Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.

The death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a cause for its dismissal because the respondent enjoys the constitutional rights to presumption of innocence and due process, and the death extinguishes personal liability; the non-dismissal of the pending administrative case upon the respondent’s death transgresses these constitutional guarantees.

Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. served as Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Agusan del Norte. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from Rev. Fr. Antoni A. Saniel exposing alleged extortion activities by Judge Abul involving solicitation of large sums from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their release or the dismissal of their criminal cases. The OCA conducted an investigation and confirmed the extortion, which constituted grave misconduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. While the administrative case was pending review by the Supreme Court, Judge Abul was fatally ambushed by an unidentified motorcycle-riding assailant. He died on August 5, 2017 at the age of 68. Before a final judgment could be rendered, the Court issued a Per Curiam Decision on September 3, 2019 finding Judge Abul administratively liable and imposing forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits, except accrued leaves. His surviving spouse, Bernadita C. Abul, moved for reconsideration, asserting that the forfeiture unjustly deprived the family of survivorship benefits and that the deceased judge could no longer defend himself.

• Nature: An administrative complaint for grave misconduct arose from allegations that Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 4, Butuan City, extorted P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 from detainees in exchange for orders of release or dismissal of criminal cases.

• OCA Investigation and Findings: Acting on Rev. Fr. Saniel’s letter, the OCA conducted an investigation and confirmed that Judge Abul had engaged in extortion activities. It recommended a fine of P500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement gratuity, treating the acts as grave misconduct violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case was then pending review by the Supreme Court.

• Death of Judge Abul: On August 5, 2017, days after his 68th birthday, Judge Abul was ambushed by an unidentified motorcycle-riding assailant while about to leave his house; he died of multiple gunshot wounds. His spouse survived with injuries. On September 13, 2017, Bernadita C. Abul wrote to the Court informing it of his death, describing severe financial hardship due to his prior preventive suspension, and requesting release of accrued leave benefits and whatever assistance could be extended to support the family and their son’s medical school education.

• September 3, 2019 Per Curiam Decision: A majority of the Court declared that death during pendency of an administrative case does not terminate the proceedings if the investigation had been completed before demise. Finding Judge Abul guilty of gross misconduct—an offense punishable by dismissal—the Court instead imposed the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits except accrued leaves, deeming it the proper consequence since dismissal from service was no longer feasible.

• Motion for Reconsideration: Bernadita C. Abul filed the present motion, arguing that Judge Abul could no longer assail the findings, plead innocence, or express remorse. She contended that forfeiture of all benefits punished innocent family members, and that death should have extinguished the administrative case, consistent with constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence.

• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner asserted that adjudging Judge Abul liable and forfeiting his benefits without affording him the opportunity to contest the findings, seek reconsideration, or exhaust other remedies constituted a denial of due process because his death prevented any further participation.
• Extinguishment of Liability and Protection of Heirs: Petitioner maintained that Judge Abul’s death before final judgment should have extinguished the administrative complaint and any personal liability, and that penalizing innocent family members by forfeiting death and survivorship benefits was unjust.
• Humanitarian and Equitable Considerations: Petitioner invoked equity, highlighting the family’s financial dependence on Judge Abul as sole breadwinner and the ongoing educational needs of their son, and requested release of all benefits to alleviate their hardship.

• Effect of Death on Pending Administrative Case: Whether the death of a respondent public officer before final judgment in an administrative proceeding compels dismissal of the case.
• Presumption of Innocence: Whether a respondent in an administrative case possesses the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until final adjudication, such that death prior to final judgment precludes a finding of liability.
• Applicability of Extinguishment of Liability Principle: Whether the rule under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code—that death before final judgment extinguishes personal criminal liability and pecuniary penalties—applies analogously to administrative cases.
• Due Process: Whether continuing an administrative proceeding after the respondent’s death violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.
• Humanitarian and Equitable Considerations: Whether exceptional circumstances grounded on equity and humanitarian reasons justify dismissal of the administrative complaint and release of death and survivorship benefits to the deceased judge’s heirs.

• Effect of Death on Pending Administrative Case: The death of a respondent in an administrative case before final resolution is a ground for its dismissal. The Court abandoned its prior ruling that death during pendency does not automatically terminate administrative proceedings when the investigation has been completed. The constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence override the public-policy principle that public office is a public trust.

• Presumption of Innocence: A respondent in an administrative case is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence until final judgment. Because administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence—a lower quantum than the proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases—it follows with greater force that a respondent who dies before final adjudication cannot be stripped of the presumption. Judge Abul’s death before final judgment thus meant the presumption of innocence in his favor must stand.

• Applicability of Extinguishment of Liability Principle: The criminal-law principle under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code—that death before final judgment extinguishes personal penalties and pecuniary liability—applies by analogy to administrative cases. Since death extinguishes liability in criminal prosecutions where the quantum of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, no stricter measure should govern administrative cases where only substantial evidence is required. To impose harsher consequences in an administrative forum would be illogical.

• Due Process: Continuing the administrative proceeding after the respondent’s death constitutes a denial of due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard at every stage—from investigation through finality of judgment—including the right to seek reconsideration and request clemency. Death extinguishes that opportunity entirely, rendering further adjudication a violation of the constitutional guarantee. The Constitution does not limit due-process protection to criminal or civil cases; it applies equally to administrative proceedings.

• Humanitarian and Equitable Considerations: Compelling humanitarian reasons warranted dismissal and the release of benefits. The deceased judge was the family breadwinner; his spouse was a homemaker with no independent income, and their son was in medical school. Forfeiture of benefits would penalize family members with no part in or knowledge of the alleged misconduct. Liability is personal and should not survive to burden innocent heirs. Moreover, Judge Abul would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 before the Decision was released, underscoring the inequity of the forfeiture.

• Dismissal of Administrative Case upon Death Before Final Judgment — The death of a respondent in an administrative case prior to final resolution extinguishes personal liability and mandates dismissal of the complaint. This doctrine replaces the former rule under Gonzales v. Escalona that death does not automatically terminate administrative proceedings unless denial of due process, exceptional circumstances, or the nature of the penalty warranted dismissal. The new rule rests directly on the constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence, and aligns administrative liability with the criminal-law principle under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Presumption of Innocence in Administrative Cases — Respondents in administrative proceedings are constitutionally presumed innocent until final adjudication. Because the quantum of proof in administrative matters is substantial evidence (lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt), the presumption operates with even greater force and demands dismissal if death occurs before final judgment.

• Due Process as a Continuous Right — The opportunity to be heard must be available at every stage of an administrative proceeding, including the opportunity to seek reconsideration or invoke other remedies after a decision. Death definitively forecloses these opportunities, and to proceed with adjudication thereafter is a denial of due process.

• Personal Nature of Administrative Liability and Protection of Heirs — Administrative liability is personal; it does not survive the respondent’s death to burden innocent heirs. The forfeiture of survivorship and retirement benefits that would otherwise flow to family members who had no involvement in the alleged misconduct is disfavored.

• “Death of the respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case shall not terminate the proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the dismissal of the complaint if the investigation was completed prior to his demise. If death intervenes before he has been dismissed from service, the appropriate penalty is forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued leaves.” — The prior doctrine expressly overturned by this Resolution.

• “If death extinguishes the criminal and civil liabilities arising from criminal cases, then why should more rigid measures or penalties be imposed in mere administrative cases?” — The Court’s reasoning for applying the criminal-law extinguishment principle by analogy.

• “The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.” — Reaffirming the definition and scope of due process in administrative matters.

• “Judge Abul’s mistakes should not unduly punish his heirs, especially if they had no part in or knowledge about the alleged extortions. Judge Abul’s liability should be considered personal and extinguished upon his death.” — The humanitarian foundation of the ruling.

• “Thus, the Court so now holds that the death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a cause for its dismissal. Otherwise stated, the non-dismissal of a pending administrative case in view of the death of the respondent public servant is a transgression of his or her Constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence.” — The categorical statement of the new rule.

• Gonzales v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448 (2008) — Previously the controlling doctrine that death during pendency of an administrative case does not automatically cause dismissal; established three exceptions. Overruled by this Resolution in favor of a rule mandating dismissal upon death before final judgment.
• Bayaca v. Ramos, 597 Phil. 86 (2009) — Dismissed administrative case upon death of respondent judge on due process grounds; cited as persuasive authority for the conclusion now adopted as the general rule.
• Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997) — Dismissed administrative complaint after respondent judge’s death prior to promulgation of decision, emphasizing that death before final judgment warranted dismissal despite potential liability.
• Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, 443 Phil. 732 (2003) — Barred continuation of formal investigation upon death of respondent judge, recognizing that factual resolution and reception of evidence could not proceed after death.
• Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38 (2003) — Declared the administrative case closed and terminated upon respondent’s death because dismissal from service could no longer be imposed.
• Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra, 388 Phil. 60 (2000) — Directed release of withheld retirement benefits to heirs because the respondent judge’s death prevented him from explaining his inaction.
• Geocadin v. Pena, 195 Phil. 344 (1981) — Applied the presumption of innocence and humanitarian compassion to impose a penalty of reprimand instead of forfeiture where the respondent was incapacitated by serious illness.
• Liwanag v. Lustre, 365 Phil. 496 (1999) — Modified the penalty from forfeiture to fine upon respondent’s retirement, noting that forfeiture would adversely affect innocent family members.

• Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Presumption of innocence. Applied to administrative respondents; death before final adjudication meant the presumption remained unrebutted, requiring dismissal.
• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Due process clause. Due process demands an opportunity to be heard at every stage; death extinguished that opportunity, rendering further proceedings unconstitutional.
• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Extinguishment of criminal liability by death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties when death occurs before final judgment. Applied by analogy to administrative cases to support dismissal upon death before final judgment.
• Republic Act No. 9946, Sections 2, 3, and 3-A — Granting additional retirement, survivorship, and other benefits to members of the Judiciary. The Court ordered release of the lump-sum gratuity (5 or 10 years depending on length of service) and subsequent survivorship pension to the surviving spouse, treating the judge as having died in actual service.

Associate Justices Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan concurred. Associate Justice Leonen concurred with a separate opinion.

• Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (joined by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.) — Maintained the position in the September 3, 2019 Decision that death during pendency of an administrative case should not automatically result in dismissal when the investigation has been completed and the offense is serious. The dissenting view held that forfeiture of retirement benefits is an appropriate accessory consequence that survives death to vindicate the principle that public office is a public trust and to preserve the integrity of the Judiciary.
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa — Concurred in the result but dissented in part, as indicated by the notation “Concurring and Dissenting,” without detailing specific grounds in the Resolution.