Ordoño vs. Daquigan

A husband’s rape of his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the exception to the marital disqualification rule, because such an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, thereby permitting the wife to testify against him without his consent.

Avelino Ordoño was the husband of Catalina Balanon Ordoño and the father of Leonora Ordoño and Rosa Ordoño. The marital disqualification rule in Rule 130, Section 20(b) of the Rules of Court generally bars a spouse from being examined for or against the other without consent, except in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty-four-year-old victim and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 104.

In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement. She disclosed that on October 11, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage, but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if they reported the crime to the police. Catalina also revealed that her husband had raped their other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973, and that he was charged in court for that offense.

Catalina said that the rape committed by Avelino against Leonora was mentioned during the investigation and trial of Avelino for the rape committed against Rosa. In her sworn statement, she explained that they had narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal’s Office and when she testified in court in the case of Rosa Ordoño, but Leonora was then still in Manila. During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa.

The case against Avelino, where Leonora was the complainant, was elevated to the Court of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch, as Criminal Case No. 356. On May 29, 1974, the Fiscal presented Catalina Ordoño as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, defense counsel objected to her competency, invoking the marital disqualification rule in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and claiming that Avelino had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife’s testifying against him. The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino’s motion for reconsideration, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition and was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.

• Marital Disqualification: Petitioner argued that under Rule 130, Section 20(b), his wife Catalina could not be examined for or against him without his consent, and that he had not given such consent expressly or impliedly.

• Marital Disqualification — Scope of Exception: Whether the rape committed by a husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the exception to the marital disqualification rule.
• Interpretation of the Exception: Whether the phrase “in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other” should be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery, or concubinage, or given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital discord.

• Marital Disqualification — Scope of Exception: Yes. The rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the exception to the marital disqualification rule, because it directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation.
• Interpretation of the Exception: Neither the narrow nor the broad reading controls. The exception applies when the offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, not merely when it is a physical wrong upon the spouse or any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony.

• Marital Disqualification — Scope of Exception: Rule 130, Section 20(b) bars a spouse from testifying for or against the other without consent, except in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. The Court adopted the formulation in Cargill vs. State: the rule requiring the injury to amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow, while treating any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony as within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that an offense falls within the exception when it directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. Applying that criterion, the rape perpetrated by Avelino Ordoño against his daughter Leonora was a crime committed by him against his wife Catalina, the victim’s mother. The Court characterized the rape of a daughter by her father as an abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications that positively undermines the connubial relationship. It also noted the Filipino family tradition in which the daughter is close to the mother and, when in distress, calls for her mother; in this case, when Avelino tried to repeat the act in the evening of October 11, 1970, Leonora shouted “Mother” and he desisted. Thus, Catalina was competent to testify against him without his consent.
• Interpretation of the Exception: The Court rejected both a restrictive reading limited to crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery, or concubinage, and a latitudinarian reading covering any offense causing marital discord. It relied on the dictum in People vs. Francisco that where marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility to be disturbed, the reason for the privilege fails, identity of interests disappears, and the danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. It also cited Wilkinson vs. People, where the wife was competent to testify against the husband in a prosecution for rape committed against her natural daughter, the stepdaughter of the accused, because the crime was an outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations and a crime against humanity; State vs. Chambers, where the wife was competent to testify against the husband prosecuted for incest against his stepdaughter; and State vs. Shultz, where the wife could testify against the husband prosecuted for incest against their eleven-year-old daughter because incest is a crime committed against the wife. The Court also cited Dill vs. People for the interpretation that a crime committed by one against the other may refer to a crime where the wife is the individual particularly and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the husband is prosecuted. Under this standard, the rape of Leonora directly and vitally impaired the conjugal relation and fell within the exception.

• Marital Disqualification Rule — Under Rule 130, Section 20(b), a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. The Court applied the exception to allow Catalina Ordoño to testify against Avelino Ordoño.
• Direct Attack or Vital Impairment Test — The exception is not limited to physical wrongs upon the spouse and does not extend to any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony. The controlling test is whether the offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. The Court found the incestuous rape of the daughter by the father satisfied this test.
• Rape of Daughter as Crime Against Wife — In the law of evidence, rape perpetrated by a father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife, the victim’s mother, for purposes of the marital disqualification exception. The conclusion was reinforced by the close mother-daughter relationship in the Filipino family and the direct undermining of the connubial relationship.

• “The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad.” — The Court rejected the two extreme interpretations of the exception to the marital disqualification rule.
• “The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.” — This is the controlling test adopted from Cargill vs. State.
• “Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim’s mother).” — The Court applied the test to the facts and resolved the central issue.
• “That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.” — The Court explained why the offense directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation.

• People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704 — The Court relied on its dictum that when marital and domestic relations are so strained that no harmony remains to be preserved, the rationale for the marital privilege fails; in that case the wife was allowed to testify against the husband charged with killing their son.
• Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314 — The Court adopted its formulation as the correct rule: an offense comes within the exception when it directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation.
• Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257 — Cited for the holding that a wife was competent to testify against her husband in a prosecution for rape committed against her natural daughter, the accused’s stepdaughter, because the crime was an outrage upon nature and humanity.
• State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090 — Cited for the holding that the wife was competent to testify against the husband prosecuted for incest committed against his stepdaughter.
• State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539 — Cited for the holding that the wife may testify against the husband prosecuted for incest against their eleven-year-old daughter because incest is a crime committed against the wife.
• Dill vs. People, 19 Colo. 469, 475, 36 Pac. 229, 232 — Cited for the interpretation that a crime committed by one spouse against the other may refer to a crime where the wife is the individual particularly and directly injured or affected.
• People vs. Segura, 60 Phil. 933 — Cited in support of the Court’s conclusion.

• Rule 130, Section 20(b), Rules of Court — The provision disqualifies a spouse from testifying for or against the other without consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. The Court construed the exception to include the rape by the husband of his daughter, allowing the wife to testify against him.

Makalintal, C.J.; Castro; Fernando; Teehankee; Barredo; Makasiar; Esguerra; Fernandez; and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concurred. Antonio, J., was on leave.