O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit

When property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one person but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property, a resulting trust arises under Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code; such a trust may be proved by oral evidence, but the proof must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document, and it is imprescriptible for as long as the trustee has not repudiated it.

Petitioner Emilia O'Laco and private respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters, and O Lay Kia had taken care of Emilia when the latter was still young and their mother had died. The respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia, who were Chinese nationals at the time of the purchase in question, had previously acquired a property on Kusang-Loob, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and placed its title in the name of Ambrosio O'Laco, Emilia's older brother, under circumstances identical to those surrounding the Oroquieta property. The spouses explained that they did not place the properties in their own names because, as Chinese nationals during the Japanese occupation, they did not want to execute the required affidavit that they were allies of the Japanese. The Kusang-Loob property later became the subject of a separate reconveyance suit against Ambrosio O'Laco, in which the trial court declared the respondent-spouses the owners, and of a complaint before the Anti-Dummy Board, docketed as Case No. 2424, which exonerated the spouses because the purchases were made in 1943, when the Anti-Dummy Law was not enforceable.

On 31 May 1943, the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd. sold a parcel of land — Lot No. 5, Block No. 10, Plan Psu-10038, situated at Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila — under a Deed of Absolute Sale that named Emilia O'Laco as vendee, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66456 was thereafter issued in her name. According to the respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia, they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property and had merely caused the legal title to be placed in Emilia's name, using conjugal funds for the purchase. They had done the same with an earlier property on Kusang-Loob, Sta. Cruz, Manila, whose title they placed in the name of Ambrosio O'Laco, Emilia's older brother, under similar or identical circumstances; the spouses explained that being Chinese nationals at the time of the purchase, they did not want to execute the required affidavit that they were allies of the Japanese, and because O Lay Kia had taken care of Emilia when the latter was still young, they did not hesitate to place the Oroquieta title in Emilia's name. The spouses kept in their possession the document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies, the receipt of the initial premium of insurance coverage, and real estate tax receipts.

Emilia, for her part, maintained that she had actually bought the property with her own money; that she had left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with the respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping; that when she asked for the return of the documents evidencing her ownership, the spouses told her these had been misplaced or lost; and that in view of the loss, she filed a petition for the issuance of a new title, which the then Court of First Instance of Manila granted on 18 August 1944. Notably, the petitions respectively filed by Emilia and Ambrosio for the Oroquieta and Kusang-Loob properties were both granted on the same day, 18 August 1944, and the orders were recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila at the same time, 2:35 o'clock in the afternoon of 1 September 1944, in consecutive entries, Nos. 246117-18.

Before Emilia married Hugo Luna, O Lay Kia asked her to have the title to the Oroquieta property transferred to O Lay Kia and her husband Valentin, and Emilia assured her that it "would be arranged (maaayos na)" after her wedding. On 17 May 1960, the respondent-spouses learned from the newspapers that Emilia had sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for P230,000.00, with assumption of the real estate mortgage. In the separate Kusang-Loob litigation, the trial court's decision — now final and executory — declared the respondent-spouses owners of that property and ordered Ambrosio O'Laco to reconvey it to them; Ambrosio had also charged the spouses before the Anti-Dummy Board, docketed as Case No. 2424, claiming that they had used his name for the Kusang-Loob property and Emilia's name for the Oroquieta property, an implied admission that Emilia, like him, was merely used as a dummy; the Anti-Dummy Board exonerated the spouses because the purchases were made in 1943, during World War II, when the Anti-Dummy Law was not enforceable.

As to the parties' means, the trial court itself determined that Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia had some money with which they could buy the property; Valentin was the Chief Mechanic of the Paniqui Sugar Mills, was engaged in the buy-and-sell business, operated a gasoline station, and owned an auto supply store as well as a ten-door apartment in Caloocan City. Emilia, by contrast, failed to convince the courts that she was financially capable of purchasing the Oroquieta property: she opened a bank account only in 1946 and began filing income tax returns that same year, while the property was bought in 1943; the spouses had even helped Emilia and her brothers with their expenses and livelihood; and Emilia could give only a vague account of how she raised the purchase money, her narration abounding with "I don't know" and "I don't remember."

• Earnest Efforts Toward Compromise: Petitioners contended that the present action should have been dismissed because the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been exerted, considering that the suit is between members of the same family, pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, with a motion to dismiss available under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
• Absence of Trust Relation: Petitioners argued that no trust relation exists between the parties, Emilia O'Laco having actually bought the property with her own money and having left the documents of ownership with the respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping.
• Laches: Petitioners further argued that even assuming ex argumenti that a trust relation exists, the respondents are already barred by laches.

• Real Vendeeship and Resulting Trust: Respondent-spouses asserted that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property sold in 1943 by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in her name.
• Breach of Trust: Respondent-spouses contended that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and they accordingly sought recovery of the purchase price.

• Earnest Efforts Toward Compromise: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made, the suit being between members of the same family.
• Resulting Trust: Whether a resulting trust was intended by the parties in the acquisition of the Oroquieta property.
• Prescription and Laches: Whether the respondents' action for breach of trust was already barred by prescription or laches.

• Earnest Efforts Toward Compromise: No. Although the complaint was defective for failing to aver earnest efforts toward a compromise, the defect was cured when the respondents introduced unobjected evidence of such efforts, the complaint being deemed amended to conform to the evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
• Resulting Trust: Yes. A resulting trust under Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code was intended by the parties, the legal estate having been granted to Emilia O'Laco while the price was paid by the respondent-spouses for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.
• Prescription and Laches: No. In a resulting trust, prescription does not run for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust; repudiation occurred only upon the sale of the property, and the complaint for breach of trust was filed two months after the respondents acquired knowledge of that sale.

• Earnest Efforts Toward Compromise: The action was admittedly between members of the same family, Emilia O'Laco and O Lay Kia being half-sisters, so the complaint should have averred that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The attempt to compromise, as well as the inability to succeed, is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, and the defect is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action. A plaintiff may, however, be allowed to amend the complaint to correct the defect if the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on the court, the amendment serving only to cure the perceived defect. While the respondent-spouses did not formally amend their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence showing that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made — that O Lay Kia importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the Oroquieta property in the name of the spouses just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna, and that instead of transferring the title, Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. This testimony was not objected to by the petitioner-spouses, so the complaint was deemed amended to conform to the evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. If the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and that evidence supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the complaint, and the insufficiency of the allegations is deemed ipso facto rectified.

• Resulting Trust: Trust relations between parties may be express or implied. Express trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may be either resulting or constructive, both coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest, and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties; they arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold that legal title for the benefit of another. Constructive trusts, on the other hand, are created by the construction of equity to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment, arising contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress, or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Unlike express trusts concerning immovables, which cannot be proved by parol evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral evidence; however, to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document, and it cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.

A resulting trust was intended by the parties under Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code, which provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property, the former being the trustee and the latter the beneficiary. Five circumstances supported this conclusion. First, as stipulated by the parties, the document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies, the receipt of the initial premium of insurance coverage, and real estate tax receipts were all in the possession of the respondent-spouses, who offered them in evidence; O Lay Kia emphatically asserted that these documents remained with her because the land belonged to her. There could be no persuasive rationalization for the spouses' possession of these documents of ownership for seventeen years after the property was purchased in 1943 other than that of precluding its possible sale, alienation, or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any machination or fraud; this continued possession, together with other corroborating evidence, strongly suggested that Emilia merely held the Oroquieta property in trust for the spouses. Second, before buying the Oroquieta property, the respondent-spouses had purchased the Kusang-Loob property with its certificate of title placed in the name of Ambrosio O'Laco, Emilia's older brother, under similar or identical circumstances; the testimony of their former counsel, then Associate Justice Antonio G. Lucero of the Court of Appeals, recounted that Valentin had said he and his wife had already acquired the Kusang-Loob property and would like to place the Oroquieta Maternity Hospital, should the negotiation materialize, in the name of a sister of his wife. The spouses explained that they did not place the properties in their own names because, being Chinese nationals at the time of the purchase, they did not want to execute the required affidavit that they were allies of the Japanese, and because O Lay Kia had taken care of Emilia when she was still young, they did not hesitate to place the Oroquieta title in Emilia's name. The spouses had also instituted a reconveyance action against Ambrosio when he claimed the Kusang-Loob property, and the trial court's decision, now final and executory, declared them owners and ordered Ambrosio to reconvey it. Ambrosio had in turn charged the spouses before the Anti-Dummy Board, docketed as Case No. 2424, claiming that they utilized his name for the Kusang-Loob property and Emilia's name for the Oroquieta property — in effect an implied admission that his sister Emilia, like him, was merely used as a dummy; the Anti-Dummy Board exonerated the spouses since the purchases were made in 1943, during World War II, when the Anti-Dummy Law was not enforceable.

Third, the circumstances by which Emilia obtained a new title by reason of the alleged loss of the old title then in the possession of the respondent-spouses cast serious doubt on the veracity of her ownership: the petitions respectively filed by Emilia and Ambrosio for the Oroquieta and Kusang-Loob properties were both granted on the same day, 18 August 1944, and the orders were recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila at the same time, 2:35 o'clock in the afternoon of 1 September 1944, in consecutive entries, Nos. 246117-18. This coincidence lent credence to the spouses' position that there was in fact a conspiracy between the siblings Ambrosio and Emilia to defraud and deprive the spouses of their title to the two properties. Fourth, until the sale of the Oroquieta property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Emilia actually recognized the trust: when the spouses learned that Emilia was getting married to Hugo, O Lay Kia asked her to have the title transferred to her and her husband Valentin, and Emilia assured her that it "would be arranged (maaayos na)" after her wedding; that answer was an express recognition of the trust, since otherwise she would have refused the request outright, and the petitioners never objected to this evidence nor attempted to controvert it. Fifth, the trial court itself determined that Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia had some money with which they could buy the property; Valentin was the Chief Mechanic of the Paniqui Sugar Mills, was engaged in the buy-and-sell business, operated a gasoline station, and owned an auto supply store as well as a ten-door apartment in Caloocan City. In contrast, Emilia failed to convince the Court that she was financially capable of purchasing the Oroquieta property: she opened a bank account only in 1946 and began filing income tax returns that same year, while the property was bought in 1943; the spouses even helped Emilia and her brothers with their expenses and livelihood; and Emilia could give only a vague account of how she raised the money for the purchase, her narration abounding with "I don't know" and "I don't remember."

• Prescription and Laches: Having established a resulting trust between the parties, the next question was whether prescription had set in. As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene, in a resulting trust the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust; once the resulting trust is repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription. A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing. In Tale vs. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically ruled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years, and not otherwise, thereby modifying previous decisions holding that the prescriptive period was four (4) years. Neither the registration of the Oroquieta property in the name of Emilia O'Laco nor the issuance of a new Torrens title in 1944 in her name in lieu of the alleged loss of the original could be made the basis for the commencement of the prescriptive period, for the issuance of the Torrens title in her name could not be considered adverse, much less fraudulent; precisely, although the property was bought by the respondent-spouses, the legal title was placed in Emilia's name, and the transfer of the Torrens title in her name was only in consonance with the deed of sale in her favor. Consequently, there was no cause for any alarm on the part of the respondent-spouses. As late as 1959, or just before she got married, Emilia continued to recognize the ownership of the respondent-spouses over the Oroquieta property; thus, until that point, the spouses were not aware of any act of Emilia which would convey to them the idea that she was repudiating the resulting trust, and the second requisite was therefore absent. Hence, prescription did not begin to run until the sale of the Oroquieta property, which was clearly an act of repudiation. But immediately after Emilia sold the property — obviously a disavowal of the resulting trust — the respondent-spouses instituted the present suit for breach of trust; correspondingly, laches could not lie against them, for so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition and ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. There is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust. Since the complaint for breach of trust was filed by the respondent-spouses two (2) months after acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action had not yet prescribed.

• Resulting Trust under Art. 1448, New Civil Code — There is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property; the former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. The trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration, not legal title, determines the equitable title or interest, and is presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. The Court applied this provision to hold that a resulting trust arose when the Oroquieta property was bought with the conjugal funds of the respondent-spouses but titled in the name of Emilia O'Laco.

• Classification of Trusts — Trust relations may be express or implied. Express trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts, which arise by operation of law, are either resulting or constructive. Resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold that legal title for the benefit of another. Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment, arising contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress, or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

• Proof of Implied Trusts — Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein, which cannot be proved by parol evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral evidence. However, to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document, and it cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.

• Requisites of Repudiation of a Resulting Trust — A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing. The Court found the second requisite absent because Emilia continued to recognize the spouses' ownership as late as 1959.

• Imprescriptibility of Resulting Trusts Until Repudiation — In a resulting trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust; once repudiated, the resulting trust is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. The Court held that prescription did not begin to run until the sale of the Oroquieta property, which was the act of repudiation, and that the suit filed two months later was timely.

• Laches and Recognition of the Trust — Laches cannot lie against the beneficiary so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, because the beneficiary may rely upon that recognition and ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. There is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust.

• Earnest Efforts Toward Compromise as a Condition Precedent — Under Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it appears that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but have failed. The attempt to compromise, as well as the inability to succeed, is a condition precedent to the filing of such a suit, and the defect is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.

• Amendment to Conform to Evidence — Under Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. If the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and that evidence supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the complaint, and the insufficiency of the allegations is deemed ipso facto rectified.

• "Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another." — This passage states the canonical definition and rationale of a resulting trust, the doctrine on which the entire disposition of the case rests.

• "However, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. It cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof." — This passage fixes the exacting evidentiary standard for proving an implied trust in real property by oral evidence, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent trust litigation.

• "As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene, in resulting trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. Once the resulting trust is repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on prescription, distinguishing resulting from constructive trusts and explaining the effect of repudiation on the prescriptive period.

• "A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing." — This passage enumerates the three requisites of repudiation of a resulting trust, the test applied by the Court in rejecting the defense of prescription and laches.

• Tale vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101028, 23 April 1992, 208 SCRA 266 — Controlling precedent on prescription; categorically ruled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years, and not otherwise, thereby modifying previous decisions holding that the prescriptive period was four (4) years.
• Ramos vs. Ramos, No. L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284 — Source of the requisites of repudiation of a resulting trust applied by the Court; also cited for the definition of express trusts.
• Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500 (1960) — Cited for the rule that in a resulting trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
• Segura vs. Segura, No. L-29320, 19 September 1988, 165 SCRA 369 — Cited for the rule that there is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust.
• Salao vs. Salao, No. L-26699, 16 March 1976, 70 SCRA 65 — Cited for the classification of implied trusts into resulting and constructive trusts, both arising by operation of law.
• Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario, 50 Phil. 110 (1927) — Cited for the evidentiary standard that an implied trust in real property must be proved as fully convincingly as if by an authentic document.
• Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303 (1933) — Cited for the rule that an implied trust cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.
• Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-23102, 24 April 1967, 19 SCRA 756 — Cited for the rule that the attempt to compromise, as well as the inability to succeed, is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family.
• Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-54526, 26 August 1986, 143 SCRA 623 — Cited in support of the rule that a complaint is deemed amended to conform to the evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
• Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76851, 19 March 1990 — Cited for the rule that if the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and that evidence supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, the evidence cures the defects of the complaint.
• Versoza vs. Versoza, No. L-25609, 27 November 1968, 26 SCRA 78 — Cited for the rule that a plaintiff may be allowed to amend the complaint to cure a defect if the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on the court.

• Art. 1448, New Civil Code — Provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property, the former being the trustee and the latter the beneficiary. The Court applied this provision as the basis for holding that a resulting trust arose in favor of the respondent-spouses over the Oroquieta property.
• Art. 222, New Civil Code — Provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but have failed, subject to the limitations in Art. 2035. The Court held that the complaint should have contained this averment, but that the omission was cured by unobjected evidence.
• Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, Rules of Court — The ground for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, cited as the remedy for the defective complaint in a suit between members of the same family.
• Sec. 5, Rule 10, Rules of Court — Provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. The Court applied this provision in deeming the complaint amended to conform to the evidence of earnest efforts toward a compromise.
• Art. 1441, New Civil Code — Cited for the classification of trusts into express and implied.
• Art. 1443, New Civil Code — Cited for the rule that express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein cannot be proved by parol evidence.
• Art. 1457, New Civil Code — Cited for the rule that implied trusts may be established by oral evidence.
• Arts. 1449, 1451, 1452, and 1453, New Civil Code — Cited as specific examples of resulting trusts.
• Arts. 1450, 1454, 1455, and 1456, New Civil Code — Cited as illustrations of constructive trusts.

Justices Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Quiason concurred in the decision.