Pacete vs. Carriaga

A judgment by default is prohibited in actions for legal separation. When a defendant fails to answer such a complaint, the court is without discretion to declare a default; instead, it must order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether collusion exists and, if none is found, to intervene for the State to ensure the evidence is not fabricated.

Private respondent Concepcion Alanis Pacete filed a complaint against her husband, petitioner Enrico L. Pacete, and his second wife, petitioner Clarita de la Concepcion, for legal separation, declaration of nullity of the second marriage, accounting, and separation of property. She alleged a prior subsisting marriage to Enrico and his subsequent bigamous marriage to Clarita. After being served summons, the defendants (petitioners) filed several motions for extension to file an answer. The trial court denied the last motion as it was filed after the expiration of a previously granted extension. Upon motion by the plaintiff, the court declared the defendants in default, received the plaintiff's evidence ex parte, and rendered a decision granting all reliefs prayed for.

• Nature of the Action: Private respondent Concepcion Alanis Pacete filed a complaint for legal separation from petitioner Enrico L. Pacete, declaration of nullity of his subsequent marriage to petitioner Clarita de la Concepcion, accounting, and separation of property.
• Allegations: She claimed she married Enrico in 1938, they had a child, and Enrico bigamously married Clarita in 1948, a fact she learned only in 1979. She alleged Enrico acquired vast properties during their marriage and fraudulently placed them in his name, Clarita's name, or in the names of their children and dummies.
• Procedural Default: After being served summons, the defendants filed multiple motions for extension. The trial court denied the third motion, declared the defendants in default upon plaintiff's motion, and proceeded to trial without their participation.
• Trial Court Decision: The court granted legal separation, identified and declared numerous parcels of land, fishponds, and motor vehicles as conjugal properties of the first marriage, ordered the cancellation and issuance of new titles, and declared the second marriage void ab initio.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioners argued that the default order was improperly declared, making the special civil action of certiorari the proper remedy to assail the judgment, as an appeal or petition for relief would be inadequate.
• Violation of Mandatory Procedure: Petitioners contended the lower court gravely abused its discretion by failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 101 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which prohibit default judgments in legal separation cases and require state intervention.

• Improper Remedy: Private respondent countered that the proper remedy of petitioners should have been an appeal from the judgment by default or a petition for relief from judgment, not a special civil action for certiorari.
• Compliance with Procedure: Implicitly, respondent argued the lower court acted within its jurisdiction in declaring default after the defendants failed to file their answer within the extended period granted.

• Procedural Safeguard in Marital Actions: Whether the Court of First Instance gravely abused its discretion in declaring the defendants in default and rendering judgment in an action for legal separation without ordering the intervention of the prosecuting attorney as required by law.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the special civil action of certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a judgment by default in a legal separation case.

• Procedural Safeguard in Marital Actions: The default order and subsequent proceedings were void. Article 101 of the Civil Code (now Article 60 of the Family Code) and Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court explicitly prohibit default in actions for legal separation. The law mandates that upon a defendant's failure to answer, the court must order the prosecuting attorney to investigate for collusion and, if none is found, to intervene to ensure the evidence is not fabricated. This reflects the state's vital interest in the marriage institution. The lower court's failure to observe this mandatory procedure constituted a jurisdictional defect that rendered the judgment null and void.
• Propriety of Certiorari: While ordinarily the proper remedy is appeal or a petition for relief, certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared. Here, the default order was not legally sanctioned due to the violation of the cited procedural safeguard, making certiorari an available remedy to annul the proceedings.

• Prohibition of Default in Actions Affecting Marital Status — In actions for legal separation, annulment of marriage, or declaration of nullity of marriage, a defendant's failure to answer does not authorize the court to declare a default. Instead, the court is mandated to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to investigate whether a collusion between the parties exists. If no collusion is found, the fiscal must intervene for the State to ensure the evidence presented by the plaintiff is not fabricated or suppressed. This doctrine underscores that marriage is a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.

• "The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation... is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves." — This passage from Brown v. Yambao, cited by the Court, articulates the rationale for the mandatory procedural safeguard.

• Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168 (1957) — Cited as controlling authority explaining the public policy behind requiring state intervention in uncontested marital proceedings, emphasizing the state's interest in the marriage institution.
• Lina v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637 — Cited to support the exception that certiorari is available when a default order is improperly declared.
• Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 732 — Cited for the same principle as Lina.
• Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 265 — Cited for the rule that certiorari lies to assail a judgment by default when the default order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Article 101, Civil Code of the Philippines (now Article 60, Family Code) — Provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court must order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether collusion exists and, if none, to intervene for the State to prevent fabricated evidence.
• Section 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court — States that if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate for collusion and to intervene for the State to ensure evidence is not fabricated.

• Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Chairman)
• Justice Jose C. Vitug (Ponente)
• Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino
• Justice Jose A.R. Melo