Palad vs. Solis

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not bar the media from making a fair, true, and accurate report of a disbarment complaint when there is a legitimate public interest; no indirect contempt lies absent proof of malice, unauthorized publication, or comment on the merits.

Atty. Raymund P. Palad served as legal counsel of Katrina Halili in the highly publicized controversy involving Hayden Kho, Jr., which concerned video voyeurism on the internet and prompted a Senate inquiry and the enactment of Republic Act No. 9995, the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009. Respondents Lolit Solis, Salve V. Asis, Al G. Pedroche, and Ricardo F. Lo are entertainment journalists or editors associated with Filipino Star Ngayon and The Philippine Star. The dispute implicated the confidentiality rule for proceedings against attorneys under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the media’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

Atty. Raymund P. Palad was the legal counsel of Katrina Halili in the highly publicized case against Hayden Kho, Jr. involving a sex video scandal. Respondents Lolit Solis and Ricardo F. Lo were entertainment columnists, while Salve V. Asis was the editor of the Showbiz section of Filipino Star Ngayon and Al G. Pedroche was its Editor-in-Chief. On December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution in CBD Case No. 09-2498 recommending the penalty of suspension of Palad. Palad received a copy on March 8, 2013, and filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

Around 6:30 in the morning on April 23, 2013, Palad received a text message from fellow lawyer friends informing him that an article in Filipino Star Ngayon stated that he was already suspended from the practice of law for one year. The article was written by Solis in her column “Take it, Take it” and was also published on the tabloid’s website. It carried the headline “ABOGADO NI KATRINA HALILI SUSPENDIDO NG ISANG TAON!” and reported that Palad had been suspended for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility because of statements against the Belo Medical Clinic and for not verifying the case, while also stating that the Startalk staff would try to get his side and that, if true, he shared the fate of Hayden Kho, whose medical license had been revoked.

On the same date, Lo broached the same topic in his column Funfare in The Philippine Star, asking whether it was true that Palad, Halili’s counsel, had been suspended from the practice of law because of actions deemed inconsistent with the lawyers’ code of professional responsibility, including irresponsible public statements against the Belo Medical Clinic without verifying his reports and making public statements regarding a pending case, with a motion for reconsideration awaiting resolution.

Palad avowed that respondents violated the confidentiality rule in proceedings against attorneys under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court by disclosing the pending administrative case to the public and were liable for indirect contempt for making comments, opinions, and conclusions as to the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. In their Joint Comment, respondents described their roles: Solis had been an entertainment journalist for forty years; Asis had been the editor of Pilipino Star Ngayon’s Showbiz section for four years and edited articles but had no control or discretion over topics; Pedroche, as Editor-in-Chief, prepared the newspaper overall and determined which news to publish by national significance, but showbiz editors had autonomy; and Lo had been an entertainment journalist for almost forty years and wrote Funfare.

Solis and Lo claimed that sometime in April 2013 they received information from a reliable source that Palad was reportedly suspended for supposed violation of the code of ethics. They argued that the administrative case was a matter of public interest because Palad became a public figure by gaining national recognition and notoriety as the ardent counsel of Halili, whose scandal with Hayden Kho made headlines, and that he became an overnight celebrity lawyer due to extensive media exposure; the issue generated so much publicity, captured the nation’s attention, and even led to a Senate investigation. They thus alleged that their writings were qualified privileged communication protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Palad then filed the present petition to cite respondents for indirect contempt.

• Violation of Rule 139-B: Petitioner argued that respondents violated Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which declares that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, by disclosing the pending administrative case to the public.
• Indirect Contempt: Petitioner maintained that respondents were liable for indirect contempt because they made comments, opinions, and conclusions as to the findings of the IBP Board of Governors regarding the administrative case against him.
• Violation of Fortun: Petitioner argued that respondents violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Atty. Sigfrid Fortun vs. Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists (FFFJ), et al.
• No Legitimate Public Interest: Petitioner alleged that he is an ordinary private practicing lawyer who handled the Hayden Kho-Katrina Halili sex scandal, which he characterized as a private case not imbued with legitimate public interest; he alleged that unlike in Fortun, the media merely reported the filing of the disbarment complaint without comment, in good faith, and without malice.
• Hearsay and Lack of Copies: Petitioner alleged that the articles were pure hearsay since respondents were not supposed to have copies of the Resolution.

• Public Interest and Public Figure: Respondents countered that the administrative case was a matter of public interest because petitioner became a public figure by gaining national recognition and notoriety as the ardent counsel of Katrina Halili, whose scandal with Hayden Kho made headlines; he became an overnight celebrity lawyer due to extensive media exposure, and the issue generated publicity, captured the nation’s attention, and led to a Senate investigation.
• Qualified Privileged Communication: Respondents argued that their writings about petitioner’s suspension were qualified privileged communication protected under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
• Reliance on Sources: Respondents alleged that as entertainment journalists they received information from their respective sources about various incidents, events, and personalities; Solis and Lo claimed that in April 2013 they received information from a reliable source that petitioner was reportedly suspended for supposed violation of the code of ethics, and they took the information as truth and reported it as relayed to them.
• Editorial Roles and Autonomy: Asis contended that as editor of the Showbiz section she edited articles but had no control or discretion over the topics columnists wrote; Pedroche stated that as Editor-in-Chief he determined which news to publish by national significance, but editors of other segments such as showbiz had autonomy to decide which article to use.

• Confidentiality of Disciplinary Proceedings: Whether respondents violated Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which makes proceedings against attorneys private and confidential, by publishing articles on petitioner’s alleged suspension from the practice of law.
• Indirect Contempt: Whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for disclosing the pending administrative case and making comments, opinions, and conclusions as to the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
• Public Interest and Freedom of the Press: Whether the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner was a matter of legitimate public interest, such that the media’s reports were protected as qualified privileged communication under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
• Malice and Reliance on a Lone Source: Whether respondents acted maliciously or with reckless disregard for the truth in relying on a lone source and publishing the articles.

• Confidentiality of Disciplinary Proceedings: No. Although Section 18, Rule 139-B generally makes disciplinary proceedings private and confidential until final resolution, the proceeding became a matter of public concern because it arose from petitioner’s representation of Katrina Halili in the video voyeurism controversy, making him a public figure.
• Indirect Contempt: No. The reports were legitimate news, and there was no evidence respondents published them to influence the Court or deliberately destroy petitioner’s reputation.
• Public Interest and Freedom of the Press: Yes. A legitimate public interest existed, so the media could make a fair, true, and accurate report of the disbarment complaint under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
• Malice and Reliance on a Lone Source: No. Petitioner failed to prove malice or that respondents had copies of the Resolution or made their own comments, opinions, and conclusions; a reporter may rely on a lone source absent a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.

• Confidentiality of Disciplinary Proceedings: Section 18, Rule 139-B provides that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published. The confidentiality has a three-fold purpose: (i) to enable the court and investigator to make the investigation free from extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting publication of such charges pending resolution; and (iii) to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon. The general rule is that disciplinary proceedings are confidential until final resolution and the final decision of the Court. However, Section 18 is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. As long as there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint; absent such interest, the media must preserve confidentiality during pendency. Here, the highly publicized controversy involving petitioner’s client, a public figure, roused public attention because the footage was available to anyone with internet access. The case involved photo or video voyeurism on the internet, a subject of public interest. The public concern focused on the event, the conduct of the personalities, and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not on the mere personalities. Thus, petitioner represented a matter of public interest. The Senate inquiry in 2009, as stressed by then Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal, was conducted not only for Halili but for all women who might be videotaped during sexual intercourse and publicized without consent, and Republic Act No. 9995, the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009, was enacted to stop voyeurism using the internet. A person, even if not a public official or public figure, could validly be the subject of public comment as long as involved in a public issue. Petitioner became a public figure because he represented a public concern. The disciplinary proceeding arose from his representation of his client on video voyeurism; the public interest was not in himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as Halili’s counsel in the scandal, and the proceeding related to his supposed conduct and statements before the media in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy. Because petitioner became a public figure and the event was a matter of public interest, the media had the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Respondents merely reported the alleged penalty and supposed grounds, acting as entertainment writers on information from a source about petitioner, who used to appear before the media representing his actress client. There was no evidence they published to influence the Court or deliberately destroy petitioner’s reputation. Thus, they did not violate the confidentiality rule.
• Indirect Contempt: Contempt of court is a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority; in its restricted sense, it is a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings, while indirect or constructive contempt is committed out of the presence of the court and includes improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. Petitioner filed a contempt charge in the nature of criminal contempt, which is conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially, obstructs the administration of justice, and is punitive. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors or reporters may be actionable, and premature publication constitutes contempt punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Contempt is akin to libel, and what is a privilege in one may be a privilege in the other. United States vs. Cañete ruled that publications privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, so the principle of privileged communications may be invoked in contempt charges. Here, the publication was not malicious or unauthorized because the disciplinary proceeding was a matter of legitimate public interest and the reports were legitimate news. No evidence showed an intent to influence the Court or destroy petitioner’s reputation. Thus, no indirect contempt was committed.
• Public Interest and Freedom of the Press: Public interest is something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected; it does not mean mere curiosity or the interests of particular localities. In Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the Court held that there is no rigid test for public concern; “public concern” and “public interest” elude exact definition and embrace a broad spectrum of subjects the public may want to know, either because they directly affect their lives or simply because they naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. It is for the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the matter is of interest or importance as it relates to or affects the public. In this case, the highly publicized controversy involving petitioner’s client, a public figure, roused public attention; the footage was available on the internet, and the case involved photo or video voyeurism on the internet, a subject of public interest. The public concern focused on the event, the conduct of the personalities, and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not on the mere personalities. Petitioner thus represented a matter of public interest and became a public figure because he represented a public concern. The media had the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Respondents merely reported the alleged penalty and grounds, and there was no evidence of intent to influence the Court or destroy reputation. Accordingly, no violation of the confidentiality rule was shown.
• Malice and Reliance on a Lone Source: Petitioner alleged that respondents made comments, opinions, and conclusions on the IBP Board’s findings and that the articles were pure hearsay because respondents were not supposed to have copies of the Resolution. Respondents alleged that as entertainment journalists they received information from sources, took it as truth, and reported it as relayed. While substantiation of facts is an important reporting standard, a reporter may rely on information from a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story, provided the reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. To be malicious, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or published with knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not; reckless disregard means the author or publisher entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. Aside from his bare allegation, petitioner presented no proof that respondents had their own copies of the Resolution or that they made their own comments, opinions, and conclusions. Petitioner also failed to prove that the publication was malicious, and there was no evidence that respondents entertained awareness of the probable falsity of their information. Thus, the claim of malice failed.

• Confidentiality of disciplinary proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B — Proceedings against attorneys are private and confidential, and only the final order of the Supreme Court is published. The confidentiality serves to keep the investigation free from extraneous influence, protect attorneys’ reputations from baseless charges pending resolution, and deter the press from publishing charges or proceedings based thereon. The general rule of confidentiality, however, is not a restriction on freedom of the press: where there is a legitimate public interest, the media may make a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint; absent such interest, the media must preserve confidentiality during pendency. The Court applied this exception because the disciplinary proceeding arose from petitioner’s representation of Halili in the video voyeurism controversy, a matter of public interest.
• Public interest and public concern — Public interest is not mere curiosity or the interest of a particular locality; it is something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. There is no rigid test; the terms elude exact definition and embrace a broad spectrum of subjects the public may want to know, and courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a matter is of public interest. A person may be the subject of public comment if involved in a public issue even if not a public official or public figure. The Court applied this to find petitioner a public figure and the disciplinary case a matter of public interest.
• Privileged communication in contempt and libel — Contempt is akin to libel because both limit freedom of the press or expression, and what is a privilege in one may be a privilege in the other. Publications privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, and the principle of privileged communications may be invoked in contempt charges. The Court applied this to hold that respondents’ reports were protected as legitimate news.
• Indirect or constructive contempt — Indirect contempt is committed out of the presence of the court and includes improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. Criminal contempt is directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and public justice, and is punitive. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers may be actionable and premature publication may constitute contempt. The Court found no such malicious or unauthorized publication.
• Actual malice and reckless disregard in libel — To be malicious, a libelous statement must be published with knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not; reckless disregard means the author or publisher entertains serious doubt as to the truth or possesses a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. A reporter may rely on a lone source although it reflects only one side, provided the reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. The Court found no proof of malice or awareness of probable falsity.
• Freedom of the press — The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press protects fair, true, and accurate news reports on matters of legitimate public interest, including disbarment complaints involving public figures or public issues. The Court applied this to uphold respondents’ articles.

• “Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.” — This is the text of Section 18, Rule 139-B, stating the general confidentiality rule that governed the controversy.
• “It is settled that Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. As long as there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. However, in the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the confidentiality rule yields to freedom of the press when a legitimate public interest exists.
• “Since petitioner has become a public figure for being involved in a public issue, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disciplinary case against petitioner is a matter of public interest, the media has the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news.” — This passage applies the public-interest exception to the facts and explains why respondents’ reports did not violate confidentiality.
• “Aside from his bare allegation, petitioner presented no proof that respondents have their own copies of the Resolution, or that they made their own comments, opinions and conclusions. Petitioner also failed to prove that the publication of the articles is malicious. Likewise, there was no evidence that respondents entertained awareness of the probable falsity of their information.” — This passage disposes of the claims of unauthorized comment and malice, which were necessary for indirect contempt.

• United States vs. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918) — Ruled that publications privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech; cited to support invoking privileged communications in contempt charges.
• Fortun vs. Quinsayas, et al., 703 Phil. 578 (2013) — Cited for the definition of criminal contempt and for the rule that Section 18, Rule 139-B is not a restriction on freedom of the press where legitimate public interest exists; absent such interest, media must preserve confidentiality during pendency.
• Tan vs. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 532 Phil. 605 (2006) — Cited for the rule that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors or reporters may be actionable.
• Saluda vs. CA, 522 Phil. 556 (2006) — Cited for the rule that premature publication of administrative complaints against lawyers constitutes contempt punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
• Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521 (1987) — Cited for the rule that there is no rigid test for public concern or public interest and that courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a matter is of public interest.
• Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a person may be the subject of public comment if involved in a public issue even if not a public official or public figure; public interest focuses on the event and conduct, not prior anonymity or notoriety.
• Villanueva vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., et al., 605 Phil. 926 (2009) — Cited for the standard that a reporter may rely on a lone source absent a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, and for the definition of malice and reckless disregard.
• Ligon vs. RTC-Branch 56, Makati City, G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 373 — Cited for the definition of contempt of court.
• Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. Q-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, 567 Phil. 189 (2008) — Cited for the distinction between direct and indirect contempt.
• People vs. Castelo, 114 Phil. 892 — Cited in Fortun vs. Quinsayas for the proposition that contempt is akin to libel and privileges may overlap.
• Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264 (1989) — Cited for the meaning of public interest.

• Section 18, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Provides that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, but the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. The Court applied it as the general confidentiality rule, subject to the exception that the media may make a fair, true, and accurate report of a disbarment complaint where there is legitimate public interest.
• Section 3(d), Republic Act No. 9995 (Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009) — Defines “photo or video voyeurism” as taking photo or video coverage of a person or group performing a sexual act or capturing an image of a person’s private area without consent under circumstances with reasonable expectation of privacy, or selling, copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing, or exhibiting such coverage through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones, and similar means without written consent. The Court cited the law to show that the controversy involved a subject of public interest.
• Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press — The Court cited the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press as protecting the media’s right to publish a fair, true, and accurate report of a disbarment complaint involving a public figure or public issue. It also cited the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech through United States vs. Cañete to allow privileged communications in contempt charges.
• Code of Professional Responsibility — The disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements before the media in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy; the Court mentioned it as the subject of the disciplinary case but did not apply a specific provision.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.