Ortega vs. Quezon City Government

The Supreme Court’s power to review the validity of a local ordinance is appellate, exercisable only through appeal or certiorari from a final judgment or order of a lower court; it has no original jurisdiction over a direct petition for declaratory relief challenging an ordinance, particularly where the claim of invalidity depends on a factual issue such as ownership.

Petitioner Zenaida Ortega claims ownership of parcels covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137, while the Quezon City Government asserts ownership of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The land is in Barangay Vasra, Quezon City, and was the subject of a socialized housing project of Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra under Batas Pambansa Blg. 220 and the Community Mortgage Program, subject to conditions in Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of 1993. The assailed ordinance reclassified a parcel considered an accretion/excess lot or portion of easement between Block 14, Psd-39577 and Culiat Creek as residential for distribution or sale to informal settlers.

Petitioner Zenaida Ortega, represented by her attorney-in-fact Octavio Alvarez and/or Zemve Ortega Alvarez, claims ownership of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137. The Quezon City Government, on the other hand, claims ownership of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The land is in Barangay Vasra, Quezon City.

On January 10, 2002, Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 was filed before the City Council. It sought to approve the subdivision plan of Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra, a socialized housing project under Batas Pambansa Blg. 220 with seventeen lots under the Community Mortgage Program, containing a total area of 667 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 owned by the Quezon City Government as vendor, located at a portion of an easement in Barangay Vasra, as applied for by Samahang Kapitbahayan as vendee, subject to conditions under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-56, S-93 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 220. On January 20, 2002, Proposed Resolution No. 2003-13 was filed to complement Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07; it sought to authorize Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte to enter into a contract to sell a portion of an easement in Barangay Vasra with Samahang Kapitbahayan, represented by its president, through the Community Mortgage Program of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.

On August 5, 2003, the Quezon City government enacted Ordinance No. SP-1304, Series of 2003, the ordinance challenged in the petition. It reclassified as residential, or converted from its original classification to residential for distribution or sale to informal settlers, a parcel of land which may be considered an accretion/excess lot and previously conceived and referred to in Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 and Proposed Resolution No. 2002-13 as a portion of easement situated between Block 14, Psd-39577 of the original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay Vasra, Quezon City. Section 2 provided that the ordinance would take effect immediately upon its approval.

Petitioner alleged that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests to the City Council against proposed Resolutions Nos. 2002-13, 2002-07, and 2002-239 were not heeded, violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. She claimed that the lot referred to in the ordinance overlaps her properties, as their technical descriptions in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137 show; and that assuming there exists an accretion or easement of Culiat Creek, she, as owner of the adjoining land, is the rightful owner under Articles 457 and 620 of the Civil Code. She likewise claimed that the intended beneficiaries under the proposed ordinance and resolution are not informal settlers as required under City Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of 1993, but lessees of her properties who had been ordered ejected after she filed several unlawful detainer cases against them. Petitioner thereafter came directly to the Supreme Court assailing the ordinance and praying that the NHA, HLURB, DENR-BLM, NHMFC, and HIGC be restrained from implementing it.

• Due Process and Equal Protection: Petitioner alleged that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests to the City Council against proposed Resolutions Nos. 2002-13, 2002-07, and 2002-239 were not heeded, thus violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
• Ownership and Accretion: Petitioner claimed that the lot referred to in the ordinance overlaps her properties as their technical descriptions in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137 show; and that assuming there exists an accretion or easement of Culiat Creek, she, being the owner of the adjoining land, is the rightful owner thereof under Articles 457 and 620 of the Civil Code.
• Informal Settlers: Petitioner claimed that the intended beneficiaries under the proposed ordinance and resolution are not informal settlers as required under City Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of 1993, but lessees of her properties who had been ordered ejected after she filed several unlawful detainer cases against them.
• Original Jurisdiction over Questions of Law: Petitioner contended that since the ordinance violates national laws, the petition delves on questions of law over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.

• Prematurity and Factual Issues: The Quezon City Government, through the Office of the City Attorney, argued that the petition is premature and raises questions of fact which entail reception of evidence, and that petitioner has not yet established her right of ownership over the property, whereas its clear right thereover is evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued in its name.
• Lack of Original Jurisdiction over Declaratory Relief: The NHA prayed for dismissal, pointing out that the petition is actually one for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.
• Non-Party and Prematurity: The NHMFC alleged that it is not a party to any of the transactions with any of the parties in the case, and it adopted the Quezon City Government’s comment that the petition is premature and alleges facts which still need to be proven.

• Original Jurisdiction over Ordinance Validity: Whether the Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction to review the validity of Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1304, Series of 2003, absent a final judgment or order of a lower court.
• Declaratory Relief: Whether the petition is in substance one for declaratory relief and whether the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over such a petition.
• Questions of Law and National Law Violation: Whether petitioner’s contention that the ordinance violates national laws and thus raises questions of law confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court.
• Prohibition and Direct Resort: Whether the petition may be treated as one for prohibition or whether direct resort to the Supreme Court is proper.

• Original Jurisdiction over Ordinance Validity: No. Under Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may review the validity of an ordinance only on appeal or certiorari from a final judgment or order of a lower court; no such final judgment or order existed.
• Declaratory Relief: No. If treated as a petition for declaratory relief, it falls under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which requires an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court; the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over it.
• Questions of Law and National Law Violation: No. The claim that the ordinance violates national laws does not confer original jurisdiction, because the asserted invalidity rests on the factual issue of ownership; even if only questions of law were raised, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief advancing only questions of law.
• Prohibition and Direct Resort: No. No facts were alleged showing entitlement to a writ of prohibition, and direct resort to the Supreme Court is not entertained absent inability to obtain redress in the proper courts or exceptional and compelling circumstances.

• Original Jurisdiction over Ordinance Validity: Article VIII, Section 5(2) confers on the Supreme Court the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases where the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance is in question. There must first be a final judgment rendered by an inferior court before the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case of this nature. The Court does not conduct an original and full trial of a main factual issue, does not analyze or weigh evidence at first instance, and would otherwise preempt the lower court’s primary function to try the case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide definitively. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing or revising final judgments or orders and applying the law based on the lower court’s findings of fact. Because petitioner came directly to the Supreme Court without any final judgment or order of a lower court, the petition could not be entertained.
• Declaratory Relief: If the petition were considered one for declaratory relief, it is not embraced within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 63 allows any person whose rights are affected by an ordinance, before breach or violation, to bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity and for a declaration of rights or duties. Section 4, Rule 63 requires notification of the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit in actions involving the validity of a local ordinance. The proper forum is thus the Regional Trial Court, not the Supreme Court.
• Questions of Law and National Law Violation: Petitioner’s contention that the ordinance violates national laws and therefore raises questions of law over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction fails. The assertion that the ordinance is invalid is premised on petitioner’s claim that she has a better right to the parcel of land, which is a factual issue. Even if the petition were to be treated as raising only questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief that advances only questions of law.
• Prohibition and Direct Resort: While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, petitioner alleged no facts tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy remains that the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction. No such circumstances were shown.

• Appellate Jurisdiction over Ordinance Validity — Under Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s power to review the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance is exercised on appeal or certiorari from final judgments and orders of lower courts. The Court cannot assume original jurisdiction over a direct challenge to an ordinance absent a prior final judgment or order of an inferior court. In this case, the direct petition was dismissed because no final judgment or order of a lower court existed.
• No Original Jurisdiction over Declaratory Relief — A petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 must be brought in the appropriate Regional Trial Court before breach or violation of the ordinance. The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over such a petition. The Court applied this rule in dismissing the petition insofar as it sought a declaration of the ordinance’s invalidity.
• Factual Issue of Ownership — A claim that an ordinance is invalid because the petitioner has a better right to the land affected by it is a factual issue requiring reception of evidence. The Supreme Court does not conduct an original and full trial of main factual issues or weigh evidence at first instance. This principle supported dismissal of the direct petition.
• Prohibition as a Treatment of Declaratory Relief — A petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. However, the petitioner must allege facts showing entitlement to the writ. Because no such facts were alleged, the petition could not be treated as one for prohibition.
• Hierarchy of Courts and Direct Resort — Direct resort to the Supreme Court is not entertained except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction. The petitioner’s direct filing did not satisfy this policy.

• "This Court can thus only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of, among other things, an ordinance is in question. Foremost, therefore, is that there must be first a final judgment rendered by an inferior court before this Court can assume jurisdiction over a case of this nature." — This passage states the ratio for dismissing the direct challenge: the Supreme Court’s review of an ordinance’s validity is appellate and requires a prior final judgment or order of a lower court.
• "Verily, this Court does not conduct original and full trial of a main factual issue like what petitioner is raising in the present petition. It does not analyze or weigh evidence brought before it at the first instance, otherwise, it would preempt the primary function of the lower court to try the case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide the case definitively." — This passage explains why the petitioner’s ownership claim could not be resolved in an original Supreme Court proceeding.
• "In another vein, if this petition was to be considered as one for declaratory relief, as observed by the OSG, it is not embraced within the original jurisdiction of this Court." — This passage establishes the alternative ground that declaratory relief against an ordinance belongs in the proper lower court, not the Supreme Court.
• "The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction." — This passage states the direct-resort policy applied to deny the petition.

• Darnoc Realty Devt. Corp. vs. Ayala Corporation, 117 SCRA 538, 542 (1982) — Cited to support the requirement that a final judgment rendered by an inferior court must exist before the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case assailing an ordinance.
• Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 125 SCRA 522, 527 (1983) — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court does not conduct an original and full trial of a main factual issue.
• New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragoza, 170 SCRA 563, 568 (1989) — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court does not analyze or weigh evidence at first instance, as doing so would preempt the lower court’s function.
• Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico, Jr., 163 SCRA 716, 727 (1988) — Cited to show that jurisdiction in ordinance-validity cases is limited to reviewing final judgments or orders and applying the law to the lower court’s factual findings.
• Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794, 795 (1981) — Cited for the proposition that a petition for declaratory relief is not within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
• Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1, 10 (1983) — Cited for the same proposition and for the absence of a statutory or jurisprudential basis for original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief advancing only questions of law.
• Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 243 (1993) — Cited for the rule that a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.
• John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim, 414 SCRA 356, 369 (2003) — Cited for the judicial policy against direct resort to the Supreme Court except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

• Article VIII, Section 5(2), 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Supreme Court may review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases where the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance is in question. Applied: because no final judgment or order of a lower court existed, the Court could not assume jurisdiction over the direct petition.
• Section 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court — Allows any person whose rights are affected by an ordinance, before breach or violation, to bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine its construction or validity and for a declaration of rights or duties. Applied: if the petition were treated as one for declaratory relief, it should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court, not the Supreme Court.
• Section 4, Rule 63, Rules of Court — Requires that in any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be notified and entitled to be heard. Applied: cited as part of the procedural framework for declaratory relief against an ordinance.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 220 — Mentioned as the socialized housing law under which the Samahang Kapitbahayan project was proposed. Applied: it formed part of the context of the proposed ordinance and resolution, not the jurisdictional holding.
• Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-56, S-93 — Mentioned as prescribing conditions for the socialized housing project. Applied: it was referenced in the proposed ordinance and in petitioner’s claim that the beneficiaries were not informal settlers.
• Civil Code Articles 457 and 620 — Invoked by petitioner to support her claim to accretion or easement as adjoining owner. Applied: the Court treated this claim as part of the factual issue of ownership, not as a basis for original jurisdiction.

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (Chief Justice); Reynato S. Puno; Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Artemio V. Panganiban; Consuelo Ynares-Santiago; Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez; Antonio T. Carpio; Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez; Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.; Renato C. Corona; Adolfo S. Azcuna; Dante O. Tinga; Minita Chico-Nazario; Cancio C. Garcia. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.