Occena v. Commission on Elections

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, when convened as a constituent body upon the call of the Prime Minister, possesses the power to propose amendments to the Constitution by a majority vote of its members, and the scope of such proposals may extend to revision or total overhaul of the Constitution, subject to ratification by the people in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval of the amendments.

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales were both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1973 Constitution. They sued as taxpayers to challenge the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions (Resolution Nos. 28, 104, and 106 of 1981) proposing constitutional amendments. The 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution had vested the Interim Batasang Pambansa with the same powers as the Interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly, including the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister. The Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution originally vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments by a majority vote of all its members, to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1973 Constitution, filed separate petitions for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers. Occena filed his petition on March 6, 1981, docketed as L-56350, naming as respondents the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit, the National Treasurer, and the Director of Printing. Gonzales filed his petition on March 12, 1981, docketed as L-56404, naming as respondents the National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections, joined by co-petitioners Manuel B. Imbong, Jo Aurea Marcos-Imbong, Ray Allan T. Drilon, Nelson V. Malana, and Gil M. Tabios.

The petitions assailed the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions — Resolution Nos. 28, 104, and 106 of 1981 — proposing amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body and approved the resolutions on February 5 and 27, 1981. Resolution No. 1 proposed an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes, approved by a vote of 122 to 5. Resolution No. 2 dealt with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly, approved by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention. Resolution No. 3 proposed an amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections, approved by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.

On March 10 and 13, 1981, respectively, respondents were required to answer each petition within ten days from notice, and a comment was thereafter filed by the respondents. On March 24, 1981, an amended petition was filed in the Occena case adopting the theory advanced by Gonzales that the 1935 Constitution was once again in force and effect. Both cases were set for hearing and argued on March 26, 1981, by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 set the date of the plebiscite for April 7, 1981, which fell within the 90-day period prescribed by Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

• Invalidity of the 1973 Constitution: Petitioners asserted that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding, and that the 1935 Constitution was once again in force and effect.
• Exceeding the Scope of Authority (Revision vs. Amendment): Petitioners contended that the amendments proposed by the Interim Batasang Pambansa were so extensive in character that they went far beyond the limits of the authority conferred, amounting to a revision rather than an amendment of the Constitution.
• Vote Requirement: Petitioners urged that a three-fourths vote was necessary for the validity of the proposed amendments, rather than a simple majority.
• Proper Submission: Petitioners maintained that the standard for proper submission to the people was not satisfied, implying that the period before the plebiscite and the extent of public information were inadequate.

• Validity of the 1973 Constitution: Whether the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law of the Philippines, notwithstanding petitioners' contention that the 1935 Constitution remains in force.
• Power to Propose Amendments: Whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa possessed the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
• Scope of Proposed Changes: Whether the proposed amendments were so extensive as to exceed the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, constituting revision rather than amendment.
• Vote Required: Whether a three-fourths vote or a majority vote was required for the Interim Batasang Pambansa to validly propose amendments when sitting as a constituent body.
• Standard for Proper Submission: Whether the proposed amendments were properly submitted to the people, considering the period before the plebiscite and the adequacy of public information.

• Validity of the 1973 Constitution: Yes. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law, as settled in Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, which declared that there was no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect as of January 17, 1973.
• Power to Propose Amendments: Yes. The Interim Batasang Pambansa possessed the power to propose amendments, having been vested by the 1976 Amendments with the same powers as the Interim National Assembly, which under the Transitory Provisions could propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister.
• Scope of Proposed Changes: No infirmity. The principle that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing was adopted; "amendment" includes "revision" or total overhaul of the entire Constitution, and the distinction becomes immaterial once ratified by the sovereign people.
• Vote Required: Majority vote suffices. When the Interim Batasang Pambansa sits as a constituent body, only a majority vote is needed; the three-fourths vote requirement applicable to its legislative functions does not extend to its constituent power. Even assuming arguendo that three-fourths was required, the extraordinary majority was obtained in all three resolutions.
• Standard for Proper Submission: Satisfied. The plebiscite set for April 7, 1981 fell within the 90-day constitutional period, and the proposed amendments had been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa and through the mass media, such that the people could not be said to be unaware of the proposed changes.

• Validity of the 1973 Constitution: The force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution could no longer be denied. In the dispositive portion of Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, the Court dismissed petitions for prohibition and mandamus seeking to declare invalid the ratification of the Constitution, stating by a vote of six to four that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." This pronouncement served to clear the atmosphere and made manifest that as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. The function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect: the Court may not only nullify acts of coordinate branches but also sustain their validity. The dismissal of the suit in Javellana constituted an affirmation that the ratification could not be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. Since then, the Court has invariably applied the present Constitution, with at least ten cases citable during the first year of its effectivity alone, the latest being People vs. Sola promulgated barely two weeks before the decision.

• Power to Propose Amendments: The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments was deemed indubitable. The 1976 Amendments provided that the Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the Interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly. One of such powers was that of proposing amendments, vested in the Interim National Assembly by Article XVII, Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions, which authorized it upon special call by the interim Prime Minister to propose amendments by a majority vote of all its Members, to be ratified in accordance with Article XVI. When the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such competence. The question of its authority had been involved, though not directly passed upon, in the earlier case of Occena vs. Commission on Elections.

• Scope of Proposed Changes: The contention that the proposed amendments were so extensive as to constitute revision rather than amendment was disposed of by reference to Del Rosario vs. Commission on Elections, where Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, stated that "amendment" includes the "revision" or total overhaul of the entire Constitution and that whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. This adopted the principle, well-known in American decisions and legal texts, that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. The Court was not disposed to deviate from such a principle, deemed sound in theory and advantageous in practice.

• Vote Required: The language of the Constitution supplied the answer. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments, and in that capacity only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourths votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement for a constitutional convention, nor is it a requirement when the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power. Moreover, even on the assumption that the three-fourths vote requirement applied, such extraordinary majority was obtained: Resolution No. 1 was approved 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 by 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 by 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.

• Standard for Proper Submission: The question of proper submission was viewed from two standpoints: the period that must elapse before the plebiscite and whether the amendments had been called to the attention of the people. As to the period, Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that any amendment or revision shall be valid when ratified by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval. The three resolutions were approved on February 5 and 27, 1981, and Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 set the plebiscite for April 7, 1981, within the 90-day period. As for the people being adequately informed, the proposed amendments had been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa as well as through the mass media, so that it could not be said that the people were unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments, consistent with the earlier ruling in Occena vs. Commission on Elections.

• A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. — This principle, well-known in American decisions and legal texts, holds that a constituent assembly or convention possesses plenary power to propose any amendment or revision, including a total overhaul of the Constitution, but the proposed changes have no force or effect until ratified by the sovereign people. The Court adopted this doctrine to reject the argument that the Interim Batasang Pambansa exceeded its authority by proposing extensive amendments amounting to revision, holding that the distinction between amendment and revision becomes immaterial once the proposals are ratified by the people.

• Dual aspect of judicial review. — The function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. The Court may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches (negative aspect) but also sustain their validity (positive aspect). In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices as such affirmation. This doctrine was applied to explain the significance of the dismissal in Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary.

• Constituent power vs. legislative power: differing vote requirements. — When a body such as the Interim Batasang Pambansa sits as a constituent body to propose amendments, only a majority vote is required; the three-fourths vote requirement applicable when it sits as a legislative body does not extend to the exercise of constituent power. This distinction mirrors the rule applicable to constitutional conventions, which are not bound by supermajority requirements when proposing amendments.

• "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." — This is the concluding statement from Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary as quoted in the decision, which the Court relied upon to establish that the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law and that all doubts on its force and applicability were resolved as a matter of law.

• "The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one * * * is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." — This passage from Del Rosario vs. Commission on Elections, quoted in the decision, articulates the principle that a constituent body may propose anything, and that the amendment-versus-revision distinction is immaterial upon ratification by the people.

• "It would be on indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed." — This statement establishes the doctrinal distinction between the vote required for legislative action and that required for constituent action, holding that only a majority vote suffices when the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its power to propose amendments.

• Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973) — Controlling precedent on the force and effect of the 1973 Constitution. The Court relied on its dismissal of petitions challenging the ratification of the Constitution as establishing that the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law, with no further judicial obstacle to its being considered in force and effect.

• Del Rosario vs. Commission on Elections, 35 SCRA 367 (1970) — Followed for the proposition that "amendment" includes "revision" or total overhaul of the entire Constitution, and that the distinction becomes immaterial upon ratification by the sovereign people. This disposed of petitioners' contention that the proposed amendments exceeded the scope of authority.

• Occena vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755 (1980) — Cited for the proposition that the proposed amendments had been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa and through the mass media, satisfying the standard for proper submission. The question of the Interim Batasang Pambansa's authority to propose amendments was involved though not directly passed upon in this earlier case.

• Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) — Cited in a footnote for the view that the question of proper submission reduces itself not to power, which is the concern of the judiciary, but to wisdom, which is entrusted to the constituent body proposing the amendments. The ponente aligned himself with this view, originally articulated in the ponencia of retired Chief Justice Concepcion.

• Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702 (1971) — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the doctrine that constitutional provisions on amendments dealing with procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and other departments of government, and no less binding upon the people.

• Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976) — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the proposition that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments has been withheld from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power.

• Paragraph 2, 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution — Provides that the Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the Interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof, except the power to concur in treaties. This provision was the textual basis for the Court's holding that the Interim Batasang Pambansa possessed the power to propose amendments.

• Article XVII, Section 15, 1973 Constitution (Transitory Provisions) — Vests the Interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, with the power to propose amendments by a majority vote of all its Members, such amendments to take effect when ratified in accordance with Article XVI. This provision was the source of the constituent power that devolved upon the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor to the Interim National Assembly.

• Article XVI, Section 2, 1973 Constitution — Provides that any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. This provision was applied to confirm that the plebiscite set for April 7, 1981 fell within the 90-day period, the resolutions having been approved on February 5 and 27, 1981.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Abad Santos, J., was on official leave.

• Teehankee, J. — Justice Teehankee voted to give due course to the petitions and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. He reiterated his position from Sanidad vs. COMELEC that the constituent power to propose and approve amendments has been withheld from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power, and that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of the amending process must be observed. He argued that the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa were invalid under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino vs. COMELEC, and that the proposed amendments at bar, having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid 1976 amendments, necessarily suffered from the same congenital infirmity. Even assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, Justice Teehankee contended that the doctrine of fair and proper submission, as enunciated in Gonzales vs. COMELEC and officially adopted in Tolentino, was fully applicable: the three resolutions proposing complex, complicated, and radical amendments to the structure of government were approved on February 27, 1981, with the plebiscite set only thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981, which he deemed totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for the people to be sufficiently informed, to conscientiously deliberate, and to express their will in a genuine manner. He quoted at length Justice Sanchez's separate opinion in Gonzales emphasizing that the people are not to be mere rubber stamps and must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and reach a conclusion free from extraneous influences.