Pabulario vs. Palarca

An information alleging that a single act of reckless imprudence produced damage to property and multiple physical injuries of varying degrees charges but one quasi-offense; it does not improperly complex offenses under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and the municipal court retains jurisdiction over the case. Corollarily, the denial of a motion to quash on such a ground, even if erroneous, does not render the order null and void, the proper recourse being to proceed to trial and, if necessary, to appeal.

Mateo J. Pabulario was the chauffeur and person in charge of a truck owned by Louis Lee. The charge against him arose under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which treats criminal negligence as a quasi-offense dealt with separately from willful felonies and fixes its penalty by reference to the class of felony that the willful act would have constituted rather than to the penalty prescribed for any particular crime. Article 48 of the same Code governs complex crimes, while Article 266 defines the slight physical injuries named in the information. The case thus called for the delineation of criminal negligence as a quasi-offense against the framework of complex crimes and the jurisdictional consequences of that classification.

On or about July 26, 1961, at the intersection of Sabayle and Luna Streets in Iligan City, Mateo J. Pabulario, then the chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing Plate No. T-9000 and owned by Louis Lee, drove and operated the vehicle. According to the information, he did so in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations, and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing the truck he was driving to bump and hit a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. AC-4528, driven by Florentino Ermac and owned by Carlos Subang.

The collision caused actual damages to the passenger jeep in the total amount of P397.00 and physical injuries to two passengers of the jeep. Maemona Dinal de Panandegan sustained a very slight bluish discoloration on the left arm near the anterior part of the elbow, an injury requiring medical attendance for two to three days, while Macalewan Panandegan sustained a slight abrasion on the right lower extremity, likewise requiring medical attendance for two to three days. The information, filed in the Municipal Court of Iligan City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1509-AF, charged a violation of Article 365 in relation to Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pabulario moved to quash the information on the theory that it charged more than one offense, namely, damage to property through reckless imprudence and multiple slight physical injuries, likewise through reckless imprudence. Judge Pompeyo L. Palarca, as judge of the municipal court of Iligan City, denied the motion to quash as well as Pabulario's subsequent motions for reconsideration.

Pabulario then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, docketed as Case No. 582, anchored on the proposition that the municipal court of Iligan City was without jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 1509-AF and that the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration were null and void. The Court of First Instance sustained the contention and granted the writ, prompting the present appeal by Judge Palarca.

• Multiplicity of Offenses: Petitioner maintained that the information charged more than one offense, namely, damage to property through reckless imprudence and multiple slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and that the two could not be joined in a single information.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Municipal Court of Iligan City was without jurisdiction to hear and decide Criminal Case No. 1509-AF.
• Nullity of the Denial Orders: Petitioner contended that the order of Judge Palarca denying the motion to quash, as well as the orders denying the motions for reconsideration, were null and void.

• Multiplicity of Offenses: Whether the information charged more than one offense by alleging damage to property through reckless imprudence and multiple slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
• Jurisdiction of the Municipal Court: Whether the Municipal Court of Iligan City had jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 1509-AF.
• Validity of the Denial Orders: Whether the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration were null and void.

• Multiplicity of Offenses: No. The information does not purport to complex several offenses; it merely alleges that a single act of reckless negligence produced multiple consequences, which constitutes but one quasi-offense.
• Jurisdiction of the Municipal Court: Yes. Even assuming that the information alleged two separate offenses, both the offense of damage to property through reckless negligence and that of multiple slight physical injuries through reckless negligence are within the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
• Validity of the Denial Orders: No. The order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration, even if hypothetically erroneous, were not null and void.

• Multiplicity of Offenses: The issue was substantially identical to that decided in People vs. Cano, where the Court rejected the theory that slight physical injuries through reckless negligence cannot be complexed with damage to property and multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence because a misdemeanor may not, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, be complexed with grave or less grave felonies. The information does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence with that of damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence; it merely alleges that, through the reckless negligence of the accused, the vehicle he drove hit another vehicle, causing serious physical injuries to some passengers, less serious physical injuries to others, and slight physical injuries to still others, in addition to damage to property. The contrary assumption rests on the predicate that the effect or consequence of the negligence, rather than the negligence itself, is the principal or vital factor in these offenses — a predicate that is not altogether accurate. As held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga, criminal negligence in the Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, dealt with separately from willful offenses; in intentional crimes the act itself is punished, whereas in negligence or imprudence what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. The strict technical offense is more accurately described as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or simple imprudence causing damages to property. Article 365 itself fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, showing that the penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime but is set in relation to a whole class or series of crimes. The purpose of Article 48 in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act, or from one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the penalty for the most serious crime instead of the penalties for each of the aforesaid crimes, which put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense. Finally, from the viewpoint of trial practice and justice, it is doubtful whether the prosecution should split the action by filing several informations — one for damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence before the Court of First Instance, and another for slight physical injuries through reckless negligence before the justice of the peace or municipal court — since such splitting would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice and to the accused, requiring the presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts and, on appeal, a third presentation in the Court of First Instance. No reason was advanced, and none was found, to warrant a departure from the foregoing ruling.

• Jurisdiction of the Municipal Court: Assuming for the sake of argument only that the information alleged two different and separate offenses, it does not follow that the Municipal Court of Iligan City had no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 1509-AF, inasmuch as the offense of damage to property amounting to P397.00 through reckless negligence and that of multiple slight physical injuries through reckless negligence are within the jurisdiction of that court. The municipal court could therefore properly try the accused, and the proper procedure for the lower court, regardless of how the issue of multiplicity should be resolved, was to reserve its resolution until after the case had been heard on the merits and decision rendered thereon.

• Validity of the Denial Orders: Because the municipal court possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration, even if hypothetically erroneous, were not null and void. Certiorari did not lie to annul them, and the Court of First Instance erred in granting the writ.

• Criminal negligence as a quasi-offense — Criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code is not a mere modality in the commission of felonies that operates only to reduce the penalty; it is a quasi-offense dealt with separately from willful offenses. In intentional crimes the act itself is punished, whereas in negligence or imprudence what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act — the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. The strict technical designation is not "homicide through reckless imprudence" but "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide," or "simple imprudence causing damages to property." The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a single act of reckless imprudence producing damage to property and multiple physical injuries of varying degrees constitutes one quasi-offense, not a complex crime.

• Complex crimes under Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Article 48 governs the complexing of several felonies resulting from a single act or from one which is a necessary means to commit another. Its purpose is to favor the accused by prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime instead of the penalties for each of the aforesaid crimes, which put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense. The Court invoked this purpose in rejecting the theory that the information improperly complexed offenses.

• Penalty for reckless imprudence is class-based — Article 365 fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range from prision mayor to death. The actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime but is set in relation to a whole class or series of crimes.

• Jurisdiction is not defeated by an erroneous denial of a motion to quash — Where the offenses charged, whether one or several, fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, that court has jurisdiction to try the case. The proper procedure is to reserve resolution of the question of multiplicity until after the case has been heard on the merits and decision rendered thereon. An order denying a motion to quash, even if hypothetically erroneous, is not null and void.

• Prohibition against splitting the prosecution — The prosecution should not split the action against the accused by filing several informations covering the same negligent act, since doing so would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts and, in the event of conviction in the municipal court and appeal to the Court of First Instance, a further presentation of the same evidence in the latter court.

• "However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical injuries with reckless imprudence with that of damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Cano, states the ratio decidendi: a single negligent act producing multiple consequences is charged as one quasi-offense, and the information does not thereby complex offenses under Article 48.

• "In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight; the 'imprudencia punible.'" — This is the canonical formulation, drawn from Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga, of the quasi-offense character of criminal negligence, and is the doctrinal core on which the Court's rejection of the multiplicity argument rests.

• "It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act; or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each of the aforesaid crimes, which, put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense." — This passage articulates the rationale of Article 48 and is frequently cited for the principle that the complex crime rule is intended to benefit the accused.

• "Again, the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration, even if hypothetically erroneous, were not null and void." — This passage supplies the jurisdictional corollary of the decision: an erroneous interlocutory order of a court of competent jurisdiction is not void, and certiorari will not lie to annul it.

• People vs. Cano, G.R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966 — The controlling precedent. The Court declared the issue in the case at bar substantially identical to that decided in Cano and adopted its ruling in full, quoting its disquisition on the non-complexing of a single act of reckless negligence producing multiple consequences and on the purpose of Article 48.
• Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga, G.R. No. L-6641 — Cited within People vs. Cano and quoted at length by the Court. It established that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but a quasi-offense, that what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, and that the penalty for criminal negligence under Article 365 is set in relation to a class or series of crimes rather than to the individual willful offense.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes criminal negligence as a quasi-offense. The Court relied on its penalty structure — arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if the willful act would constitute a grave felony — to demonstrate that the penalty for reckless imprudence bears no relation to the individual willful crime but is set in relation to a whole class or series of crimes. The information charged a violation of this article in relation to Article 266.
• Article 266, Revised Penal Code — Defines slight physical injuries. The information charged the offense of multiple slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence under Article 365 in relation to this article, and the Court held that such offense falls within the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes, that is, several felonies resulting from a single act or from one which is a necessary means to commit another. The Court held that the information did not purport to complex offenses under this article, and explained that the article's purpose is to favor the accused by prescribing the penalty for the most serious crime instead of the sum of the penalties for each offense.
• Article 3, Revised Penal Code — Referenced in the excerpt from Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga in connection with the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing a crime, a proposition the Court rejected as too broad to deserve unqualified assent.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concurred.