Paña vs. Buyser

The death penalty cannot be imposed for murders committed on December 10, 1993, because the 1987 Constitution then proscribed it and Republic Act No. 7659 restoring the death penalty took effect only on December 31, 1993; a conspirator may still be convicted even if an alleged co-conspirator is acquitted, provided the acquittal does not remove the basis of the conspiracy charge.

A land dispute between the Juanite family and the Paña spouses, among others, was litigated before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which rendered a decision dated October 28, 1993 in favor of the Juanites. At the time of the killings on December 10, 1993, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of the death penalty, and Republic Act No. 7659 restoring the death penalty took effect only on December 31, 1993. These circumstances frame the motive attributed to Melecia Paña and the penalty issue on automatic review.

On December 10, 1993, at around 6:30 in the evening, Jose Juanite, Sr. and his son Jose Juanite, Jr. were in their residence in San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte conversing with members of their family. Someone knocked on the door, and ten-year-old Teotimo Questo, Jr. opened it. A man suddenly burst in and fired at Jose Juanite, Sr.; when Jose Juanite, Jr. rushed to close the door, he was shot from the window by another man. The gunshot wounds sustained by both father and son caused their instantaneous deaths.

The prosecution’s eyewitness, Maria Elena Juanite, daughter and sister of the victims, testified that when knocks were heard, Jose Juanite, Jr. asked Questo, Jr. to open the door; upon opening, Tiguman went inside and shot Jose Juanite, Sr. without warning, and when Jose Juanite, Jr. rushed to close the door, Pomoy, Jr., positioned outside the house, fired at him from the window. Tiguman was positively identified as the triggerman. Pomoy, Jr., a co-accused, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and testified that he was an informer of Tiguman; that Paña solicited Tiguman, a scout ranger of the Philippine Army, to kill the Juanites for monetary consideration; that the plan was hatched in the house of the Paña spouses in their presence; that the plan was on account of a land dispute and money was paid by Paña to Tiguman; that the killing was facilitated by two other men unknown to him but known to Tiguman; and that after the killing he left the place and settled in Parañaque, Metro Manila, upon Tiguman’s advice.

Ten-year-old Questo, Jr. testified that prior to the shooting, he saw Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and an unidentified person on December 10, 1993, between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, in the waiting shed of Purok 5, Barangay San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte, carrying a sack from where the muzzles of firearms were protruding; he positively identified Tiguman as the person who suddenly shot Jose Juanite, Sr. Arturo Balesteros testified that moments after hearing gunshots coming from the residence of the Juanites, he saw Manny Tiguman pass by, coming from the direction of the Juanite house. Graciano Madelo, a driver in the ricemill of an engineer in the locality, testified that Tiguman was present in Alegria, Surigao del Norte on the day the Juanites were killed and that Madelo was tasked by Manny Tiguman to drive for him to pick up Pomoy, Jr. and their unidentified companion.

Tiguman offered denial and alibi as his defenses, claiming that at the time of the incident he was in Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City, a neighboring city of Surigao del Norte. The trial court found his alibi worthless in the face of his positive identification by prosecution witnesses who had no motive to wrongly accuse him.

For Paña, the prosecution showed motive arising from a land dispute: the Juanites filed an agrarian case against Efren Paña, her husband, and other people, and when judgment was rendered in favor of the Juanites, the Paña spouses harbored a grudge. Anita Sanchez, wife of Macario Sanchez, one of the respondents in the DARAB case, testified that Paña went to her house several times for financial assistance in order to “liquidate” Jose Juanite, Sr., and Sanchez subsequently learned that the Juanites were shot to death. Elena Siaboc, the domestic helper of the Juanites, testified that Paña requested pictures of the victims, which she gave, showing that the killing was conceived by Paña because Tiguman could not have known the victims and a picture was necessary to identify the targets. Andy Acebedo, a neighbor of the Paña spouses, testified that on December 8, 1993 he saw Pomoy, Jr. and Tiguman pass by and proceed to the house of the Pañas; when he followed them, he overheard Paña telling Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and two persons unknown to him to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. Gemma Bacor, whose house was located just across the house of the Juanites, testified that on the fateful night, while watching television, she heard gunfire; she opened the door and saw two persons in the street carrying firearms; on January 2, 1994, the Paña spouses invited her to their residence and asked her to execute an affidavit stating that what she saw on that night were only children and not adults.

The trial court summarized that, as a result of the adverse DARAB decision dated October 28, 1993, motive existed on the part of Paña to cause the killing; that on November 25, 1993, Paña procured pictures of the victims from Elena Siaboc; that in the evening of December 8, 1993, Paña, Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and a certain Glen and Nonoy met in the Paña residence and planned the killing, during which Paña instructed Manny Tiguman and Robert Bayan, “That is all, ha? You will kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.”; that Paña handed money to Manny Tiguman, saying, “Here is the money. This is one-half of the total price, ‘bahala na nimo’ (it is up to you)”; and that on January 2, 1994, Paña and her husband Efren invited Gemma Bacor to their residence and convinced her to execute an affidavit declaring that the persons she saw after hearing gunshots were children and not adults. The trial court found Tiguman guilty as principal by direct participation and Paña guilty as principal by inducement, acquitted Efren Paña for insufficiency of evidence, and archived the case against John Doe.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellants argued that the trial court convicted them in the absence of evidence that would prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Improper Rebuttal Testimony: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of accused Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. alias Robert Bayan as evidence in chief during the rebuttal stage of the trial, after the prosecution had already rested its case.
• Disregard of Defense Evidence: Appellants argued that the trial court ignored the evidence for the defense, which allegedly wrecked the prosecution’s evidence “just like the Walls of Jericho.”
• Unauthorized Death Penalty: Appellants argued that the trial court imposed the death penalty without authority of law.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether appellants’ guilt for murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admission of Rebuttal Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in admitting Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr.’s testimony as evidence in chief during the rebuttal stage.
• Defense Evidence: Whether the trial court ignored defense evidence that allegedly destroyed the prosecution’s evidence.
• Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was imposed without authority of law.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery, dwelling, evident premeditation, and price or reward attended the killings.
• Conspiracy and Acquittal of Co-conspirator: Whether Melecia Paña could be convicted despite the acquittal of her husband Efren Paña.
• Damages: Whether the monetary awards were proper.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through positive identification, the testimony of Pomoy, Jr., and circumstantial evidence; denial and alibi are inherently weak and cannot prevail over affirmative testimony.
• Admission of Rebuttal Testimony: No. The rules permit rebuttal evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the defendant was not taken by surprise and was not prevented from introducing sur-rebuttal evidence.
• Defense Evidence: No. The trial court did not err in disregarding the defense, as Tiguman’s alibi was self-serving and his bare denial could not overcome the prosecution’s positive identification and corroborating evidence.
• Death Penalty: No. The death penalty could not be imposed because the crimes were committed on December 10, 1993, before Republic Act No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993, and the 1987 Constitution then proscribed the death penalty.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Treachery qualified the killings to murder; dwelling and evident premeditation were aggravating, while price or reward was appreciated only against Tiguman.
• Conspiracy and Acquittal of Co-conspirator: Yes. Conspiracy was established, and the acquittal of Efren Paña did not remove the basis of the conspiracy charge or preclude Paña’s conviction.
• Damages: Partly. Civil indemnity and moral damages were proper; actual damages lacked evidentiary basis, but temperate damages of P15,000.00 each and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 per victim were proper.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution discharged its burden under Rule 133, Section 2, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Tiguman was positively identified by Maria Elena Juanite as the person who shot Jose Juanite, Sr.; Pomoy, Jr. testified to the plan, solicitation, and payment; Questo, Jr. saw Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and another person carrying firearms before the shooting; Balesteros saw Tiguman coming from the direction of the Juanite house after gunshots; and Madelo testified that Tiguman was in Alegria on the day of the killing and tasked him to pick up Pomoy, Jr. and a companion. Against this evidence, Tiguman’s denial and alibi were weak and unreliable.

• Admission of Rebuttal Testimony: Rule 119, Section 3 allows the parties to present rebutting evidence, and the right to present evidence is reserved to the State no less than to the accused. The rules permit trial courts considerable discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence, and no abuse was shown because the defendant was not taken by surprise and was not prevented from introducing evidence in sur-rebuttal. Even assuming the testimonies of Maria Elena Juanite and Pomoy, Jr. were inadmissible, Tiguman’s culpability was established by other prosecution witnesses.

• Defense Evidence: Tiguman’s alibi that he was in Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City, a neighboring city of Surigao del Norte, did not prove physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene. His alibi was self-serving, and his bare denial was a negative declaration that could not prevail over the affirmative testimony of prosecution witnesses, which was corroborated by further evidence.

• Death Penalty: Murder committed in 1993 was penalized with reclusion temporal maximum to death. Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, when only an aggravating circumstance is present, the maximum period shall be imposed, and the courts may not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law in its maximum period. However, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of the death penalty, and Republic Act No. 7659 restoring the death penalty took effect only on December 31, 1993. Because the crimes were committed on December 10, 1993, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was proven because the attack was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without giving the victims an opportunity to defend themselves or repel the aggression. Dwelling was aggravating because the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, who had not given provocation; provocation in dwelling must be given by the offended party, sufficient, and immediate to the commission of the crime, and no such provocation concurred. Evident premeditation was shown by the hiring of Tiguman, the providing of the victims’ pictures, and the meeting to carry out the killing. Price or reward was appreciated only against Tiguman because he committed the felonious act for money, and the same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants, so the act of one was the act of all.

• Conspiracy and Acquittal of Co-conspirator: Although conspiracy is a joint act, there is nothing irregular if a supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others are convicted. Conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed, and the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable. As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. The acquittal of Efren Paña for insufficiency of evidence did not remove the basis of the conspiracy charge against Paña.

• Damages: The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to each of the heirs of the two victims, as well as the additional P50,000.00 as moral damages each, were proper. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the offended party or heirs in case of death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime and the accused-appellants’ culpability. The actual damages of P150,000.00 awarded by the trial court lacked evidentiary basis because no receipt or document was presented; nonetheless, P15,000.00 as temperate damages sufficed in lieu of unproven burial expenses. In addition, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages should have been granted considering the presence of aggravating circumstances.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt — In criminal cases, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, which does not require absolute certainty but only moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The prosecution’s positive identification, co-accused testimony, and circumstantial evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Rebuttal Evidence — The rules permit the parties to present rebutting evidence, and trial courts have considerable discretion in admitting it. No abuse of discretion occurs where the defendant is not taken by surprise and is not prevented from introducing sur-rebuttal evidence.

• Alibi and Denial — Alibi and denial are inherently weak and unreliable defenses, especially when the accused is positively identified by witnesses with no motive to falsely accuse him. Tiguman’s alibi that he was in a neighboring city did not prove physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.

• Conspiracy and Acquittal of a Co-conspirator — Conspiracy is a joint act, but the acquittal of a supposed co-conspirator does not necessarily acquit the others if the acquittal does not remove the basis of the conspiracy charge. One defendant may be convicted as long as the conspiracy is established.

• Principal by Inducement — A person who solicits, instructs, and pays another to commit a crime may be convicted as a principal by inducement. Paña’s solicitation of Tiguman, payment of money, and instruction to kill the victims established her liability as principal by inducement.

• Aggravating Circumstances — Only one aggravating circumstance is needed to qualify a killing to murder, while the rest constitute generic aggravating circumstances. Treachery qualified the killings to murder; dwelling and evident premeditation were aggravating; price or reward was appreciated only against Tiguman.

• Non-retroactivity of the Death Penalty — The 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of the death penalty at the time of the killings, and Republic Act No. 7659 restoring the death penalty took effect only on December 31, 1993. Crimes committed before that date cannot be punished by death.

• Damages in Criminal Cases — Civil indemnity is automatically granted in case of death without need of further evidence beyond the commission of the crime and the accused’s culpability. Actual damages require evidentiary proof; temperate damages may be awarded when pecuniary loss is suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty; exemplary damages may be awarded when aggravating circumstances are present.

• “The fact that the husband of appellant Paña, one of the alleged conspirators or inducers in the killing, was acquitted of the charges does not put to doubt appellant's culpability. Though conspiracy is a joint act, there is nothing irregular if the supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others convicted.” — This passage states the rule that the acquittal of an alleged co-conspirator does not necessarily preclude the conviction of another conspirator where the basis of the conspiracy charge remains.

• “Considering however, the proscription in the 1987 Constitution on the imposition of death penalty as well as the non-retroactive application of the restored death penalty, the trial court erred in imposing on appellants Tiguman and Paña the death penalty. The crimes in this case were committed prior to the restoration of the Death Penalty Law on December 31, 1993.” — This is the ratio decidendi for the modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• “Only one aggravating circumstance is enough to qualify the killing to murder, the rest constitute generic aggravating circumstances.” — This passage states the rule on qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances applied to the finding of murder qualified by treachery.

• “The rules of evidence permit the use of considerable discretion by the trial courts in the admission of rebuttal evidence. It cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this respect, where the defendant is not taken by surprise and is not prevented from introducing evidence in sur-rebuttal.” — This passage defines the standard for reviewing the admission of rebuttal evidence and supports the rejection of appellants’ second assigned error.

• People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) — Cited to support the rule that the right to present evidence is reserved to the State no less than to the accused, in connection with the admission of rebuttal evidence.
• United States vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856 (1918) — Cited for the rule that trial courts have considerable discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence and that no abuse is shown where the defendant is not surprised and may present sur-rebuttal evidence.
• People vs. Cortes, 226 SCRA 91 (1993) — Cited for the weakness of denial and alibi as defenses.
• People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 (1995); People vs. Lozano, 296 SCRA 403 (1998) — Cited for the rule that alibi is worthless against positive identification.
• People vs. Ranido, 351 Phil. 610 (1998) — Cited for the rule that alibi is self-serving and a bare denial cannot prevail over affirmative testimony.
• People vs. Merza, 238 SCRA 283 (1994); People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995); People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471 (1996) — Cited for giving full probative value to prosecution witnesses absent proof of ill motive.
• People vs. Riglos, G.R. No. 134763, September 4, 2000 — Cited for the rule that dwelling is aggravating when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation.
• People vs. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451 (1998); People vs. Feliciano, 326 Phil. 719 (1996) — Cited in the discussion of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000 — Cited for the requisites of provocation in dwelling and for exemplary damages.
• People vs. Ordoño, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000 — Cited in the discussion of price or reward and conspiracy.
• People vs. Arlalejo, G.R. No. 127841, June 16, 2000, citing US vs. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918) — Cited for the penalty for murder committed in 1993.
• People vs. Mindanao, G.R. No. 123095, July 6, 2000 — Cited in the penalty discussion under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Medina, 300 SCRA 98 (1998), citing People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Cited for the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law, Republic Act No. 7659, on December 31, 1993, and its non-retroactive application.
• People vs. Pedroso, G.R. No. 125128, July 19, 2000 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity is automatically granted in case of death.
• People vs. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264 (1999) — Cited for the requirement of evidentiary basis for actual damages.
• People vs. de la Tongga, G.R. No. 133246, July 31, 2000, citing Article 2224 of the Civil Code — Cited for the award of temperate damages when pecuniary loss is suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
• People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000; People vs. Tañeza, G.R. No. 121668, June 20, 2000 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the trial court convicted appellants under this provision, and the Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction qualified by treachery.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when only an aggravating circumstance is present, the maximum period shall be imposed, and that courts may not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law in its maximum period; applied in the penalty discussion, but the death penalty was not imposed due to constitutional proscription and non-retroactivity.
• 1987 Constitution — Proscribed the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed on December 10, 1993.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Restored the death penalty effective December 31, 1993; because the crimes were committed before its effectivity, the death penalty could not be applied retroactively.
• Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court — Defines proof beyond reasonable doubt as requiring moral certainty, not absolute certainty; applied to uphold the finding of guilt.
• Rule 119, Section 3, Rules of Court — Sets the order of trial and permits the presentation of rebuttal evidence; applied to reject appellants’ objection to Pomoy, Jr.’s rebuttal testimony.
• Article 2224, Civil Code — Allows temperate damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty; applied to award P15,000.00 each in lieu of unproven burial expenses.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92 — Cited by the trial court in ordering the cancellation of Melecia Paña’s bail bond and her confinement pending resolution of her automatic appeal.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, Melo, and Kapunan, JJ., were on leave.