Ocampo vs. People

Cohabitation under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code is established when a man and a woman dwell together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse, and proof of actual sexual intercourse is not required where the association sufficiently demonstrates an unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation.

The petitioner was charged with concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines three modes of committing the offense: (1) keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; (2) having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is not his wife; and (3) cohabiting with such woman in any other place. The case concerned only the third mode. The petitioner was married, and his illicit relations with his co-accused, Igmedia Refe, began in 1937.

Petitioner Luis Ocampo was charged with concubinage together with his co-accused Igmedia Refe in the Court of First Instance of Albay. The illicit relations between them began in 1937. In September of that year, petitioner and Igmedia went to Naga, Camarines Sur, where they dwelt together as husband and wife in the same house and were often seen together attending shows and dances. In October of the same year, they went for a thermal bath in Tiwi, Albay, where, in the first visit, they stayed for three days, and in the second, for four days. During their entire stay, they dwelt together as husband and wife in the house of one Alfonsa Toledo, occupying one room where they slept alone.

Petitioner maintained that a letter (Exhibit 2) sent to him by the complainant in the latter part of June, 1937, constituted consent to his illicit relations and was therefore a condonation within the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court, however, construed the letter under the facts and circumstances of the case as not constituting consent or condonation, and this finding was not reversed by the Court of Appeals.

• Condonation through Letter: Petitioner argued that the letter (Exhibit 2) sent to him by the complainant in the latter part of June, 1937, constituted consent to his illicit relations and was therefore a condonation within the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's arguments in detail.

• Cohabitation: Whether petitioner's conduct with his co-accused constituted cohabitation within the meaning of Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, sufficient to sustain a conviction for concubinage.
• Condonation: Whether the letter (Exhibit 2) sent by the complainant constituted consent or condonation under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Cohabitation: Yes. The association between petitioner and his co-accused was sufficient to constitute cohabitation within the meaning of the law, even disregarding proofs of actual sexual intercourse, because they dwelt together as husband and wife in the same house in Naga and again in Tiwi for seven days and nights.
• Condonation: No. The trial court's finding that the letter did not constitute consent or condonation involves questions of fact that the Supreme Court cannot review at that stage of the proceedings.

• Cohabitation: The term "cohabit" means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse, citing People vs. Pitoc, 43 Phil., 758. Whether an association for illicit intercourse has been such as to constitute an unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation is, in every case, a question of fact, and the extent of such association as to constitute cohabitation within the meaning of the law is a matter of the court's appreciation. In this case, petitioner's conduct was not confined to isolated interviews for unlawful intercourse. He and his co-accused dwelt together as husband and wife in the same house in Naga, where they were seen attending shows and dances, and again in Tiwi, where they dwelt together as husband and wife for seven days and nights, sleeping together and alone in one room. This association was sufficient to constitute cohabitation even without proof of actual sexual intercourse.
• Condonation: The letter was construed by the trial court under the facts and circumstances of the case as not constituting consent or condonation, and this finding was not reversed by the Court of Appeals. At that stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court cannot review the finding because it involves questions of fact.

• Cohabitation under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code — Cohabitation means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse. Whether an association for illicit intercourse constitutes an unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation is a question of fact in every case, and the extent of such association as to constitute cohabitation is a matter of the court's appreciation. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the petitioner's conduct in dwelling with his co-accused as husband and wife in Naga and Tiwi was sufficient to constitute cohabitation, even without proof of actual sexual intercourse.

• "The term 'cohabit' means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine of cohabitation under Article 334 and is the canonical formulation cited from People vs. Pitoc.
• "We are of the opinion and so hold that such association is sufficient to constitute a cohabitation within the meaning of the law even disregarding proofs of actual sexual intercourse." — This states the ratio decidendi: actual sexual intercourse need not be proven where the association demonstrates an unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation.
• "At this stage of the proceeding we cannot review the finding which involves questions of fact." — This explains the Court's refusal to review the trial court's factual finding on the condonation issue.

• People vs. Pitoc, 43 Phil., 758 — Controlling precedent cited for the definition of "cohabit" as dwelling together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse.

• Article 334, Revised Penal Code — Defines the three modes of committing concubinage: (1) keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; (2) having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is not his wife; and (3) cohabiting with such woman in any other place. The Court applied the third mode to the facts of the case.
• Article 344, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the condonation of the offense. The Court declined to review the trial court's factual finding that the letter did not constitute consent or condonation under this provision.

Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.