Palma, Sr. v. Fortich

Acts of Lasciviousness not linked to the performance of official duties do not constitute Misconduct in Office under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185; for crimes involving moral turpitude not connected with official functions, conviction by final judgment is required before administrative action and suspension. The replacement of an incumbent mayor by an Officer-in-Charge under the Freedom Constitution renders the issues of removal and suspension moot and academic.

Teodulo M. Palma, Sr. was the duly elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon. Respondent Carlos O. Fortich was the Governor of Bukidnon, and respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan was the provincial board. The legal backdrop is Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, which the text identifies as the provision governing the filing of an administrative complaint and the suspension of an elective local official.

Teodulo M. Palma, Sr. was the duly elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon. On March 30, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vivencio P. Estrada of Bukidnon, at the instance of Nelia Arandel, a clerk-typist, and Susan Palamine, a clerical aide, both of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon Criminal Cases Nos. 2795, 2796, and 2797 against Palma. The cases were for Acts of Lasciviousness.

By virtue of those three separate cases, the offended parties sent a sworn joint letter complaint to respondent Provincial Governor Carlos O. Fortich requesting an immediate administrative investigation for the purpose of suspending Palma from office pending final determination of the criminal cases. Attached to the letter were three copies of the Information for Acts of Lasciviousness and the statements of the offended parties. Treating the letter as a formal letter complaint, the Governor formally informed Palma of the administrative charge against him for Misconduct in Office. The record of the administrative case was then forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bukidnon, which set the case for hearing on April 13, 1981. After the hearing, where the complainants testified and were cross-examined by Palma's counsel, the complainants petitioned for Palma's preventive suspension. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan granted the petition in Resolution No. 82-87. Palma accepted his preventive suspension from office as shown in his Office Order dated February 15, 1982.

Palma nonetheless filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit the respondents from continuing with the hearing and investigation of Administrative Case No. 2 and to nullify Resolution No. 82-87. On September 1, 1983, Palma filed a Manifestation and Prayer informing the SC that the three criminal cases against him had been dismissed by the RTC of Bukidnon, Branch X, in an Order dated February 24, 1983. The RTC dismissed the cases for insufficiency of evidence, finding that the attendant circumstances logically pointed to the existence of consent on the part of the offended parties.

Before the petition could be decided, the Provisional Constitution, also known as the Freedom Constitution, was promulgated in Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986. Article III, Section 2 thereof provided that all elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. Records of the Ministry of Local Government showed that Palma, who was elected under the 1973 Constitution, had been replaced by OIC Fabian Gardones as Mayor.

• Misconduct in Office: Petitioner argued that "Acts of Lasciviousness," however numerous, do not fall within the category of "malfeasance and misfeasance" or "conduct in the office" contemplated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, and therefore cannot be the basis for filing a separate administrative case against an elective official and for the latter's preventive suspension.
• Effect of Dismissal of Criminal Cases: Petitioner maintained that because the three criminal cases were dismissed by the RTC, the administrative case and the resulting preventive suspension were bereft of legal basis, and prayed for judgment in accordance with his petition.

• Constitutional Accountability: Respondents maintained that the lascivious acts of petitioner constitute misconduct under Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution on Accountability of Public Officers.

• Misconduct in Office: Whether the filing and pendency of three separate Informations for Acts of Lasciviousness against an elective local official constitute "Misconduct in Office" within the meaning of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, warranting an administrative complaint and/or suspension from office.
• Moot and Academic: Whether the replacement of petitioner as Mayor by an Officer-in-Charge under the Freedom Constitution rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office moot and academic.

• Misconduct in Office: No. Acts of Lasciviousness, not linked to the performance of official duties, do not constitute Misconduct in Office under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185; for crimes involving moral turpitude not connected with official functions, conviction by final judgment is required before administrative action. No final judgment existed, and the criminal cases were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
• Moot and Academic: Yes. The replacement of petitioner as Mayor by OIC Fabian Gardones under the Freedom Constitution rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office moot and academic.

• Misconduct in Office: The SC noted the general rule that dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily follow dismissal of a criminal case, because the former requires only preponderance of evidence while the latter requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, in administrative actions against municipal officers, Festijo vs. Crisologo classified the grounds for suspension into two categories: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned, such as neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other forms of maladministration of office; and (2) those not so connected with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action. The SC defined misconduct as that which affects the performance of duties as an officer and not only the character of the individual as a private person, stressing the need to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. It relied on Mindano vs. Silvosa, where charges of rape and concubinage involved moral turpitude but the provincial governor and board could not act unless conviction by final judgment preceded the filing of charges and trial by the provincial board. The SC held that the same ruling applies to acts of lasciviousness, which fall under the same classification as crimes against chastity. In this case, not only was final judgment lacking, but the criminal cases were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, with the trial court finding that the circumstances logically pointed to consent on the part of the offended parties. There was no showing that the acts were linked with the performance of official duties such as neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration of office. The administrative case therefore had no basis, and the restraining order should be made permanent.
• Moot and Academic: The SC applied Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, under which an incumbent Mayor elected under the 1973 Constitution may be replaced by an Officer-in-Charge, a species of successor considered within the ambit of the provision. The records of the Ministry of Local Government showed that petitioner, elected under the 1973 Constitution, had been replaced by OIC Fabian Gardones as Mayor. The SC thus held that the replacement rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office moot and academic.

• Misconduct in Office — Misconduct is defined as that which affects the performance of the officer's duties and not only the officer's character as a private individual; it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. The SC applied this by holding that acts of lasciviousness, not linked to official functions, do not amount to misconduct in office under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185.
• Suspension of Municipal Officers for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude Not Connected with Official Duties — Under Festijo vs. Crisologo, grounds for suspension are classified into:
  • Those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned, such as neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other forms of maladministration of office; and
  • Those not so connected with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action. The SC applied this to acts of lasciviousness as a crime against chastity.
• Moot and Academic — Under Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, an incumbent Mayor elected under the 1973 Constitution may be replaced by an Officer-in-Charge, a species of successor within the provision's ambit. The SC applied this by holding that petitioner's replacement by OIC Fabian Gardones rendered the issues of removal and suspension moot and academic.

• "such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer." — Defines misconduct for purposes of administrative suspension and explains why private acts not linked to official duty are outside its scope.
• "Under the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action." — States the controlling rule for crimes involving moral turpitude that are not connected with official functions.
• "Indeed, there is merit in petitioner's contention that the same ruling applies to acts of lasciviousness which falls under the same classification as crimes against chastity." — Applies the final-conviction requirement to acts of lasciviousness as a crime against chastity.
• "Nonetheless, the replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-Charge Fabian Gardones has rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office, moot and academic." — States the ground for dismissing the petition as moot.

• Festijo vs. Crisologo, et al., 17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966] — Relied on and applied for the two-category classification of grounds for suspension and the final-conviction requirement for crimes involving moral turpitude not linked to official duties.
• Lacson vs. Roque, et al., 92 Phil. 456 — Relied on for the definition of misconduct as affecting performance of official duties, not merely private character.
• Mindano vs. Silvosa, et al., 97 Phil. 144-145 [1955] — Relied on as analogous precedent; its final-conviction requirement for rape and concubinage was applied to acts of lasciviousness as a crime against chastity.
• Topacio, Jr. vs. Pimentel; Velasco vs. Pimentel; Governors of the Phil. vs. Pimentel; The Municipal Mayors League of the Phil. et al. vs. Pimentel; and Solis vs. Pimentel et al., G.R. Nos. 73770, 73811, 73823, 73940, and 73970, Resolution, Court En Banc dated April 10, 1986 — Relied on for the rule that an Officer-in-Charge is a successor under the Freedom Constitution, supporting the mootness ruling.

• Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185 — The SC considered whether Acts of Lasciviousness constitute Misconduct in Office within the meaning of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, which the text identifies as the provision governing the filing of an administrative complaint and/or suspension of an elective local official. Applied: because the acts were not linked to official duties and no final conviction existed, the administrative case and suspension lacked basis.
• Article XIII, Section 1, 1973 Constitution — Respondents invoked this provision on Accountability of Public Officers to argue that lascivious acts constitute misconduct. The SC did not adopt that position; it applied the requirement of final conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude not linked to official duties.
• Article III, Section 2, Provisional Constitution (Freedom Constitution), Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 — Provided that elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided or upon designation or appointment and qualification of successors within one year from February 25, 1986. Applied: petitioner's replacement by OIC Fabian Gardones rendered the issues of removal and suspension moot and academic.