Oliveros vs. Villaluz

Before a trial court may order the suspension of an accused public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it must first hold a hearing on the validity of the information; an ex parte suspension order is premature and in grave abuse of discretion. The Secretary of Justice may, in the exercise of supervisory power, reverse the Provincial Fiscal and designate a special prosecutor under Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184, and such action does not make the information defective for lack of preliminary investigation.

Petitioner Jose R. Oliveros was the Municipal Mayor of Antipolo, Rizal. The case concerns the suspension of an incumbent elected local official under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) pending criminal prosecution. The statutory backdrop includes the Secretary of Justice’s supervisory authority over fiscals under the Revised Administrative Code and the designation of special prosecutors under Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184.

On 31 March 1971, an information was filed in the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District, and signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman of Rizal and State Prosecutor Edilberto Barot, Jr.; it was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-753, Rizal (People vs. Jose Rentoria Oliveros, et al.), and charged petitioner Oliveros with violation of Sections 3(a) and 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). In substance, the information alleged that between 1 August 1968 and 31 January 1969 Oliveros, as Municipal Mayor of Antipolo, Rizal, in conspiracy with other persons unknown, in bad faith and with intent to defraud the Government of the Philippine Republic, appointed his brother Simplicio to the position of confidential agent to the office of the mayor, knowing the appointee to be an employee of the Far East Bank & Trust Company, and caused the salary as confidential agent from 1 August 1968 to 31 January 1969, in the sum of P1,080, to be charged to the general funds of the Municipality of Antipolo, without the appointee rendering service nor presenting proof of service, as required by the applicable regulations.

On the same date, 31 March 1971, the presiding judge, respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, without previous hearing, issued an order suspending the accused Oliveros under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The order stated that, considering the information sufficient in form and substance, duly approved by Chief State Prosecutor Emilio Gancayco and filed by State Prosecutor Edilberto Barot, Jr. and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman, they having certified that a preliminary investigation had been conducted in accordance with law; that the accused was given a chance to appear in person or by counsel; and that there was reasonable ground to believe that the offense complained of had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof, Oliveros was ordered suspended from office within twenty-four hours from receipt of the order.

The preliminary investigation antecedents showed that respondent Assistant Fiscal Eliseo de Guzman first conducted a preliminary investigation and recommended to his chief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, that an information be filed for violation of the Anti-Graft law (Republic Act No. 3019). Upon Oliveros’s motion, the Provincial Fiscal had the case reviewed by First Assistant Fiscal Luis Victor and State Prosecutor Joel Tiangco, who later recommended dismissal of the charges, with which Provincial Fiscal Castillo concurred. Castillo, however, on 20 January 1971, submitted the recommendation to quash the charges and the entire record of the case to the Secretary of Justice for review by the Department. The case was referred to State Prosecutor Edilberto Barot, Jr., who, after study, concurred with Assistant Fiscal de Guzman and recommended that the charges be filed. The Department of Justice returned the records to the Provincial Fiscal with instructions to take appropriate action in conformity with the Barot report; but as the Provincial Fiscal considered the action asked of him to be contrary to his convictions, upon his suggestion and request, the Department of Justice by Administrative Order No. 130 designated respondent Barot to handle the case, and thus the information came to be filed.

Oliveros applied to the SC for writs of certiorari and prohibition, pleading grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction, in that (a) the prosecutors who filed the information had no authority to do so, and that they filed it without giving him proper preliminary investigation; and (b) that he was ordered suspended without giving him opportunity to contest the sufficiency of the information.

• Authority of Prosecutors and Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner argued that the prosecutors who filed the information had no authority to do so and filed it without giving him proper preliminary investigation; he claimed that the original charges had been quashed by the Provincial Fiscal and that no information could thereafter be filed against him without another investigation.
• Suspension Without Hearing: Petitioner argued that he was ordered suspended without being given an opportunity to contest the sufficiency of the information.

• Preliminary Investigation and Prosecutorial Authority: Whether the information was filed by prosecutors with authority and after proper preliminary investigation.
• Suspension Under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019: Whether the trial court may order the suspension of an accused public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 without a previous hearing on the validity of the information.

• Preliminary Investigation and Prosecutorial Authority: Yes. The charge of lack of preliminary investigation is without merit, and the Secretary of Justice validly reversed the Provincial Fiscal and designated State Prosecutor Barot as special prosecutor under Section 3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184.
• Suspension Under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019: No. An order of suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 issued without a previous hearing on the validity of the information is premature and in grave abuse of discretion; a hearing on the validity of the information is required before suspension.

• Preliminary Investigation and Prosecutorial Authority: The SC found the charge of lack of preliminary investigation to be without merit. The annexes to the petition and the answer showed that a preliminary investigation was first conducted by respondent Assistant Fiscal Eliseo de Guzman, who recommended to his chief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, that an information be filed for violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Upon petitioner’s motion, the Provincial Fiscal had the case reviewed by First Assistant Fiscal Luis Victor and State Prosecutor Joel Tiangco, who later recommended dismissal of the charges, with which Provincial Fiscal Castillo concurred. Castillo, however, on 20 January 1971, submitted the recommendation to quash the charges and the entire record of the case to the Secretary of Justice for review by the Department. The case was referred to State Prosecutor Edilberto Barot, Jr., who, after study, concurred with Assistant Fiscal de Guzman and recommended that the charges be filed. The Department of Justice returned the records to the Provincial Fiscal with instructions to take appropriate action in conformity with the Barot report; but as the Provincial Fiscal considered the action asked of him to be contrary to his convictions, upon his suggestion and request, the Department of Justice by Administrative Order No. 130 designated respondent Barot to handle the case, and thus the information came to be filed. Petitioner’s claim that the original charges had been quashed by the Provincial Fiscal and that no information could thereafter be filed without another investigation was unfounded. The quashing of the charges never became operative, since the Secretary of Justice, in the exercise of his supervisory power as Department Head under Sections 83, 74 and 76 of the Revised Administrative Code, reversed the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal and designated State Prosecutor Barot to handle the case as special prosecutor, as authorized by Section 3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184. The SC noted that this authority of the Secretary has been repeatedly upheld, citing Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr. and cases cited therein.
• Suspension Under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019: The SC agreed with petitioner Oliveros that the order of suspension issued by respondent Judge Villaluz was premature and in grave abuse of discretion, being contrary to the doctrine set in Luciano vs. Wilson. In that case, upon review of a similar ex parte order of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the SC held that before an order of suspension should be issued, a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elected public official even before his conviction. The SC accordingly set aside the order of suspension and directed the judge to forthwith hold a hearing on the validity of the information. The same rule applied to this case. The SC added that should the court judicially uphold the validity of the information, after due hearing of the parties, it may reissue the suspension order.

• Hearing on Validity of Information Before Suspension Under Section 13, RA 3019 — Before an order of suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 is issued, a hearing on the validity of the information is required, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of suspending an elected public official even before conviction. The SC applied it by setting aside the ex parte suspension order and ordering a preliminary hearing; if the information is upheld after due hearing, the suspension may be reissued.
• Supervisory Power of the Secretary of Justice and Designation of Special Prosecutor — The Secretary of Justice, as Department Head under Sections 83, 74 and 76 of the Revised Administrative Code, may reverse the Provincial Fiscal’s opinion and designate a special prosecutor under Section 3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184. The SC applied it to uphold the information filed by State Prosecutor Barot despite the Provincial Fiscal’s prior recommendation to quash.
• Effect of Secretary of Justice’s Reversal on Prior Recommendation to Quash — A recommendation to quash the charges by the Provincial Fiscal never becomes operative where the Secretary of Justice reverses it in the exercise of supervisory power; the information may thereafter be filed by the designated special prosecutor without another preliminary investigation.

• “before an order of suspension should be, issued, a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elected public official even before his conviction.” — This passage, adopted from Luciano vs. Wilson, states the hearing requirement before suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
• “The quashing of the charges never became operative, since the Secretary of Justice, in the exercise of his supervisory power as Department Head (Sections 83, 74 and 76, Revised Administrative Code), reversed the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, and designated State Prosecutor Barot to handle the case as special prosecutor, as authorized by Section 3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184.” — This passage rejects Oliveros’s claim that the prior quashing of charges barred the information and supports the Secretary of Justice’s authority.
• “It goes without saying that should the court judicially uphold the validity of the information, after due hearing of the parties, it may reissue the suspension order.” — This passage clarifies that the suspension is not permanently barred; it may be reissued after a hearing if the information is upheld.
• “We agree with petitioner Oliveros, however, that the order of suspension issued by respondent Judge Villaluz was premature and in grave abuse of discretion, being contrary to the doctrine set by this Court in Luciano vs. Wilson, L-31347, 31 August 1970 (34 SCRA 638, 643).” — This passage is the SC’s core holding that the ex parte suspension order was premature and in grave abuse of discretion.

• Luciano vs. Wilson, L-31347, 31 August 1970 (34 SCRA 638, 643) — Controlling precedent; the SC followed its holding that a hearing on the validity of the information must precede suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr., L-19611, 27 February 1971, 37 SCRA 640 — Cited to support the Secretary of Justice’s authority to reverse the Provincial Fiscal and designate a special prosecutor.

• Sections 3(a) and 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The information charged petitioner with violation of these provisions.
• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — The SC held that suspension under this provision requires a prior hearing on the validity of the information; the ex parte order was set aside.
• Sections 83, 74 and 76, Revised Administrative Code — Cited as the source of the Secretary of Justice’s supervisory power as Department Head to reverse the Provincial Fiscal’s opinion.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic Act No. 5184 — Cited to authorize the designation of State Prosecutor Barot as special prosecutor; the SC upheld the information filed by him.