Olbinar vs. Court of Appeals

A person who acts in defense of the person or rights of a spouse, ascendant, descendant, or sibling is justified and incurs no criminal liability when the following concur: (1) unlawful aggression against the person defended; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. The means employed are not unreasonable where the defender, unarmed and facing two assailants who had already subdued and bloodied the victim, had no time to deliberate on the most measured response.

Procerfina Olbinar and Emiliano Olbinar were spouses. In the evening of June 8, 1980, an altercation occurred in Barangay Caliclic, Babak, Davao, involving Emiliano, Fernando Jimenez, and Romeo Cahilog. The case arose from injuries inflicted by Procerfina on Fernando during that incident. The applicable law was the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 11(2) on justifying circumstances for defense of relatives and Article 13(1) on the mitigating circumstance arising when not all requisites for justification are present.

Procerfina Olbinar was charged with serious physical injuries for hacking Fernando Jimenez with a bolo on the evening of June 8, 1980, in Barangay Caliclic, Babak, Davao. The prosecution's version was that a certain Romeo Cahilog was boxing Emiliano Olbinar, Procerfina's husband, and that Fernando Jimenez was trying to break up the assault by pulling Romeo Cahilog from behind. At that point, Procerfina came and with a bolo hacked Fernando "in the right ear"; a second blow aimed at Fernando was parried by the latter with his left hand. Fernando cried out that he had been hacked, after which he lost consciousness. He sustained a wound in the left ear and a broken left forearm.

Procerfina, for her part, claimed she had acted in legitimate defense of her husband. She testified that from the kitchen of her home, she heard her husband shouting for help; she ran to the scene and saw Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog mauling her husband, who was bloodied and down on the ground. She tried to stop the assailants but, not succeeding, ran back to her home, took a bolo, and returned to the scene. Fernando Jimenez intercepted her and tried to grab the bolo from her. To avoid being disarmed, she wildly brandished the bolo and in the process hit Jimenez, thus succeeding in stopping the attack on her husband.

The trial court conceded that there was unlawful aggression by Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog against Procerfina's husband, Emiliano. The court was aware of Criminal Case No. 877, also pending before it, where Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog were charged with physical injuries in the same incident, and in which both entered a plea of guilty and were sentenced accordingly. The criminal complaint in that case, dated June 18, 1980, alleged that the two accused, confederating and helping one another, attacked, assaulted, boxed, and kicked Emiliano Olbinar, hitting him in the face and in different parts of the body while he was sitting on a bench near the store of Procerfina, causing him physical injuries requiring medical attendance with a healing period of ten days. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the means employed by Procerfina were not reasonably necessary, considering the prosecution's story that she hacked Fernando twice, directed at the head, with a bolo, at the height of anger. The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, noting that Fernando did not appear to be armed, nor did it appear that the life of her husband was under serious threat, yet she used a bolo to hack the complainant at his ear, with another blow wounding the parrying arm and breaking his elbow. The Court of Appeals also ruled that Fernando's version that he was hacked at his head while breaking up the fight was more credible.

• Justifiable Defense: Petitioner argued that she acted in legitimate defense of her husband and should therefore be exculpated, having responded to her husband's cry for help and found him being mauled by two men while bloodied and down on the ground.
• Reasonable Necessity of Means: Petitioner maintained that the means she employed were reasonable under the circumstances, as she was unarmed and no match for either of the two assailants, much less both of them, and had no time to deliberate on a more measured response.
• Credibility of the Victim: Petitioner contended that Fernando Jimenez's version of events was belied by his own plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 877, where he admitted to attacking, boxing, and kicking Emiliano Olbinar together with Romeo Cahilog.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means: Respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the means employed by Procerfina were not reasonably necessary, noting that Fernando Jimenez did not appear to be armed, nor did it appear that the life of her husband was under serious threat, yet she used a bolo to hack the complainant at his ear, with another blow wounding the parrying arm and breaking his elbow.
• Credibility of the Victim's Version: Respondent Court of Appeals ruled that Fernando's version that he was hacked at his head while breaking up the fight between appellant's husband and Cahilog was more credible.

• Justifying Circumstance of Defense of Relatives: Whether Procerfina Olbinar acted in justifiable defense of her husband under paragraph 2, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby incurring no criminal liability.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed: Whether the use of a bolo by Procerfina against Fernando Jimenez constituted reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression against her husband.

• Justifying Circumstance of Defense of Relatives: Yes. Procerfina acted in justifiable defense of her husband, and all the requisites of paragraph 2, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code were present: unlawful aggression by Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog against Emiliano Olbinar, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of provocation on the part of Procerfina.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed: Yes. The means employed by Procerfina were not unreasonable in the premises, considering that without any weapon, she was no match for either of the assailants, much less both of them, and she had no time to analyze the situation and ascertain the most reasonable mode of stopping the assault.

• Justifying Circumstance of Defense of Relatives: The Court found the ruling of the lower courts erroneous, being contrary to the undisputed fact expressly and solemnly admitted by Fernando Jimenez when he and his co-accused, Romeo Cahilog, entered a plea of guilty when arraigned in Criminal Case No. 877 — that at the time they were attacking, boxing, and kicking Emiliano Olbinar, hitting him in the face and in different parts of the body, cooperating with and helping each other. This belied Fernando's protestations that the fight transpired only between Romeo Cahilog and Procerfina's husband, and that he was merely trying to break up the fight and pacify the protagonists. It being incontrovertible that both Romeo Cahilog and Fernando Jimenez attacked Emiliano and beat him up so severely as to cause his incapacity for labor and require medical treatment for ten days or so, it was not improbable, as Procerfina testified, that he had fallen to the ground and his face had been bloodied because of the assault. Procerfina had not seen the commencement of the assault on her husband and had no way of knowing if her husband had given sufficient provocation therefor. All that she saw, on responding to her husband's cry for help, was that he was on the ground, there was blood on his person, and two men were boxing and kicking him.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed: The Court reasoned that after Procerfina had tried vainly to get the men to stop beating her husband, she had gotten a bolo from her home and rushed back to defend her fallen spouse who, for all she knew, was already seriously wounded. Unarmed, and her husband to all appearances already hors de combat, she evidently could offer no reasonable defense, or otherwise cause cessation of the assault on her husband. Whatever might have transpired immediately on her return with the bolo, the fact of the matter is that under the circumstances, she obviously felt the compelling urgency for swift action to stop the assault on her prostrate husband, and there was nothing else she could do towards this end except to try to hit out at his attackers. She must have been near panic; she had no time to think; she had to act, and act quickly. The circumstances certainly afforded her no time to investigate the nature of her husband's injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation, and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which with her bolo she could stop her husband's mauling — whether she should use the flat, not the sharp edge of the weapon, should first announce that she had a bolo and would use it if they did not cease in their nefarious acts, etc. The Court was therefore satisfied that Procerfina had acted in justifiable defense of her husband. In the situation in which she had found herself, she was justified in believing that her husband was the victim of an unlawful aggression by two men, who had gotten the better of him and had already succeeded in bloodying his face and dropping him to the ground; she had no way of knowing if her husband had given provocation for the attack; she herself had not given any such provocation; and the means employed by her were not in the premises unreasonable.

• Defense of Relatives (Article 11(2), Revised Penal Code) — A person who acts in defense of the person or rights of a spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, incurs no criminal liability, provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression against the person defended; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit Procerfina, finding that all three requisites were present.
• Reasonable Necessity of Means — The means employed to prevent or repel unlawful aggression are not unreasonable where the defender, unarmed and facing two assailants who had already subdued and bloodied the victim, had no time to deliberate on the most measured response. The Court held that the circumstances afforded the defender no time to investigate the nature of the victim's injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation, and ascertain the most reasonable mode of stopping the assault.
• Judicial Admission by Plea of Guilty — An express and solemn admission made by a party upon entering a plea of guilty in a criminal case constitutes an undisputed fact that binds that party. The Court relied on Fernando Jimenez's plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 877, where he admitted to attacking, boxing, and kicking Emiliano Olbinar together with Romeo Cahilog, to reject his protestations that he was merely trying to break up the fight.

• "The ruling is obviously erroneous being contrary to the undisputed fact expressly and solemnly admitted by Fernando Jimenez—when he and his co-accused, Romeo Cahilog, entered a plea of guilty when arraigned in Criminal Case No. 877, supra—that at the time they were attacking, boxing and kicking Emiliano Olbinar, hitting (him) in the face and in different parts of the body, cooperating with and helping each other." — This passage establishes the factual foundation for the Court's reversal, using the victim's own judicial admission to disprove his claim that he was merely a peacemaker.
• "She must have been near panic. She had no time to think. She had to act, and act quickly. The circumstances certainly afforded her no time to investigate the nature of her husband's injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which with her bolo she could stop her husband's mauling—whether she should use the flat, not the sharp edge of the weapon, should first announce that she had a bolo and would use it if they did not cease in their nefarious acts, etc." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning on the reasonable necessity of the means employed, emphasizing the exigency of the situation and the defender's lack of time for measured deliberation.
• "The Court is therefore satisfied that Procerfina had acted in justifiable defense of her husband." — This is the core ratio decidendi, stating the Court's conclusion that all requisites of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives were present.

• People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350 — Cited in the footnote regarding the concurrent original jurisdiction of municipal circuit courts with Courts of First Instance in special cases, including assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident upon trial.
• Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834 — Cited in the footnote on the same jurisdictional point.
• People vs. Nazareno, 70 SCRA 531 — Cited in the footnote on the same jurisdictional point.
• Andico vs. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968 — Cited in the footnote for the proposition that appeals from judgments of conviction rendered by inferior courts in the exercise of concurrent original jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance were appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

• Article 11(2), Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. The Court applied this provision to acquit Procerfina, finding that all its requisites — unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of provocation by the defender — were present.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of self-defense, whose first and second requisites (unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed) are incorporated by reference into the defense of relatives under paragraph 2.
• Article 13(1), Revised Penal Code — The mitigating circumstance arising when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are not attendant. The trial court applied this provision to credit Procerfina with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of spouse, a finding the Supreme Court effectively superseded by holding that the justifying circumstance was complete.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.