Pacete vs. The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments

A confirmation duly made by the Commission on Appointments is not nullified by the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration that is not voted upon and approved by the required majority. The motion must be acted upon and approved by a majority of the members present to reopen the appointment; absent such approval, the confirmation stands and becomes final upon adjournment of the session.

Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete was appointed by the President as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, during the recess of Congress, pursuant to the President's constitutional power to make ad interim appointments. Such appointments are effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." The Commission on Appointments operates under Revised Rules, including Rule 21, which governs motions for reconsideration of confirmed appointments and requires majority concurrence to reopen an appointment. The then Secretary of the Commission on Appointments was Teodoro K. Molo, the same respondent in the earlier case of Altarejos vs. Molo, which had already resolved the same legal question.

Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, during the recess of Congress. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged the duties of the position. Because the appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. On May 20 of that year, the Commission unanimously confirmed the appointment. Two days later, petitioner received a congratulatory telegram from the then Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was likewise the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments.

More than nine months after the confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge on the ground that his appointment had been by-passed. Petitioner was taken by surprise and sought clarification from the principal respondent, the then Secretary of the Commission on Appointments. He was informed that on May 21, 1965 — one day after his confirmation — one of the members of the Commission, the then Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, had written to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the confirmation in view of derogatory information he had received.

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments notified the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of the Commission that the mere presentation of such a letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question." The Secretary of Justice, through the Judicial Superintendent, then advised petitioner to vacate his position, and the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice withheld petitioner's salaries. The motion for reconsideration filed by Senator Guanzon was never acted upon by the Commission as a body, and the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress had adjourned at midnight of May 21, 1965.

• Ineffectivity of Unacted Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that the letter of Senator Guanzon, even assuming it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect because it was not approved by the Commission as a body. He contended that the confirmation had become final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965.
• Collective Exercise of Constitutional Power: Petitioner maintained that the power to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on the Commission on Appointments as a body and not on its members individually. The Commission exercises this power through the vote of a majority of the members present at a quorum, as provided by Section 10 of its Rules. Once an appointment is approved by that majority, the approval becomes an act of the Commission and cannot be changed, voided, vacated, or set aside except by the same Commission acting through the required majority. A mere motion to reconsider, unless approved by said majority, has no force and effect.

• Recall of Confirmation: Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments prayed for dismissal on the ground that there was a recall of the confirmation upon the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Senator Guanzon, following the prevailing practice that the mere filing automatically vacated the confirmation.
• Political Question Doctrine: Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments alleged as a special defense that there was no infringement of the Constitution, the question being merely one of interpretation or construction of the rules of the Commission involving its internal business, which cannot be made a subject of judicial inquiry.
• Full Faith and Credence: Respondent Secretary of Justice and the Disbursing Officer admitted the facts but sought dismissal on the ground that, upon notification from the Commission on Appointments that petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed, the Secretary of Justice had no alternative but to give full faith and credence to the communication from the agency entrusted by the Constitution with the power to confirm.

• Effect of Unacted Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, without its being acted upon, suffices to set aside a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.
• Judicial Inquirability: Whether the interpretation of the Commission on Appointments' internal rules on motions for reconsideration is beyond judicial inquiry under the political question doctrine.

• Effect of Unacted Motion for Reconsideration: No. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not nullify a confirmation duly made; the motion must be approved by a majority of the members present to reopen the appointment, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments.
• Judicial Inquirability: No. The question is not beyond judicial inquiry; where a construction sought to be placed on the Commission's rules would defeat the right of an individual to a public office under the express language of the Constitution, courts are called upon to adjudicate.

• Effect of Unacted Motion for Reconsideration: The controlling principle was supplied by Altarejos vs. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments. That rule provides that a resolution on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one day after approval, but only if a majority of the members present concur to grant the reconsideration shall the appointment be reopened and submitted anew. The Court in Altarejos rejected the theory that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration had the effect of recalling a confirmation, holding instead that the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion is necessary to reopen the appointment. The Chairman of the Commission on Appointments himself had ruled that in case of adjournment sine die, motions for reconsideration not acted upon are considered not approved and have no effect whatsoever, so the confirmation stands. Although the facts of the present case differ from Altarejos in that there was no motion to lay on the table and no withdrawal of the motion for reconsideration, the decisive principle is the same: a confirmation duly made is not nullified by a motion for reconsideration filed but never voted upon and approved. The constitutional provision on ad interim appointments requires either disapproval by the Commission or non-action until adjournment; petitioner had instead a unanimous vote of confirmation. To hold otherwise would allow the will of a single member to prevail over the will of the Commission, reducing a collective constitutional body to a one-man rule.

• Judicial Inquirability: The insistence that the question is beyond the Court's jurisdiction extends the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. Courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded; even legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond judicial scrutiny. There is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially when a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. While utmost deference should be paid to the interpretation accorded by the Commission itself, judicial inquiry becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. As Justice Brandeis observed regarding the rules of the United States Senate, where the construction affects persons other than members of the body, the question is of necessity a judicial one. The memorandum of the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary of Justice likewise acknowledged that the Commission's actuations are exempt from judicial supervision except on a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power constituting a denial of due process.

• Finality of Confirmation Despite Unacted Motion for Reconsideration — A confirmation duly made by the Commission on Appointments is not nullified by the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration that is not voted upon and approved by the required majority. Rule 21 of the Revised Rules requires that a majority of the members present concur to grant reconsideration before an appointment may be reopened. Absent such approval, and upon adjournment of the session, the confirmation stands and becomes final. This principle reflects both the express language of Rule 21 and the settled interpretation of the Commission on Appointments speaking through its Chairman, and is consistent with the constitutional provision that ad interim appointments are effective until disapproval by the Commission or until the next adjournment of Congress.

• Judicial Review of Internal Rules of Constitutional Bodies — Internal rules of constitutional bodies such as the Commission on Appointments are subject to judicial inquiry when their construction affects the rights of persons other than the body's own members, particularly where a challenged interpretation would defeat an individual's right to a public office under the express language of the Constitution. The political question doctrine does not shield such rules from scrutiny, though courts should accord utmost deference to the body's own interpretation.

• "Respondent's theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion were approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary." — This passage, quoted from Altarejos vs. Molo, articulates the core ratio decidendi: the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not self-executing and cannot substitute for the majority approval required by Rule 21.

• "In case of an adjournment sine die, the motions for reconsideration are considered as not approved and therefore the motion for reconsideration are not valid for of any effect whatsoever." — This is the ruling of the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments himself, cited by the Court as authoritative confirmation that unacted motions for reconsideration have no effect after adjournment, and that the confirmation therefore stands.

• "A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional prescription. Rather it makes a mockery of what is therein ordained." — This passage underscores the constitutional infirmity of allowing a single member's motion to override a collective confirmation, framing the issue as one of structural constitutional principle.

• Altarejos vs. Molo, G.R. No. L-25726, October 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 550 — Controlling precedent. The Court interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments and held that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not set aside a confirmation; majority approval is required. The present case applies the same principle, notwithstanding factual differences (no motion to lay on the table, no withdrawal of the motion for reconsideration).

• Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 — Cited in the Solicitor General's memorandum for the proposition that the Commission on Appointments, like the Electoral Tribunals, is an independent organ when acting within the limits of its authority.

• Morero vs. Bocar, 37 O.G. 445 — Cited in the Solicitor General's memorandum for the principle that the Commission's actuations are exempt from judicial supervision except on a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power constituting a denial of due process.

• United States vs. Smith, 286 US 6, 33 (1932) — Cited for Justice Brandeis's observation that where the construction of a legislative body's rules affects persons other than its own members, the question is of necessity a judicial one.

• Article VII, Section 10, paragraph (3), 1935 Constitution — Provides that the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, military officers of specified ranks, and all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for. The Court relied on this provision to underscore the collective nature of the confirmation power.

• Article VII, Section 10, paragraph (4), 1935 Constitution — Provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The Court applied this provision to show that petitioner's ad interim appointment, having been unanimously confirmed rather than disapproved, remained effective beyond the adjournment of the session.

• Rule 21, Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments — Provides that a resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one day after approval, and that if a majority of the members present concur to grant reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew. Any motion to reconsider may be laid on the table, which constitutes a final disposition. The Court applied this rule to hold that majority concurrence is required for a motion for reconsideration to have effect.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred.