Paa vs. Chan

A person claiming Philippine citizenship bears the burden of proving his citizenship to the satisfaction of the court, and no presumption is indulged in favor of the claimant; any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. Baptismal and marriage certificates are competent evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates specified therein, but not the veracity of statements made therein regarding the kinsfolk or citizenship of the person baptized or married. The exercise of rights and privileges granted to Filipino citizens is not conclusive proof of Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner Norberto B. Paa and respondent Quintin Chan were candidates for the office of councilor of San Fernando, La Union in the general elections of November 12, 1963. Respondent was elected, placing fourth among the winning candidates, and was duly proclaimed and took his oath of office. Petitioner, who lost in the election, filed a petition for quo warranto before the Court of First Instance of La Union pursuant to Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, questioning respondent's eligibility on the ground that respondent is a Chinese citizen.

In the general elections held on November 12, 1963, respondent Quintin Chan and petitioner Norberto B. Paa were candidates for the office of councilor of San Fernando, La Union. Respondent was elected, placing fourth among the winning candidates, while petitioner lost. Respondent was duly proclaimed elected and took his oath of office.

Pursuant to Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the Court of First Instance of La Union questioning respondent's eligibility on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen. The parties submitted a stipulation of facts on March 11, 1965. The stipulation established that respondent was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese citizen and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 90215 dated April 30, 1946; that he reported yearly to the Bureau of Immigration through the Municipal Treasurer of San Fernando, La Union in 1947, 1948, and 1949; that his father, Chan Lun Siu, was likewise registered as a Chinese citizen and issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 90215 dated April 30, 1946; that his mother, Tan Hit, was registered as a Chinese citizen and issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 90217 dated April 30, 1946; that respondent filed a War Damage Claim No. 997394 with the U.S. War Damage Commission which was disallowed because he was held to be a Chinese citizen; that respondent previously filed an application for naturalization in the Court of First Instance of La Union, docketed as Case No. 6, dated April 17, 1948, which was dismissed on October 27, 1949 on motion of the applicant on his allegation that he is already a Filipino citizen; that respondent is a qualified elector; that he ran for councilor in the 1963 elections and came out fourth among the winning candidates; that he took his oath of office and has been discharging his duties as alderman; that in the elections of 1949 (1959) he first ran for councilor but nobody questioned his citizenship; that he holds a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a truck-hire business; that his brother Mariano Chan was allowed to take the government examination for Civil Engineering and passed; that his sister Estrella Chan was allowed to take the Board Examination for Nurses; that his uncle Fernando Chan is a Doctor of Medicine; that on May 14, 1950, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs issued respondent a Philippine Passport stating that he is a Filipino citizen; that respondent entered into contracts with national, provincial, and municipal governments; and that in 1954, the Provincial Auditor of La Union expressed doubt as to respondent's citizenship and referred the matter to the Department of Justice, which rendered Opinion No. 313, Series of 1954, opining that he is a Filipino citizen.

Respondent claimed he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Leoncio Chan alias Chan Lun Siu, was a Filipino—being the illegitimate son of Lucino A. Chan Tanco, a Chinese, and Bartola Maglaya, a Filipina. To support this claim, respondent presented: (1) Leoncio Chan's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 5) reciting that he was born on August 18, 1896, was baptized the following day, and was the natural child of Bartola Maglaya, "soltera"; (2) the marriage certificate of Leoncio Chan and Teofila Tan (Exhibit 7) dated October 3, 1921, stating that he is a Filipino citizen, born in Caba, La Union, the child of Bartola Maglaya and Lucino A. Chan Tanco; (3) Leoncio Chan's own affidavit dated August 2, 1954, stating that he is a Filipino, born in Caba, La Union, the natural son of Bartola Maglaya and Lucino A. Chan Tanco (Exhibit 9); and (4) the sworn statement of Teofila Tan (Tangot) that she is the wife of Leoncio Chan, a Filipino, and that her husband is the natural son of Bartola Maglaya, a Filipino (Exhibit 12).

The Court of First Instance of La Union rendered a decision on February 28, 1966, declaring that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner, that Quintin Chan is a Chinese citizen now and at the time he was elected as municipal councilor on November 12, 1963, and that he was therefore not eligible for the position. The court ordered that respondent vacate the office once the decision became final, with costs against him. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

• Citizenship of Respondent: Petitioner argued that respondent Quintin Chan is a Chinese citizen based on the stipulation of facts showing that respondent and his parents were registered as aliens with the Bureau of Immigration, that respondent filed a petition for naturalization declaring under oath that he is a Chinese citizen born in Amoy, China, and that his war damage claim was rejected because he was held to be a Chinese citizen.
• Evidentiary Weight of Respondent's Acts: Petitioner maintained that respondent's own acts and sworn declarations—registering as an alien in 1941 and 1946, reporting yearly to the Bureau of Immigration, and filing a petition for naturalization—constitute declarations against interest that should be given more weight than the documentary evidence adduced by respondent.

• Filipino Citizenship Through Father: Respondent argued that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Leoncio Chan alias Chan Lun Siu, was a Filipino, being the illegitimate son of Lucino A. Chan Tanco, a Chinese, and Bartola Maglaya, a Filipina, and that respondent is the legitimate son of Leoncio Chan.
• Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion: Respondent stressed that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice declaring him a Filipino citizen is anchored on the circumstance that respondent is the legitimate son of a Filipino father, Leoncio Chan, as stated in the report of the Provincial Fiscal of La Union to the Department of Justice.
• Exercise of Filipino Citizenship Rights: Respondent averred that he is a Filipino because he had been exercising the right to vote since 1935; he was issued a Philippine passport stating that he is a Filipino citizen; his residence certificate issued in 1945 shows his citizenship as Filipino; he entered into contracts with national, provincial, and municipal governments; he owns real property in La Union; he was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission; and his uncle, brother, and sister have been licensed to practice their professions in the Philippines.
• Explanation for Alien Registration: Respondent explained that he had to register as a Chinese because during the Japanese occupation, the Japanese associated with the Chinese and hated Filipinos because of the guerrillas, so he registered as Chinese to evade identification in helping the guerrillas.

• Citizenship of Respondent: Whether respondent Quintin Chan is a Filipino citizen and therefore eligible for the office of municipal councilor of San Fernando, La Union.
• Evidentiary Value of Baptismal and Marriage Certificates: Whether the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan are competent evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father, and thus a Filipino citizen.
• Status of Respondent as Legitimate or Acknowledged Natural Child: Whether respondent, having been born out of wedlock, was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, or was an acknowledged natural child entitled to claim Filipino citizenship through his father.

• Citizenship of Respondent: No. Respondent is not a Filipino citizen. The Court sustained the finding of the lower court that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, as the evidence adduced to support the alleged Filipino citizenship of his father was insufficient and the respondent's own acts and declarations established that he is a Chinese citizen.
• Evidentiary Value of Baptismal and Marriage Certificates: No. The baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan are not competent evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father. While these certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
• Status of Respondent as Legitimate or Acknowledged Natural Child: No. The evidence does not establish that respondent is the legitimate son of Leoncio Chan. Respondent was born on March 24, 1917, and his parents were legally married four years later, in 1921, so he was born out of wedlock. Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, children are considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof, and the record is devoid of any evidence of such acknowledgment.

• Citizenship of Respondent: The Court held that it is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. The Court found that respondent's evidence was insufficient. The affidavits executed by Leoncio Chan and his wife Teofila Tan were self-serving and obviously biased, and the affiants were not presented as witnesses, making the affidavits inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule. The Court also noted that respondent's own acts contradicted his claim: he registered as an alien in 1941 and again in 1946, he filed a petition for naturalization declaring under oath that he is a Chinese citizen born in Amoy, China, on March 13, 1915, and his war damage claim was rejected because he was a Chinese citizen. The Court found respondent's explanation for registering as Chinese—that he did so to evade identification in helping the guerrillas during the Japanese occupation—to be flimsy, considering that in 1941, before the Japanese occupation, his name already appeared in the Chinese registry of aliens, and in 1946 he registered again as an alien and reported yearly until 1949, when there were no more Japanese in the Philippines. The Court observed that respondent claimed to be Chinese when the sailing was rough for Filipinos in time of war, and claimed to be Filipino when everything was calm in time of peace. The Court also noted that five out of respondent's eight children were enrolled at the local Chinese High School.
• Evidentiary Value of Baptismal and Marriage Certificates: The Court held that a baptismal certificate attests only the fact that originated its execution and the date of the same—the administration of the sacrament on the day specified—but not the veracity of the statements made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized. The Court cited Republic of the Philippines vs. The Workmen's Compensation Commission and Adriano vs. De Jesus for the doctrine that baptismal certificates are proof only of the act of which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, particularly the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the stated day, and are not proof of the truth of the declarations therein with respect to the parentage of the baptized children. The Court also cited Alfonso Dy Cueco vs. The Honorable Secretary of Justice, where the Court held that a baptismal certificate was insufficient to establish the Philippine citizenship of the petitioner's mother. The Court noted that respondent's case was worse than Dy Cueco's because respondent's father had registered himself as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration on April 30, 1946, and held Alien Certificate of Registration No. 90219, and respondent himself married a Chinese and registered as an alien.
• Status of Respondent as Legitimate or Acknowledged Natural Child: The Court held that assuming Leoncio Chan is a Filipino, the evidence does not establish that respondent is his legitimate son. Respondent was born on March 24, 1917, and his parents were legally married four years later, in 1921, so he was born out of wedlock. Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, children are considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. The record is devoid of any evidence that respondent was acknowledged by his parents before or after their marriage. Although there was an insinuation in the joint affidavit of Pio Ancheta and Leon Lacsamana (Exhibit 13) that respondent had enjoyed the uninterrupted status of a natural child of his parents, such statement does not legally establish his status as an acknowledged natural child, because the affidavit is inadmissible under the hearsay rule, and even if true, it was imperative upon respondent to institute an action for compulsory recognition so that upon being recognized his legitimation would take place. Respondent failed to do so, hence he cannot claim Filipino citizenship for being the legitimate son of a Filipino father.

• Burden of Proof in Citizenship Claims — A person claiming Philippine citizenship must prove his citizenship to the satisfaction of the court. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that respondent failed to discharge his burden of proving his alleged Filipino citizenship.
• Evidentiary Value of Baptismal Certificates — A baptismal certificate attests the fact that originated its execution and the date of the same—the administration of the sacrament on the day specified—but not the veracity of the statements made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by some of the kinds of proof recognized by law. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the baptismal certificate of Leoncio Chan was not competent evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father.
• Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage — Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, children are considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent, having been born out of wedlock, was not legitimated by his parents' subsequent marriage in 1921 because there was no evidence of acknowledgment.
• Exercise of Citizenship Rights Not Conclusive — The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Filipino citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Filipino citizen. A person, otherwise disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy the right or privilege of a Filipino citizen by representing himself to be a Filipino. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting respondent's reliance on his exercise of the right to vote, his Philippine passport, his contracts with the government, and the licenses granted to his relatives.

• "It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the burden of proof in citizenship claims and is the ratio decidendi of the Court's decision.
• "A baptismal certificate, like all documents in general, attests the fact that originated its execution, and the date of the same, to wit, the administration of the sacrament on the day specified, but not to the veracity of the statements made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized." — This passage defines the limited evidentiary value of baptismal certificates and is the canonical formulation of this doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence.
• "By his own acts and statements respondent has given reason for the conclusion that he claimed and appeared to be Chinese when the sailing is rough for the Filipinos in time of war, and then claim and appear as Filipino when everything is calm in time of peace." — This passage captures the Court's assessment of respondent's credibility and the weight given to his inconsistent acts and declarations regarding his citizenship.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-19945, February 26, 1965 — Cited as reiterating the doctrine that baptismal certificates are proof only of the administration of the sacrament, not of the truth of declarations therein regarding parentage.
• Alfonso Dy Cueco vs. The Honorable Secretary of Justice, G.R. L-18069, May 26, 1962 — Cited as a similar case where the Court held that a baptismal certificate was insufficient to establish the Philippine citizenship of the petitioner's mother, and where the Court noted that the respondent's case was worse because his father had registered as an alien.
• Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350 — Cited for the doctrine that a canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, but does not prove the veracity of declarations and statements contained therein concerning the relationship of the person baptized.
• Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492 — Cited in the Workmen's Compensation Commission case for the proposition that baptismal certificates are not the records of birth referred to in Article 278 of the Civil Code.
• Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 — Cited in the Workmen's Compensation Commission case for the same proposition regarding baptismal certificates not constituting records of birth.
• U.S. vs. Orosa, 7 Phil. 247; U.S. vs. Arceo, 11 Phil. 530; U.S. vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 — Cited in the footnotes for the proposition that a baptismal certificate can be considered a public document because it is a church record or canonical certificate issued prior to December 18, 1899.
• Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Lim, L-10975, May 27, 1959 — Cited in the footnotes for the proposition that the Public Service Commission has the power to revoke a certificate of public convenience whenever it finds that its issuance was obtained through misrepresentations.

• Section 173, Revised Election Code — The provision pursuant to which petitioner filed his petition for quo warranto before the Court of First Instance of La Union questioning respondent's eligibility to the office of councilor.
• Article 115, Civil Code — Cited for the proposition that the filiation of legitimate children may be proven by the record of birth entered in the civil registry, which is analogous to certificates of baptism issued prior to the creation of the civil registry, but such record is presumptive evidence only and susceptible of proof to the contrary.
• Article 121, Old Civil Code — The provision that children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. The Court applied this in holding that respondent was not legitimated by his parents' subsequent marriage.
• Article 135, Old Civil Code (now Article 383, New Civil Code) — Cited in connection with the joint affidavit of Pio Ancheta and Leon Lacsamana attesting that respondent had enjoyed the uninterrupted status of a natural child of his parents, which the Court held did not legally establish his status as an acknowledged natural child.
• Article 271, New Civil Code — Cited in the footnotes as the current provision on legitimation by subsequent marriage, adding that children who have been declared natural children by final judgment may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage.
• Article 278, Civil Code — Cited in the Workmen's Compensation Commission case for the proposition that baptismal certificates are not the records of birth referred to in that article.
• Section 16(m), Commonwealth Act 146 — Cited in the footnotes for the proposition that the Public Service Commission has the power to revoke a certificate of public convenience whenever it finds that its issuance was obtained through misrepresentations.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.