Pacita David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals

A compulsory easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code requires the claimant to prove: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. The claimant's failure to establish any of these requisites defeats the claim, and equity cannot be invoked to grant relief in contravention of statutory law.

Petitioner Pacita David-Chan owned a parcel of land of approximately 635 square meters in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga, covered by TCT No. 57596-R. Her property was delineated on its northern and western sides by various business establishments, adjoining the land of the Pineda family along its southern boundary, and bordered along its east-northeastern boundary by a lot owned by private respondent Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., which lay between her property and the MacArthur Highway. The legal framework governing her claim was Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which prescribe the requisites for a compulsory easement of right of way.

Petitioner Pacita David-Chan owned a parcel of land of approximately 635 square meters in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga, covered by TCT No. 57596-R. Her property was surrounded on its northern and western sides by various business establishments, adjoined the land of the Pineda family along its southern boundary, and was bordered along its east-northeastern boundary by a lot of approximately 161 square meters owned by private respondent Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., which lay between her property and the MacArthur Highway. Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through private respondent's property.

On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to the highway. She alleged that the prospective subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square meters covered by TCT No. 163033-R, formerly owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation and sold to private respondent without her knowledge and consent, allegedly preventing her from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to complete the construction of its concrete fence on the lot, which would deprive her of the only available right of way. The petition prayed that judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot and to pay damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

Private respondent denied the allegations, asserting that petitioner's parents and relatives were never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers, but were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 4865, an ejectment case. The MTC ordered petitioner and her co-defendants to vacate the area, remove all improvements constructed thereon, and pay attorney's fees and costs. Private respondent further argued that the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale, that the land sold was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, that private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the property, and that petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through the lot in question.

The Singian Brothers, impleaded in the trial court, alleged that they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed lot, that petitioner's complaint stated no cause of action because the right of way, being apparent and discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription, that petitioner was not a tenant and therefore not entitled to a right of pre-emption or redemption, and that petitioner had another access to the National Highway which she closed during the pendency of the case when she extended the construction of her fence.

The Court of Appeals found that petitioner built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family, and during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway without passing through private respondent's property. The appellate court also found that petitioner's apprehensions that the Pineda family would fence off their lot were without basis because petitioner had already constructed a fence to separate the two properties, and even if the Pineda family eventually fenced off their land, petitioner could ask for an easement of right of way from them. The appellate court further found that petitioner's complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement had been made after payment of the proper indemnity, and there was no showing that petitioner ever made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity.

• Requisites of Easement: Petitioner argued that she was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, and submitted that the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after establishing four requisites: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest.

• Error in Factual Findings: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that she had an outlet measuring two feet and four inches to the national highway without passing through respondent's property, as per the commissioner's report.

• Equity and Filipino Values: Petitioner, claiming to be an "ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources," pleaded that "those who have less in life should have more in law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao in resolving the case.

• Lack of Entitlement: Private respondent argued that petitioner was not entitled to an easement of right of way, asserting that petitioner's parents and relatives were never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers, but were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by the MTC in an ejectment case.

• No Obligation to Inform: Private respondent argued that the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale, and that the land sold by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

• Alternative Access: Private respondent argued that petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through the lot in question, and that private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the property.

• No Right of Pre-emption: The Singian Brothers argued that petitioner was not a tenant and therefore not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption, and that petitioner had another access to the National Highway which she closed during the pendency of the case when she extended the construction of her fence.

• Entitlement to Easement: Whether petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent's property under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

• Application of Filipino Values: Whether petitioner is entitled to the easement through the recognition and application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao.

• Entitlement to Easement: No. Petitioner failed to establish the requisites for a compulsory easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, specifically that she was without adequate outlet to a public highway, that her isolation was not due to her own acts, and that she tendered proper indemnity.

• Application of Filipino Values: No. Equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure, and since petitioner was not legally entitled to the right of way, equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.

• Entitlement to Easement: The Court found that while petitioner was correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was not "without adequate outlet to a public highway" because it was petitioner herself who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family, and during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway without passing through private respondent's property. If petitioner wanted a bigger opening, she could destroy a portion of the concrete fence she erected and pass through the Pineda property, which had an open space on the southern boundary of her land. The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property, citing Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, which held that an owner cannot by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper indemnity, as her complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement had been made after payment of the proper indemnity, and there was no showing that she ever made a tender of payment. The Court held that the questions of whether petitioner has another adequate outlet, whether she caused her own isolation, and whether she made a tender of proper indemnity are all issues of fact which the Supreme Court has no authority to rule upon, as it is not a trier of facts. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon the Supreme Court, and while there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner did not convince the Court that this case falls under one of them.

• Application of Filipino Values: The Court held that petitioner's appeal based on equity, which has been described as "justice outside legality," cannot prevail. Equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Since the Court of Appeals found that petitioner was not legally entitled to a right of way on private respondent's property, such equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings. The Court emphasized that there are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may be granted an easement of right of way, and these standards must be strictly complied with because an easement is a burden on the property of another. Applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own acts, in which case they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of such choice.

• Requisites for Compulsory Easement of Right of Way — Under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after establishing four requisites: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. In this case, petitioner failed to satisfy the first, second, and third requisites, as she had an alternative access through the Pineda property, she caused her own isolation by fencing her property and closing the 28-inch clearance, and she failed to tender proper indemnity.

• Self-Procured Isolation Bars Claim for Easement — An owner cannot by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third requisite for a compulsory easement — that the claimant has not himself procured the isolation of his property — must be met, and a claimant who brings about the contrary condition vitiates his claim to such an easement. Mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

• Equity Cannot Contravene Statutory Law — Equity, described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Equitable arguments cannot prevail over legal findings where the claimant is not legally entitled to the relief sought.

• Binding Effect of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals — Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon the Supreme Court, which is not a trier of facts. Exceptions exist, including when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion; when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; when the judgment is based on misapprehensions of facts; when the findings of fact are conflicting; when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case; when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence; when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts; and when the findings are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

• "But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot. as respondent has done. by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites; that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement." — This passage, quoted from Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, articulates the principle that a claimant who causes his own isolation cannot demand a compulsory easement, and was the basis for the Court's finding that petitioner failed the third requisite.

• "It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location." — This passage establishes that mere inconvenience in using an existing access does not justify claiming an easement in an alternative location, supporting the Court's rejection of petitioner's claim despite her alleged difficulty with the existing narrow opening.

• "There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of such choice." — This passage states the Court's rationale for strictly requiring compliance with the statutory requisites, emphasizing that an easement is a burden on another's property and that self-imposed isolation defeats the claim.

• Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 52 — Controlling precedent cited by the Court of Appeals and adopted by the Supreme Court, holding that an owner cannot by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate, and that mere inconvenience does not justify a claim for an easement in an alternative location.

• Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178 — Cited for the doctrine that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and has no authority to rule on factual issues.

• Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 — Cited for the same doctrine that factual questions are beyond the Supreme Court's authority to review.

• Quebral vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353 — Cited for the same doctrine regarding the Supreme Court's limited role in reviewing factual findings.

• Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

• Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 — Cited for the same principle.

• Banson vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 42 — Cited for the same principle.

• Floro vs. Llenado, 244 SCRA 713 — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and for the enumeration of exceptions to the binding effect of factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

• Binalay vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 — Cited for the doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon the Supreme Court.

• Florentino Reyes, et al vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110207 — Cited for the enumeration of ten exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive.

• Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615 — Cited for the principle that equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.

• Article 649, Civil Code — Provides that the owner of an immovable surrounded by other immovables and without adequate outlet to a public highway is entitled to demand a right of way through neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity, and that the easement is not compulsory if the isolation is due to the proprietor's own acts. Applied to deny petitioner's claim because she had an alternative outlet and caused her own isolation.

• Article 650, Civil Code — Provides that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. Applied as one of the requisites petitioner failed to establish.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred.