Office of the President vs. Cataquiz

Accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits may still be imposed on a public officer found administratively liable, notwithstanding the impossibility of enforcing the principal penalty of dismissal due to the officer's prior removal or separation from office, and the dismissal of a criminal case by the Ombudsman does not bar subsequent administrative prosecution for the same acts.

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) is a government corporation created under R.A. No. 4850, tasked with regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay. Its General Manager is a presidential appointee, subject to the direct disciplining authority of the President under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. The respondent, Calixto R. Cataquiz, was appointed General Manager on April 16, 2001. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is the body tasked with investigating administrative complaints against presidential appointees, and its findings are subject to adoption by the Office of the President. The case implicates the interplay between criminal and administrative liability of public officers, the validity of LLDA Board resolutions governing fishpen operations, and the imposable penalties after an officer has already been separated from service.

Calixto R. Cataquiz was appointed General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) on April 16, 2001. On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the LLDA Management Committee and rank-and-file employees submitted to DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun a Petition for the Ouster of Cataquiz on grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management incompetence. Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team, which submitted a Report dated May 21, 2003 finding that Cataquiz may be guilty of acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and violations of several laws and regulations. The team recommended forwarding the case to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). In a Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported prima facie evidence supporting some accusations, noted that Cataquiz had lost leadership credibility, and recommended his relief and investigation by PAGC.

On June 6, 2003, the Concerned Employees of the LLDA (CELLDA), a duly organized employees union, formally expressed support for the ouster petition and called for Cataquiz's immediate replacement. CELLDA thereafter filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before PAGC, charging Cataquiz with violations of R.A. No. 3019, E.O. No. 292, and R.A. No. 6713. The complaint enumerated twelve specific allegations, including direct transactions with 35 fishpen operators without public bidding in violation of LLDA Board Resolution No. 28, unauthorized approval of additional fishpen areas beyond the ZOMAP carrying capacity, condonation of fines and penalties without Board concurrence, dismissal of pending cases without authority, unauthorized disbursement of ₱500,000 from LLDA funds, hiring of consultants without COA concurrence, unauthorized disbursement for gifts to indigent residents, allowing Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company to occupy LLDA facilities without contract or Board approval, direct procurement without bidding, solicitation of patronage for RVQ Productions' film entry, and failure to act promptly on official documents.

PAGC issued a Resolution on December 5, 2003 recommending to the President that Cataquiz be dismissed from the service with accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment and forfeiture of retirement benefits. On December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez as Officer-in-Charge/General Manager by virtue of a presidential appointment dated December 3, 2003. The Office of the President adopted PAGC's findings and recommendations in its Decision dated June 29, 2004, ordering Cataquiz's dismissal. Cataquiz filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial, arguing that his prior removal rendered the issue moot and that he could not be found guilty for violating a resolution foreign to the charges. The OP issued an Amended Resolution on February 10, 2005, imposing only the accessory penalties since the principal penalty of dismissal was no longer applicable. Cataquiz elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the OP's Amended Resolution on January 31, 2008, reasoning that the accessory penalties could no longer be imposed because the principal penalty was not enforced, that Board Resolution No. 68 was unrelated to fishpen awards, and that the acts charged were within Cataquiz's authority as General Manager.

• Review of CA Factual Findings: Petitioners argued that the CA gravely erred in reversing the findings of the OP and PAGC in toto without stating clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor, contrary to the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that the CA's findings were conclusions without citation of specific evidence.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioners maintained that the CA's judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, and that the CA went beyond the issues of the case.
• Contrary Findings: Petitioners contended that the CA's findings were contrary to those of the OP, PAGC, and the DENR Fact-Finding Committee.
• Imposition of Accessory Penalties: Petitioners argued that the OP and PAGC correctly found Cataquiz unfit for public service and did not err in imposing the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
• Typographical Error: Petitioners claimed that the reference to Board Resolution No. 68 instead of No. 28 in the PAGC Resolution was merely a typographical or clerical error that was unfortunately adopted by the OP, and that Cataquiz would not be unduly prejudiced by its correction since he had exhaustively argued against the allegation of violating Board Resolution No. 28 in his counter-affidavit.

• Law of the Case: Cataquiz argued that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal charges against him under the same set of facts constituted the law of the case between the parties, necessitating the dismissal of the petition and supporting the correctness of the CA's decision.
• Correctness of CA Decision: Cataquiz maintained that the CA did not commit any error when it reversed the Amended Resolution of the OP.
• Mootness and Accessory Penalties: Cataquiz contended that his removal from office rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of dismissal impossible, and citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal, he insisted that the accessory penalties could no longer be imposed.
• Invalidity of Board Resolution No. 28: Cataquiz argued that Board Resolution No. 28 was invalid because it was never approved by the President pursuant to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813.

• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Court of Appeals made an incorrect determination of the facts of the case warranting review of its factual findings by the Supreme Court.
• Ombudsman Dismissal as Bar: Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz serves as a bar to the decision of the Office of the President.
• Imposition of Accessory Penalties: Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC and the OP of their decision and resolution.
• Clerical Error in Board Resolution Number: Whether Cataquiz can be charged with a violation of Board Resolution No. 28, despite the clerical error made by the PAGC in indicating the Board Resolution number to be No. 68.

• Review of Factual Findings: Yes. The CA's findings were contrary to those of the PAGC and the DENR investigating team, and were conclusions without citation of specific evidence, falling within recognized exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the CA are binding and conclusive.
• Ombudsman Dismissal as Bar: No. The Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal charges does not bar administrative prosecution, as administrative liability is separate and distinct from criminal liability, and the issue was raised for the first time on appeal.
• Imposition of Accessory Penalties: Yes. Accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment and forfeiture of retirement benefits can still be imposed notwithstanding the impossibility of enforcing the principal penalty of dismissal due to prior removal from office.
• Clerical Error in Board Resolution Number: Yes. The typographical error of citing Board Resolution No. 68 instead of No. 28 is correctable, Cataquiz having been fully apprised from the pleadings that the charge pertained to Resolution No. 28, and the resolution not requiring presidential approval because it merely set guidelines for public bidding of free fishpen areas.

• Review of Factual Findings: While the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition and that factual findings of the CA are binding, several exceptions are recognized, including when findings are contrary to those of lower tribunals, when they are conclusions without citation of specific evidence, and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. Here, the CA's findings were contrary to those of PAGC and the DENR investigating team, both of which found substantial evidence of Cataquiz's violations. The CA cavalierly absolved Cataquiz in a single paragraph declaring that the acts were within his authority as General Manager, without any analysis of the evidence or comprehensive discussion. This violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based. Findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence — defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion — are binding and conclusive. The Court found substantial evidence supporting PAGC's determination across multiple allegations, including revenue loss of ₱755,700 from direct fishpen transactions, unauthorized condonation of fines, dismissal of pending cases without authority, hiring of consultants without COA concurrence, and allowing Phil-Tai to occupy LLDA facilities without contract or Board approval.

• Ombudsman Dismissal as Bar: Cataquiz never raised the Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal charges before the CA, despite the Ombudsman having promulgated its resolution on November 30, 2004, more than three months before he filed his CA petition on March 2, 2005. Issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as doing so would disregard basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. Even overlooking this procedural lapse, the argument would still fail. The Ombudsman's resolution pertained only to criminal charges under Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 (malversation and fraud), not to the administrative case. Under the three-fold responsibility rule, a public official may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for the same act, and administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. The difference lies in the quantum of evidence required, the procedure observed, and the sanctions imposed, as well as the principle that a single act may give rise to both criminal and administrative liability. The dismissal of the criminal case therefore does not foreclose administrative action.

• Imposition of Accessory Penalties: Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite his prior removal, Cataquiz could still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General Manager and made to suffer the corresponding penalties. As a presidential appointee, Cataquiz was under the direct disciplining authority of the President, whose power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. The Court rejected Cataquiz's argument that because the principal penalty of dismissal could no longer be enforced, the accessory penalties must likewise fall under the rule that the accessory follows the principal. Citing In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico and Pagano vs. Nazarro, Jr., the Court held that even when separation from service makes the principal penalty of dismissal impossible to impose, accessory penalties of disqualification to hold government office and forfeiture of benefits may still be imposed if the officer is found guilty of administrative offenses.

• Clerical Error in Board Resolution Number: The reference to Board Resolution No. 68 instead of No. 28 in the PAGC Resolution was unmistakably a typographical error. The Affidavit Complaint filed by CELLDA and Cataquiz's own Counter-Affidavit before PAGC both referred to Board Resolution No. 28, which approved policy guidelines for public bidding of remaining free fishpen areas in Laguna de Bay. Cataquiz had argued extensively that Resolution No. 28 was an invalid exercise of legislative power, demonstrating full awareness of the true charge. Pursuant to the rule that judgment should be in accordance with the allegations and evidence presented, clerical errors in a decision may be rectified even after finality by reference to the pleadings and findings. The CA erred in sustaining Cataquiz's argument that Board Resolution No. 28 required presidential approval under Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813. That provision requires presidential approval only for rules and regulations governing fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay. Board Resolution No. 28 merely set guidelines for public bidding of residual free fishpen areas and did not regulate fisheries development activities, rendering the requirement of presidential approval inapplicable.

• Three-fold Responsibility Rule — A public official may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for the same act or omission. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability, differing in the quantum of evidence required, procedure observed, and sanctions imposed. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative prosecution for the same acts.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Cases — Findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered with and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court provided there is substantial evidence to support such findings. Substantial evidence is defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion" or "evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs."

• Imposition of Accessory Penalties Despite Separation from Service — Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Even when the principal penalty of dismissal can no longer be enforced due to the officer's prior separation from service, accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits may still be imposed.

• Exceptions to the Rule on Review of Factual Findings in Rule 45 Petitions — While factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court in a Rule 45 petition, ten recognized exceptions exist, including: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) grave abuse of discretion; (4) judgment based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) conflicting findings; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues and the same is contrary to admissions of both parties; (7) when findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence; (9) when facts set forth in the petition are not disputed by respondents; and (10) when CA findings are premised on supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

• Corrections of Clerical Errors in Decisions — Clerical errors or ambiguities in a decision can be rectified even after the judgment has become final by reference to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court, pursuant to the rule that judgment should be in accordance with the allegations and the evidence presented.

• "It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act." — This passage articulates the three-fold responsibility rule, the doctrinal basis for holding that the Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal charges does not bar administrative prosecution.

• "Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office." — This is the ratio decidendi on the accessory penalties issue, establishing that separation from service does not preclude imposition of accessory penalties.

• "Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based." — This passage identifies the constitutional infirmity in the CA's decision, grounding the Court's willingness to review the CA's factual findings despite the general rule against doing so in Rule 45 petitions.

• "Clerical errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the judgment has become final by reference to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court." — This passage states the rule permitting correction of clerical errors in judgments, applied to rectify PAGC's erroneous citation of Board Resolution No. 68 instead of No. 28.

• Modesto vs. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010 — Cited for the proposition that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition and for the enumerated exceptions to the rule that CA factual findings are binding and conclusive.
• People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010 — Cited for the elaboration on the distinction between administrative and criminal liability, including differences in quantum of evidence, procedure, and sanctions, and the principle that a single act may give rise to both criminal and administrative liability.
• In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010 — Cited as controlling authority for the imposition of accessory penalties (forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re-employment) despite the resignation of the guilty employee making the principal penalty of dismissal impossible to enforce.
• Pagano vs. Nazarro, Jr., G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007 — Cited for the holding that a case is not moot despite separation from government service, as accessory penalties of disqualification to hold office and forfeiture of benefits may still be imposed.
• Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil. 961 (1997) — Cited for the principle that the President's power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, pursuant to Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the corrupt practice of causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Applied to find Cataquiz liable for transactions with Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company and direct fishpen dealings causing revenue loss.
• Section 46(b)(27), Chapter VI, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Classifies conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as a ground for disciplinary action. Applied as the administrative law basis for Cataquiz's dismissal.
• Section 7(d), Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Prohibits solicitation or acceptance of gifts, gratuities, or favors in the course of official duties. Found not violated by the film promotion itself, but the use of government vehicles for a private entity's benefit was deemed prejudicial to the service.
• Section 4(k), Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 — Requires presidential approval for rules and regulations governing fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay. Construed as inapplicable to Board Resolution No. 28, which merely set guidelines for public bidding of free fishpen areas and did not regulate fisheries development activities.
• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based. Applied to find the CA's one-paragraph absolution of Cataquiz constitutionally deficient.
• Section 212, Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) 86 — Requires prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit and the Solicitor General or Government Corporate Counsel for the hiring of private law practitioners. Applied to find Cataquiz's engagement of consultants without COA concurrence administratively liable.

• Diosdado M. Peralta (Acting Chairperson)
• Lucas P. Bersamin (designated as additional member per Raffle dated September 12, 2011)
• Roberto A. Abad
• Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011)