Pamil vs. Teleron

Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it prohibits ecclesiastics from being elected or appointed to municipal office, remains operative where a constitutional challenge against it fails to muster the eight votes required to render it inoperative, the presumption of statutory validity prevailing in such circumstances.

Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, enacted in 1917, provides that "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain an express guarantee that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights," creating potential tension with the statutory ban on ecclesiastics holding local elective office. The 1935 Constitution also provides that existing laws remain operative unless inconsistent with the Constitution, a provision carried forward in the 1973 Charter.

In 1971, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, a Catholic priest, ran for the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol, and was elected and duly proclaimed to that office. Petitioner Fortunato R. Pamil, himself an aspirant for the same mayoralty, thereafter filed a quo warranto petition seeking Gonzaga's disqualification. The petition was predicated on Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."

The case was brought before the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch III, presided by respondent Judge Victorino C. Teleron. The trial court sustained Father Gonzaga's right to the office, ruling that the statutory ineligibility provision had been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Pamil then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, contending that no such implied repeal had occurred and that Section 2175 remained in full force and effect.

Upon deliberation, the Supreme Court found itself divided on the question. Seven Justices—Fernando, Teehankee, Muñoz-Palma, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero—were of the view that the challenged provision was no longer operative, either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or had been repealed. Five Justices—Chief Justice Castro, and Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino—held that the prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Because seven votes were insufficient to render the challenged provision inoperative, the ponente concluded that the presumption of validity required the provision's application, and the petition was granted.

• No Implied Repeal: Petitioner contended that Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code was not impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971 and that the provision remained in full force and effect, thereby disqualifying Father Gonzaga from the office of municipal mayor.

• Constitutionality of Section 2175: Whether Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it prohibits ecclesiastics from being elected to municipal office, remains operative or has been rendered inoperative by the Constitution's prohibition on religious tests for the exercise of civil or political rights.
• Implied Repeal by the Election Code: Whether Section 2175 was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971, as the lower court ruled.

• Constitutionality of Section 2175: The provision remains operative. Seven Justices found it inconsistent with the constitutional prohibition on religious tests, but this number fell short of the eight votes required to invalidate a statute; the presumption of validity thus required the provision's enforcement.
• Implied Repeal by the Election Code: No. The lower court's ruling of implied repeal was reversed, the challenged provision being accorded full force and application.

• Constitutionality of Section 2175: The ponente argued that Section 2175, in barring ecclesiastics from elective municipal office, imposes a religious test inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." Under the principle of constitutional supremacy, laws inconsistent with the Constitution become inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity without need of positive judicial nullification. This principle was applied in People vs. Linsangan, where Section 2718 of the Administrative Code authorizing imprisonment for non-payment of cedula tax was declared inoperative as inconsistent with the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt; in De los Santos vs. Mallare, where the President's power to remove appointive city officials at pleasure was held inoperative; and in Martinez vs. Morfe, where Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code was found to have unduly extended the legislative privilege of freedom from arrest beyond constitutional bounds. The American decision Torcaso vs. Watkins, which struck down Maryland's religious test for public office, was cited as persuasive authority, the analogy being that disqualification based on religious status is as objectionable as disqualification based on lack of religious belief. The argument that the provision had long been acquiesced in was rejected, citing McGirr vs. Hamilton for the principle that prior failure to assert constitutional rights does not preclude a later challenge. However, this constitutional view obtained only seven votes—insufficient to invalidate a statute. The presumption of validity thus prevailed, and the provision was accorded full force and application.

• Implied Repeal by the Election Code: The lower court's ruling that the Election Code of 1971 impliedly repealed Section 2175 was not sustained. The five Justices who found no constitutional infirmity likewise found no basis for implied repeal, and the ponente, unable to muster eight votes for the constitutional attack, applied the presumption of validity, which necessarily rejected the lower court's implied-repeal rationale.

• Presumption of Validity of Statutes — A statute is presumed valid and remains operative unless declared inoperative by the requisite number of votes. In this case, seven Justices believed Section 2175 was unconstitutional, but eight votes were required to invalidate it; the shortfall meant the presumption of validity controlled, and the statute was applied.

• Constitutional Supremacy — Laws inconsistent with the Constitution become inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity, without need of positive judicial nullification. As stated in De los Santos vs. Mallare, an inconsistent statutory provision is "non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate." This doctrine was invoked to argue that Section 2175's ban on ecclesiastics could not survive the constitutional prohibition on religious tests, though the argument ultimately failed for lack of votes.

• Religious Test Prohibition — The constitutional guarantee that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights" prohibits disqualification from public office based on religious status or belief. A statutory ban on ecclesiastics holding municipal office was argued to impose such a test, by analogy to Torcaso vs. Watkins, where a requirement of belief in God for public office was struck down.

• "The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective." — This passage explains the unusual procedural outcome: seven Justices found the provision unconstitutional, but that number was insufficient to invalidate a statute, so the presumption of validity prevailed.

• "To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." — Quoted from De los Santos vs. Mallare, this articulates the doctrine of constitutional supremacy: a statute inconsistent with the Constitution is automatically inoperative, requiring no separate judicial declaration of nullity.

• "The fact that certain individuals have, by ignorance or neglect, failed to claim their fundamental rights, furnishes no reason why another individual, alert to his rights and their proper enforcement, should be prevented from asserting and sustaining those rights." — Quoted from McGirr vs. Hamilton, this rejects the argument that long-standing silent acquiescence in a statute precludes a later constitutional challenge.

• People vs. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935) — Followed. Held that Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code, authorizing imprisonment for non-payment of cedula tax, became inoperative upon the 1935 Constitution's effectivity because it was inconsistent with the prohibition on imprisonment for debt. Applied as the foundational precedent for the doctrine of constitutional supremacy.

• De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) — Followed. Held that the President's power under the Administrative Code to remove appointive city officials at pleasure was inoperative as inconsistent with the Constitution. Cited for the principle that inconsistent statutes are "outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself."

• Martinez vs. Morfe, L-34022, March 24, 1972, 44 SCRA 22 — Followed. Held that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, unduly extending the legislative privilege of freedom from arrest, was inoperative as contrary to the Constitution. Applied as a further illustration of constitutional supremacy rendering inconsistent statutes inoperative.

• Torcaso vs. Watkins, 367 US 488 (1961) — Cited as persuasive authority. The United States Supreme Court struck down Maryland's constitutional requirement of belief in God for public office as violative of the First Amendment. The analogy was drawn that disqualifying ecclesiastics from office based on their religious profession is as objectionable as requiring a religious belief.

• McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563 (1915) — Cited for the principle that long-standing silent acquiescence in a statute does not preclude a later constitutional challenge, and that it is "never too late to re-establish constitutional rights."

• Vilar vs. Paraiso, 96 Phil. 659 (1955) — Distinguished. The validity of the ecclesiastics ban was assumed without being squarely raised; the Court was not bound by a question passed sub silentio, citing United States vs. More.

• United States vs. More, 3 Cranch 159 (1805) — Cited for the principle that questions passed sub silentio do not bind the Court, supporting the conclusion that prior failure to challenge Section 2175 did not foreclose the present challenge.

• Section 2175, Revised Administrative Code (1917) — Prohibits ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from public funds, and public works contractors from being elected or appointed to municipal office. This was the provision at issue; the Court held it remains operative.

• Article III, Section 1, paragraph 7, 1935 Constitution — "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." The ponente found this provision inconsistent with Section 2175's ban on ecclesiastics, but the view did not obtain the eight votes required to invalidate the statute.

• Article XVI, Section 2, 1935 Constitution — Provides that existing laws remain operative unless inconsistent with the Constitution. This was the constitutional basis for the doctrine that inconsistent statutes become inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity. A similar provision appears in Article XVII, Section 7 of the 1973 Constitution.

• Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution — Reiterates the religious-test prohibition in language similar to the 1935 Charter, providing that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concurred with the ponencia, joining the ponente's conclusion that the presumption of validity required the provision's application notwithstanding the constitutional objections. Chief Justice Castro and Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino concurred in the result on the ground that the prohibition against ecclesiastics was not constitutionally infirm.

• Teehankee, J. — Dissented from the disposition, believing the challenged provision was no longer operative. Justice Teehankee stressed the doctrine of implied repeal in his separate opinion, while also agreeing that the ban on ecclesiastics was not in conformity with the Constitution, though he considered the constitutional question not squarely raised. His separate opinion, along with those of the other dissenting Justices, is listed in the case header but its text is not provided in the source.

• Muñoz-Palma, J. — Dissented from the disposition, joining the view that the challenged provision was no longer operative. The text of her separate opinion is not provided in the source.