Orosa vs. Roa

Resolutions of the Department of Justice directing the withdrawal of an information are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, because the DOJ was deliberately excluded from the Rule's enumeration of covered agencies, and the proper recourse from the Secretary of Justice's decision is to the President under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Petitioner Jose Luis Angel B. Orosa and respondent Alberto C. Roa are both dentists. The dispute originated from an article written by respondent and published in the March–April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc., which delved into the possibility of a father who was an examiner in a dentistry licensure examination manipulating the results to enable his sons to top the examination. Petitioner, who topped the May 1994 dental board examinations, considered the article defamatory and filed a criminal complaint for libel. The procedural question before the Court concerns the proper mode of judicial review of a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the withdrawal of the information filed in the criminal case.

On November 27, 1996, petitioner Jose Luis Angel B. Orosa, a dentist by profession, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Pasig City Prosecution Office charging respondent Alberto C. Roa, likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 96-5442, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written by respondent and published in the March–April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. The article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same. Petitioner alleged that the article was defamatory as it besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May 1994.

Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constituted a "fair and accurate report on a matter of both public and social concern" and was written not with malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of professional examinations. After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint, finding the publication a bona fide communication on matters of public concern made without malice and holding respondent entitled to the protection of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño issued a Resolution setting aside the City Prosecutor's findings and directing the filing of an Information for libel against respondent. An Information was accordingly filed in the RTC of Pasig City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517. Respondent then appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuño Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. A "Motion to Withdraw Information" was filed in court by the Pasig City Prosecution Office in compliance. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary of Justice on May 12, 1999.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53190. The CA, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1999, dismissed the petition, holding that the Pasig City Prosecution Office and the DOJ are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the CA, and that the CA was not at liberty to supply the omissions in the Rule. The CA also noted that the petition was premature because the Information was already with the RTC, which had control of the case, and petitioner's remedy was to oppose the Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court.

• Rule 43 Coverage: Petitioner argued that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, and that the enumeration of agencies in Section 1 thereof is not exclusive, as indicated by the phrase "among these agencies."
• DOJ Quasi-Judicial Function: Petitioner submitted that resolutions of the DOJ in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are properly appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43.
• Defective Appeal by Respondent: Petitioner contended that respondent's appeal from the resolution of the DOJ through the Chief State Prosecutor dated January 22, 1998 was fatally defective.
• Defamatory Article: Petitioner maintained that respondent's article was defamatory, that malice attended its publication, and that it was not protected by the mantle of privileged matter.
• Merits: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in not resolving the petition on the merits and in not reversing the assailed DOJ resolution.

• Applicability of Rule 43: Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case.
• Prematurity: Whether the petition filed before the Court of Appeals was prematurely filed.
• Reviewability Under Rule 65: Whether the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are reviewable under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Resolution on the Merits: Whether the CA erred in not resolving the petition on the merits.
• Defective Appeal: Whether respondent's appeal from the DOJ resolution was fatally defective.
• Defamation and Privileged Matter: Whether respondent's article was defamatory, attended by malice, and not protected as privileged matter.

• Applicability of Rule 43: No. The DOJ was deliberately excluded from the enumeration of agencies in Section 1 of Rule 43, and recourse from the Secretary of Justice's decision should be to the President under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Prematurity: Yes, the petition was premature. The Information was already with the RTC, which had control of the case, and petitioner's remedy was to oppose the Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court.
• Resolution on the Merits: No error. Having resolved the threshold procedural issue, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address the remaining issues.
• Defective Appeal / Defamation / Privileged Matter: Not addressed. The Court declined to resolve the substantive issues relating to the libel charge, having disposed of the petition on procedural grounds.

• Applicability of Rule 43: Section 1 of Rule 43 enumerates the quasi-judicial agencies whose final orders are appealable to the CA, and uses the phrase "among these agencies," indicating the enumeration is not exclusive. While the DOJ may perform quasi-judicial functions, its deliberate exclusion from the list is consonant with the President's constitutional power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. This power of control means the President may review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has done and substitute his judgment for that of the subordinate. Being thus under the President's control, the Secretary of Justice's decision is subject to review by the President. Recourse from the Secretary's decision should therefore be to the President, not the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The inclusion of the Office of the President in Rule 43's enumeration accentuates that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to. Whether or not a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding is of little moment, as the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine guilt or innocence and does not exercise adjudication or rule-making functions; preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial.

• Prematurity: The CA correctly held that the petition was premature. The Information charging respondent with libel was already with Branch 155 of the RTC of Pasig City, which had control of the case. Petitioner's remedy was to reiterate the grounds in his petition by way of an appropriate opposition to the Pasig City Prosecution Office's Motion to Withdraw Information, enabling the trial court to rule on the matter first without the precipitate intervention of the appellate court.

• Resolution on the Merits: Having resolved the threshold procedural issue that Rule 43 does not provide a proper mode of appeal from DOJ resolutions, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address the other issues raised in the petition, including the substantive questions regarding defamation, malice, and privileged matter.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — If an appeal or remedy is available within the administrative machinery, it should be resorted to before recourse to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined exceptions, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies. Applied here: because the Secretary of Justice is subject to the President's power of control, the proper recourse from the Secretary's decision is to the President, not the courts.

• President's Power of Control over Executive Departments — Under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution, the President has the power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices, which means the power to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. This power, which even Congress cannot limit or withdraw, underlies the deliberate exclusion of the DOJ from Rule 43's enumeration.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial; the prosecutor does not determine guilt or innocence and does not exercise adjudication or rule-making functions. It is not a trial on the merits but a means of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused is guilty. The prosecutor cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court.

• "There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the DOJ's deliberate exclusion from Rule 43 is grounded in the President's constitutional power of control, making the President, not the CA, the proper appellate authority over the Secretary of Justice.

• "Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies." — This states the controlling rule that appeals from the Secretary of Justice's resolutions must be taken to the President, not the Court of Appeals, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

• "[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial." — This passage, quoted from Santos vs. Go, which in turn cited Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, defines the nature of preliminary investigation and explains why the Secretary of Justice's review of a prosecutor's findings does not constitute quasi-judicial adjudication warranting Rule 43 appeal.

• Santos vs. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 350 — Followed for the proposition that a prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not exercise adjudication or rule-making functions and that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, not a trial on the merits.
• Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001, 360 SCRA 618 — Cited through Santos vs. Go as the original source of the principle on the inquisitorial nature of preliminary investigation.
• Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 — Cited for the definition of the President's power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
• De Leon vs. Carpio, G.R. Nos. 85243 & 85442, October 12, 1989, 178 SCRA 457 — Cited alongside Mondano for the scope of the presidential power of control.
• Laguna CATV Network, Inc. vs. Maraan, G.R. No. 139492, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 221 — Cited for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100579, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 416 — Cited for the principle that immediate recourse to the courts is premature and precipitate when administrative remedies are available.
• Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. CA, 342 SCRA 549 — Cited for the proposition that failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders a case susceptible to dismissal for lack of cause of action.

• Section 1, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines the scope of appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. The Court held that while the phrase "among these agencies" indicates the enumeration is not exclusive, the deliberate omission of the DOJ is consonant with the President's constitutional power of control, so DOJ resolutions are not appealable to the CA under Rule 43.
• Article VII, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Vesting the President with power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. The Court relied on this provision to justify the deliberate exclusion of the DOJ from Rule 43 and to establish that recourse from the Secretary of Justice's decision should be to the President.
• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Governing privileged matters in libel. The City Prosecutor applied this provision in dismissing the libel complaint, finding the article a bona fide communication on matters of public concern made without malice. The Supreme Court did not rule on this provision's applicability, having disposed of the case on procedural grounds.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.