Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Chavez

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case imposing the penalty of dismissal is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which is a special rule prevailing over the general provisions of the Rules of Court.

Respondents were officials and employees of Batangas State University (BSU) who were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found them guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties, as embodied in a Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and a Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005. The BSU Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) is the governing body tasked with implementing personnel actions at the university. The Office of the Ombudsman, as a constitutionally mandated disciplinary authority over public officials, promulgates its own rules of procedure under Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989).

On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez directing it to enforce the Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005, which had found respondents Ernesto M. de Chavez, Rolando L. Lontoc, Sr., Dr. Porfirio C. Ligaya, Rolando L. Lontoc, Jr., and Gloria M. Mendoza guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposed upon them the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties. Pursuant to that Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, series of 2005, dated August 22, 2005, resolving to implement the Ombudsman's directive.

Respondents thereupon filed a petition for injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, against the BSU-BOR. They contended that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because those issuances were still on appeal before the CA and therefore not yet final and executory. On September 26, 2005, the RTC dismissed the petition for injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Respondents filed a notice of appeal and, on December 8, 2005, submitted a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction before the CA. On February 17, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a temporary restraining order, enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing Resolution No. 18, series of 2005. On March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order. Respondents opposed the motion and filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On April 7, 2006, the CA denied the Ombudsman's motion to recall the TRO and granted respondents' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, conditioned upon the posting of an injunction bond of Php10,000.00, enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing Resolution No. 18, series of 2005, pending resolution of the appeal. The CA reasoned that the administrative penalty of dismissal was not yet final and immediately executory in view of the appeal interposed by respondents.

• Forum Shopping: Petitioner argued that the CA disregarded the well-entrenched rule against forum shopping when it took cognizance of respondents' petition instead of outrightly dismissing it.
• Unverified Petition: Petitioner contended that the CA seriously overlooked the provisions of Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure when it took cognizance of respondents' unverified petition and subsequently issued its February 17, 2006 and April 7, 2006 Resolutions.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Petitioner maintained that the CA's issuance of the injunctive resolutions unduly disregards the established rules relative to the implementation of Ombudsman decisions pending appeal, considering that Board Resolution No. 18 was issued pursuant to the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, and that under the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, an appeal does not stay the execution of decisions, resolutions, or orders issued by the Office of the Ombudsman.
• Entitlement to Injunctive Relief: Petitioner argued that respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in their unverified motion filed before the CA.

• Legal Personality: Respondents countered that the Ombudsman has no legal personality to institute the instant petition inasmuch as it is not a party to the appealed case pending before the CA.
• Improper Remedy: Respondents argued that, assuming the Ombudsman has legal personality to intervene in the appealed case before the CA, the instant petition is not the proper recourse available to the petitioner.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents maintained that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

• Intervention: Whether the CA erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion to intervene in the appeal pending before it.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Whether the CA erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction staying the enforcement of an Ombudsman decision imposing dismissal from service while the decision is pending appeal.
• Propriety of Remedy: Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to question the CA's interlocutory Resolution granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

• Intervention: Yes. The CA patently erred in denying the Ombudsman's motion to intervene, as the Ombudsman has a clear legal interest in defending its decisions and ensuring their enforcement as a constitutionally mandated disciplinary authority.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Yes. The CA erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, an appeal does not stay the execution of an Ombudsman decision imposing dismissal; this special rule prevails over the general provisions of the Rules of Court.
• Propriety of Remedy: No, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy, as the assailed Resolution is merely interlocutory. However, because the Resolution is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court relaxed procedural rules and treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65.

• Intervention: The Office of the Ombudsman is not an ordinary prosecutory agency; it is a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people" and a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial functions to resolve administrative cases against public officials. Its power to ensure enforcement of its decisions is in danger of being impaired when a court issues an injunction staying their execution. The CA likened the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question — a comparison the Court found overly simplistic and dismissive of the Ombudsman's powers, duties, and functions. In administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest, giving the Ombudsman a direct constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers. Relying on Office of the Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, the Court held that the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest as a "competent disciplining body" with the right to seek redress against the erroneous issuance of an injunctive writ. The CA's discretion to allow or disallow intervention is not without limitations and must not be exercised in disregard of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.

• Execution Pending Appeal: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, categorically provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. This rule applies to appealable decisions of the Ombudsman — those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The penalty of dismissal meted upon respondents therefore falls within the scope of immediately executory decisions. The same Section 7 also provides that in case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins the appeal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and emoluments not received by reason of the removal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office, except in constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure. The Ombudsman's rules being procedural, no vested right of the respondents is violated. Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure is a special rule that prevails over Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which gives the CA discretion to stay execution on terms it may deem just. The principle of specialis derogat generali applies: when two rules apply to a particular case, the one specially designed for that case must prevail. The CA's issuance of a preliminary injunction staying the penalty of dismissal encroached on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, rendering nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III. The BSU-BOR acted properly in issuing Resolution No. 18, series of 2005, pursuant to the Ombudsman's order, as it was its legally mandated duty. The requisites for a writ of preliminary injunction — material and substantial invasion of right, clear and unmistakable right, and urgent necessity — were not satisfied because respondents' right to a stay of execution was not clear and unmistakable.

• Propriety of Remedy: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order, as Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari under Rule 65 is allowed. Because the CA Resolution was patently erroneous and the Ombudsman's opportunity to be heard was of primordial importance, the Court relaxed the application of procedural rules and treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions — Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory. This applies to decisions imposing penalties other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary. In case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins the appeal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and emoluments not received. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the dismissal of respondents was immediately executory pending appeal and could not be stayed by an injunctive writ.

• Specialis Derogat Generali — When two rules apply to a particular case, the rule specially designed for that case prevails over the other. The Court applied this principle to hold that Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, being a special rule on execution pending appeal, supersedes the general discretion given to the CA under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to stay execution on terms it deems just.

• Legal Interest of the Ombudsman to Intervene — The Office of the Ombudsman has a clear legal interest in defending its decisions and ensuring their enforcement, arising from its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and its role as a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial functions. The Ombudsman cannot be likened to a detached, disinterested judge when defending its own decisions, because in administrative cases the offense is committed against the government and public interest.

• No Vested Right in Public Office — Except in constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure, no one has a vested interest or absolute right to hold office. The Ombudsman's rules being procedural, no vested right of a dismissed employee is violated by immediate execution, as the employee is considered under preventive suspension and entitled to back wages and emoluments if the appeal is successful.

• "Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on why the CA cannot stay execution of an Ombudsman decision pending appeal, grounding the ruling in the principle that the Ombudsman's special procedural rules prevail over the general Rules of Court.

• "The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest." — This passage defines the Ombudsman's legal interest in intervening to defend its own decisions, distinguishing it from a neutral judge and establishing the basis for allowing intervention.

• "The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure." — This passage explains why the CA's injunctive writ was constitutionally infirm, as it encroached on the Ombudsman's rule-making authority.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 567 — Controlling precedent on the Ombudsman's legal interest to intervene in appeals of its own decisions. The Court relied on this case to hold that the Ombudsman, as a "competent disciplining body" and constitutionally mandated protector of the people, has a clear legal interest in defending its decisions and that the CA should have allowed its motion to intervene.

• Facura vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184263, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 428 — Controlling precedent on the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions pending appeal. The Court extensively quoted this case, which in turn relied on Samaniego, to establish that Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure categorically provides that an appeal does not stay execution, and that the CA has no discretion to stay an Ombudsman decision.

• Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187872, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 545 — Cited for the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction: (1) material and substantial invasion of right; (2) clear and unmistakable right of complainant; and (3) urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

• Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 163117, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 433 — Cited for the procedural principle that where an assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari under Rule 65 is allowed as a mode of redress.

• Section 7, Rule III, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003) — Provides that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory, and that in case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins the appeal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid salary and emoluments not received. The Court applied this provision to hold that respondents' dismissal was immediately executory despite their pending appeal.

• Section 13(8), Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The Court invoked this provision to hold that the CA's injunctive writ encroached on the Ombudsman's constitutionally granted rule-making power.

• Sections 18 and 27, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to promulgate its rules of procedure and to amend or modify them as the interest of justice may require. The Court relied on these provisions to reinforce that the Ombudsman's rules on execution pending appeal are within its statutory authority.

• Section 12, Rule 43, Rules of Court — Gives the CA discretion to stay execution of a judgment on terms it may deem just. The Court held that this general provision is superseded by the special rule in Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure.

• Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. The Court noted this provision in explaining why a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was not the proper remedy, before relaxing the rules to treat the petition as one under Rule 65.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concurred.