PAGCOR vs. Marquez; Verdillo vs. PAGCOR

The designation of the offense in an administrative charge is not controlling; what matters is that the respondent is sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation through a clear statement of the acts complained of, and conspiracy to commit administrative offenses may be established by substantial circumstantial evidence showing a common design to defraud, even without direct proof of an explicit agreement.

Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Verdillo were employed as dealers at the Casino Filipino Heritage operated by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). In the game of Craps, a "stickman" validates throws by ensuring at least one die hits the rubber wall at the table's end; invalid throws must be declared "no dice." On November 26, 2006, while Verdillo served as stickman and Marquez as pay-off dealer at Table No. 30, an Acting Pit Supervisor observed that Verdillo repeatedly declared throws by patron Johnny Cheng as "good dice" despite the dice failing to hit the rubber wall, with Marquez subsequently paying out winnings on these void transactions. An Internal Security Investigation confirmed through CCTV footage eight such fraudulent transactions occurring within a seventeen-minute period, establishing a pattern where Cheng altered his throwing technique only when unsupervised by other casino personnel.

The Employment and the Incident:
Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Verdillo worked as dealers at PAGCOR's Casino Filipino Heritage. On November 26, 2006, at approximately 2:46 a.m., they manned Craps Table No. 30, with Verdillo acting as stickman and Marquez as pay-off dealer. Patron Johnny Cheng began playing at their table. Acting Pit Supervisor Eulalia Yang observed that Verdillo declared several of Cheng's throws as "good dice" and valid despite the dice failing to touch the rubber wall—a mandatory requirement for validity. Marquez, as pay-off dealer, paid Cheng's winning bets on these invalid throws.

The Evidence of Fraud:
A review of CCTV footage confirmed eight specific transactions between 2:58 a.m. and 3:14 a.m. where void throws were validated and paid out, totaling significant winnings for Cheng. The footage revealed a distinct pattern: when other employees or customers monitored the table, Cheng threw the dice forcefully to hit the rubber wall; when only Marquez and Verdillo were present, he threw the dice softly to the side, avoiding the wall. Senior Branch Surveillance Officer Wilbur U. Isabelo reported that Verdillo should have declared these games void but instead called them good, after which Marquez paid the bets.

The Administrative Proceedings:
Both dealers were charged with conspiring with Cheng to defraud PAGCOR. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Marquez admitted awareness of Verdillo's erroneous calls but proceeded to pay Cheng nonetheless. Verdillo denied the accusations in his written explanation. The Branch Management Panel found both liable for fraudulent transactions and recommended dismissal, noting that Marquez failed to overrule Verdillo's bad calls despite his duty and experience as a five-year veteran dealer. The PAGCOR Board adopted this recommendation and dismissed both for dishonesty, grave violation of company rules, conduct prejudicial to the company's interest, and loss of trust and confidence.

The CSC and CA Proceedings:
The CSC affirmed the dismissals but modified the charges to Serious Dishonesty, Violation of Office Rules and Regulations, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The CSC found that both dealers acted in concert with Cheng to manipulate the game. On appeal, the CA reversed Marquez's dismissal, holding that the disparity between the charge (conspiracy) and the findings (dishonesty, etc.) violated due process, and that Marquez's actions constituted negligence rather than dishonesty. The CA, however, denied Verdillo's petition, finding substantial evidence of his guilt and the existence of conspiracy.

PAGCOR (in G.R. No. 191877): - Designation of Offense: The designation of the offense in an administrative charge is not controlling; a respondent may be found guilty of a different offense if it is based on the same facts subject of the original charge. - Due Process Compliance: The notice of charges substantially complied with the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, as Marquez was duly apprised of the specific fraudulent acts and afforded opportunity to be heard. - Substantial Evidence: The CA erred in disregarding the CSC's factual findings, which are controlling on reviewing authorities when supported by substantial evidence; the CCTV footage and admissions established a conspiracy to defraud.

Verdillo (in G.R. No. 192287): - Lack of Substantial Evidence: PAGCOR failed to present substantial evidence to justify dismissal; his sworn statement contained no admission of violating house rules. - Non-Establishment of Conspiracy: The existence of conspiracy was not proven by clear and convincing evidence required for administrative cases involving moral turpitude or dishonesty.

Marquez (in G.R. No. 191877): - Denial of Due Process: The charge was for conspiracy, but he was found guilty of serious dishonesty and other offenses without proper notice, violating Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. - Insufficient Evidence: No substantial evidence supported the finding of dishonesty or conspiracy; his act of calling Verdillo's attention to erroneous calls negated unity of purpose required for conspiracy. - Negligence vs. Dishonesty: His failure to overrule Verdillo constituted negligence, not dishonesty, as he lacked intent to defraud.

PAGCOR (in G.R. No. 192287): - Substantial Evidence: The CSC correctly found substantial evidence of Verdillo's guilt based on the CCTV footage, witness testimony, and the pattern of fraudulent transactions; the findings of administrative bodies are entitled to respect. - Conspiracy by Circumstances: Conspiracy was properly inferred from the coordinated actions between Verdillo, Marquez, and Cheng to validate void throws and authorize payments.

• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: Whether Marquez was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of serious dishonesty, violation of office rules, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when the formal charge alleged only conspiracy to defraud.
• Substantial Evidence: Whether the CSC's factual findings that Marquez and Verdillo committed serious dishonesty and conspired to defraud PAGCOR are supported by substantial evidence.
• Nature of the Offense: Whether the conduct of Marquez and Verdillo constitutes serious dishonesty warranting dismissal, or merely negligence.

• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: Marquez was not denied due process. Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases requires only that the formal charge contain a specification of charges and a brief statement of material facts to inform the respondent of the nature and cause of accusation. Pursuant to Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, the charge need not be drafted with the precision of a criminal information; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. The Memorandum dated November 28, 2006, sufficiently apprised Marquez of the specific fraudulent transactions at Table No. 30, and he was afforded the opportunity to submit his explanation and participate in a formal hearing.

• Substantial Evidence: The CSC's findings are supported by substantial evidence defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Marquez admitted in his sworn statement that he was aware of Verdillo's erroneous calls yet proceeded to pay Cheng on eight occasions within seven minutes—a statistical improbability indicating deliberate collusion rather than inadvertence. Verdillo's declarations of "good dice" on throws that did not hit the rubber wall, corroborated by CCTV footage and the eyewitness testimony of Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, establish his direct participation in the fraudulent scheme.

• Conspiracy and Serious Dishonesty: Conspiracy was established by the circumstances showing a common design to defraud: Verdillo validated void throws, Marquez paid the winnings, and Cheng altered his throwing technique depending on whether observers were present. Dishonesty, defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter relevant to one's office, implies a disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud. The repeated nature of the fraudulent acts—eight times in seventeen minutes—demonstrates a deliberate pattern constituting serious dishonesty, not mere negligence. The factual findings of the CSC, affirmed by the CA regarding Verdillo and now upheld regarding Marquez, are binding upon the reviewing court absent showing of arbitrariness or lack of evidentiary support.

• Designation of Offense in Administrative Proceedings — The specific designation of the offense in an administrative charge is not controlling; what is essential is that the respondent is sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation through a clear statement of the acts or omissions constituting the violation. The charge need not possess the technical precision of a criminal information; substantial compliance with the requirement of notice suffices as long as the respondent understands the charges sufficiently to prepare a defense.

• Substantial Evidence Standard in Administrative Cases — Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Findings of fact by administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are entitled to great respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence in the record.

• Dishonesty as a Grave Administrative Offense — Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; and lack of integrity. As a grave offense under the Civil Service Rules, it is punishable by dismissal with accessory penalties including forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from reemployment, and cancellation of civil service eligibilities.

• Proof of Conspiracy in Administrative Cases — Conspiracy to commit an administrative offense may be inferred from the circumstances showing a unity of purpose and concerted action toward a common illegal objective. It need not be proved by direct evidence of an explicit agreement; the coordinated acts of the parties themselves may demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy to defraud or violate administrative regulations.

• "The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense." — Citing Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission.

• "The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations intelligently."

• "Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness."

• "Hence, it is our view that the conduct of Marquez amounts to serious dishonesty, and not merely negligence, since his dishonest act was committed not just a few times but repeatedly or eight times over a very short period of seven minutes, a statistical improbability."

• Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 747 — Established that the designation of the offense in administrative cases is not controlling; the substance of the charge governs.

• University of San Agustin Employees’ Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, 520 Phil. 400 (2006) — Affirmed the rule that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raise only questions of law, not fact.

• The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79 — Recognized exceptions to the general rule against reviewing factual findings, such as when findings are conflicting or when relevant facts were manifestly overlooked.

• Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 189479, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 532 — Provided the definition of dishonesty as a grave administrative offense.

• Velasquez v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 150732 & 151095, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357 — Defined substantial evidence as relevant evidence acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate to support a conclusion.

• Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Governs the contents of the formal charge in administrative proceedings, requiring a specification of charges, a brief statement of material or relevant facts, and notice of the right to counsel.

• Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification that the conclusions in the decision were reached in consultation before assignment to the writer of the opinion.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.