Primary Holding
Service of summons and hearing notices on a private corporation through its bookkeeper at its provincial office is valid service on its agent that confers jurisdiction over the corporation, substantial compliance being sufficient in quasi-judicial proceedings where the papers were in fact received by the corporation.
Background
Salome Pabon and Vicente Camonayan were complainant-employees of Senior Marketing Corporation, a company maintaining a principal office in Manila and a provincial office at 13 Valley Homes, Patul Road, Santiago, Isabela under Field Manager R-Jay Roxas. Claims for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits by such employees fall within the original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, with appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission. Service of process on a domestic private corporation was then governed by Section 13, Rule 14 of the old Rules of Court and by Section 5, Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure on proof and completeness of service by registered mail.
History
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Labor Arbiter, May 24, 1994 and June 22, 1994 — complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits filed by Pabon and Camonayan against Senior Marketing Corporation and R-Jay Roxas.
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Labor Arbiter, September 15, 1994 — rendered judgment by default declaring complainants illegally dismissed and ordering reinstatement with backwages, after finding private respondent evaded summons and hearing notices.
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Labor Arbiter, after September 15, 1994 — private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration/new trial alleging lack of notice, lack of jurisdiction, and denial of due process, instead of appealing within the ten-day reglementary period.
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NLRC Second Division, March 31, 1995 — set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and directed Senior Marketing Corporation to submit its evidence for further proceedings, on the ground that service of summons was invalid.
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Supreme Court, via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 — petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC for nullifying a judgment rendered after valid service.
Facts
On May 24, 1994 and June 22, 1994, Salome Pabon and Vicente Camonayan filed complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits against Senior Marketing Corporation and its Field Manager, R-Jay Roxas. Summons and notices of hearings were sent to Roxas at the corporation's provincial office at 13 Valley Homes, Patul Road, Santiago, Isabela, and were received by its bookkeeper, Mina Villanueva.
According to the Manifestation of Pabon dated August 30, 1994, she went to the Santiago post office to secure a certification in compliance with a directive in the Constancia dated August 2, 1994, and was told that summons addressed to respondent were sent through the Barangay Captain, which had been the practice for mails in the barrio, but remained unclaimed by the addressee. The Labor Arbiter found that private respondent tried to evade all summons and orders of hearing by refusing to claim registered mail addressed to it.
Thereafter, on September 15, 1994, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment by default declaring Pabon and Camonayan illegally and unjustly dismissed in a whimsical and capricious manner, and ordering Senior Marketing Corporation and Roxas jointly and severally to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay full backwages and other benefits until actual reinstatement, computed as of September 15, 1994. A copy of that Decision was sent to private respondent's principal office in Manila.
Instead of appealing to the National Labor Relations Commission within ten days from receipt, Senior Marketing Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration/new trial before the Labor Arbiter, alleging non-receipt of notice and summons, lack of jurisdiction over its person, denial of due process, and possession of defensive evidence. It appealed to the NLRC only after the ten-day period had lapsed. The NLRC, in its Decision promulgated March 31, 1995, set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and directed the corporation to submit its evidence, reasoning that the Arbiter should not have relied on Pabon's unverified Manifestation and should have sent hearing notices to respondents' Manila address with greater circumspection.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Service Through Corporate Agent: Petitioner argued that private respondent was properly served with summons in accordance with Section 13, Rule 14 of the old Rules of Court through its bookkeeper at its provincial office address, and that by virtue of said service the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over private respondent.
- Waiver and Finality: Petitioner maintained that private respondent, by deliberately failing to present evidence, cannot now claim transgression of due process where the decision rested solely on petitioners' evidence, and that failure to appeal to the NLRC within the ten-day reglementary period rendered the Labor Arbiter's judgment final and executory.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Lack of Authority – Bookkeeper Not Agent: Respondent countered that it was not validly served with summons since its bookkeeper cannot be considered as an agent under Section 13, Rule 14 of the old Rules of Court upon whom valid service can be made, and consequently the Labor Arbiter's decision is void as rendered without jurisdiction over private respondent.
Issues
- Service of Summons – Corporate Agent: Whether summons was properly served on Senior Marketing Corporation through its bookkeeper so as to confer jurisdiction on the Labor Arbiter over said corporation.
Ruling
- Service of Summons – Corporate Agent: Yes. Service through the bookkeeper at the provincial office satisfied the requirement of notice to the corporation's agent, substantial compliance being adequate in quasi-judicial proceedings, and jurisdiction was thereby acquired.
Ruling Rationale
- Service of Summons – Corporate Agent: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by service of summons in the manner required by law, but while modes of service are strictly followed in courts, they are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings where substantial compliance is adequate, pursuant to Santos vs. NLRC. Applied here, all summons and hearing notices addressed to private respondent were received by its bookkeeper at its provincial office, satisfying the procedural requirement of proper notice and rendering untenable the NLRC finding of deprivation of opportunity to present evidence. A bookkeeper qualifies as an agent within Section 13, Rule 14 of the old Rules of Court and Section 5, Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which makes service by registered mail complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent, because the rationale for corporate service requires delivery to one so integrated with the corporation as to make it supposable he will realize his responsibilities regarding legal papers, and a bookkeeper's regular recording of business accounts and essential transactional facts safeguards the corporation against fraud. Even service on a clerk not strictly authorized suffices where the corporation in fact received the papers, the purpose of assuring corporate notice having been attained and speedy justice prevailing over technicality, as in G & G Trading Corporation vs. Court of Appeals.
Doctrines
- Jurisdiction over the person by service of summons — Jurisdiction over a party-defendant is acquired by virtue of service of summons in the manner required by law. The rule was applied to sustain the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction once summons and notices addressed to the corporation were received at its provincial office.
- Liberal construction of service in quasi-judicial proceedings – substantial compliance — While modes of service are strictly followed in courts to acquire jurisdiction, they are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings, where substantial compliance is considered adequate. The principle justified upholding service received by the bookkeeper despite the NLRC's insistence on strict compliance.
- Corporate agent so integrated with the corporation — Service of process on a corporation must be made on an agent or representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what to do with legal papers served on him; an agent for this purpose need not be an officer and may have only limited authority, but excludes lesser employees whose duties are not integrated with business operations. A bookkeeper, whose recording of business accounts and essential transactional facts protects the corporation from fraud, meets this test and is not a mere lesser employee unable to appreciate the importance of delivered papers.
- Completeness of service by registered mail — Under Section 5, Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, the return is prima facie proof of facts indicated therein, and service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent, or if unclaimed within five days from first notice of the postmaster, after such time. Receipt by the bookkeeper as agent completed service in this case.
Key Excerpts
- "Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party-defendant by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law." — States the foundational jurisdictional premise from which the validity of service on the corporation was analyzed.
- "The rationale of all rules with respect to service of process on a corporation is that such service must be made to an agent or a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him." — Defines the canonical test for who qualifies as a corporate agent for service, applied to hold the bookkeeper sufficient.
- "Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner, nevertheless since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons." — Articulates the substantial-compliance exception that subordinates technical authorization defects to actual corporate receipt and speedy justice.
- "The need for speedy justice must prevail over technicality." — Expresses the policy preference for substance over form that justified sustaining service through the bookkeeper in a labor proceeding.
Precedents Cited
- Santos vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 673 — Cited as authority that modes of service are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings with substantial compliance deemed adequate.
- Far Corporation vs. Francisco, 146 SCRA 197 — Cited, together with Villa Rey Transit Inc. vs. Far East Motors Corporation, for the rationale that corporate service must reach an agent so integrated with the corporation as to ensure responsible handling of legal papers.
- G & G Trading Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 466 — Followed as controlling that service on a clerk, even if not authorized, constitutes substantial compliance where the corporation in fact received the summons and complaint, with speedy justice prevailing over technicality.
- Delta Motors Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, 70 SCRA 598 — Cited for the proposition that courts acquire jurisdiction over the defendant through service of summons in the manner required by law.
Provisions
- Section 13, Rule 14, Old Rules of Court — Governs service of summons on a private domestic corporation through its agent; applied to treat the bookkeeper who received summons at the provincial office as an agent, without requiring that the agent be a corporate officer or possess general contracting authority.
- Section 5, Rule III, NLRC Rules of Procedure — Provides that the return is prima facie proof of facts therein and that service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; relied upon to hold that receipt by the bookkeeper completed service and established the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Regalado, J., Melo, J., and Puno, J., concurred. Mendoza, J., was on leave. No separate concurring opinion with additional reasoning appears in the text.