Paguirigan y Cueto vs. People

An accused cannot be convicted of estafa based on false pretenses not alleged in the Information, and a variance between allegation and proof that is material and prejudicial is fatal where the conviction rests on a different constitutive act than that charged. The Information alleged misrepresentation as a licensed developer engaged in real estate business, while conviction was anchored on pretended ownership and power to transfer the lot, depriving the accused of fair notice and opportunity to prepare a defense; independently, deceit was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ma. Anacleta Rachelle Paguirigan y Cueto presented herself as general manager and owner of AJ Construction and Development Company, an entity engaged in selling lots with house construction. Elizabeth Delos Triños dealt with Anacleta as a prospective buyer of residential lots in East Fairview, Quezon City, under contracts to sell in which Anacleta acted in relation to titled owners and construction financing. Understanding this representative-selling arrangement is necessary to assess the alleged deceit and the later claim for refund.

In 2008, Anacleta introduced herself to Elizabeth as general manager of AJ Construction and Development Company. The two then executed a contract to sell over a lot on Spud St., East Fairview, Quezon City, which expressly stated that Anacleta was representing the vendor and property owner Alfredo A. Rosanna. Elizabeth tendered PHP 100,000.00 as initial payment to Anacleta, but the transaction did not materialize because Alfredo changed his mind and sold the property to another person.

Thereafter, in 2009, Anacleta and Elizabeth executed another contract to sell covering a different lot on Winston St., East Fairview, Quezon City. Elizabeth paid PHP 780,000.00 to Anacleta, but the sale again did not push through when the bank denied Elizabeth's housing loan application. Later, Elizabeth demanded a refund of the total PHP 880,000.00 from Anacleta. Anacleta agreed to return the funds and gave checks to Elizabeth, but the checks bounced.

According to the prosecution, Anacleta defrauded Elizabeth by falsely manifesting that she was a licensed developer engaged in real estate business and owner/general manager of AJ Const. & Dev't Co., thereby inducing Elizabeth to buy the lots, and thereafter misappropriating the payments to her own use. Anacleta pleaded not guilty. For her part, she claimed to be the owner of AJ Construction and Development, asserted that Elizabeth knew she was merely representing property owners, explained that the first sale failed because the owner sold to another buyer for a higher price and the second failed for lack of loan approval, and maintained that Elizabeth sought refund only upon deciding to migrate abroad. Anacleta added that she issued checks with instruction to deposit only after notice of sufficiency of funds, yet Elizabeth deposited them without clearance.

The RTC found pecuniary damage of PHP 100,000.00 in the first transaction, crediting Elizabeth's testimony that she parted with money believing Anacleta owned the Spud St. property, while finding no false claim of ownership in the second transaction. The CA sustained liability on the view that Anacleta misrepresented her power and intent to effect transfer and to build, citing floor plans, computations, collection of documents, and continued receipt of payments despite uncertainty of authority.

• Right to be Informed and Variance: Petitioner argued that conviction was based on facts not stated in the Information, since the Information alleged misrepresentation as a legitimate real estate developer while conviction rested on falsely pretending to be owner of the property under the first contract to sell.
• Absence of Deceit: Petitioner maintained that no deceit was committed because the first contract to sell itself disclosed the true owner of the property, showing she acted only as representative.

• Correctness of Conviction: Respondent countered that the CA and RTC correctly convicted petitioner of the crime charged with due regard to her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Gravamen as Power to Transfer: Respondent argued, as sustained by the CA, that the gravamen was misrepresentation of power and intent to effect transfer of the subject property, necessarily including concealment of non-ownership and uncertain authority to sell.

• Right to be Informed and Fatal Variance: Whether conviction for estafa may rest on false pretension of ownership and power to sell where the Information alleged only misrepresentation as a licensed developer engaged in real estate business.
• Variance Doctrine: Whether the offense proved was necessarily included in the offense charged so as to justify conviction under Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, of the Rules of Court.
• Elements of Estafa: Whether the requisites of estafa through false pretenses or fraudulent acts under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, particularly deceit, were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Subsisting Civil Liability: Whether civil liability to reimburse the amounts received survives acquittal based on reasonable doubt.

• Right to be Informed and Fatal Variance: No. Conviction on unalleged constitutive acts violates the constitutional right to be informed, where the variance is material and prejudicial and affects substantial rights.
• Variance Doctrine: No. The variance doctrine is inapplicable because there is no distinct lesser offense necessarily included in that charged, only a different constitutive act for the same estafa charge.
• Elements of Estafa: No. Deceit was not established beyond reasonable doubt, so reliance and prior or simultaneous false pretense could not be established with certainty.
• Subsisting Civil Liability: Yes. Acquittal on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability proved by preponderance of evidence, here supported by judicial admission of PHP 780,000.00.

• Right to be Informed and Fatal Variance: Every element and material fact constitutive of the crime must be set out in the information to avoid surprise and allow preparation of a defense, with doubts construed against the State. The Informations alleged that petitioner induced purchase by pretending to be a licensed developer engaged in real estate business and owner/general manager of AJ Const. & Dev't Co., yet conviction was imposed for falsely pretending ownership and misrepresenting power and intent to transfer the Spud St. lot. To convict while the accused concentrated her defense on the narrated facts was deemed plainly unfair; the gap between theory and evidence could not be cured at the expense of the presumption of innocence and liberty.
• Variance Doctrine: Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, permits conviction only where the offense charged includes or is necessarily included in the offense proved, as illustrated by lesser offenses subsumed in the charge. Here, no other distinct but included offense was discussed; the difference lay in the alleged acts constituting the same estafa charge — misrepresentation of legitimate business engagement versus pretended ownership and authority to sell. Procedural rules were not allowed to triumph over the constitutional rights to be informed and to be presumed innocent.
• Elements of Estafa: Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), requires (1) false pretense of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, imaginary transaction or similar deceit, (2) employed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud, (3) reliance by the offended party in parting with money or property, and (4) damage. Insufficient evidence of such pretense was found: petitioner established she was general manager of a company duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and possession of floor plans and quotations was consistent with real estate development; the first contract expressly named Alfredo as vendor/owner and petitioner as representative, indicating knowledge of non-ownership; continued payments related to a second, distinct purchase found by the RTC to involve no fraud; refund was sought after a decision to migrate; and admission of receipt plus arrangement to return funds evinced good faith negating malice and deceit.
• Subsisting Civil Liability: Dismissal of the criminal action does not carry extinction of civil liability where acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, liability is declared only civil, or civil liability does not arise from the crime of acquittal, with preponderance of evidence as the quantum. Petitioner's deliberate and unequivocal judicial admission of civil liability in the sum of PHP 780,000.00 was considered more than preponderant and not even requiring proof, earning 6% per annum interest from finality until full payment pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

• Right of accused to be informed of nature and cause of accusation — The information must state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in intelligible terms with particularity sufficient to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty; the actual recital of facts determines the real nature of the charge, and conviction for a crime not clearly charged is prohibited however convincing the evidence. Applied to void a conviction that substituted pretended ownership and power to sell for the charged pretense of being a licensed developer engaged in real estate business.
• Fatal variance between allegation and proof — A variance is fatal where material and prejudicial so as to affect substantial rights, particularly where the accused is misled in preparing a defense. Applied because petitioner defended against the alleged business-license misrepresentation but was convicted on unalleged ownership/authority misrepresentation.
• Variance doctrine under Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, Rules of Court — Conviction for an offense different from but necessarily included in the crime charged is allowed when essential elements alleged constitute the offense proved, or vice versa. Held inapplicable where the dispute concerns different constitutive acts for the same estafa charge rather than a subsumed lesser offense such as other deceits, falsification through negligence, acts of lasciviousness, sexual abuse, or illegal possession.
• Estafa through false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Requires use of fictitious name or false pretense of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, imaginary transaction or similar deceit prior to or simultaneous with fraud, reliance by the victim, and damage. Applied to acquit for failure to prove the first element of deceit and consequently reliance and timing.
• Good faith as negating deceit — Good faith implies honesty of intention, honest belief in validity of one's right, ignorance of superior claim, and absence of intent to overreach, thereby negating malice and deceit. Applied in light of disclosure of representative capacity, registration of the company, and admission of receipt with arrangement to refund.
• Civil liability despite criminal acquittal — Acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability where preponderance of evidence supports it, especially upon judicial admission. Applied to direct reimbursement of PHP 780,000.00 with legal interest despite acquittal in Criminal Case No. 16-03867.

• "The integral components of a crime must be sufficiently alleged in the information and established during trial with proof beyond reasonable doubt." — States the dual requirement of allegation and proof extending to material constitutive facts, grounding the strict construction in favor of the accused.
• "No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, the accused cannot be convicted of any crime unless it is clearly charged in the information for which they are tried." — Articulates the limit on conviction by evidence alone and the primacy of notice through the information.
• "The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects their substantial rights." — Provides the test for fatal variance applied to the gap between charged business misrepresentation and proved ownership misrepresentation.
• "Verily, good faith negates malice and deceit." — Capsules the finding that disclosure, company registration, and willingness to refund refuted fraudulent intent.

• Andaya vs. People, 526 Phil. 480 (2006) — Cited for the rule that alleged constitutive acts are substantial matters and that material, prejudicial variance between information and proof is fatal and non-waivable.
• Quimvel vs. People, 808 Phil. 889 (2017) — Cited for strict construction of informations in favor of the accused and the bar against conviction for an uncharged crime.
• Sevilla vs. People, 741 Phil. 198 (2014); Osorio vs. People, 834 Phil. 768 (2018); People vs. Adajar, 853 Phil. 623 (2019); People vs. Ursua, 819 Phil. 467 (2017); People vs. Hong Yen E, 701 Phil. 280 (2013); Guillergan vs. People, 656 Phil. 527 (2011) — Cited as illustrations where the variance doctrine properly allowed conviction for a lesser offense necessarily included in that charged, distinguished from the present case.
• Lopez vs. People, 715 Phil. 839 (2013) — Cited for the four requisites of estafa through false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a).
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Basis for imposing 6% per annum interest from finality until full payment on the civil award.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts through fictitious name or false claim of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transaction; applied as the charge that required proof of deceit, reliance, and damage, which the prosecution failed to establish.
• Rule 110, Sections 6, 8 and 9, Rules of Court — Require the information to state the acts or omissions constituting the offense with particularity sufficient for persons of common understanding to know the charge; applied to measure sufficiency and the accused's right to notice.
• Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, Rules of Court — Govern judgment in case of variance and when an offense includes or is included in another; held inapplicable because no necessarily included distinct offense was proved, only different constitutive acts for the same estafa.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.