Oliveros, Jr. vs. People

For a conviction of Frustrated Murder, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wounds sustained by the victim were fatal or sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention; where the medico-legal officer fails to categorically state that the wounds were fatal, and testifies only that death was "possible" from secondary causes such as infection, the crime is only Attempted Murder.

Petitioners Benjamin and Oliver Oliveros are brothers and pig butchers residing in San Isidro Sur, Binmaley, Pangasinan; their sister Mimielyn Oliveros operates a small meat stall at the public market in Poblacion, Binmaley, and is the live-in partner of co-petitioner Maximo Z. Sotto. The private complainant, Glenn F. Apostol, and his father Virgilio are neighbors of the Oliveros family. The dispute originated from rumors that Glenn had spoken ill of Benjamin's candidacy for Barangay Kagawad, which Mimielyn confronted Glenn about at the public market.

An Information for Frustrated Murder was filed against Benjamin and Oliver Oliveros, alleging that on or about October 30, 2013, at the public market in Poblacion, Binmaley, Pangasinan, the accused, in conspiracy and with intent to kill, took advantage of superior strength while armed with bolos, assaulted Glenn F. Apostol — Oliver holding Glenn from behind while Benjamin hacked his face, after which the accused together with a John Doe mauled him, and Oliver chased and hacked Glenn on the right shoulder — causing hacking wounds on the left zygomatic area, right shoulder, and a lacerated wound on the frontal area, with the crime not resulting in death only by reason of competent medical intervention. Maximo Z. Sotto was later included as an accused by order of the RTC on January 9, 2014, and was arrested on January 12, 2014. All three pleaded not guilty.

According to the prosecution, at about 5:30 in the afternoon of October 20, 2013, Glenn and his father Virgilio went to the public market of Poblacion, Binmaley to buy fish, with Glenn driving the tricycle. Glenn noticed Benjamin following him on a scooter and giving him dagger looks. After Glenn and Virgilio failed to find their preferred fish inside the fish center, they purchased from a sidewalk vendor. Benjamin drove his scooter toward Glenn, stopping with the front wheels between Glenn's legs, and asked why Glenn was staring at him; Glenn answered there was no problem, and Benjamin left. Mimielyn then approached and accused Glenn of spreading malicious talk about Benjamin's candidacy for Barangay Kagawad. Glenn denied the accusation and challenged Mimielyn to file a case. After an exchange of curses, Glenn and Virgilio re-entered the fish center, and Mimielyn called someone on her phone. Moments later, Benjamin and Oliver arrived on a scooter, challenged Glenn to a fight, and suddenly punched him. When Glenn evaded, Oliver held him from behind while Benjamin hacked his face and forehead with a bolo. Thereafter, Benjamin, Oliver, and Maximo — who came from Mimielyn's stall — mauled and kicked Glenn. Benjamin also punched Virgilio above the right eye, causing him to fall, and all three kicked Virgilio. Mimielyn handed a bolo to Maximo, who hacked at Virgilio; Glenn parried the blow with his right hand. Maximo then passed the bolo to Oliver, who hacked Glenn on the right shoulder. Mimielyn strangled Glenn from behind and pulled his hair. Glenn pulled Mimielyn toward him to shield himself and managed to run, but Oliver and Benjamin chased him. Six policemen arrived and arrested Benjamin and Oliver; Maximo and Mimielyn had already left. Glenn and Virgilio were rushed to Lingayen Community Hospital, where Dr. Melquiades Manaois treated hacking wounds on Glenn's left cheek and right shoulder, a lacerated wound on his forehead, and a fracture on the cheekbone. Dr. Manaois testified that without timely medical attention, the injuries could have caused blood loss and infection, which could possibly result in death depending on the victim's bodily resistance.

For the defense, Benjamin testified that Glenn blocked his path at the market and attempted to punch him, but Virgilio held Glenn's hands, allowing Benjamin to leave. Upon learning from Oliver that Mimielyn was in trouble, they returned to the market, where Benjamin saw Glenn kick Mimielyn. Benjamin claimed he hacked Glenn with a bolo from their stall after Glenn punched Oliver, and hacked Glenn again on the upper body when Glenn lifted Mimielyn by her hair. Oliver testified that Mimielyn called him to pick up money for pig purchases and informed him that Glenn was kicking her; upon arrival, he saw Glenn kicking Mimielyn, tried to pacify Glenn, but was punched and lost consciousness. Mimielyn testified that Glenn badmouthed her, lifted her by the waist, and that she called Oliver for help. She denied that Oliver and Maximo hacked Glenn, and claimed that Virgilio threatened to shoot Maximo. The defense witnesses' accounts contained material inconsistencies regarding the sequence of events, whether Mimielyn kept silent or retaliated when badmouthed, whether Benjamin and Oliver arrived together or separately, whether Glenn kicked Mimielyn before or after their arrival, and the precise moment of the hacking.

The RTC found petitioners guilty of Frustrated Murder, crediting the prosecution's version and finding material inconsistencies in the defense testimonies that cast doubt on their veracity. The RTC ruled that intent to kill and abuse of superior strength were sufficiently proven. The CA affirmed, holding that petitioners could not invoke defense of a relative or defense of a stranger for lack of unlawful aggression, that the wounds were mortal based on their location, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.

• Intent to Kill: Petitioners argued that intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.
• Non-Fatal Wounds: Petitioners maintained that the RTC erred in convicting them of Frustrated Murder because the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal, and since the wounds were non-mortal, the crime was committed only in the attempted stage.
• Defense of a Relative and Defense of a Stranger: Petitioners claimed they acted in defense of a relative (Benjamin and Oliver, defending their sister Mimielyn) and in defense of a stranger (Maximo), invoking the justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Passion or Obfuscation: Petitioners alternatively claimed the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, arguing that their acts were provoked by the sight of Glenn attacking Mimielyn.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that petitioners did not only take advantage of their numerical superiority but also armed themselves with bolos to render the victim defenseless, given the huge disparity and inequality of forces between them and the unarmed victim.
• Fatal Wounds: Respondent maintained that the location of the wounds — two of three hack wounds being on the victim's face — unquestionably indicated they were fatal but for timely medical treatment, and that petitioners presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of the physician as an expert witness.

• Conspiracy: Whether petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of the crime.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
• Intent to Kill: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioners' intent to kill the victim.
• Justifying Circumstances: Whether petitioners acted in defense of a relative or defense of a stranger.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated in favor of petitioners.
• Stage of the Felony: Whether the crime committed was Frustrated Murder or only Attempted Murder, given the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was sufficiently established through the series of coordinated acts performed by each petitioner in pursuance of their common unlawful purpose to kill the victim.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Abuse of superior strength attended the commission, as petitioners purposely used bolos — weapons out of proportion to the defense available to the unarmed victim — and took advantage of numerical superiority.
• Intent to Kill: Yes. Intent to kill was proven by the means used, the nature and location of the wounds, the conduct of petitioners before, during, and after the assault, and their pursuit of the fleeing victim.
• Justifying Circumstances: No. The requisites of defense of a relative and defense of a stranger were not proven, there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and no reasonable necessity of the means employed.
• Mitigating Circumstance: No. The elements of passion or obfuscation were absent, as there was no clear evidence that petitioners witnessed Glenn initiate any attack against Mimielyn, and the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings preceding the commission of the offense.
• Stage of the Felony: Attempted Murder, not Frustrated Murder. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wounds were fatal, the medico-legal officer having testified only that death was "possible" from infection or blood loss, not that the wounds themselves were sufficient to cause death.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each accused in pursuance of their common unlawful purpose. The RTC's observation, affirmed by the CA, showed that Oliver punched and then held Glenn from behind, Benjamin hacked Glenn's face, and Maximo — who was at Mimielyn's nearby stall — joined in kicking Virgilio and hacking Glenn. The closeness and coordination of these acts indicated a common purpose or design among all three petitioners, establishing collective responsibility.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: Abuse of superior strength is present not only when offenders enjoy numerical superiority or there is a notorious inequality of forces, but also when the offender uses a weapon out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. Petitioners did not only take advantage of numerical superiority but armed themselves with bolos, rendering the unarmed victim defenseless. The unity of their moves demonstrated deliberate exploitation of superior strength.

• Intent to Kill: Intent to kill is a specific intent that the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds, the conduct of the malefactors, and the circumstances of the crime. Petitioners hacked Glenn three times, two of which were directed at his face; they continued hacking and mauling even after Glenn was wounded and no longer a threat; and they chased him even as he fled. These acts unequivocally demonstrated intent to kill.

• Justifying Circumstances: For defense of a relative or defense of a stranger to prosper, unlawful aggression must first be present, as it is the indispensable element; without it, there is nothing to prevent or repel, and the second requisite has no basis. The defense witnesses' accounts were doubtful and inconsistent — Mimielyn's claim that she called for help while being lifted overhead, Oliver's claim of being punched unconscious without any injury, and Benjamin's assertion that the already-hacked Glenn still lifted Mimielyn were beyond logic and normal human experience. Material inconsistencies among defense witnesses further undermined credibility. Even assuming unlawful aggression existed, the means employed were unreasonable: three petitioners acting in conspiracy and armed with bolos against the bare hands of the victim were not commensurate, even if the victim were allegedly a karate expert.

• Mitigating Circumstance: Passion or obfuscation requires (1) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind, and (2) the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings, and the turmoil from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment that deprives a person of sanity and self-control. Due to the inconsistent defense testimonies, there was no clear evidence that petitioners witnessed Glenn initiate any attack against Mimielyn. What was certain was that petitioners and the victim had a quarrel or fight — insufficient to constitute passion or obfuscation.

• Stage of the Felony: Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator's will; there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution. To convict for Frustrated Murder, the nature of the wounds must be proven fatal, supported by independent proof showing the wound was sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention. Dr. Manaois testified only that the victim "might" lose blood, that the wounds "will get infected," that he "could have tetanus," and that death was "possible" — all contingent on secondary causes (blood loss, infection, tetanus) rather than the wounds themselves. The physician failed to categorically state that the wounds were fatal. The Court cited consistent jurisprudence holding that where nothing in the evidence shows the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful and must be resolved in favor of the accused. Circumstances qualifying criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. The uncertainty on the nature of the wounds warranted appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime, consistent with the fundamental principle that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Distinction Between Frustrated and Attempted Felony — In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all acts of execution which should produce the felony, and the non-accomplishment is due to a cause independent of the perpetrator's will; in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution, with non-fulfillment due to a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance. Applied here: because the prosecution failed to prove the wounds were fatal, it could not be established that petitioners performed all acts of execution that would produce the felony of murder; thus, the crime was only attempted.

• Fatal Wound Requirement for Frustrated Murder — To convict an accused of Frustrated Murder or Homicide, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim must be proven fatal, supported by independent proof showing the wound was sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention. Where the character of the wounds is doubtful — i.e., nothing in the evidence shows the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to — the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, and the crime may be declared as attempted, not frustrated. Applied here: Dr. Manaois testified only that death was "possible" from infection or blood loss, not that the wounds themselves were fatal; accordingly, the conviction was downgraded to Attempted Murder.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each accused in pursuance of their common unlawful purpose. For collective responsibility, it is sufficient that at the time of aggression, all acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design. Applied here: the coordinated acts of Oliver holding the victim, Benjamin hacking him, and Maximo joining the assault established conspiracy.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is present not only when offenders enjoy numerical superiority or there is a notorious inequality of forces, but also when the offender uses a weapon out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. Applied here: three petitioners armed with bolos attacked an unarmed victim, deliberately taking advantage of their superior strength.

• Intent to Kill — Intent to kill is a specific intent that the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds, the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or after the killing, the circumstances of the crime, and the motives of the accused. Applied here: hacking the victim three times, twice on the face, continuing the assault after the victim was wounded, and chasing the fleeing victim demonstrated intent to kill.

• Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Element of Self-Defense — Unlawful aggression is the initial and crucial element of self-defense (including defense of a relative and defense of a stranger); absent unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel, and no justifying circumstance can be successfully interposed. When the accused admits the criminal act, the burden shifts to the defense to prove justifying circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. Applied here: the defense witnesses' doubtful and inconsistent accounts failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

• Passion or Obfuscation — Passion and obfuscation requires (1) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind, and (2) the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings, and the turmoil from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment that deprives a person of sanity and self-control. Applied here: no clear evidence showed petitioners witnessed Glenn initiate an attack on Mimielyn; a mere quarrel or fight was insufficient.

• "It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder or Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death without timely medical intervention." — This passage states the controlling rule distinguishing frustrated from attempted murder based on the fatality of wounds, the central ratio decidendi of the decision.

• "Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine resolving doubt as to the character of wounds in favor of the accused, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence." — This principle underscores that the fatality of wounds cannot be inferred from location alone but must be established by competent evidence, a foundational rule in criminal law applied to downgrade the conviction.

• "A conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of their common unlawful purpose." — This defines the standard for proving conspiracy through circumstantial evidence, applied to find collective responsibility among the three petitioners.

• People vs. Costales, G.R. Nos. 141154-56, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 269 — Followed. The Court ruled that when the character of the wounds is doubtful, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime declared attempted, not frustrated, murder. Applied directly to downgrade petitioners' conviction.

• People vs. Vibal, Jr., G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018, 867 SCRA 370 — Followed. The Court held that where no evidence shows the wound would be fatal without medical attention, the crime is only attempted murder. Applied to the present case where the attending physician's testimony was insufficient.

• Epifanio vs. People, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 552 — Followed. The Court held that absent proof the victim would have died without timely medical attendance, the accused could only be convicted of Attempted Murder.

• Paddayuman vs. People, G.R. No. 120344, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 278 — Followed. The Court held that where the medico-legal officer did not categorically state the wounds were fatal, the accused should be convicted only of Attempted Homicide. Directly analogous to the present case.

• Serrano vs. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 322 — Followed. Although the stab wound could have been fatal (the victim saw his intestines), no exact evidence proved the gravity of the wound, so the Court convicted only of Attempted Homicide. Cited to illustrate that even seemingly grave wounds require categorical medical proof of fatality.

• People vs. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386 — Cited for the proposition that intent to kill may be proven by the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds, the conduct of the malefactors, and the circumstances of the crime.

• Palaganas vs. People, G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533 — Cited for the distinction between frustrated and attempted felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331 — Followed for the proper amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in attempted murder cases.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator's will; there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution. Applied to determine that the crime was only attempted because the wounds were not proven fatal.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates justifying circumstances, including defense of one's person (par. 1), defense of relatives (par. 2), and defense of strangers (par. 3), all requiring unlawful aggression as the first requisite. Applied to reject petitioners' claims of defense of a relative and defense of a stranger for failure to prove unlawful aggression.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder, prescribing reclusion perpetua to death. Applied as the base crime, with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Applied to derive the penalty for Attempted Murder from the penalty for consummated Murder under Article 248.

• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by one degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in a frustrated felony. Referenced in the Information and the RTC decision as the basis for the penalty for Frustrated Murder.

Carandang and Zalameda, JJ., concurred. Rosario, J. was on leave and designated as additional member per Raffle dated January 25, 2021 vice Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.

• Peralta, C.J. — Maintained that petitioners should be convicted of Frustrated Murder, not Attempted Murder. The Chief Justice argued that the testimony of Dr. Manaois — that the victim "might lose blood" and that death was "possible" — already qualified the wounds as fatal, since fatal means "causing death" and the words "might" and "possibly" connote that the injuries can cause death. Citing People vs. Las Piñas, where the physician testified that a gunshot wound "may not be immediately fatal but it could lead to the death of the patient if neglected" and the Court still ruled the crime was frustrated murder, the Chief Justice contended that a categorical statement that "the wounds are fatal" is not necessary; it is sufficient that the wounds could lead to death. The Chief Justice also emphasized that the factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts — which ruled the crime was frustrated murder — should be given great weight absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.