Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

A proprietor of a recreational facility is not an insurer of its patrons' safety and is not liable for damages where it has exercised ordinary care in maintaining its premises and employing trained personnel, unless the claimant proves fault or negligence on the part of the proprietor or its employees.

The Metropolitan Water District is a government-owned corporation that operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon City, charging nominal admission fees to the public. The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong, are the parents of Dominador Ong, a 14-year-old high school student and boy scout who drowned in one of the pools on July 5, 1952. The action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the Civil Code, addressing quasi-delict and liability for acts of persons for whom one is responsible.

The Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon City, to which the public is invited for a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children. The main pool is situated between two smaller oval-shaped pools known as the "Wading Pool" and the "Beginners Pool." Diving boards are installed in the big pools, and water depths at different points are indicated by marks on the wall. The defendant employs a recreational section headed by Simeon Chongco, with a male nurse named Armando Rule and six lifeguards who had completed life-saving courses certified by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila. Safety equipment—including a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit, and resuscitator—is provided, and a sanitary inspector is in charge of a clinic for patrons. Rules and regulations are displayed conspicuously, including one prohibiting swimming alone or without an attendant. Although the defendant does not maintain a full-time physician, a nurse and sanitary inspector are available to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if needed.

On the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 p.m., Dominador Ong, a 14-year-old high school student and boy scout, went to the swimming pools with his brothers Ruben and Eusebio. The three brothers had visited the natatorium four or five times before. They arrived at about 1:45 p.m., paid the admission fee, and went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador told his brothers he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Ruben and Eusebio then went to the bigger pool, leaving Dominador in the small pool, and neither brother saw him leave the small pool. Two lifeguards were on duty that afternoon: Manuel Abaño, whose shift ran from 8:00 to 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 to 6:00 p.m., and Mario Villanueva, whose shift ran from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., there were approximately twenty bathers in the pool area, and Abaño was walking around the pools observing the bathers in compliance with instructions from his chief.

Between 4:40 and 4:45 p.m., some boys informed a bather named Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming underwater for an unusually long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abaño, who immediately jumped into the big pool and retrieved Dominador's apparently lifeless body from the bottom. Abaño placed the body at the edge of the pool and applied manual artificial respiration. Male nurse Armando Rule arrived to assist, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente, who had been called by phone from the clinic by a security guard, boarded a jeep carrying a resuscitator and medicine kit, and upon arriving injected the boy with camphorated oil. Vicente then left to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. When manual artificial respiration proved ineffective, the resuscitator was applied until both oxygen tanks were exhausted. Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator but found the boy already dead and ordered the body taken to the clinic.

That evening, the Quezon City Police Department investigated the incident, and Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. gave written statements. The following day, July 6, 1952, Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos of the National Bureau of Investigation performed an autopsy, finding an abrasion on the right elbow, contusion on the right forehead, hematoma on the scalp, brain congestion with petechial subcortical hemorrhage, cyanosis, soggy lungs with froth in the bronchioles, dark fluid blood in the heart, congestion in the visceral organs, and brownish fluid in the stomach. The cause of death was asphyxia by submersion in water. The trial court also noted expert evidence from both parties suggesting that Dominador might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the pool, and been stunned, leading to his drowning—a danger he should have appreciated as a boy scout who had presumably received swimming instruction.

• Negligence of Lifeguard: Petitioners argued that the defendant failed to take necessary precautions to protect patrons' lives by not placing efficient and competent employees who could render help at a moment's notice. They ascribed negligence to the defendant because the lifeguard on duty was not available or was attending to something else when Dominador was drowning, resulting in delayed assistance. Through the testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong, petitioners attempted to prove that lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not immediately respond to the alarm, allegedly chatting with a security guard and reading a comic magazine, and only responded upon the third call, allowing three or four minutes to elapse before retrieving the body.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Petitioners alternatively argued that even if the deceased were partly to blame, the defendant could still be held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance, because the defendant, having the last opportunity to save the victim, failed to do so.

• Due Diligence and Victim's Own Negligence: Respondent admitted the fact of drowning but averred that the death was caused by the victim's own negligence or by unavoidable accident. Respondent maintained that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances.

• Quasi-delict Liability: Whether the death of Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of the defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle the plaintiffs to recover damages.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies to render the defendant liable notwithstanding the victim's possible contributory negligence.

• Quasi-delict Liability: No. The defendant was not liable, having exercised ordinary care in maintaining its facilities and employing trained personnel, and the plaintiffs having failed to prove fault or negligence on the part of the defendant or its employees by sufficient evidence.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine: No. The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the record does not show how the victim came to be in the big swimming pool, where the victim apparently went there alone in violation of pool regulations, and where the defendant's employees responded promptly upon discovering the emergency and exhausted all means at hand to save the victim.

• Quasi-delict Liability: The action was governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the Civil Code, establishing quasi-delict liability and the obligation to answer for acts of persons for whom one is responsible. The burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish fault or negligence on the part of the defendant or its employees. The plaintiffs' key witnesses, Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr., testified at trial that lifeguard Abaño was reading a comic magazine and chatting with a security guard and failed to respond immediately to calls for help. However, their testimony was belied by their own written statements given to the Quezon City Police approximately three hours after the accident, in which they did not mention any delay by the lifeguard and instead emphasized that the lifeguard immediately dived into the pool upon hearing shouts for help. The trial court found their testimony unworthy of credence on this point. On the other hand, the defendant demonstrated that it had taken all necessary precautions: trained and certified lifeguards working on a scheduled rotation ensuring two guards on duty at all times, safety equipment including ring buoys and resuscitators, a clinic with a male nurse and sanitary inspector, conspicuously posted rules and regulations, and security guards available for emergencies. When the body was retrieved, the employees did everything possible to resuscitate the victim—manual artificial respiration, injection of camphorated oil, application of oxygen resuscitator until both tanks were exhausted, and summoning a physician from the University of the Philippines. Expert evidence suggested that Dominador likely dove into water only 5.5 feet deep, hit his forehead against the bottom, and was stunned, leading to drowning—a danger he should have known as a boy scout. A proprietor of a natatorium is not an insurer of patrons' safety, and the death of a patron on the premises does not cast upon the proprietor the burden of excusing itself from any presumption of negligence.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance provides that a person who has the last clear opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for the consequences. The doctrine cannot apply here because the record does not disclose how Dominador came to be in the big swimming pool. The only thing known is that he told his brothers he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke, and from that point nobody knew what happened until his body was retrieved. It is apparent that he went to the big pool without any companion, in violation of the defendant's regulations prohibiting swimming alone or without an attendant. Lifeguard Abaño responded as soon as his attention was called to the emergency, and all available efforts were immediately deployed to revive the victim. The doctrine of last clear chance can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is discovered, at least where any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

• Quasi-delict (Article 2176, Civil Code) — Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. The burden of proving fault or negligence rests on the claimant. The Court applied this by requiring the plaintiffs to prove negligence on the part of the defendant or its employees, which they failed to do.

• Liability for Persons for Whom One Is Responsible (Article 2080, Civil Code) — The obligation to pay damages under quasi-delict is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The Court examined whether the defendant's employees—lifeguards, nurse, and sanitary inspector—were negligent and found they were not.

• Proprietor's Duty of Ordinary Care — Owners of resorts to which the public is expressly or impliedly invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and maintenance of such resorts to make them reasonably safe for visitors. However, a proprietor is not an insurer of patrons' safety, and the death of a patron on the premises does not cast upon the proprietor the burden of excusing itself from any presumption of negligence. The Court found that the defendant had satisfied this standard through its trained personnel, safety equipment, posted regulations, and prompt emergency response.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine — A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine cannot apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered, at least where any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

• "Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not, however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence" — This passage articulates the standard of care applicable to proprietors of recreational facilities and clarifies that no presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact of injury on the premises.

• "Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees." — This states the burden of proof in quasi-delict actions, which the plaintiffs failed to discharge.

• "The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury." — This defines a limitation on the last clear chance doctrine, distinguishing situations where the defendant had no prior negligence contributing to the injury and could not have avoided the harm even upon discovering the peril.

• Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 — Cited as the foundational Philippine case on the last clear chance doctrine, establishing that where both parties are negligent but the defendant's negligence succeeded the plaintiff's by an appreciable interval, the party with the last clear chance to avoid harm is chargeable with the consequences. The Court distinguished the present case because the record did not show how the victim came to be in the big pool, and the defendant's employees acted promptly upon discovery.

• Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil. 517 — Cited for the principle that the burden of proving fault or negligence rests on the person claiming damages.

• Bertalot vs. Kinnare, 72 Ill. App. 52, 22 A.L.R. 635 — Cited as persuasive foreign authority for the proposition that a natatorium proprietor is not an insurer of patrons' safety and that no recovery lies for drowning where the victim was merely last seen alive in the pool and later found lifeless at the bottom, all resuscitation efforts being unavailing.

• Larkin vs. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac. 686 — Cited for the rule that owners of resorts to which the public is invited are bound to exercise ordinary care in maintaining such resorts to make them reasonably safe for visitors.

• O'Mally vs. Eagan, 77 A.L.R. 582, 43 Wyo. 233 — Cited for the limitation on the last clear chance doctrine: it cannot apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided after the peril is discovered.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — Provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, defining quasi-delict. The Court applied it by requiring the plaintiffs to prove the defendant's negligence, which they failed to do.

• Article 2080, Civil Code — Provides that the obligation to pay damages under quasi-delict is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The Court examined whether the defendant's employees were negligent and found they were not.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concurred.