Ong Lay Hin vs. Court of Appeals

The negligence of counsel binds the client, and the client's own failure to monitor the status of the case precludes relief under the gross-negligence exception; a registry return card carries the presumption of regularity and accuracy, and absent rebuttal, the date of receipt stated therein fixes the finality of the judgment.

Petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin and Leo Obsioma, Jr. were parties to a trust receipt agreement with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code punishes estafa for failure to account for or return goods received under a trust receipt. The present controversy concerns the finality and execution of a criminal judgment after appellate review, and the effect of a former counsel's alleged failure to receive notice of a denial of reconsideration.

Henry Ong Lay Hin and Leo Obsioma, Jr. were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City, found that Ong and Obsioma, Jr. failed to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company a total of ₱344,752.20, in violation of their trust receipt agreement with the bank. In its Decision dated February 8, 2000, the trial court convicted them and sentenced them to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Ong filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated March 31, 2000. Ong then filed a Notice of Appeal, which the trial court gave due course, and the records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated November 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals denied Ong's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 14, 2003 for raising mere rehashed arguments.

The Court of Appeals then issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the case became final and executory on May 15, 2003. It based the date of finality on the registry return card corresponding to the mail sent to Ong's former counsel, Zosa & Quijano Law Offices, which showed receipt on April 29, 2003 of the Resolution denying Ong's Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004, the trial court received the original records, the Decision, and the Entry of Judgment, and ordered Ong's arrest. Almost six years later, on February 12, 2010 at about 10:30 p.m., Ong was arrested at Ralphs Wines Museum, No. 2253 Aurora Boulevard, Tramo, Pasay City. He was initially ordered committed to the Cebu City Jail but was later serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison.

On May 6, 2010, Ong filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for preliminary and/or mandatory injunction, seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals' Entry of Judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 24368 and the Regional Trial Court's Order dated March 25, 2004 and Order of Detention dated February 15, 2010 in Criminal Case No. CBU-48773. He alleged that his counsel never received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration; consequently, the Decision never became final and executory, and the Court of Appeals and Judge Gabriel T. Ingles gravely abused their discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment, warrant of arrest, and commitment order. In the alternative, he argued that if his former counsel received the Resolution, counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal, thereby depriving him of due process. The People countered that the registry return card carried the presumption of regularity and accuracy, that the negligence of counsel bound Ong, and that he failed to show specific instances of grave abuse.

• Non-Receipt of CA Resolution: Petitioner alleged that his counsel never received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration, so the Court of Appeals' Decision never became final and executory and the Entry of Judgment was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Grave Abuse by Trial Court: Petitioner maintained that Judge Gabriel T. Ingles gravely abused his discretion in issuing a warrant for his arrest and ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel: Petitioner argued that, assuming his former counsel received the Resolution, counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal the Resolution, thereby depriving him of due process; such negligence should not bind him.
• Injunctive Relief and Bail: Petitioner prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction to be liberated from illegal imprisonment, or alternatively, to be allowed to post bail for provisional liberty while the Petition was pending.

• Presumption of Regularity of Registry Return Card: Respondent argued that the registry return card carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties regularly performed and is accurate unless proven otherwise; it showed Ong's former counsel received the Resolution on April 29, 2003, so the Decision became final and the Entry of Judgment was correct.
• Negligence of Counsel Binds Client: Respondent countered that even assuming the former counsel did not receive a copy, the negligence of counsel binds the client.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent contended that Ong failed to point out specific instances where the Court of Appeals and the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion, so he was not entitled to the writ.
• Bail After Conviction: Respondent argued that bail is premised on the uncertainty of guilt; since Ong's conviction removed that uncertainty, it would be absurd to admit him to bail.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Entry of Judgment: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Warrant of Arrest and Commitment: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest and commitment order against petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel: Whether petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin's former counsel was grossly negligent.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Entry of Judgment: No. The registry return card is an official record evidencing service by mail and carries the presumption of regularity and accuracy; petitioner failed to rebut it, so the Resolution was presumed received on April 29, 2003, and the Decision became final on May 15, 2003 under Rule 51, Section 10.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Warrant of Arrest and Commitment: No. After the Court of Appeals issued the Entry of Judgment and remanded the records, the trial court had the duty to execute the judgment; the warrant and commitment order were proper.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel: No. The negligence of counsel binds the client, and the gross-negligence exception does not apply where the client himself failed to monitor the case; Ong's delay of almost seven years precluded relief.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Entry of Judgment: Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise amounting to evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The registry return card is the official record evidencing service by mail and carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties regularly performed and is accurate unless proven otherwise. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. The affidavits of his wife and mother-in-law stating that his former counsel told them the law office never received the Resolution were inadmissible hearsay under Rule 130, Section 36. Moreover, his former counsel had notice of the denial as early as April 21, 2004, when counsel received a copy of the trial court's Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Since the presumption stood, the former counsel was deemed to have received the Resolution on April 29, 2003. Under Rule 122, Section 6, the 15-day period to appeal commenced from that date. No appeal was filed, so the Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003. Under Rule 51, Section 10, if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk, and the date of entry is deemed the date of finality. The Court of Appeals thus did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Warrant of Arrest and Commitment: The trial court likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion. Since the Court of Appeals had issued the Entry of Judgment and remanded the original records to the trial court, it became the trial court's duty to execute the judgment. The arrest warrant and commitment order were issued in the execution of that final judgment.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel: The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of procedural rules. The exception is when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law. The counsel-client agency is highly fiduciary; counsel is the eyes and ears in the prosecution or defense, and the client engages counsel's skills. The state does not guarantee the kind of service the client expects, and finding good counsel is also the client's responsibility, especially when he can afford it. Some degree of error must be borne by the client who has capacity to make choices. The exception requires negligence so gross, almost bordering on recklessness and utter incompetence, that due process rights were violated. There must be a clear and convincing showing that the client was so maliciously deprived of information that he could not have acted to protect his interests; the error must be both palpable and maliciously exercised. In Bejarasco, Jr. vs. People, the Court reiterated that the exception does not apply when the gross negligence is accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, because the client has the duty to be vigilant and keep himself updated on the status of the case. In Bejarasco, the client failed to file a petition for review within the extended period; the Court rejected his due process argument, noting the 16 months from the Entry of Judgment and 22 months from the trial court's Decision before he appealed, and that an unreasonably long time should have alerted him. Here, Ong took almost seven years, or almost 84 months, from the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file his Petition. He ought to have been alerted by the unreasonably long time the Court of Appeals was taking. He was arrested in Pasay City, not in Cebu where he resides. His failure to know or find out the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of sympathy vis-a-vis the negligence of his former counsel. The Court could not accept a standard of negligence on the part of a client to fail to follow through or address counsel to get updates; either that, or counsel's alleged actions were merely subterfuge to avail a penalty well deserved.

• Negligence of Counsel Binds the Client — The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of procedural rules. The exception applies only when counsel's reckless or gross negligence deprives the client of due process, and even then the gross negligence must not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice. The client has the duty to be vigilant and keep himself updated on the status of the case. In this case, Ong's former counsel's failure to appeal bound Ong; no gross negligence was shown because Ong himself failed to monitor the case for almost seven years.
• Presumption of Regularity of Registry Return Card — A registry return card is the official record evidencing service by mail. It carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties regularly performed and is presumed accurate unless proven otherwise. The Court applied this presumption because Ong failed to rebut it; the date of receipt stated in the card fixed the start of the appeal period and the finality of the judgment.
• Finality of Judgment and Entry of Judgment — Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments, and the date when it becomes executory is deemed the date of its entry. Since no appeal was filed within 15 days from April 29, 2003, the Decision became final on May 15, 2003, and the Entry of Judgment was proper.
• Duty to Execute Final Judgment — Once the Court of Appeals issued the Entry of Judgment and remanded the original records, the trial court had the duty to execute the judgment. The arrest warrant and commitment order were therefore not grave abuse of discretion.
• Hearsay Evidence — Under Rule 130, Section 36, a witness can testify only to facts known of personal knowledge derived from own perception, except as otherwise provided. The affidavits of Ong's wife and mother-in-law, stating that his former counsel told them the law office never received the Resolution, were inadmissible for being hearsay.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power amounting to evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court found none in the Court of Appeals' issuance of the Entry of Judgment or the trial court's execution orders.

• "Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to “monitor the status of [their] case[s],” especially if their cases are taking an “unreasonably long time” to be resolved." — This opening statement frames the Court's core rationale that a client cannot rely entirely on counsel and must monitor the case, especially when resolution is delayed.
• "The registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by mail.” It “carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed [and, therefore,] it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise[.]” Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption." — This passage states the evidentiary basis for finding that Ong's former counsel received the Court of Appeals' Resolution, which made the conviction final.
• "The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of procedural rules. The exception to the rule is “when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law.”" — This is the canonical formulation of the counsel-negligence doctrine applied to deny Ong relief.
• "In the present case, petitioner took almost seven (7) years, or almost 84 months, from the Court of Appeals’ issuance of the Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a Petition before this court. As this court ruled in Bejarasco, Jr., petitioner ought to have been sooner alerted of the “unreasonably long time” the Court of Appeals was taking in resolving his appeal." — This passage applies the doctrine to Ong's own failure to monitor the case, showing why the gross-negligence exception did not apply.

• Bejarasco, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 328 — Controlling precedent reiterated and applied. It holds that the negligence of counsel binds the client; the gross-negligence exception does not apply where the client is also negligent, and the client has the duty to monitor the case. The Court relied on it to reject Ong's due process argument.
• Lagua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173390, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 176 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• Eureka Personnel & Management Services, Inc. vs. Valencia, 610 Phil. 444 (2009) — Cited for the rule that a registry return card is an official record evidencing service by mail and carries the presumption of regularity and accuracy.
• Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253 (1997) — Cited by respondent for the principle that bail is premised on the uncertainty of an accused's guilt and that conviction generally removes that uncertainty. The Court did not resolve the bail issue because it dismissed the petition.

• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which Ong and Obsioma, Jr. were convicted of estafa for failure to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company under their trust receipt agreement.
• Rule 51, Section 10, Rules of Court — Provides that if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments, and the date when it becomes executory is deemed the date of its entry. Applied to hold that the judgment became final on May 15, 2003.
• Rule 122, Section 6, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal must be taken within 15 days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from, and the period is suspended from the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration until notice of the order overruling the motion. Applied to compute the 15-day period from April 29, 2003.
• Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to facts known of personal knowledge derived from own perception, except as otherwise provided. Applied to exclude the affidavits of Ong's wife and mother-in-law as hearsay.

Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. Velasco, Jr. was designated acting member per S.O. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.