Office of the President vs. Carandang

The President possesses no administrative or disciplinary authority over a Deputy Ombudsman, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 having been declared unconstitutional in the Second Gonzales Decision for contravening the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and this ruling binds as stare decisis.

The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally independent office created under Article XI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, designed to be insulated from political pressure and executive control. Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) purportedly granted the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and after due process. In Gonzales III vs. Office of the President (725 Phil. 380, 2014), the Court initially upheld this provision but reversed itself on reconsideration, declaring Section 8(2) unconstitutional insofar as it granted the President disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman, while maintaining its validity as regards the Special Prosecutor. The constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman was understood as freedom from executive control, supervision, or political influence, analogous to the independence enjoyed by the Constitutional Commissions. Melchor Arthur H. Carandang served as Overall Deputy Ombudsman, appointed on October 14, 2013, for a seven-year term expiring in 2020. When then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales inhibited herself from all complaints related to then President Rodrigo R. Duterte due to her relation by affinity to the President's daughter, Carandang took over the complaint filed by former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV against Duterte.

On May 5, 2016, former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV filed a complaint against then President Rodrigo R. Duterte with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging him with malversation, violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), plunder, and alleged unexplained accumulated wealth. Then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales inhibited herself from all complaints related to Duterte on account of her relation by affinity to the President's daughter, and consequently, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang took over the complaint. On February 21, 2017, Trillanes requested the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to release all alleged flagged or reported bank transactions of Duterte and his family, but the AMLC denied the request, citing Republic Act No. 1405 (the Bank Deposit Secrecy Law), which absolutely prohibits inquiry into bank deposits except under strictly construed exceptions not present in the case. On August 17, 2017, Carandang sent a letter to the AMLC requesting investigation of the accounts identified by Trillanes.

On September 27, 2017, Carandang gave an ambush interview to news anchor Henry Omaga-Diaz and Philippine Daily Inquirer reporter Nikko Dizon at the canteen of the Ombudsman Building. When the interview was broadcast, Carandang was reported to have claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman possessed documentary proof purportedly exposing the ill-gotten wealth of Duterte and his family, including bank transaction records allegedly transmitted by the AMLC. He stated: "We can confirm that we received bank transactions coming from AMLC, bank transactions generated by AMLC," and went on to reference various amounts, using speculative qualifiers such as "baka" and "siguro." He also intimated that these documents surfaced in connection with the investigation initiated following Trillanes's complaint. The very next day, September 28, 2017, the AMLC Secretariat issued a statement declaring that it was not the source of the documents and information exposed by Trillanes, that it had not provided the Office of the Ombudsman with any report as a consequence of any investigation, and that it had yet to evaluate Carandang's August 17, 2017 letter. The AMLC further stated that the amounts disclosed were wrong and misleading, as the alleged debits and credits had been added together, producing erroneous totals.

Two administrative complaints were subsequently filed against Carandang before the Office of the President. The first, dated October 3, 2017, was filed by Attys. Manuelito R. Luna and Eligio P. Mallari, while the second, dated August 15, 2018, was filed by Attys. Jacinto V. Paras and Glenn A. Chong. Both charged Carandang with graft and corruption under Sections 3(e) and (k) of Republic Act No. 3019, grave misconduct, gross negligence, serious dishonesty constituting betrayal of public trust, and unauthorized disclosure of information under various laws and rules. On January 26, 2018, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, issued a Formal Charge against Carandang for betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, and placed him under preventive suspension for 90 days. Instead of filing an answer, Carandang filed a Special Appearance with Manifestation Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam, arguing that Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 had been declared unconstitutional in Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, and that the Office of the President therefore lacked jurisdiction. Notably, the directive to preventively suspend Carandang was not implemented by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales.

On July 30, 2018, the Office of the President issued a Decision finding Carandang administratively liable for graft and corruption and betrayal of public trust, and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties. The OP maintained that the President had disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman as a presidential appointee, and cited Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President to argue that the Court had supposedly abandoned the Second Gonzales Decision. On the merits, the OP found that Carandang improperly disclosed confidential information in violation of Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07 and Republic Act No. 1405, that his disclosure of his alleged source and the figures he presented were false and misleading, and that he exhibited manifest partiality toward Trillanes by broadcasting adverse information against the President while remaining silent about the termination of the investigation favorable to the President. Carandang's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 28, 2019. Upon the retirement of Ombudsman Carpio-Morales, then President Duterte appointed Samuel Martires as the new Ombudsman on July 26, 2018. Pursuant to the OP's Decision, Ombudsman Martires issued an Order on June 14, 2019, directing Carandang to cease and desist from performing his functions as Overall Deputy Ombudsman and declaring his post vacant. Carandang thereafter filed a Verified Petition for Review before the CA, which granted the petition on November 18, 2021, applying the doctrine of stare decisis and holding that the Second Gonzales Decision squarely governed the controversy. The CA found the OP's Decision and Resolution void for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed the complaints without prejudice to re-filing before the proper forum. The OP's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 5, 2022, prompting the present petition before the Supreme Court.

• Constitutional Basis for Presidential Disciplinary Authority: The Office of the President argued that Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution draws a clear line between impeachable officers and those whose removal shall be "as provided by law," and that the Deputy Ombudsman, not being subject to impeachment, falls under the latter category, whose removal may be governed by statute.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Petition contended that Section 8(2) in relation to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants the President concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction with the Ombudsman over a Deputy Ombudsman, and that this concurrent power does not undermine the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman but functions as a measure of check and balance.
• Reliance on Agustin-Se: The Office of the President cited Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President to argue that the Court had supposedly abandoned the Second Gonzales Decision, as the Court in Agustin-Se confirmed the OP's assumption of jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and concurred with its ruling.
• Justification for Exercise of Authority: The Petition asserted that the exercise of disciplinary authority over Carandang was even more warranted given Ombudsman Carpio-Morales's inhibition and unwillingness to implement Carandang's preventive suspension.
• Administrative Liability on the Merits: Even if the CA no longer ruled on Carandang's administrative liability, the Petition nonetheless argued that the OP was correct in finding Carandang liable for graft and corruption and betrayal of public trust based on his disclosure of confidential information, false statements, and manifest partiality.

• Lack of Presidential Jurisdiction: Carandang argued that Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770, the provision granting the President administrative disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, had been declared unconstitutional by the Court in the Second Gonzales Decision, and that the Office of the President therefore had no authority to issue the Formal Charge or order his preventive suspension.
• No Administrative Liability: Assuming arguendo that the OP possessed jurisdiction, Carandang refuted the finding that he betrayed public trust and committed acts amounting to graft and corruption, maintaining that his statements during the televised interview were qualified with speculative terms and reflected the preliminary nature of the investigation.
• Violation of Due Process: Carandang submitted that the OP's Decision and Resolution were issued in violation of his right to due process.
• Mootness Disputed: In response to the OSG's argument that the Verified Petition before the CA was rendered moot by Ombudsman Martires's Order, Carandang claimed he was not furnished a copy of the Order and only learned of it upon receiving the OSG's Comment, and maintained that the validity of the Order remained subordinate to the determination of whether the OP's findings were valid.

• Stare Decisis: Whether the CA was correct in applying the doctrine of stare decisis and in following the Second Gonzales Decision despite the Office of the President's reliance on Agustin-Se.
• Presidential Disciplinary Authority: Whether the President has the authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or at least to exercise administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over them.
• Administrative Liability: Whether Carandang is administratively guilty of graft and corruption and betrayal of public trust.

• Stare Decisis: Yes. The CA correctly applied the doctrine of stare decisis, the Second Gonzales Decision having declared Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional and that ruling having become part of the legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
• Presidential Disciplinary Authority: No. The President possesses no administrative or disciplinary authority over a Deputy Ombudsman, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 having been declared unconstitutional for contravening the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
• Administrative Liability: No. Even assuming arguendo that the OP possessed jurisdiction, the claims of Carandang's administrative liability are tenuous at best, his statements during the interview not meeting the threshold for graft and corruption or betrayal of public trust.

• Stare Decisis: The doctrine of stare decisis compels courts to adhere to settled decisions in cases involving similar facts and circumstances, ensuring stability, certainty, and integrity in the administration of justice. Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system. When the Second Gonzales Decision was promulgated on January 28, 2014, its declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 became woven into the fabric of fundamental law. The OP's reliance on Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President was erroneous: in that case, the OP's disciplinary jurisdiction was never put in issue because the complaint was dismissed and no administrative sanction was imposed, rendering any opinion on the constitutionality of Section 8(2) mere obiter. Moreover, Agustin-Se was a Third Division decision, and under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. The Second Gonzales Decision, having been decided en banc, could not be revisited or disturbed by a division ruling. The Court found no compelling reason to depart from the established doctrine, all the more so when the President's own conduct was in issue, underscoring the enduring need to shield the Office of the Ombudsman from political influence.

• Presidential Disciplinary Authority: The Second Gonzales Decision traced the history of the Office of the Ombudsman and established that its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed under Article XI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, an institutional response to the encroachments and excesses experienced under Martial Law. This independence means freedom from executive control, supervision, or political influence, analogous to the independence of the Constitutional Commissions. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirmed the intent to keep the Office of the Ombudsman separate from the President, with Commissioner Monsod emphasizing that the Tanodbayan under the President's influence had been ineffectual. The Court recognized that executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman would create an absurd situation where the Office is tasked with adjudicating the integrity of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members. The inhibition of Ombudsman Carpio-Morales effectively positioned Carandang as Acting Ombudsman for cases involving Duterte, making it a constitutional paradox for the President to sanction an official empowered to hold him to account. The arguments raised in the Petition regarding Congress's power to determine the manner of removal of non-impeachable officers and the check-and-balance rationale were already adequately addressed in the Second Gonzales Decision, and the Court deemed it improper to revisit them.

• Administrative Liability: Even assuming arguendo that the OP possessed jurisdiction, the Court found the administrative liability claims tenuous. Carandang's statements during the televised interview more closely resembled observations by an official whose mandate includes investigating all public officials, including the President, for the purpose of pursuing criminal proceedings or filing a verified complaint for impeachment when warranted. His comments were qualified with speculative terms such as "baka" and "siguro," and referenced other individuals through the pronoun "nila," demonstrating the absence of wrongful intent. The figures and documents he was evaluating were supplied by the reporter and had not been vetted by the Office of the Ombudsman. The OP's finding of manifest partiality under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, based on Carandang's failure to publicize the termination of the investigation favorable to the President, was rejected: the interview was largely upon the insistence of the press, over which Carandang had no control, and he could not be expected to grant further interviews once administrative complaints had been filed. Regarding the allegedly false statements about receiving AMLC records, Carandang clarified that he mentioned receipt of bank transactions generated by the AMLC, not an "investigation report," since the AMLC had not yet responded to his August 17, 2017 letter. The Court likewise found infirm the Ombudsman's June 14, 2019 Order implementing the dismissal, as it was issued solely in reliance on the OP's void Decision and Resolution without any independent evaluation or opportunity for Carandang to be heard. However, reinstatement was not possible as Carandang's term expired in 2020. With the OP's Decision and Resolution voided, the accessory penalties were rendered without force or effect, entitling Carandang to retirement benefits and back salaries up to the end of his term.

• Stare Decisis — The doctrine of stare decisis, meaning "to stand by things decided," compels courts to adhere to settled decisions in cases involving similar facts and circumstances. It rests on the fundamental need for stability, certainty, and integrity in the administration of justice. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines under Article 8 of the Civil Code. Once the Court en banc declares a provision unconstitutional, that ruling becomes part of the fabric of fundamental law and binds lower courts and divisions of the Court. A division decision cannot overturn or modify an en banc ruling under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.

• Constitutional Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman — The Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional office whose independence is expressly guaranteed under Article XI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This independence means freedom from executive control, supervision, or any form of political influence, analogous to the independence enjoyed by the Constitutional Commissions. The President possesses no administrative or disciplinary authority over a Deputy Ombudsman, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 having been declared unconstitutional for contravening this independence. The power to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman lies exclusively with the Ombudsman. Allowing the President to discipline officials charged with investigating potential wrongdoing within the administration invites retaliation, coercion, and the suppression of oversight.

• Distinction Between En Banc and Division Rulings — Under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. A Third Division decision cannot impliedly abandon or overturn an en banc ruling, even if the division decision is promulgated later and makes no reference to the en banc precedent.

• "By constitutional design, the President possesses no administrative or disciplinary authority over a Deputy Ombudsman. Moreover, even on the merits, the claims of Carandang's administrative liability are tenuous at best, lacking a firm foundation in fact or law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, articulating both the jurisdictional and merits-based grounds for denying the petition.

• "the Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members." — Quoted from the Second Gonzales Decision, this passage articulates the core constitutional rationale for insulating the Office of the Ombudsman from presidential disciplinary authority.

• "Allowing the President to unilaterally discipline officials charged with investigating potential wrongdoing within the administration invites retaliation, coercion, and the suppression of oversight, conditions fundamentally at odds with transparency and accountability." — This passage explains the practical consequences of permitting executive disciplinary authority over the Ombudsman's deputies, reinforcing the constitutional design of checks and balances.

• "From that point forward, it has been settled that the President holds no power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, even on grounds that may constitute an impeachable offense, and even where due process appears to have been observed." — This passage defines the scope and absoluteness of the constitutional prohibition on presidential removal of a Deputy Ombudsman as established by the Second Gonzales Decision.

• Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, 694 Phil. 52 (2012) (First Gonzales Decision) — The initial ruling upholding the validity of Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770, recognizing concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the President over a Deputy Ombudsman. The Petition cited this decision to support its argument, but the Court treated it as superseded.

• Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, 725 Phil. 380 (2014) (Second Gonzales Decision) — The controlling en banc precedent, promulgated on January 28, 2014, which declared Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional insofar as it granted the President disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. The Court applied this as binding stare decisis, finding no compelling reason to depart from it.

• Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President, 780 Phil. 371 (2016) — A Third Division decision cited by the OP to argue abandonment of the Second Gonzales Decision. The Court distinguished it, holding that the OP's disciplinary jurisdiction was never in issue because the complaint was dismissed, rendering any opinion on Section 8(2)'s constitutionality mere obiter, and that a division ruling cannot overturn an en banc precedent.

• Brillantes, Jr. vs. Yorac — Cited in the Second Gonzales Decision to establish that Constitutional Commissions characterized as "independent" are not under the control of the President, supporting the analogy to the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Bautista vs. Senator Salonga — Cited in the Second Gonzales Decision for the proposition that the tenure of commissioners of an independent constitutional body cannot be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

• Dela Cruz vs. Malunao — Cited by the Office of the President for the definition of misconduct and corruption as elements of grave misconduct; the Court referenced this in recounting the OP's findings.

• Article XI, Section 5, 1987 Constitution — Creates the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman, one Overall Deputy, and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The Court relied on this provision to establish the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman from executive control.

• Article XI, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed only by impeachment, and that all other public officers and employees may be removed as provided by law but not by impeachment. The Petition invoked this provision to argue that the Deputy Ombudsman, as a non-impeachable officer, may be removed by statute.

• Article VIII, Section 4(3), 1987 Constitution — Provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. The Court applied this provision to hold that the Second Gonzales Decision, having been decided en banc, could not be overturned by the Third Division's ruling in Agustin-Se.

• Section 8(2), Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provided that a Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and after due process. Declared unconstitutional in the Second Gonzales Decision insofar as it granted the President disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.

• Section 21, Republic Act No. 6770 — Grants the Office of the Ombudsman disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government except over officials removable only by impeachment, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. The Petition argued this provision established concurrent jurisdiction with the President.

• Article 8, Civil Code — Provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court cited this as the basis for the binding effect of the Second Gonzales Decision as stare decisis.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The OP found Carandang liable under this provision; the Court rejected this finding.

• Section 3(k), Republic Act No. 3019 — Penalizes divulging valuable information of a confidential character acquired by official position to unauthorized persons. The OP found Carandang liable under this provision; the Court found the liability claim tenuous.

• Section 2, Rule V, Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07 — Limits public disclosure by the Office of the Ombudsman to the filing of a complaint and the final resolution, decision, or action taken thereon. The OP found Carandang violated this provision; the Court found the liability claim tenuous.

• Republic Act No. 1405 (Bank Deposit Secrecy Law) — Provides that all bank deposits and transactions related thereto are absolutely confidential. The AMLC cited this law in denying Trillanes's request for bank transaction records.

• Section 22, Republic Act No. 6770 — Grants the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment if warranted. The Court cited this provision to contextualize Carandang's mandate to investigate the President.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.