Pacoy vs. Cajigal

A change in the designation of the offense in the caption and preamble of an Information from Homicide to Murder, without altering the recital of facts, constitutes a mere formal amendment that may be made after plea provided it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

SSGT. Jose Pacoy was charged with Homicide for shooting his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita, with an aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank." Upon arraignment, Pacoy pleaded not guilty. The presiding judge motu proprio ordered the prosecutor to amend the Information to Murder, believing "disregard of rank" qualified the offense. The prosecutor crossed out "Homicide" and wrote "Murder" in the caption and preamble, leaving the accusatory portion untouched. Pacoy refused to plead to the amended Information, prompting the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.

• The Charge: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed against Pacoy, alleging he shot his commanding officer with an aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank."
• Arraignment and Amendment: On September 12, 2002, Pacoy pleaded not guilty to Homicide. The same day, the trial judge ordered the amendment of the Information to Murder, deeming "disregard of rank" a qualifying circumstance. The amendment consisted solely of crossing out "Homicide" and writing "Murder" in the caption and preamble; the accusatory portion remained identical.
• Re-arraignment and Objection: On October 8, 2002, Pacoy objected to re-arraignment on double jeopardy grounds and refused to plead. The court entered a plea of not guilty for him.
• Motion to Quash: Pacoy filed a Motion to Quash the Murder Information, arguing double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion.
• Motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatement: Pacoy filed a Motion to Inhibit and a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing "disregard of rank" is merely generic aggravating and that the amendment was substantial. On December 18, 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit but granted the Motion for Reconsideration, realizing "disregard of rank" is generic aggravating, and reinstated the original Homicide Information.

• Substantial Amendment: Petitioner argued that the amendment from Homicide to Murder after plea was substantial and violated Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
• Double Jeopardy (First Instance): Petitioner maintained that the amendment from Homicide to Murder terminated the Homicide case without his express consent, placing him in double jeopardy.
• Double Jeopardy (Second Instance): Petitioner contended that the reinstatement of the Homicide Information after the judge corrected his error placed him in double jeopardy, as the Homicide case had already been terminated.

• Mootness: The Solicitor General countered that the reinstatement of the Homicide Information rendered the petition moot and academic.
• No Termination: The Solicitor General argued that the fourth element of double jeopardy—dismissal or termination without consent—was absent; the amendment did not terminate the previous case.
• Amendment Not Substitution: The Solicitor General maintained that the trial court's order was a mere amendment under Section 14, Rule 110, not a substitution requiring dismissal.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Private respondent argued that no grave abuse of discretion was committed, as the proceedings under the first Information had not yet commenced and the case was not dismissed or terminated.

• Amendment of Information: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder after the accused had pleaded.
• Double Jeopardy (Amendment to Murder): Whether the accused was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder.
• Double Jeopardy (Reinstatement to Homicide): Whether the reinstatement of the Homicide Information after the trial court corrected its error placed the accused in double jeopardy.

• Amendment of Information: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The amendment was purely formal because only the caption and preamble were changed, leaving the recital of facts identical. Formal amendments after plea are permissible if they do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The judge's erroneous belief that "disregard of rank" qualified the offense did not render the amendment substantial.
• Double Jeopardy (Amendment to Murder): Double jeopardy did not attach. The first case was never dismissed or terminated without the accused's consent; it was merely amended. The requisites of double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 were not met.
• Double Jeopardy (Reinstatement to Homicide): Double jeopardy did not attach. The reinstatement of the Homicide Information was a correction of the trial court's prior error, not a termination of the original case. Because the original case was never terminated, the element requiring a dismissal without express consent was absent.

• Amendment vs. Substitution of Information — An amendment involves the same offense or one necessarily included in the original charge, while substitution involves a distinct offense requiring dismissal of the original. Where the second information involves the same offense or one necessarily included, an amendment suffices; otherwise, substitution is required. Homicide is necessarily included in Murder, making the change an amendment.
• Formal vs. Substantial Amendment — A formal amendment does not alter the recital of facts or the determination of jurisdiction, such as changing the designation in the caption and preamble. A substantial amendment alters the facts alleged. Formal amendments after plea are allowed if they do not prejudice the accused's rights.
• Prejudice Test for Amendments — The rights of the accused are prejudiced if a defense under the original information would no longer be available, or if evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the amended information.
• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — (1) A first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense. First jeopardy attaches only after a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, when a valid plea has been entered, and when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without express consent.

• "In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order."
• "The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information."

• Teehankee v. Madayag, G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134 — Followed. Distinguished between amendment and substitution of information, establishing that amendment applies when the second offense is the same or necessarily included in the first.
• People v. Navarro, 159 Phil. 863 (1975) — Followed. Cited to support that changing the designation in the caption and preamble without altering the recital of facts is a formal amendment.
• Poblete v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 150610, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 346 — Followed. Cited for the test of whether an amendment prejudices the rights of the accused.

• Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Governs amendment or substitution of a complaint or information. Applied to determine that the change from Homicide to Murder was a formal amendment, not a substitution, as Homicide is necessarily included in Murder.
• Section 19, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Governs substitution when a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. Cited to distinguish that substitution applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved.
• Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Defines former conviction or acquittal and double jeopardy. Applied to determine that the requisites of double jeopardy were not met, as the original case was never terminated without the accused's consent.
• Article 14, Paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Lists aggravating circumstances, including "disregard of rank." Applied to correct the trial court's error that this circumstance qualifies Homicide to Murder; it is merely generic aggravating.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes