Pajarito vs. Señeris

The subsidiary civil liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case in which the employee was convicted and ordered to pay civil indemnity, as part of the execution proceeding, and need not be pursued in a separate civil action.

Lucia S. Pajarito is the mother of Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, a passenger on an Isuzu passenger bus driven by Joselito Aizon and alleged in the Information to be owned and operated by Felipe Aizon. The criminal charge against Joselito was for double homicide through reckless imprudence under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136. The case concerns the statutory subsidiary civil liability of employers under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

On or about May 9, 1975, in Zamboanga City, Joselito Aizon was the driver of an Isuzu passenger bus bearing Plate No. SB-511, alleged in the Information to be owned and operated by Felipe Aizon. The bus was operating on a public road. The Information charged Joselito with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence, or violation of Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136, alleging that through reckless and fast driving and without taking the necessary precautions, he caused the bus to turn turtle, resulting in injuries that caused the deaths of Myrna Pajarito de San Luis and Musa Baring.

Upon arraignment, Joselito entered a plea of guilty. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of Myrna Pajarito de San Luis in the amount of P12,000.00. The judgment became final and executory.

A writ of execution was then issued against Joselito for the P12,000.00 indemnity, but it was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of Myrna, filed with the court a motion for issuance of a Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy on Felipe Aizon, the employer of Joselito as alleged in the Information.

Felipe opposed the motion. He claimed that he was not the employer of Joselito because the vehicle had already been sold to Isaac Aizon, Joselito's father, although the deed of transfer had not been executed because the full price had not yet been paid; he also argued that in case of insolvency, Joselito had to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity was concerned. The court denied the motion on the ground that Felipe, the alleged employer, was not a party in the criminal case, and that a separate civil action had to be filed against him under Article 103. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. The Supreme Court noted that Felipe did not deny he was the registered operator of the bus but only claimed that he had sold it to the father of the accused.

• Enforcement in Same Criminal Case: Petitioner contended that the enforcement of subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be filed under the same criminal case under which the subsidiary liability was granted.
• Day in Court: Petitioner maintained that Felipe Aizon was given his day in court because he was furnished a copy of the motion for issuance of the Subsidiary Writ of Execution and filed an opposition thereto.
• Employer's Participation: Petitioner argued that although Felipe was not made a party in the criminal case, he should have taken active participation in the defense of his employee, Joselito Aizon.

• Separate Civil Action Required: Respondents maintained that to enforce subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, a separate civil action must be filed against the employer because, under the judicial system, before one could be held subsidiarily liable, he should be made a party defendant to the action.
• Not a Party in Criminal Case: Respondents argued that this was not legally feasible because Felipe Aizon was not accused together with Joselito Aizon in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) for Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence.
• Ownership and Insolvency: In his opposition, Felipe Aizon claimed that he was not the employer of Joselito because the vehicle had been sold to Isaac Aizon, the father of Joselito, though the deed of transfer had not been executed because the full price had not been paid; he further argued that in case of insolvency, Joselito had to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity was concerned.

• Enforcement of Subsidiary Civil Liability: Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or only in a separate civil action.
• Day in Court: Whether the employer, though not made a party to the criminal case, is deprived of his day in court when subsidiary liability is enforced in the same proceeding.

• Enforcement of Subsidiary Civil Liability: Yes. The subsidiary civil liability under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case, as part of the execution proceeding; a separate civil action is not required.
• Day in Court: No. The employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case because of the subsidiary liability imposed by law, and he may litigate in that proceeding his ownership or employer status and the employee's insolvency.

• Enforcement of Subsidiary Civil Liability: Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and the institution of the criminal action carries with it the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation. Article 103, in relation to Article 102, makes an employer subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability when (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) the employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. The subsidiary liability arises only after conviction. A judgment of conviction sentencing the employee to pay indemnity is conclusive upon the employer, absent collusion, not only as to the civil liability but also as to its amount; allowing the employer to dispute it would amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment. Enforcement may be treated as part of the execution proceeding, since a case in which execution has been issued is still pending and the court has supervisory control over execution, including the power to determine questions of fact and law. Thus, Felipe's claim that he had sold the bus could be litigated in the same criminal case, and a separate civil action was unnecessary.
• Day in Court: The employer cannot claim deprivation of his day in court because the proceeding is not one for primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code but for subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the driver's criminal negligence, which is properly tried in the criminal action. The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the driver's conviction and proof of insolvency, just as acquittal wipes out both the employee's primary civil liability and the employer's subsidiary liability. Although not strictly a party, the employer is in substance and in effect a party because of the subsidiary liability imposed by law; he should take virtual participation in the employee's defense, and if he fails to do so, he cannot later complain that he was not given his day in court.

• Subsidiary Civil Liability of Employers under Article 103, Revised Penal Code — An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) the employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. The liability arises only after conviction of the employee. The Court applied these requisites to the alleged employer, Felipe Aizon, after Joselito Aizon's conviction and insolvency, and held that the liability could be enforced in the same criminal case.
• Conclusiveness of the Criminal Conviction upon the Employer — A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay indemnity, absent collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action to enforce the latter's subsidiary liability, not only as to the civil liability but also as to its amount. The employer cannot dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case, because to allow him to do so would amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment. The Court relied on this doctrine to reject the need for a separate civil action.
• Execution Proceeding as Part of the Case — The enforcement of subsidiary civil liability may be considered part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. The Court used this principle to permit the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator to be heard and decided in the same criminal case.
• Employer as Party in Substance and in Effect — Although an employer is not strictly a party to the criminal case against his employee, he is in substance and in effect a party because of the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. He must protect his interest by taking virtual participation in the employee's defense; if he fails to do so, he cannot later complain of lack of day in court. The Court applied this to hold that Felipe Aizon was not deprived of due process by being required to litigate his liability in the same proceeding.
• Liberal Construction of Rules — The Rules of Court are to be liberally construed to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. The Court invoked this principle to avoid a separate action that would prolong litigation and require the heirs to incur unnecessary expenses.

• "Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability." — States the requisites for an employer's subsidiary civil liability, which the Court applied to allow enforcement against the alleged employer in the same criminal case.
• "It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee, but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law." — Articulates the rationale for treating the employer as a party in substance and in effect, thereby defeating the claim that he was deprived of his day in court.
• "At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit." — States the ratio decidendi for allowing the subsidiary liability to be enforced in the same criminal case rather than in a separate civil action.
• "Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also with regard to its amount, this Court stated in Rotea, that in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision." — Explains the conclusiveness of the criminal judgment upon the employer and the limited function of the court in enforcing subsidiary liability.

• Ramcar, Incorporated vs. De Leon, L-1329, May 15, 1947, 78 Phil. 449 — Cited for the rule that when no civil action is expressly instituted, it is impliedly jointly instituted with the criminal action, and the civil action may be tried and prosecuted with all ancillary processes provided by law.
• Martinez vs. Barredo, G.R. No. 49308, May 13, 1948, 81 Phil. 1 — Held that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity, absent collusion, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability.
• Miranda vs. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., L-8943, July 31, 1956, 99 Phil. 670 — Held that the employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case, and the conviction is binding on the employer as to civil liability and its amount; the employer cannot later complain of lack of day in court.
• Manalo and Salvador vs. Robles Transportation Company, Inc., L-8171, August 6, 1956, 99 Phil. 729 — Held that the sheriff's return showing that the writs of execution were not satisfied because of the driver's insolvency is prima facie evidence of the employee's insolvency in an action against the employer.
• Rotea vs. Halili, L-12030, September 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 495 — Held that in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no function other than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it.
• Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, G.R. No. 6287, December 1, 1911, 20 Phil. 523, 530 — Cited for the principle that the purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice but to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties.

• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — A person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The Court cited this to explain that the criminal action carried with it the civil action arising from the offense, except when a separate civil action was instituted or reserved.
• Article 102, Revised Penal Code — Cited in relation to Article 103 as part of the statutory basis for subsidiary civil liability. The Court applied the requisites under Article 103, in relation to Article 102, to determine when an employer may be subsidiarily liable.
• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the subsidiary civil liability of an employer when the employer is engaged in any kind of industry, the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties, and the employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. The Court held that this liability may be enforced in the same criminal case.
• Article 1903, Civil Code — Cited to distinguish primary liability of an employer from the subsidiary civil liability under the Revised Penal Code. The Court used the distinction to explain why the employer was not deprived of his day in court in the same criminal proceeding.
• Section 48, Republic Act No. 4136 — The offense under which Joselito Aizon was charged, Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence or violation of Section 48. The conviction under this provision gave rise to the civil indemnity and the employer's subsidiary liability.
• Section 2, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court — Rules are to be liberally construed to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. The Court invoked this to justify resolving the subsidiary liability in the same proceeding.
• Section 1(a), Rule 107, Revised Rules of Court — Quoted in Ramcar, Incorporated vs. De Leon: when no civil action is expressly instituted, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the criminal action. The Court used this to support the joinder of the civil action with the criminal case.

Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concurred. Barredo, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. In that opinion, Barredo, J. clarified that the only issues open at the hearing before the court a quo are: (1) whether Felipe Aizon was the owner of the vehicle driven by Joselito Aizon, or whether he was the employer of Joselito at the time of the commission of the offense on May 9, 1975; and (2) whether Joselito Aizon is insolvent. The criminal judgment is conclusive upon the employer not only as to civil liability but also as to its amount; what is to be decided is not strictly the subsidiary liability, because the judgment is deemed to include that liability, but only those two issues.