Palmera vs. Civil Service Commission

A void contract of service cannot be used to establish abandonment of a permanent civil service position or to defeat security of tenure, and laches does not bar reinstatement where the employee's delay was induced by repeated assurances of reappointment.

Rodolfo R. Palmera entered government service in 1953 and held various positions in the Ministry of Public Works. On October 1, 1982, upon the merger of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways, he was appointed Assistant Regional Director of the National Capital Region. Under P.D. 807, the Assistant Regional Director is included in the Career Executive Service, which is characterized by merit-based entrance, opportunity for advancement, and security of tenure. The respondents are the Civil Service Commission and the Secretary of Public Works and Highways.

Rodolfo R. Palmera began working in the government in 1953 and held various positions in the Ministry of Public Works. On October 1, 1982, upon the merger of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways, he was appointed Assistant Regional Director of the National Capital Region. On April 24, 1986, then DPWH Minister Rogaciano M. Mercado directed Palmera to turn over his office to Pacifico Mendoza, who had been assigned thereat as OIC, and to report to the MPWH Central Office for his new assignment.

On June 26, 1987, then DPWH Secretary Vicente R. Jayme charged Palmera, along with several others, with grave misconduct and dishonesty in Administrative Case Nos. 87-28 and 87-29. All the respondents were placed under a 90-day preventive suspension, which was lifted on November 16, 1987. On December 1, 1987, then DPWH Secretary J. Nery Ferrer issued another Memorandum charging Palmera and other respondents with grave misconduct and dishonesty in Administrative Case No. 87-44; Palmera was again placed under preventive suspension. These administrative cases were based on the recommendation of the DPWH Fact-Finding Committee, which had investigated anomalies in flood control and related projects in Metro Manila. Its findings were embodied in separate complaints and informations filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and the Sandiganbayan for malversation, estafa, falsification, and violations of R.A. No. 3019 and P.D. 1759.

On May 19, 1988, Palmera's second preventive suspension was lifted, but he was no longer ordered reinstated. Palmera alleged that while he was still under preventive suspension, he learned that Pacifico Mendoza had been appointed to his position. He said he was repeatedly assured that he would be appointed to another position, but no such appointment was ever extended to him. Instead, the DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services recommended that Palmera be hired on a contractual basis from January 1 to December 31, 1987, to provide a legal basis for the payment of his salaries; after December 31, 1987, management would decide whether to renew the contract. Palmera signed the contract, but it was never renewed. He alleged that he returned to work immediately after the lifting of his first preventive suspension, and the public respondents did not categorically deny this. It is also not disputed that he continued reporting for work in the Office of the Secretary even after learning that somebody else had been appointed to replace him.

On November 21, 1991, Palmera filed with the Civil Service Commission a letter-appeal for reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights, and prayed for the nullification of Mendoza's appointment as Assistant Regional Director. The DPWH commented that Palmera's acceptance of a contractual appointment as Technical Assistant to the Secretary on January 2, 1987 indicated his relinquishment of his former position as Assistant Regional Director, and that after the expiration of the contract no other appointment was issued to him. The Commission thereafter dismissed the appeal on laches and denied reconsideration, prompting Palmera to file the present petition.

• Relinquishment of Position: Petitioner argued that the Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that his acceptance of a contractual appointment indicated relinquishment of his position as Assistant Regional Director and foreclosed his right to contest his non-reinstatement.
• Laches: Petitioner argued that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding him guilty of laches.
• Security of Tenure: Petitioner argued that the Commission arbitrarily disregarded his constitutional right to security of tenure.
• Assurances of Reappointment: Petitioner alleged that he was repeatedly assured he would be appointed to another position, but no such appointment was ever extended to him.

• Relinquishment of Position: Respondent countered that by accepting the contract and assuming the temporary position of Technical Assistant to the Secretary, petitioner effectively relinquished his position as Assistant Regional Director and abided by the terms of the contract, including the limitation of its duration.
• Abandonment of Security of Tenure: Respondent argued that when petitioner accepted his temporary appointment, he abandoned his right to security of tenure, citing Romualdez vs. Civil Service Commission, where a temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
• Laches: Respondent contended that petitioner was guilty of laches because he sought to implement the order dated November 16, 1987 only on November 18, 1991, or more than four years later, and thus forfeited any remedy to which he may have been entitled under the law.

• Validity and Effect of the Contract of Service: Whether the contract of service was void and could be used as a basis for abandonment or as notice of dismissal.
• Relinquishment of Position: Whether petitioner's acceptance of a contractual appointment as Technical Assistant to the Secretary constituted relinquishment of his permanent position as Assistant Regional Director and foreclosed his right to contest non-reinstatement.
• Laches: Whether petitioner was guilty of laches for filing his claim for reinstatement only on November 21, 1991, more than four years after the November 16, 1987 lifting of his preventive suspension.
• Security of Tenure: Whether the Civil Service Commission arbitrarily disregarded petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure.
• Reinstatement and Back Wages: Whether petitioner is entitled to immediate reinstatement and back wages under Section 24(d) of P.D. 807, considering the pending administrative and criminal charges against him.

• Validity and Effect of the Contract of Service: Void. The contract was contrary to law and public policy, produced no legal effect from the beginning, and could not be validated by time or ratification.
• Relinquishment of Position: No. Acceptance of the void contract did not amount to abandonment; abandonment requires a total and clear intention to relinquish, which was absent.
• Laches: No. Laches is not measured by lapse of time alone; petitioner's delay was induced by repeated assurances of reappointment, and he had no formal notice of dismissal.
• Security of Tenure: Yes. The Commission disregarded petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure; his dismissal without cause and due process was illegal.
• Reinstatement and Back Wages: Yes as to reinstatement under Section 24(d) of P.D. 807; back wages may not be paid until petitioner is exonerated of the pending administrative and criminal charges.

• Validity and Effect of the Contract of Service: The Commission itself held that the contract of service entered into by Palmera and DPWH officials was null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and cannot be validated either by time or ratification. Hence, the subject contract cannot be used as basis for the claim that Palmera abandoned his post as Assistant Regional Director. It also cannot be considered a notice of dismissal because it was null and void and produced no legal effect.

• Relinquishment of Position: The public respondent contended that by accepting the contract and assuming the temporary position of Technical Assistant to the Secretary, Palmera effectively relinquished his position as Assistant Regional Director and abided by the terms of the contract, including its limited duration, citing Romualdez vs. Civil Service Commission. The Court distinguished Romualdez: there, Romualdez applied for the temporary appointment in exchange for his permanent position and acted on his own volition with full knowledge of the consequences. Here, Palmera had no intention to abandon his permanent position and security of tenure. He had been in government service for about 34 years; it cannot be reasonably supposed that by signing the contract he was knowingly relinquishing his permanent post and all concomitant rights, including accrued leave benefits. He was already getting on in years and could not afford an uncertain future without regular income. The DPWH Legal Officer's memorandum explained that the contractual appointment was recommended to provide a legal basis for payment of salaries for services rendered; after December 31, 1987, management would decide whether to renew. It can be inferred that Palmera did not seek the appointment as Technical Assistant, was not informed of the real objective of the contract, and was made to understand that it was merely for formality to give legal basis for his compensation for 1987. The public respondents did not categorically deny that he returned to work immediately after the lifting of his first preventive suspension, conduct inconsistent with an intent to surrender his permanent office. In Santiago vs. Agustin, the Court held that abandonment of office must be total and under circumstances clearly indicating absolute relinquishment; temporary absence is not sufficient; there must be an intention, actual or imputed, to abandon. No such intention was shown.

• Laches: The public respondents further contended that Palmera was guilty of laches because he sought to implement the order dated November 16, 1987 only on November 18, 1991, more than four years later, and thus forfeited his remedy. The reasonableness of the period for filing a claim for reinstatement is determined on a case-by-case basis; there is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches or staleness of demand. In this case, Palmera's inaction was due to his reliance on assurances that he would be appointed to another position. It is not disputed that he continued reporting for work in the Office of the Secretary even after learning that somebody else had been appointed to replace him; he could not have done so unless assured of reappointment. Such assurances were made in recognition of his right to reinstatement upon the lifting of his preventive suspension. The Court applied Cristobal vs. Melchor: laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice; it will not be taken against a plaintiff where the defendant promised from time to time to grant the relief sought, and recognition of the right asserted may excuse delay; courts will not be strictly bound by the statute of limitations or laches when manifest wrong and injustice would result. In Cristobal, the petitioner took nine years before filing suit for reinstatement because of repeated assurances. Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription; prescription deals with the fact of delay, laches with the effect of unreasonable delay. To constitute laches, (1) the complainant must have knowledge of the conduct of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. The first requirement is lacking: there was no formal communication to Palmera that he had already been dismissed from the service. The contract cannot be considered a notice of dismissal because it was null and void and produced no legal effect.

• Security of Tenure: It is not disputed that Palmera has the constitutional right to security of tenure. P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. The career service is characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. Together with the merit and fitness rule, it is a basic feature of the civil service system. Because the contract was void, there was no valid abandonment, and the Commission's laches ruling had no basis, the dismissal was illegal and violated petitioner's security of tenure.

• Reinstatement and Back Wages: Section 24(d) of P.D. 807 provides that any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. It follows that Palmera should be immediately reinstated to his former position or appointed to another position of equivalent rank and compensation. However, in view of his pending cases before the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, back salaries may not be paid to him at this time and until he is absolved of all the administrative and criminal charges against him.

• Security of Tenure in the Civil Service — No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. Together with the merit and fitness rule, it is a basic feature of the civil service system. The Court applied it because Palmera's permanent position as Assistant Regional Director was in the Career Executive Service under P.D. 807, and his dismissal without valid cause was illegal.

• Abandonment of Office — A public office may become vacant by abandonment only when the relinquishment is total and under circumstances clearly indicating an absolute relinquishment; temporary absence is insufficient, and there must be an intention, actual or imputed, to abandon the office. The Court found no such intention because Palmera returned to work, accepted the contract only as a formality for salary payment, and did not knowingly surrender his permanent post.

• Void Contract — A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and cannot be validated either by time or ratification. The Court held that the contract of service was null and void for being contrary to law and public policy, so it could not be used to establish abandonment or as a notice of dismissal.

• Laches — Laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice. It is not concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription; prescription deals with the fact of delay, while laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay. To constitute laches, (1) the complainant must have knowledge of the conduct of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. The Court did not apply laches because Palmera's delay was induced by repeated assurances of reappointment and he had no formal notice of dismissal.

• Reinstatement under Section 24(d), P.D. 807 — Any person permanently appointed to a position in the career service who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. The Court ordered Palmera's immediate reinstatement or appointment to an equivalent position, but deferred back wages until exoneration from the pending administrative and criminal charges.

• Career Executive Service — P.D. 807 includes the position of Assistant Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. The career service is characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. The Court used this to affirm Palmera's security of tenure.

• "A public office may become vacant by abandonment. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not sufficient. There must be an intention, actual or imputed to abandon the office." — The Court quoted Santiago vs. Agustin to define the strict requisites of abandonment, which it applied to reject the claim that Palmera had abandoned his permanent position.

• "A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or by ratification." — This states the ratio for holding that the contract of service could not serve as the basis for abandonment or as notice of dismissal.

• "The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice. Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff by reason of the latter's failure to come to court within the statutory period provided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not be taken against him where the defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant the relief sought for." — Quoted from Cristobal vs. Melchor, this passage supplied the controlling equitable rule that excused Palmera's delay due to repeated assurances of reappointment.

• "It follows that the petitioner should be immediately reinstated to his former position or appointed to another position of equivalent rank and compensation. However, in view of his pending cases before the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, back salaries may not be paid to him at this time and until he is absolved of all the administrative and criminal charges against him." — This encapsulates the Court's disposition on reinstatement and the conditional award of back wages.

• Romualdez vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168 — Distinguished. The Court held that Romualdez was not on all fours because Romualdez applied for a temporary appointment in exchange for his permanent position and acted voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences, whereas Palmera had no intention to abandon his permanent position and signed the contract only as a formality for salary payment.

• Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 14 — Followed. The Court relied on this old but still valid case for the rule that abandonment of office must be total and under circumstances clearly indicating absolute relinquishment, and that temporary absence is not sufficient.

• Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 184-185 — Followed. The Court applied its ruling that laches will not be taken against a plaintiff where the defendant promised from time to time to grant the relief sought, and that recognition of the right asserted may excuse delay; in Cristobal, the petitioner took nine years before filing suit because of repeated assurances of reappointment.

• Section 24(d), P.D. 807 — "Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified." The Court applied this provision to order Palmera's immediate reinstatement to his former position or appointment to another position of equivalent rank and compensation, with back wages deferred until exoneration.

• P.D. 807 (Career Executive Service) — The Court noted that P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. It used this to establish that Palmera's position was covered by the career service and protected by security of tenure.

• Constitutional right to security of tenure — The Court stated that it is not disputed that petitioner has the constitutional right to security of tenure, and defined it to mean that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. The dismissal was held illegal for violating this right.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on official leave.