Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals

A Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the enumeration of impeachable officers therein being exclusive, and prior judicial pronouncements to the contrary being mere obiter dicta that do not bind under the doctrine of stare decisis.

The Office of the Ombudsman, its Overall Deputy Ombudsman, and a constituted Committee of Peers initiated criminal and administrative proceedings against Arturo C. Mojica, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, arising from a formal complaint filed by twenty-two officials and employees of the OMB-Visayas charging him with sexual harassment, extortion, and oppression. The constitutional framework governing the removal of the Ombudsman and his deputies—specifically the interplay between Section 2 (enumerating impeachable officers) and Section 8 (qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution—forms the legal backdrop. Prior Supreme Court resolutions in Cuenco vs. Fernan, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque vs. Desierto, and Lastimosa-Dalawampu vs. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had, in the context of disbarment proceedings, stated in passing that the Ombudsman and his deputies were removable only by impeachment, a proposition the Office of the Ombudsman itself had historically rejected as a matter of official position.

On December 29, 1999, twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo C. Mojica, alleging sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco, and oppression of all employees by withholding the release of ₱7,200.00 benefits on the date they were due. The complainants requested the appointment of an officer-in-charge from OMB-Manila to prevent Mojica from harassing witnesses and wielding influence, threatened a mass leave of absence, and took their cause to the media.

The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City. Upon arrival, he was informed that Mojica wished to relocate to Manila, apparently due to alienation from his staff and fear of reprisal from the alleged victims' husbands; Mojica already held a plane ticket for a flight departing two hours later. The Ombudsman assented to the transfer for Mojica's safety and the interest of the Office's operations, and installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz as Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas. The Ombudsman then directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation, which later reported strong evidence against Mojica on charges of extortion, sexual harassment, and oppression.

The FFIB report was referred to a Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the Special Prosecutor, and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. The Committee initially recommended converting the investigation into one solely for purposes of impeachment, but the Ombudsman denied this recommendation, reiterating the official position of the Office that Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment, citing Zaldivar vs. Gonzales and distinguishing the Jarque case as involving the Ombudsman himself. The Ombudsman directed the Committee to evaluate the merits and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and criminal investigations. On March 30, 2000, the Committee recommended docketing the complaint as criminal case OMB-0-00-0615 (for violation of Section 3(b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 and R.A. 7877) and administrative case OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (for dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and financial/material interest in transactions requiring his Office's approval).

On April 6, 2000, the Committee directed Mojica to submit controverting evidence. On April 10, 2000, the complainants filed a motion to place Mojica under preventive suspension, citing strong evidence and his harassment of witnesses. On the same date, the Ombudsman directed the Committee to conduct administrative proceedings and submit a recommendation on preventive suspension. The Committee subsequently issued an Order finding prima facie evidence against Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer, counter-affidavit, and supporting evidence within ten days. Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, praying for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction, and a declaration that the Ombudsman's acts—his indefinite detail to Manila, the docketing of complaints against an allegedly impeachable official, and the denial of his leave request—were null and void.

The Court of Appeals issued a TRO on May 4, 2000, enjoining proceedings on the preventive suspension motion. Despite this, the Committee issued an Order on June 6, 2000 deeming both cases submitted for resolution, Mojica having failed to submit counter-affidavits. Mojica filed urgent motions to enjoin further action and to cite the Ombudsman for contempt. On July 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining all action in both cases. Meanwhile, on June 19, 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed Mojica to answer a different set of charges in OMB-0-00-1050 and OMB-ADM-0-00-0506, prompting further contempt motions from Mojica. The Ombudsman opposed, noting the injunction covered only the earlier docketed cases and that Mojica's term had expired on July 6, 2000. On December 18, 2000, despite the expiration of Mojica's term, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring him an impeachable officer, setting aside the Committee's evaluation, and dismissing the complaints, invoking stare decisis while acknowledging that the Constitution, its framers, and legal commentators all indicated that a Deputy Ombudsman is not impeachable.

• Impeachability of Deputy Ombudsman: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in erroneously ruling that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable official, considering that the plain text of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, as well as the intent of the framers thereof, excludes a Deputy Ombudsman from the list of impeachable officials.
• Stare Decisis and Obiter Dictum: Petitioner maintained that the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere may not be invoked to perpetuate an erroneous obiter dictum, the prior pronouncements having been made without argument or full consideration of the impeachability question.
• Jurisdiction Over Retired Official: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to order the dismissal of a criminal case against a retired Deputy Ombudsman that was still pending preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman, and that retirement does not bar administrative investigation given the hold on retirement benefits under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 3019.

• Stare Decisis: Respondent invoked the doctrine of stare decisis as necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and stability of society, arguing that the Court of Appeals was bound by prior Supreme Court pronouncements in Cuenco vs. Fernan, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque vs. Desierto, and Lastimosa-Dalawampu classifying the Ombudsman and his deputies as impeachable officers.
• Immunity from Suit: Respondent contended that as an impeachable officer, he could not be subjected to criminal and administrative investigations during his incumbency, and that the Ombudsman's acts of detailing him to Manila, docketing complaints, and denying his leave were done without lawful authority and without jurisdiction.

• Impeachability of Deputy Ombudsman: Whether a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
• Stare Decisis vs. Obiter Dictum: Whether the doctrine of stare decisis may be invoked to perpetuate the prior pronouncement that Deputy Ombudsmen are impeachable, when such pronouncement was an obiter dictum.
• Prosecution After Retirement: Whether a former Deputy Ombudsman whose term has expired may be held criminally and/or administratively liable for offenses committed during incumbency.

• Impeachability of Deputy Ombudsman: No. A Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer; the enumeration in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive, covering only the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
• Stare Decisis vs. Obiter Dictum: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not bind courts to follow obiter dicta; the prior pronouncements in Cuenco vs. Fernan and succeeding cases including Deputy Ombudsmen among impeachable officers were made without argument or full consideration of the point and were not essential to the resolution of those cases.
• Prosecution After Retirement: Yes. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for offenses constituting grounds for impeachment presupposes continuance in office; upon removal, resignation, or expiration of term, there is no bar to criminal prosecution, nor does retirement bar administrative investigation when retirement benefits have been placed on hold pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 3019.

• Impeachability of Deputy Ombudsman: Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the impeachable officers as the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The last sentence of the provision states that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment," thereby excluding all officers not specifically named. The Records of the Constitutional Commission confirm this exclusivity: Commissioner Regalado asked whether only the Ombudsman—and "not his deputies"—was impeachable, and Commissioners Romulo and Monsod confirmed that only the Ombudsman was intended. Commissioner Davide's attempt to delete the Ombudsman from the list was rejected, but the discussion confirmed that "the Ombudsman" referred to "only one man" and "not including his deputies." Leading constitutional law commentators—Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., and Rep. Antonio Nachura—all agreed that the enumeration is exclusive. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies. The Ombudsman's own official position, as stated in his Memorandum dated March 27, 2000, was that Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment.

• Stare Decisis vs. Obiter Dictum: The prior pronouncement originated in Cuenco vs. Fernan, a disbarment case against a Supreme Court Justice, where the Court stated in passing that "[p]recisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies." This statement was made to illustrate that, as with members of the Supreme Court, certain officers were constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. The cross-reference to Section 8 (qualifications) alongside Section 2 (impeachable officers) was intended to identify officers required to be bar members—not to determine the impeachability of Deputy Ombudsmen. A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, made without argument or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under stare decisis. The succeeding cases—In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque vs. Desierto, and Lastimosa-Dalawampu—likewise did not squarely tackle the impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman; Lastimosa-Dalawampu was a minute resolution dismissing a disbarment complaint on the basis of the questioned obiter without going into the merits. Where the issue was not raised, presented, or passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision is not stare decisis on the question presented.

• Prosecution After Retirement: The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. The moment he is no longer in office by reason of removal, resignation, or permanent disability—or, by extension, expiration of term—there can be no bar to criminal prosecution. Mojica's term expired on July 6, 2000. Nor does retirement bar administrative investigation, as his retirement benefits had been placed on hold pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), which respectively prohibit resignation or retirement pending investigation and provide for suspension and loss of benefits upon conviction.

• Exclusivity of the Enumeration of Impeachable Officers — The list of impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies: the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. The Court applied this to hold that Deputy Ombudsmen, not being named in the enumeration, are not impeachable officers.

• Obiter Dictum Not Binding Under Stare Decisis — A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, made without argument or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court applied this principle to the pronouncement in Cuenco vs. Fernan and succeeding cases that included Deputy Ombudsmen among impeachable officers, holding those statements to be obiter dicta made in the context of disbarment proceedings without squarely addressing the impeachability question.

• Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere — Where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis bars relitigation of the same issue. However, where the issue involved was not raised, presented, or passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision is not stare decisis on the question presented. The Court used this to distinguish binding precedent from non-binding dicta.

• Impeachment Immunity Limited to Incumbency — The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for offenses constituting grounds for impeachment presupposes continuance in office. Upon removal, resignation, permanent disability, or expiration of term, there is no bar to criminal prosecution in the courts.

• "From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman." — This is the ratio decidendi on the impeachability issue, directly answering the central constitutional question and overturning prior contrary pronouncements.

• "A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine on why obiter dicta cannot serve as binding precedent, explaining why the prior cases did not foreclose the issue.

• "The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts." — This articulates the principle that impeachment immunity is coextensive with incumbency, resolving the issue of post-term prosecution.

• Cuenco vs. Fernan, 158 SCRA 29 (1988) — A disbarment case against Justice Marcelo Fernan where the Court first stated, in obiter dictum, that the "Ombudsman and his deputies" were removable only by impeachment. The Court in the present case declared this statement to be a non-binding dictum made without argument or full consideration of the impeachability of Deputy Ombudsmen.

• In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988) — A resolution concerning the same disbarment charges against Justice Fernan, citing Cuenco to underscore that a public officer removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during incumbency. The Court held this case likewise did not tackle the impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman.

• Jarque vs. Desierto, A.C. No. 4509 (1995) — A disbarment case against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, where the Court stated that the "Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment" before being held to answer for wrongs. The Court distinguished this as involving the Ombudsman himself, with the mention of deputies being obiter.

• Lastimosa-Dalawampu vs. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, Adm. Case No. 4683 (1997) — A minute resolution dismissing a disbarment complaint against the herein private respondent Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman, citing Jarque and Cuenco without going into the merits. The Court held this was not stare decisis on the impeachability question.

• Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578 (1988) — Cited by the Ombudsman in his Memorandum as authority for the proposition that Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor are excluded from the list of impeachable officials, supporting the official position of the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that the rule barring criminal prosecution of an impeachable officer presupposes continuance in office, and that upon removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there is no bar to criminal prosecution.

• Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Enumerates the impeachable officers as the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, and provides that all other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. The Court held this enumeration to be exclusive, excluding Deputy Ombudsmen.

• Section 8, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies. The prior pronouncement in Cuenco cross-referenced this provision with Section 2 to identify officers constitutionally required to be bar members; the Court held this cross-reference was intended only to identify bar membership requirements, not to determine impeachability.

• Section 3(b) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The criminal charges against Mojica for violation of these provisions, reinstated by the Court's disposition.

• Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) — The criminal charge of sexual harassment against Mojica, reinstated by the Court's disposition.

• Sections 12 and 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — Section 12 prohibits a public officer from resigning or retiring pending investigation or prosecution for offenses under the Act or the Revised Penal Code on bribery. Section 13 provides for suspension and loss of retirement benefits upon conviction. The Court cited these provisions to sustain the holding that retirement does not bar administrative investigation, as Mojica's retirement benefits had been placed on hold.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.