Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City vs. Ebio
The petition assailing the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s denial of prohibitory injunction was denied. Respondents, having possessed the accreted land along Cut-cut creek exclusively and continuously since 1930, acquired ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription because the registered owner of the adjoining lot failed to register the accretion. Under Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters and Article 457 of the Civil Code, accretions along creeks belong to the owner of the adjoining estate, but such alluvial property is subject to prescription by third persons if unregistered. Consequently, the subject property was no longer part of the public domain, and the State was not an indispensable party to the action for injunction against the local government.
Primary Holding
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek belong to the owner of the adjoining estate by operation of law, but if the adjoining owner fails to register the accretion under the Torrens system, third persons may acquire ownership thereof through acquisitive prescription.
Background
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, occupied and possessed an accreted portion of land along Cut-cut creek in Parañaque City starting in 1930, declaring the property for taxation purposes in 1966 and transferring his rights to respondent Mario Ebio in 1987. In 1966, Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of the adjoining Road Lot No. 8, donated the lot to the City of Parañaque. Decades later, in 1999, the local government initiated an access road project that would traverse respondents' lot, leading to an order for respondents to vacate.
History
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Respondents filed an application for a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC of Parañaque City to halt the construction of the access road.
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RTC denied the petition for lack of merit, citing respondents' failure to confirm title and to implead the Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party.
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CA reversed the RTC, granting the injunction and recognizing respondents' ownership of the accreted property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
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Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Facts
- Possession and Occupation: Respondents' great-grandfather, Jose Vitalez, originally occupied the 406-square-meter accreted land along Cut-cut creek. In 1930, he ceded possession to his son, Pedro Vitalez. Pedro declared the property for taxation in 1966 and continuously paid real property taxes. In 1964 and 1971, respondent Mario Ebio secured building permits for a family dwelling on the lot. In 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights over the property in favor of Mario Ebio.
- Proposed Road Project: In 1999, the Barangay Sanggunian passed a resolution seeking city government assistance to construct an access road traversing the subject property. When residents were advised to vacate, respondents opposed, temporarily suspending the project.
- Destruction of Property: In January 2003, city and barangay officials cut eight coconut trees planted on the lot. Respondents filed complaints with various government agencies.
- Eviction Order: On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator ordered respondents to vacate within 30 days or face physical eviction. Respondents' request for dialogue was ignored.
- Injunction Suit: Threatened with eviction, respondents filed for prohibitory injunction in the RTC. During proceedings, respondents admitted they had a pending application for a sales patent with the DENR.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Public Domain Character of Accretion: Petitioners argued that because the creek is a tributary classified as part of the public domain, any accretion formed along its banks must also be considered part of the public domain.
- Indispensable Party: Petitioners maintained that the State is an indispensable party to the action because the subject land allegedly forms part of the public domain.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Ownership by Prescription: Respondents asserted that their predecessor-in-interest possessed the property since 1930, entitling them to ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription, as the registered owner of the adjoining lot failed to register the accretion.
- Right in Esse: Respondents argued they possessed a clear and unmistakable right (right in esse) over the property, justifying the issuance of a prohibitory injunction against the city's road project.
Issues
- Indispensable Party: Whether the State is an indispensable party in an action for prohibitory injunction against a local government unit concerning the construction of a road on accreted land.
- Acquisitive Prescription: Whether the character of respondents' possession and occupation of the accreted property entitles them to ownership through acquisitive prescription and, consequently, to the relief of prohibitory injunction.
Ruling
- Indispensable Party: The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action for prohibitory injunction where no positive act is required from it, no obligation is imposed upon it, and none of its properties are divested or rights infringed. Because the accreted land was already acquired by respondents through prescription, it was no longer public domain, and the State had no interest requiring its impleading.
- Acquisitive Prescription: Ownership of the accreted land was vested in respondents through prescription. Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters and Article 457 of the Civil Code provide that alluvial deposits along creeks belong to the owner of the adjoining estate; however, the adjoining owner must register the accretion under the Torrens system. Failure to do so subjects the alluvial property to acquisition by third persons through prescription. Because the registered owner of the adjoining lot failed to register the accretion, and respondents possessed the land exclusively and continuously for over 30 years, ownership vested in respondents. The pending sales patent application did not estop respondents, as the State cannot convey via patent what it no longer owns (nemo dat quod non habet).
Doctrines
- Law on Accretion — Under Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and Article 457 of the Civil Code, accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks belong to the owners of such lands. However, the owner of the adjoining property must register the accretion under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
- Indispensable Party — An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect their right, requiring their presence for the court to proceed. The State is not an indispensable party where no positive act is required from it, no obligation is imposed upon it, and no property is divested from it.
- Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — No one can give what they do not have. This principle applies even against the State, meaning the State lacks authority to convey property through the issuance of a grant or patent if the land is no longer public land.
Key Excerpts
- "ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands."
- "The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons."
- "Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State."
Precedents Cited
- Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 268 SCRA 74 (1997) — Followed. Confirmed that Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 remains in effect and governs ownership over alluvial deposits along creeks.
- Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524 (1962) — Followed. Established that if the owner of the adjoining estate does not register the accretion under the Torrens system, third persons may acquire it through prescription.
- Meneses v. El Commonwealth De Filipinas, 69 Phil. 647 (1940) — Distinguished. While properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription, the accreted land in this case was deemed private land due to the operation of the Law on Waters and acquisitive prescription.
- Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) — Followed. Stated that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but the registration of title already possessed; registration confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
- De Guzman v. Agbagala, 546 SCRA 278 (2008) — Followed. Stated that the State does not have the authority to convey a property through the issuance of a patent if the land is no longer public land.
Provisions
- Article 84, Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 — Applied to determine that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek belong to the owners of the adjoining lands, explicitly excluding such accretions from the public domain.
- Article 457, Civil Code — Applied in relation to Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters to govern ownership of accretions received from the effects of the current of the waters.
- Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governed the procedural mechanism for the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' decision.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad.