Office of the Ombudsman vs. Reyes

A respondent in an administrative case is denied due process when the deciding body bases its ruling on affidavits that were not disclosed or furnished to the respondent prior to the rendition of the decision, necessitating a remand for further proceedings even if the Ombudsman's factual findings would otherwise be conclusive under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.

Jaime B. Acero applied for a driver’s license at the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Mambajao, Camiguin, where Antonio T. Reyes was the Acting Officer-in-Charge and Angelito Peñaloza was a Clerk III. After failing the written examination, Acero was allegedly informed by Peñaloza, in Reyes’ presence, that his application could be reconsidered if he paid an additional assessment. Acero paid ₱1,000.00, received ₱320.00 in change, and was issued an official receipt for only ₱180.00; the remaining ₱500.00 was retained without receipt. Acero executed an affidavit complaining of extortion against both Reyes and Peñaloza.

• The Complaint:
  • Acero testified that after failing the LTO examination, Peñaloza informed him in Reyes' presence that his application would be reconsidered upon payment of an additional ₱680.00. Acero agreed, paid ₱1,000.00 to Peñaloza, and received ₱320.00 in change and an official receipt for ₱180.00. The ₱500.00 balance was retained by Peñaloza without any receipt.
• The Counter-Affidavits:
  • Peñaloza admitted the transaction but implicated Reyes as the mastermind. He claimed Reyes wrote a "+27" on Acero's test paper to indicate the extra cost, and that the ₱500.00 was given to Reyes. Peñaloza submitted supporting affidavits from Rey P. Amper, a former LTO employee who attested to Reyes' system of exacting additional fees from failed applicants, and Rickie Valdehueza, another applicant who claimed Reyes extorted ₱1,200.00 from him.
  • Reyes denied the accusations, claiming Peñaloza pocketed the money. Reyes adopted his counter-affidavit from a related criminal case and asserted he had no participation in the monetary exchange.
• The Undisclosed Evidence:
  • The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao decided the case based on the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper, and Valdehueza. However, records revealed that copies of these affidavits were furnished only to the Ombudsman and Acero, and not to Reyes. Reyes only became aware of these inculpatory affidavits after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was rendered.
• The Motion for Reconsideration:
  • Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference, specifically raising the violation of his right to due process. The Ombudsman denied the motion without furnishing Reyes the copies of the contested affidavits or providing an opportunity to rebut them.

• Conclusiveness of Findings:
  • The Office of the Ombudsman argued that its findings of fact are entitled to great weight and are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, and that the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
• Due Process Compliance:
  • Petitioner maintained that Reyes was afforded due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard and to file a motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision.

• Due Process Violation:
  • Reyes argued that his right to due process was violated because he was not furnished copies of Peñaloza’s counter-affidavit and the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza before the Ombudsman rendered its decision, depriving him of the opportunity to refute the inculpatory evidence.
• Hearsay Evidence:
  • Reyes contended that Peñaloza's counter-affidavit was self-serving and hearsay as against him, being a co-respondent, and that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the declarations of another under the principle of res inter alios acta.

• Due Process:
  • Whether administrative due process is violated when the deciding body bases its ruling on affidavits that were not disclosed or furnished to the respondent prior to the rendition of the decision.
• Substantial Evidence:
  • Whether the charge of grave misconduct was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence, justifying a review of the Ombudsman's findings despite the general rule on their conclusiveness.

• Due Process:
  • Administrative due process was violated because the Ombudsman based its ruling on evidence not disclosed to the respondent. The fifth requirement of administrative due process under Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations mandates that a decision must be rendered on the evidence presented or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The filing of a motion for reconsideration did not cure this violation because the Ombudsman failed to furnish the contested affidavits to Reyes even after he raised the issue, distinguishing the case from Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman where the respondent was belatedly provided copies and given a chance to rebut them.
• Substantial Evidence:
  • The general rule that the Court cannot substitute its judgment for the Ombudsman's factual findings yields to an exception when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would result. Because the Ombudsman rendered a decision imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal based on evidence not disclosed to Reyes, a review was proper to arrive at a just resolution.

• Ang Tibay Doctrine (Administrative Due Process) — Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with seven cardinal principles: (1) the right to a hearing; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and facts; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it. In this case, the fifth requirement was violated because the Ombudsman relied on affidavits that were never disclosed to Reyes.
• Conclusiveness of Ombudsman Findings — Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, such as when a grave abuse of authority or a miscarriage of justice would result from a due process violation.

• "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected"
• "A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process."

• Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — Followed. Established the seven cardinal principles of due process in administrative proceedings, the fifth of which was violated in this case.
• Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 324 — Distinguished. In Ruivivar, the Ombudsman cured the due process defect by belatedly furnishing the affidavits and directing the respondent to file a rebuttal, whereas here the Ombudsman disregarded the protestations without providing a similar opportunity.
• Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 449 — Followed. Defined misconduct and grave misconduct, distinguishing the latter by the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.
• Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175451, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 357 — Followed. Stated the general rule that courts will not weigh conflicting evidence or substitute their judgment for that of administrative agencies regarding the sufficiency of evidence.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. The Court acknowledged this mandate but applied an exception due to the due process violation that threatened a miscarriage of justice.

Renato C. Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.