial of Motion for Lack of Basis: The respondent Judge denied the ex-parte motion for reconsideration for "lack of basis," implicitly maintaining that the preliminary examination conducted and the warrant issued were proper.
• Solicitor General's Position: The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, agreed with the petitioners and recommended that the petition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided, concurring in the view that the warrant was issued without a proper preliminary investigation.

• Completeness of Preliminary Investigation: Whether completion of the entire procedure for preliminary investigation prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
• Sufficiency of Time and Searching Questions: Whether the respondent Judge had sufficient time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons within the limited Saturday office hours and whether he propounded searching questions.
• Prior Cognizance by Provincial Fiscal: Whether the Provincial Fiscal's prior cognizance of the matter legally inhibited the respondent Judge from conducting his own preliminary investigation.
• Validity of Warrant Against "John Does": Whether the warrant of arrest issued against fifty unidentified "John Does" is valid.

• Completeness of Preliminary Investigation: No. Completion of the entire procedure laid down in Section 3, Rule 112 is not a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Section 6 of the same Rule expressly authorizes the municipal trial judge to order the respondent's arrest after the first phase of preliminary examination if satisfied that probable cause exists and there is necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody.
• Sufficiency of Time and Searching Questions: Yes, probable cause was properly determined. The respondent Judge personally and closely examined three witnesses under oath, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty applies; nothing in the record belies his affirmations.
• Prior Cognizance by Provincial Fiscal: No, the Provincial Fiscal's announcement of intention to investigate did not legally inhibit the respondent Judge. Courtesy may have dictated endorsement to the Fiscal, but duty did not require it, and nothing in the rules prohibits the Judge from conducting his own investigation when a complaint is regularly brought before him.
• Validity of Warrant Against "John Does": No. The warrant is void insofar as it is issued against fifty unidentified "John Does," being in the nature of a general warrant proscribed as unconstitutional and violative of the injunction that warrants particularly describe the persons to be seized.

• Completeness of Preliminary Investigation: The procedure mandated by Section 3, Rule 112 consists of two phases. The first is an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and supporting affidavits, ending either with dismissal or a determination that sufficient cause exists to continue. The second phase gives the respondent notice, access to evidence, and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits. The Rule requires completion of this procedure before a complaint or information may be filed in the Regional Trial Court, but nowhere requires completion before a warrant of arrest may issue. Section 6(b) of Rule 112 expressly authorizes the municipal trial judge to issue a warrant of arrest after examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath in the form of searching questions and answers, if satisfied that probable cause exists and there is necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody. This authority was equally recognized under the former rules, where the first phase was denominated "preliminary examination." In Mayuga vs. Maravilla, the Court affirmed the power of the investigating judge to order arrest after the first stage. Since no information had yet been filed and there was no pretense that the respondent Judge did not intend to undertake the second phase, he cannot be said to have failed to observe the prescribed procedure.

• Sufficiency of Time and Searching Questions: The argument that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons within the limited Saturday office hours founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he personally and closely examined the three witnesses under oath and issued the warrant believing the offense had been committed. Nothing in the record belies these affirmations, which enjoy the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The contention that witnesses merely swore to prepared statements is mere speculation unsupported by the record. The assumption that the Judge limited proceedings to the usual Saturday hours is also unwarranted; he could have extended the session. The three witnesses gave mutually corroborative accounts of the ambush, identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush group, and described the killings in broad daylight. The finding of probable cause was neither arbitrary nor unfounded. Under Luna vs. Plaza, "searching questions and answers" are those tending to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof, and what constitutes searching questions depends on the nature of the offense and the circumstances, varying from case to case. The Court was not prepared to substitute its judgment for the Judge's on what questions to put to the witnesses.

• Prior Cognizance by Provincial Fiscal: The Provincial Fiscal's announcement of intention to investigate did not legally inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own inquiry. The complaint was regularly brought before the Judge, and no formal complaint had been filed before the Fiscal. While courtesy may have dictated that the Judge leave the investigation to the Fiscal and endorse the complaint to him, duty did not require it. Nothing in the rules states or implies that the Judge could not conduct his own investigation. Nevertheless, since the Judge's action and final resolution after completing the second stage are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal, practical considerations of expediency and avoidance of duplication of work dictated that the Fiscal be permitted to take over the investigation even at its present stage.

• Validity of Warrant Against "John Does": Insofar as the warrant was issued against fifty "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant—a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." It is clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. The warrant must therefore be voided as regards its unidentified subjects.

• Two Phases of Preliminary Investigation — The procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 consists of two stages: (1) an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and supporting documents, concluding either with dismissal or a determination that sufficient cause exists to continue; and (2) a phase giving the respondent notice, access to evidence, and opportunity to submit counter-affidavits, concluding with the Judge's resolution for dismissal or holding for trial. The entire procedure must be completed before a complaint or information is filed in the Regional Trial Court, but not before a warrant of arrest may issue.

• Issuance of Warrant of Arrest After Preliminary Examination — A warrant of arrest may issue upon a finding of probable cause after the first phase of preliminary investigation (preliminary examination), without need of completing the entire procedure. Section 6(b), Rule 112 authorizes the municipal trial judge to order the respondent's arrest if satisfied, after examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath in the form of searching questions and answers, that probable cause exists and there is necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody.

• Searching Questions and Answers — As defined in Luna vs. Plaza, "searching questions and answers" are those having a tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What constitutes searching questions depends on the subject of inquiry—the nature of the offense, date, time, place, motives, the subject's circumstances, the victim's circumstances—and varies from case to case, depending to a great degree on the Judge conducting the investigation.

• General Warrants Unconstitutional — A warrant of arrest issued against unidentified "John Does" is in the nature of a general warrant, a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Such a warrant violates the constitutional injunction that warrants should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.

• "There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true." — This passage articulates the central ratio decidendi: that the completion of preliminary investigation is a prerequisite for filing an information, not for issuing a warrant of arrest.

• "The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation." — A concise restatement of the governing principle, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on warrants of arrest.

• "Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) 'John Does' not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as 'totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.'" — This passage defines the constitutional infirmity of general warrants in the context of "John Doe" arrests and is the basis for voiding the warrant as to unidentified subjects.

• Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 18 SCRA 1115 — Followed. The Court relied on this case to affirm the power of an investigating judge to order the arrest of the accused after the first stage of preliminary investigation (preliminary examination), and to explain the two-stage nature of preliminary investigation.

• Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 — Followed. The Court adopted this case's definition of "searching questions and answers" as questions tending to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof, and relied on it to decline substituting its judgment for the investigating judge's on the propriety of questions propounded.

• Mariñas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423; Tabil vs. Ong, 91 SCRA 451; Banzon vs. Cabato, 64 SCRA 419; People vs. Paras, 56 SCRA 248; People vs. Abejuela and Endan, 38 SCRA 324; People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277; San Diego vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110; People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024 — Cited in support of the proposition that failure to follow the prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation results in a denial of due process.

• Section 3, Rule 112, Rules of Court (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) — Prescribes the procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, consisting of two phases. The Court explained that completion of this procedure is required before filing a complaint or information but not before issuance of a warrant of arrest.

• Section 6(b), Rule 112, Rules of Court — Authorizes the municipal trial judge conducting a preliminary investigation to issue a warrant of arrest if satisfied, after examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that probable cause exists and there is necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody. The Court relied on this provision to uphold the warrant against the named petitioners.

• Article IV, Section 3, 1987 Constitution (Bill of Rights) — Requires that warrants of arrest particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. The Court applied this provision to void the warrant insofar as it was issued against fifty unidentified "John Does."

• Section 5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court invoked this presumption to uphold the respondent Judge's affirmations that he personally examined the witnesses under oath.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.