Oriente vs. People of the Philippines

Unlawful aggression — an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger to life and limb, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude — is indispensable to self-defense, and its absence defeats the plea whether complete or incomplete. Where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attends a conviction for homicide, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence must be fixed at the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Petitioner Manuel Oriente and the victim Romulo Cariño were neighbors in Brgy. Pasong Tamo, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where Oriente lived with his daughter Marilou Lopez and her husband Paul Lopez. The killing was charged as Murder under the Revised Penal Code, qualified by evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength; the conviction, however, was for the lesser offense of Homicide under Article 249 of the same Code, punishable by reclusion temporal and governed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

On the evening of March 16, 1996, at around 10:00 o'clock, Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo Cariño y Vallo at No. 40 Lukban Street, Area 9, Luzon Avenue, Brgy. Pasong Tamo, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Passing in front of the house of petitioner Manuel Oriente, he saw Oriente and his companions having a drinking spree at the terrace. Tanael arrived at Cariño's house, where Cariño was drinking beer alone; shortly thereafter, Cariño went out to buy cigarettes. While watching television inside the house, Tanael heard two gunshots and rushed outside to check what they were about.

Peeping through potted plants about three feet high perched on top of a neighbor's fence about two feet high, and at a distance of more or less eight meters, Tanael saw Cariño, Oriente, Oriente's daughter Marilou Lopez, her husband Paul Lopez, and one Rogelio Gascon arguing along the alley beside the concrete fence in front of Oriente's house, where a fluorescent light was on. He heard Paul Lopez tell Cariño, "Ikaw Cariño, ang liit-liit mo, ang yabang mo!" Marilou then came out of the house with a lead pipe and handed it to Paul, who struck Cariño on the right arm with it. Oriente took the lead pipe from Paul and hit Cariño on the left eyebrow. Cariño reeled and fell down. Tanael, confused, went back inside the house, switched off the light and the television, and went out again, where he saw Cariño moaning. Paul Lopez was then poking a gun at Cariño and pulled the trigger twice, but the gun did not fire. Tanael shouted at them, and Oriente and his companions said nothing. Tanael carried Cariño inside the house, called the Panabuilt Transport office for a cab, and brought Cariño to the East Avenue Medical Center, where he passed away two hours later.

The defense gave a different account. Oriente testified that on the night of the incident he was fetched by tanod members of their area to attend a wake, it being already the tanods' off-duty hours. On his way out of the house, he saw the spouses Paul and Malou and his granddaughter inside a car leaving the garage to visit Malou's in-laws. At the gate of his house, while conversing with the tanods who had fetched him, they heard two gunshots coming from downhill and noticed that the person who fired them was walking toward them; they waited for him to pass. That person was Romulo Cariño. When Cariño reached a store a fence away from Oriente's house, Oriente asked him what his problem was. Cariño suddenly extended his arms and poked a gun at Oriente and his companions, telling them not to get near him or he would shoot and kill all of them. Surprised and fearing for his life, Oriente stepped back toward his yard, took hold of a piece of wood, and hit Cariño with it. Oriente stated that he did not know whether he hit Cariño's hands, eyebrow, or other parts of his body with that single blow, but he saw Cariño lose his balance, fall, and hit his head on the ground. The victim was still holding the gun. After five seconds, Cariño stood up and ran, "pasuray-suray," toward the direction of his house. Fearing that Cariño would shoot them if they followed, Oriente told the tanods that they would just attend to him the following day. Oriente further testified that he had no intention of killing Cariño and that his purpose was only to disarm him.

Dr. Roberto Garcia, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver, declared that the cause of death was traumatic head injury. His findings included an abrasion on the right forearm, a contused-abrasion on the left temple, lacerated wounds above and over the left eyebrow, orbital hematoma on the left, injury to the scalp on the left frontal region, skull fractures, extensive hemorrhages, and congested visceral organs. On cross-examination, he opined that even with immediate and adequate medical attendance, the victim would not have survived due to the extensive nature of the hemorrhage he suffered.

The RTC found the testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the petitioner, incredible; found that the victim suffered extensive head injuries; and found that the defense failed to show any imminent threat or danger to the life of the accused. It likewise found that the incident was preceded by an intense argument between the victim and the accused, and that the prosecution duly proved actual damages of P38,500.00 for funeral services and P3,000.00 for the cemetery lot and religious services, while the other expenses were not supported by evidence. The Court of Appeals, for its part, found that Tanael's inconsistencies referred to minor details only, which tended to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility, and that his testimony on the injuries inflicted on the victim was supported by the findings of the NBI medico-legal officer as stated in the post-mortem report.

• Self-Defense and Unlawful Aggression: Petitioner argued that the victim, allegedly a troublemaker in the vicinity, was drunk, fired his gun twice, and then proceeded toward petitioner and his companions; the victim's act of poking the gun at him constituted unlawful aggression sufficient to warrant his claim of self-defense, and the means he employed to prevent it were reasonable.
• Lack of Intent and Absence of Provocation: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of homicide although it was obvious that the lower court found there was no intent on his part to commit the crime and no provocation at all on his part.
• Credibility of the Lone Eyewitness: Petitioner contended that both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of the lone eyewitness when that testimony was full of inconsistencies.
• Increase of Penalty and Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court by increasing the penalty without any discussion or explanation in the decision itself why the modification was necessary and in accordance with law; he likewise argued that the RTC promulgated two decisions and that, by doing so, he was placed in double jeopardy.

• Timeliness of the Modification: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision dated November 15, 1999 before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated November 4, 1999, which was promulgated on November 10, 1999.

• Unlawful Aggression / Self-Defense: Whether the victim's act of poking a gun at petitioner and his companions constituted unlawful aggression sufficient to justify the killing under the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
• Credibility of the Lone Eyewitness: Whether the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the lone eyewitness despite the alleged inconsistencies therein.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim should be appreciated in petitioner's favor.
• Increase of Penalty on Appeal and Double Jeopardy: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the penalty imposed by the trial court without discussion or explanation, and whether the promulgation of two decisions by the Regional Trial Court placed petitioner in double jeopardy.
• Computation of the Indeterminate Sentence: Whether the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals conforms to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Actual Damages: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in omitting the award of actual damages granted by the trial court.

• Unlawful Aggression / Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger to life and limb, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude; the defense failed to establish that the victim pointed a gun at petitioner.
• Credibility of the Lone Eyewitness: No error. The trial court's evaluation of eyewitness testimony is accorded great weight and respect, and Tanael's alleged inconsistencies referred only to minor details; his account of the injuries was corroborated by the post-mortem findings.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. The extensive injuries negate the claim of lack of intent to kill, and the alleged provocation was not immediate to petitioner's act, a sufficient interval having elapsed after Paul Lopez had already assaulted the victim.
• Increase of Penalty on Appeal and Double Jeopardy: No. An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, and the trial court's modification of the penalty was a mere correction to conform to the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, made before petitioner perfected his appeal.
• Computation of the Indeterminate Sentence: Partly no. The minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor was correctly imposed, but the maximum term should be the medium period of reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
• Actual Damages: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in omitting the actual damages awarded by the trial court; the full amount of P41,500.00 is restored, although moral and exemplary damages are not warranted.

• Unlawful Aggression / Self-Defense: When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused must prove the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All these conditions must concur, and there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person — not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude — and, most importantly, it must exist at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The petitioner's plea contradicted common knowledge and experience. The defense witnesses themselves admitted that Cariño was able to get up from the ground after being hit and ran away with the gun in hand; a person who had threatened to kill with a gun and was then struck seriously with a piece of wood could reasonably be expected to use the gun. The RTC found it doubtful that a person in Cariño's condition — with several contusions on the face and head fractures, aggravated by his alleged state of stupor — could still run, much less hold a handgun while running. The defense also failed to explain why Cariño would utter threats when there was no evidence that anyone was arresting him, and why, if he was poking a gun with both arms extended, he did not see the person hitting him across the face or shoot that person instead of running away. The Court of Appeals likewise found the defense version incredible, observing that the tanod members, including the petitioner, did not wrestle for the gun when they had the opportunity to do so, and that letting an armed man go would not be the normal reaction of persons in charge of peace and order. Dr. Garcia's post-mortem findings and his opinion that the victim would not have survived even with immediate and adequate medical attendance confirmed the extensive nature of the injuries. The defense thus failed to establish the existence of the gun being pointed at petitioner to constitute unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

• Credibility of the Lone Eyewitness: After the accused has owned the killing, the burden of proof is reversed, and he cannot simply protest that the evidence of the prosecution is weak. It becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction must ensue as a matter of consequence. The Court of Appeals found that Tanael's inconsistencies referred to minor details only, which tended to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility and proved that his testimony was unrehearsed; that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were highly credible; that the evaluation of eyewitness testimony by the trial court should be accorded great weight and respect; and that Tanael's testimony on the injuries was supported by the findings of the NBI medico-legal officer as stated in the post-mortem report. The mere fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses did not ipso facto render the decision erroneous, especially where the judgment appeared to be fully supported by the evidence on record.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The RTC appreciated in petitioner's favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim. On the first, the RTC reasoned that the accused did not intend to kill Cariño, that Cariño did not die immediately but lived for about two hours after being taken to the hospital, and that he was hit by a hard, blunt object. The Court of Appeals correctly took into account the post-mortem findings of the NBI medico-legal expert and his testimony that even with immediate and adequate medical attendance the victim would not have survived due to the extensive nature of the hemorrhage. The brute force employed by the petitioner contradicted the claim that he had no intention to kill the victim, and the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. On the second, provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; to be mitigating, it must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act. Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity, and it must immediately precede the act, meaning there should be no interval of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked. The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation contemplated by law, and petitioner failed to establish by competent evidence that the victim had a gun and used it to threaten him. The Court of Appeals further noted that a certain Paul Lopez had already previously assaulted the victim and that there was a sufficient interval of time between the provocation of the offended party and the commission of the crime by the petitioner.

• Increase of Penalty on Appeal and Double Jeopardy: It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not, including the propriety of the imposable penalty. On the claim of double jeopardy, courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice, but this prerogative is not absolute; the rules do not contemplate amendments substantial in nature and merely cover formal changes or such that will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration. Here, the change in the penalty did not involve the consideration of any new evidence but a mere correction of the penalty imposed to conform with the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. As the Solicitor General correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision dated November 15, 1999 before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated November 4, 1999, which was promulgated on November 10, 1999; it was the second Decision that petitioner elevated on appeal. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether or not the matters are made the subject of assigned errors.

• Computation of the Indeterminate Sentence: Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall be punished by reclusion temporal, that is, twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, which is prision mayor, or anywhere between six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The Court of Appeals appropriately exercised its discretion when it imposed six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum term. However, the Court of Appeals erred in imposing twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered; there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or anywhere between fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

• Actual Damages: The Court of Appeals, without reason, omitted a portion of the award of damages made by the RTC in the civil aspect of the case, namely, the amount of actual damages which comprised the expenses for the cemetery lot and religious services. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove actual damages amounting to P41,500.00 based on supporting evidence, in addition to the death indemnity of P50,000.00 as required by current jurisprudence, yet the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals judgment merely ordered petitioner to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P50,000.00. The full amount of actual damages originally awarded by the RTC is therefore restored. Moral damages are not awarded for lack of basis in fact and law, no witnesses having testified to prove the existence of the factual basis therefor. Pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code, in criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; considering that no aggravating circumstance is present in this case, the lower courts were correct in not awarding exemplary damages.

• Requisites of self-defense — Self-defense requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused, who, having owned the killing, must discharge it by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the accused failed to prove the first and primordial element, so the plea was rejected whether taken as a complete or an incomplete justifying circumstance.

• Unlawful aggression — Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude, and it must exist at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The defense failed to establish that the victim pointed a gun at the petitioner; the physical evidence of extensive head injuries and the implausibility of the defense account negated the claim of aggression.

• Mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — This circumstance cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. The brute force employed by the petitioner, which caused several contusions on the face and skull fractures, contradicted his claim that he intended only to disarm the victim.

• Mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation — Provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. To be mitigating, it must be sufficient — adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong and proportionate in gravity — and must immediately precede the act, meaning there should be no interval of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked. A heated or intense argument preceding the incident is not by itself sufficient provocation, and here the alleged provocation was separated from petitioner's act by a sufficient interval, Paul Lopez having already assaulted the victim.

• Appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review — An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether or not they are the subject of assignment of errors, including the propriety of the imposable penalty. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and takes the risk that the appellate court may render judgment as law and justice dictate, favorable or unfavorable.

• Inherent power of courts to amend their decisions — Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice, but the prerogative is not absolute. The rules contemplate only formal changes or corrections of typographical or clerical errors, not amendments substantial in nature; substantial amendments made without affording the other party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration violate due process. The change in penalty in this case was a mere correction to conform to the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, involving no new evidence.

• Computation of the indeterminate sentence — Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, while the maximum term is computed with reference to the attending circumstances. Where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the maximum term must be the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law.

• Exemplary damages in criminal offenses — Pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal offenses when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Absent any aggravating circumstance, an award of exemplary damages is improper.

• "Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of unlawful aggression, the element on which the entire plea of self-defense in this case failed; it is the ratio decidendi for the rejection of petitioner's justifying circumstance.

• "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim." — This passage states the controlling test for the mitigating circumstance invoked by petitioner and explains why the Court of Appeals correctly overturned the trial court's appreciation of it.

• "It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not, including the propriety of the imposable penalty." — This is the settled rule that justified the appellate court's modification of the penalty and defeated petitioner's objection to the increase, as well as his double jeopardy argument.

• "Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must immediately precede the act means that there should not be any interval of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked." — This passage defines the two-fold requirement of sufficiency and immediacy for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, which the Court found unsatisfied on the facts.

• People vs. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, August 16, 2006 — Cited for the requisites of self-defense, the rule that there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression, and the requirement of an unlawful and unprovoked attack; also cited for the award of death indemnity.
• People vs. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535 — Cited for the rule that there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.
• People vs. Dela Cruz, 400 Phil. 872 (2000) — Cited, together with People vs. Dagani, for the definition of unlawful aggression as presupposing an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger.
• People vs. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580 (2003) — Cited for the requirement that there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
• People vs. Venerable, 352 Phil. 623 (1998) — Cited for the test that no better measure of the value of a witness's testimony has been found than its conformity to the knowledge of mankind.
• People vs. Paulino, G.R. No. 148810, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 122 — Cited for the rule that after the accused has owned the killing, the burden of proof is reversed and he cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence; failure to discharge the burden results in conviction.
• People vs. Flores, Jr., 442 Phil. 561 (2002) — Cited for the settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review.
• Cadua vs. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 627 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the appellate court may review the propriety of the imposable penalty even if not assigned as an error.
• Cansino vs. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 686 (2003) — Cited for the rule that courts' inherent power to amend decisions is not absolute and does not extend to substantial amendments, which would violate due process.
• Unidad vs. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 96 (2003) — Cited, together with Cansino, for the limitation on the courts' power to amend their decisions.
• People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 (1999) — Cited for the rule that an accused who appeals from the sentence of the trial court waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy.
• People vs. Isleta, 332 Phil. 410 (1996) — Cited, with People vs. Francisco and People vs. Gonzales, Jr., for the rule that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated where the acts employed were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the victim's death.
• People vs. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94 (2000) — Cited, together with People vs. Isleta, for the same rule on lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• People vs. Gonzales, Jr., 411 Phil. 893 (2001) — Cited, together with People vs. Isleta, for the same rule on lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 21 (1999) — Cited for the definition of provocation as a mitigating circumstance and the requirement that it be sufficient and immediately precede the act.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall be punished by reclusion temporal, that is, twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. This was the penalty prescribed for the crime of which petitioner was convicted and the starting point for the computation of the indeterminate sentence.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to fix the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at reclusion temporal in its medium period.
• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the imposition of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present. Applied by the RTC in its second Decision, an application the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court found erroneous.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the RTC as the basis for appreciating in petitioner's favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court rejected its application on the facts.
• Article 13, paragraph 14, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the RTC for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act; the Court held that the circumstance was not established.
• Section 1, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Governs the imposition of an indeterminate sentence, requiring that the minimum term be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. Applied to fix the minimum term at six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Cited to sustain the lower courts' refusal to award exemplary damages, no aggravating circumstance being present.
• Articles 2217-2220 and 2229-2235, Civil Code — Cited in relation to the non-award of moral damages, there being no basis in fact and law and no witnesses having testified to prove the factual basis therefor.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the Decision, confirming that the conclusions were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.