Padiernos vs. People

An accused charged as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be convicted as such where the crime had already been discovered at the time of the alleged accessory act; however, where the factual allegations in the Information and the evidence proved at trial establish all the elements of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the accused may be convicted of that offense. The controlling charge is determined by the factual allegations in the Information, not the technical name assigned by the prosecutor, and an appeal opens the entire case for review, permitting the appellate court to determine the correct criminal liability and impose the corresponding punishment.

Petitioners Padiernos, Roxas, and Mesina were charged together with several other accused in connection with the illegal possession of lumber found loaded on a ten-wheeler truck (Plate No. TFZ-747) owned by Santiago Castillo. The truck and lumber were seized by DENR officers and police authorities in Dingalan, Aurora on November 15, 2002, for lack of the required transportation permits under P.D. 705 (the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines). The petitioners were specifically charged as accessories for taking and carrying away the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation, so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its forfeiture in favor of the government. The case required the Court to determine the proper characterization of the petitioners' acts in relation to the definitions of "accessory" under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code and "obstruction of justice" under P.D. 1829.

On November 15, 2002, DENR Officer Felimon Balico encountered a ten-wheeler truck bearing the name "JEROME" and Plate No. TFZ-747, parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora, loaded with 818 pieces of lumber totaling 10,253 board feet and valued at ₱133,289.00. Balico asked the truck driver, Frederico Castillo, and the helper, Roger Mostera, for the lumber's supporting documents, but they could not produce any. Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa and SPO4 Romulo Derit, and then to the DENR office. Some DENR officers claimed the transport had the required permit but likewise failed to produce supporting documents. A group of DENR officers—Balico, Tarcila Vivero, and Rodolfo Tumagan—together with police officers Gamboa and Derit, guarded the truck. The DENR group decided to transfer the truck and lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They unloaded the lumber from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway, guarded by DENR officers and police.

On November 16, 2002, accused Eddie Gatdula, Santiago Castillo (who claimed ownership of the truck), and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the location where the truck was being held. Santiago agreed with the DENR officers and police to bring the truck to the police station. He gave the truck key to Mesina, who volunteered to drive. Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumber was. Mesina started the engine, and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos boarded the front cab. The DENR group boarded the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza and PO1 John Fajardo followed on a motorcycle. Because the truck was parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico expected Mesina to maneuver for a turn. Instead, Mesina accelerated toward Nueva Ecija, leaving the police escorts behind. The escorts chased the truck and fired three warning shots. Balico shouted "Saklolo! Saklolo!" from the back, but the truck maintained speed. After the truck exited Dingalan, Mendoza and Fajardo ceased pursuit and reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan. The Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. As the passengers alighted, Padiernos berated the officers, saying they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. The police officers who arrived at Brgy. Bagting found the DENR group, Padiernos, and Roxas, and drove the truck back to the police station compound in Dingalan.

For their part, the petitioners testified that Mesina was at home watching television when Santiago, his former employer, arrived and asked him to drive the truck to Cabanatuan City. Mesina initially refused, knowing the truck had been previously involved in confiscated lumber activities, but relented after Santiago assured him everything was settled. Santiago and Mesina then fetched Roxas, who also initially refused because he had heard of the truck's apprehension, but agreed after Santiago's assurances. Along the way, they encountered Padiernos at a waiting shed, waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City since 12:30 p.m.; he hitched a ride after learning they were bringing Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City. At the site where the truck was parked, Santiago spoke with DENR officer Tumagan for about 25 to 30 minutes, then handed the keys to Mesina. Padiernos sat in the front cab with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina drove toward Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction. The petitioners testified they did not hear people shouting or tapping the truck, did not notice any motorcycle following them because the side mirrors were broken, and were flagged down by the Philippine Army before reaching Cabanatuan City. After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney to Cabanatuan City, while Roxas and Mesina took a jeepney to Dingalan.

The RTC convicted the petitioners as accessories, finding the prosecution witnesses categorical and consistent, and noting the petitioners' own admissions established prior knowledge of the truck's involvement in illegal activities. The RTC disregarded their defense of denial, citing Balico's testimony that Padiernos berated the DENR officers, and its ocular inspection showing that sounds outside the truck could be clearly heard even with a running engine. The CA affirmed the RTC's factual findings but modified the penalty, holding that the truck was an "instrument" within Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, and that since the violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, intent need not be shown. The CA further found that the petitioners' close associations with each other and with Santiago undermined their defense of denial.

• Inapplicability of Article 19, RPC: Petitioners argued that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because the DENR officers and police authorities had already discovered the crime and had control over the truck when the petitioners drove it toward Nueva Ecija. Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who prevent the discovery of the crime.

• Purpose to Prevent Discovery: Respondent maintained that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery of the crime, alleging that without the truck, the accused could easily produce transportation documents to account for the confiscated lumber.
• Discrepancy in Permits: Respondent referred to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan, who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber had a proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces, which did not tally with the actual volume of 10,253 board feet totaling 818 pieces.

• Liability as Accessories: Whether the petitioners can be held liable as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber under P.D. 705, given that the crime had already been discovered at the time they took the truck.
• Proper Offense: Whether the factual allegations in the Information and the evidence proved at trial constitute the offense of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
• Effect of Appeal on Criminal Liability: Whether the Supreme Court, on appeal, may determine the correct criminal liability of the accused and impose the corresponding punishment even if the offense differs from that initially charged.

• Liability as Accessories: No. The petitioners cannot be held liable as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC because the crime of illegal possession of lumber had already been discovered at the time they took the truck, and the legal definition of "accessory" requires that the act be committed to prevent the discovery of the crime.
• Proper Offense: Yes. The factual allegations in the Information and the evidence proved at trial constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, as the petitioners deliberately suppressed the truck as evidence with intent to impair its availability in the criminal investigation.
• Effect of Appeal on Criminal Liability: Yes. An appeal throws the whole case wide open for review, empowering and obligating the appellate court to correct errors in the appealed judgment and to determine the correct criminal liability in accordance with the charges in the Information and the crime proved.

• Liability as Accessories: The controlling charge against the petitioners is determined by the factual allegations in the Information, not the technical name assigned by the prosecutor. The Information alleged that the petitioners took and carried away the truck so it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture as a tool or instrument of the crime. Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC defines accessories as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. The punished acts must have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. Here, the crime of illegal possession of lumber had already been discovered on November 15, 2002, leading to the confiscation of the truck and lumber. The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation. Since the crime had already been discovered, the factual allegations do not coincide with the legal definition of "accessory" under Article 19, paragraph 2. The RTC and CA therefore erred in convicting the petitioners as accessories.

• Proper Offense: The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting accessory liability under Article 19, paragraph 2, instead constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. That provision penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases. The truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705, as it is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession or transportation of the seized lumber. The petitioners deliberately suppressed the truck as evidence—suppress meaning to subdue or end by force—with intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence. Their intent was established through their knowledge of the truck's status and their commission of the act at Santiago's prompting. Mesina admitted knowing the truck's involvement in illegal activities; Roxas initially refused to join because he had heard of the truck's apprehension; and Padiernos berated the DENR officers after being flagged down, demonstrating knowledge of the truck's involvement. The RTC's ocular inspection further proved that the petitioners deliberately drove the truck despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning shots and the DENR officers' shouts. The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and CA—including the petitioners' close association, their flimsy defense of denial, and the totality of their acts showing common design—lead to the conclusion that the petitioners conspired to take the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence.

• Effect of Appeal on Criminal Liability: The well-settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review, empowering and obligating the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. When an accused appeals, the whole case is opened for a new trial. The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing accused and imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with the charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial. In People vs. Manalili et al., the Court held that where the Information contains a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting the offense, the accused is fairly apprised of the nature of the charge and granted a fair opportunity to defend himself, even if the offense ultimately found differs from the technical name assigned.

• Doctrine that allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense — The nature of the offense is determined by the factual allegations in the Information, not by the technical name the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble. The accused's attention should be directed to the facts alleged, not the technical name of the crime. The real question is whether the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of the Information in the manner set forth. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the controlling charge was the factual allegation that the petitioners took and carried away the truck to prevent its use as evidence, not the technical designation of "accessory."

• Doctrine that an appeal opens the whole case for review — An appeal throws the whole case wide open for review, empowering and obligating the appellate court to correct errors in the appealed judgment even if not raised. When an accused appeals, the whole case is opened for a new trial. The Court applied this doctrine to determine the correct criminal liability of the petitioners and convict them of obstruction of justice under P.D. 1829, even though they had been charged and convicted below as accessories under Article 19 of the RPC.

• Definition of "accessory" under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC — Accessories are those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. The punished acts must be committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. The Court held this definition inapplicable because the crime had already been discovered when the petitioners took the truck.

• Obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 — The crime is committed by any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases. The penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from ₱1,000.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both. The Court found that the petitioners' deliberate suppression of the truck as evidence, with intent to impair its availability, satisfied all elements of this offense.

• "The real question is not 'did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and specific name,' but 'did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.'" — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine that the factual allegations in the Information, not the technical name assigned by the prosecutor, determine the nature of the offense and the accused's criminal liability.

• "Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for acquitting the petitioners as accessories: because the crime had already been discovered, the legal requisites of Article 19, paragraph 2 were not satisfied.

• "The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829." — This passage marks the pivotal shift in the Court's analysis, identifying the correct offense established by the same factual allegations that failed to constitute accessory liability.

• People vs. Manalili et al., 355 Phil. 652 (1998) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that where the Information contains specific allegations of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting an offense, the accused is fairly apprised of the nature of the charge and may be convicted of that offense even if the technical name differs. The Court applied this principle to convict the petitioners of obstruction of justice under P.D. 1829 despite their having been charged as accessories.

• Matrido vs. People, 610 Phil. 203 (2009) — Cited for the doctrine that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name assigned by the prosecutor. The Court relied on this to hold that the factual allegations, not the label "accessories," controlled the determination of criminal liability.

• People vs. Versola, 170 Phil. 622 (1977) — Cited for the requirement under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC that the punished acts of an accessory must have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime.

• People vs. Llaguno et al., G.R. No. 91262, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 124 — Cited for the doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and obligates the appellate court to correct errors in the appealed judgment.

• Article 19, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines accessories as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the crime had already been discovered when the petitioners took the truck.

• Section 1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 (Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) — Penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases. The Court found the petitioners guilty under this provision, holding that their deliberate suppression of the truck as evidence satisfied all elements of the offense. The penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from ₱1,000.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both.

• Presidential Decree No. 705 (Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines) — The underlying statute violated by the principals in the illegal possession of lumber. The petitioners were originally charged as accessories to this offense. The Court found the truck to be material evidence indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of this decree.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred.