Palajos vs. Abad

In forcible entry cases, prior physical possession may be established not only by material occupation but also by juridical acts of ownership — such as donation, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and Torrens registration — when the issue of possession is intertwined with ownership and ownership must be provisionally determined to resolve possession.

The parties dispute possession of Lot No. 5, Block 73, Pound Street, Phase 8, North Fairview, Quezon City, part of three adjacent and contiguous parcels (Lots 5, 7, and 9) with an aggregate area of 1,200 square meters. Manolo Abad and his siblings Ma. Jasmin E. Abad and Jose Roman E. Abad are the registered owners of the lots, covered by TCT Nos. N-213030, N-213028, and N-213029, having acquired them from their parents in 1999. Palajos claims a right to enter Lot No. 5 by virtue of a May 4, 1988 deed of absolute sale executed by B.C. Regalado & Co. in his favor, though he later asserted a contradictory claim of acquisition from the intestate estate of Don Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governs the ejectment action.

Manolo Abad and his siblings, Ma. Jasmin E. Abad and Jose Roman E. Abad, are the registered owners of three adjacent and contiguous parcels of land — Lot Nos. 5, 7, and 9 of Block 73, located at Pound Street, Phase 8, North Fairview, Quezon City — covered by TCT Nos. N-213030, N-213028, and N-213029, with an aggregate area of 1,200 square meters. They acquired the lots from their parents in 1999. Sometime in September or October 2001, they took actual possession of the subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it.

On the third week of January 2006, Manolo and his siblings discovered that Palajos and several other individuals, by means of force upon things, strategy, and stealth and without their knowledge and consent, had destroyed portions of the perimeter fence, entered the subject property, and constructed houses thereon, depriving them of possession. Upon discovery, demands were made for the defendants to vacate, but they failed and refused. A complaint was filed before the barangay authorities, but the defendants still did not comply. On February 25, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry against Palajos and the other defendants with the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, asserting compensatory damages of at least ₱30,000.00 per month equivalent to the reasonable value and use of the subject property.

Palajos, for his part, claimed that he entered Lot No. 5 by virtue of a May 4, 1988 deed of absolute sale executed by B.C. Regalado & Co. in his favor. To substantiate his claim of prior physical possession, he presented evidence of real property tax payments on February 17, 2005 and January 21, 2006, proofs of billing for a Bayantel telephone installed at his residence in 2004, and a COMELEC registration application of his son dated October 24, 2003. However, in his Position Paper, Palajos contradicted his own Answer by claiming that the subject premises were part of the intestate estate of the late Don Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez, and that the administrator of the estate assigned the property to him on February 26, 1991, with a deed of absolute sale executed in his favor on November 7, 2006 — after the complaint had already been filed.

The MeTC found that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the subject property since they constructed the concrete perimeter fence in September to October 2001, and ruled in their favor. The RTC reversed, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove prior actual physical possession. The CA, in turn, reversed the RTC and reinstated the MeTC decision, finding that Manolo sufficiently proved prior physical possession. Palajos then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Prior Possession: Petitioner contended that the CA failed to consider factual circumstances indubitably showing that he was ahead of the respondent in the possession of Lot 5, Block 73, including his 1988 deed of absolute sale, tax receipts, telephone bills, and COMELEC registration documents.
• Absence of Clandestine Entry: Petitioner argued that the CA grievously erred in finding that he made a clandestine entry into the premises despite the total absence of evidence to substantiate the same.
• Elements of Forcible Entry: Petitioner maintained that two elements of forcible entry were absent: first, that Manolo had no prior physical possession of the property; and second, that the action was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether respondent Manolo proved his prior physical possession of the subject property, which includes Lot No. 5, Block 73, to entitle him to recover in an ejectment suit for forcible entry.
• Clandestine Entry: Whether petitioner's entry into the premises constituted stealth, thereby triggering the one-year prescriptive period reckoned from discovery of the entry.
• Prescriptive Period: Whether the action was filed within one year from the time the respondent learned of his deprivation of physical possession of the property.

• Prior Physical Possession: Yes. Manolo established prior physical possession through juridical acts of ownership — acquisition from parents in 1999 and Torrens registration — and through actual occupation by constructing a concrete perimeter fence in September or October 2001, all of which predated Palajos's evidence of possession.
• Clandestine Entry: Yes. Entry into the premises without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner falls under stealth, defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into the residence of another without permission.
• Prescriptive Period: Yes, the action was timely filed. The clandestine entry was discovered on the third week of January 2006, and the complaint was filed on February 23, 2006, well within the one-year prescriptive period reckoned from discovery.

• Prior Physical Possession: The Court found it necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject property to resolve the issue of possession, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which allows ownership to be provisionally determined when the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Both the MeTC and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his siblings established registered ownership through acquisition from their parents in 1999 and Torrens registration. Although they did not immediately put the property to active use, possession can be acquired not only by material occupation but also by juridical acts — donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and inscription of possessory information titles — because possession in the eyes of the law does not require physical presence on every square meter but only that the owner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Manolo's possession since 1999, through juridical acts, and his actual occupation by fencing the property in September or October 2001, predated all of Palajos's evidence. Palajos's tax receipts (2005 and 2006), telephone bills (2004), and COMELEC registration (2003) all postdated Manolo's possession. Moreover, Palajos's claims were conflicting: he anchored his claim on a 1988 deed of sale with B.C. Regalado & Co. in his Answer, but in his Position Paper claimed acquisition from the intestate estate of Don Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez, with a deed executed only on November 7, 2006 — after the complaint was filed. If the 1988 acquisition were true, there would have been no need to purchase the same property for ₱650,000.00 from the estate.
• Clandestine Entry: The Court held that entry into the premises of the subject property without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner clearly falls under stealth. Stealth is defined as "any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within [the] residence of another without permission." The defendants' destruction of portions of the perimeter fence and construction of houses without the plaintiffs' knowledge or consent constituted such clandestine entry.
• Prescriptive Period: Because the entry was accomplished through stealth, the one-year prescriptive period was reckoned from the time the plaintiff-owner learned of the deprivation of physical possession. The clandestine entry was discovered on the third week of January 2006, and the complaint was filed on February 23, 2006, well within the one-year period.

• Juridical Acts as Mode of Acquiring Possession — Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Juridical acts — donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles — are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Manolo's registered ownership since 1999, even without immediate active use, constituted possession predating Palajos's entry.
• Provisional Determination of Ownership in Ejectment — Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the issue of ownership may be provisionally determined in an ejectment case when the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership and possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership. The Court applied this by provisionally determining that Manolo and his siblings were the registered owners, thereby establishing their prior possession.
• Three Elements of Forcible Entry — For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the following must be alleged and proved: (a) the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the defendant encroached; (b) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) the action was filed within one year from the time the plaintiff learned of the deprivation, except that when entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation. All three elements were satisfied.
• Stealth in Forcible Entry — Stealth is defined as "any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within [the] residence of another without permission." Entry without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner constitutes stealth, and the prescriptive period is reckoned from discovery of such entry.

• "Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like." — This passage, quoted from Mangaser vs. Ugay, articulates the doctrine that possession in the eyes of the law does not require physical presence on every square meter of ground but only that the possessor was able to subject the property to the action of his will — the ratio decidendi for holding that registered ownership constitutes prior possession.
• "If we are to disregard such juridical acts and unreasonably constrict the concept of prior possession to 'physical occupation' in its rigid literal sense, then it will open floodgates of absurdity wherein land intruders will be favored under the law than Torrens title holders." — This passage, quoted from Madayag vs. Madayag, defines the policy rationale for recognizing juridical acts as sufficient to establish prior possession in forcible entry, preventing intruders from being favored over Torrens title holders in summary ejectment proceedings.
• "Entry in the premises of the subject property without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner, clearly falls under stealth, which is defined as 'any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within [the] residence of another without permission.' — This passage defines stealth in the context of forcible entry and establishes that the defendants' entry without the registered owner's knowledge constituted stealth, triggering the prescriptive period from discovery.

• Mangaser vs. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372 (2014) — Controlling precedent on the doctrine that possession can be acquired by juridical acts, not merely by material occupation. Followed and applied to hold that Manolo's registered ownership and Torrens registration constituted prior possession.
• Madayag vs. Madayag, G.R. No. 217576, January 20, 2020 — Followed for the proposition that constricting prior possession to rigid physical occupation would favor land intruders over Torrens title holders, and that a Certificate of Lot Award, subsequent sale, and Torrens registration sufficiently prove prior possession by juridical act. Also cited for the definition of stealth.
• Esperal vs. Trompeta-Esperal, G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 — Cited for the rule that ownership may be provisionally determined in ejectment cases when possession is intertwined with ownership.
• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp., G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019 — Cited for the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer and the three elements of forcible entry.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines who may institute ejectment proceedings and when, providing the one-year prescriptive period from unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Applied to establish the framework for the forcible entry action.
• Section 16, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession when the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Applied to provisionally determine Manolo's ownership for purposes of resolving prior possession.

Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concurred. Perlas-Bernabe, J., was on official business.