Office of the Ombudsman vs. Santos

Administrative liability is determined by the substantial evidence rule; a finding of guilt must be sustained where the record contains such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Further, a public official or employee is prohibited from engaging in the private practice of a profession during incumbency unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law, and such practice is absolutely barred when it conflicts or tends to conflict with official functions.

Estrelita L. Gumabon, a teacher at Lagro Elementary School, filed a complaint against the school principal, Florentina A. Santos, before the Office of the Ombudsman in 1997. Gumabon alleged that Santos falsified her daily time record by recording a full day’s work on August 20, 1997, while actually attending a Linggo ng Wika program at Golden Child Montessori, a private school of which Santos was an incorporator and President/Chairman. The complaint further charged Santos with rude and oppressive behavior toward staff and parents, and with taking surplus government galvanized iron sheets from the school for her personal use.

• The Complaint and the Charges: Gumabon, a Teacher III at Lagro Elementary School, filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Santos, the school principal. The complaint alleged that on August 20, 1997, Santos indicated in her Civil Service Form No. 48 (daily time record) that she reported for work at Lagro Elementary School from 6:45 a.m. to 7:15 p.m., but she actually spent the day attending the Linggo ng Wika celebration at Golden Child Montessori Dela Costa III Annex in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, arriving there around 9:00 a.m. and later proceeding to its Carissa II Annex. The complaint also identified Santos as one of the owners/incorporators and the President/Chairman of Golden Child Montessori, a private school. Additional allegations described Santos’s rude and oppressive behavior toward teachers, staff, and parents. A supplemental complaint charged Santos with ordering the taking of galvanized iron sheets used in school repairs and having them delivered to her residence.

• Proceedings before the Ombudsman: In her answer, Santos claimed that she routinely inspected the school’s outer premises before entering the grounds, accounting for discrepancies with the security guard’s logbook. Regarding August 20, 1997, she asserted that she obtained permission from the District Supervisor to attend the private school activity. She admitted her role as an owner/incorporator of Golden Child Montessori but denied any legal violation. On the missing galvanized iron sheets, she maintained that they were excess materials from a construction project, sold to her by the contractor at cost.

• Complainant’s Evidence: Gumabon presented Santos’s daily time record for August 1997, the security guard’s logbook, and a memorandum issued by Santos to principals of Golden Child Montessori annexes. Hermelina de Vera, former principal of Golden Child Montessori Dela Costa III Annex, testified that Santos attended the Linggo ng Wika program at their campus on the morning of August 20, 1997. Zaida Zayde, corporate secretary of the private school, confirmed Santos’s active role in managing finances, signing checks, and issuing memoranda. Jeorgia Loperez, another incorporator, corroborated Santos’s position as President/Chairman. Janitress Sophia Amparo testified that Santos instructed her to accompany Jose Sabalilag to deliver several galvanized iron sheets to Santos’s house. Sabalilag himself later admitted in testimony that he took about eight pieces of new galvanized iron sheets to respondent’s house upon her instruction. Security Guard Willy Casauay noted the removal of iron sheets in his logbook. Other witnesses testified to Santos’s refusal to relay an emergency phone call to a security guard and her unreasonable exclusion of a food vendor from the school premises.

• Respondent’s Evidence: Jose Sabalilag testified that he used approximately forty galvanized iron sheets for a comfort room renovation, that about eight excess new sheets were taken to Santos’s house on her order, and that forty-one used sheets taken to a storage facility were returned to the school the next day at the instance of a Commission on Audit (COA) personnel. Benedict Guantero, a COA employee, testified that Santos had consulted him about salvageable materials from the renovated toilets. Erlinda Dela Rosa, former Officer-in-Charge of Golden Child Montessori, claimed that the school’s branches were managed independently by their respective principals, implying Santos’s role was not operational.

• Ombudsman’s Factual Conclusions: The Ombudsman found that Santos deliberately made it appear in her daily time record that she was present at Lagro Elementary School on August 20, 1997, when she was actually at the private school in Bulacan, constituting dishonesty. The charge of being an incorporator/owner of a private school was not deemed a violation because no conflict of interest was proven. The oppression charge was established by the unrebutted testimony that Santos refused to give an emergency call to a security guard. The misappropriation of government property was deemed substantially proven: Santos caused about eight new galvanized iron sheets to be taken to her residence, amounting to grave misconduct.

• Substantial Evidence Exists: The Office of the Ombudsman argued that the testimonial and documentary evidence on record constituted more than substantial evidence to establish respondent’s administrative guilt for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and violation of R.A. 6713.
• Finality of Administrative Findings: Petitioner maintained that under settled jurisprudence, the factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but finality, and the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Respondent contended that the Ombudsman’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, as the Court of Appeals correctly determined, and that the evidence adduced by complainant failed to meet the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.

• Substantial Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Ombudsman’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
• Private Practice of Profession: Whether respondent’s active involvement in managing Golden Child Montessori while serving as Principal of Lagro Elementary School violated Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. 6713, even though the Ombudsman had dismissed the charge of being an owner/incorporator for lack of proof of conflict of interest.

• Substantial Evidence: The Ombudsman’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The daily time record for August 20, 1997, showing respondent reported for work at Lagro Elementary School, was contradicted by the direct testimony of Hermelina de Vera that respondent was at the private school in Bulacan during the same hours. The charge of oppression was established by the unrebutted testimony that respondent refused to give a security guard an emergency call. The misappropriation of galvanized iron sheets was proven by the testimonies of Sophia Amparo, Willy Casauay, and crucially, respondent’s own witness Jose Sabalilag, who confirmed that about eight new galvanized iron sheets were taken to respondent’s house on her instruction and remained unaccounted for. These pieces of evidence met the standard of substantial evidence — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion — and the Court of Appeals’ reversal was accordingly set aside.

• Private Practice of Profession: The Ombudsman erred in concluding that respondent’s ownership and management of Golden Child Montessori did not violate any law. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. 6713 explicitly prohibits public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, and even then, such practice is prohibited when it conflicts or tends to conflict with official functions. Respondent’s active participation in managing the private school — handling finances, signing checks, issuing memoranda, and acting as President/Chairman — while serving as a government school principal constituted private practice of the teaching profession without authorization. The Court stressed that public servants must devote undivided attention to public duties, and respondent’s dual roles transgressed the prohibition and the ethical standard requiring public interest to prevail over personal interest. Liability under Section 7(b)(2) was thus established, independent of the conflict-of-interest analysis applied by the Ombudsman.

• Substantial Evidence Rule in Administrative Proceedings — The quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt in an administrative case is substantial evidence: such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Factual findings of administrative bodies supported by substantial evidence are generally accorded great respect and finality, and reviewing courts will not substitute their own judgment absent grave abuse of discretion.

• Prohibition on Private Practice of Profession under Section 7(b)(2), R.A. 6713 — Public officials and employees during their incumbency are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law. Even where authorized, private practice is proscribed if it conflicts or tends to conflict with official functions. The policy demands that public servants devote their undivided attention to government service and uphold public interest over personal interest.

• “A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

• “The rule is that all public officers and employees are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The exception is when such private practice is authorized by the Constitution or law. However, even if it is allowed by law or the Constitution, private practice of profession is still proscribed when such practice will conflict or tends to conflict with the official functions of the employee concerned. Indeed, public servants are expected to devote their undivided attention to their public duties, to give the tax payers the competent and excellent service that they deserve.”

• Velasquez v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 150732, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357 — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence; the Supreme Court followed this standard in evaluating the Ombudsman’s factual findings.

• Section 7(b)(2), Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Prohibition on engaging in the private practice of profession during incumbency unless authorized by the Constitution or law; private practice remains proscribed if it conflicts or tends to conflict with official functions. Applied to penalize respondent’s simultaneous management of a private school and service as a government principal.
• Section 4, R.A. 6713 — Enjoins public officials and employees to uphold public interest over personal interest. Cited to underscore the ethical breach in respondent’s divided attention and private management role.
• Section 4(c), R.A. 6713 — Norm of conduct requiring public officials to act with justice and not discriminate. Basis for the finding of oppressive conduct for refusing an emergency call.
• Section 11, R.A. 6713 — Penalty provision for violations of Section 7, imposing imprisonment not exceeding five years, a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos, or both, and disqualification to hold public office at the court’s discretion. Applied to justify the additional fine of five thousand pesos.

Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Adolfo S. Azcuna, and Cancio C. Garcia.