Ocampo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

A candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed the winner when the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is subsequently declared disqualified, and votes cast for a candidate not disqualified by final judgment before the election cannot be declared stray under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

Petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo and private respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, were rival candidates for the position of Representative of the Sixth Legislative District of Manila in the May 14, 2001 elections. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the constitutional body vested with jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, governs the effect of disqualification cases on votes cast for a disqualified candidate, providing that votes cast for a candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be counted.

On May 14, 2001, congressional elections were held for the Sixth Legislative District of Manila. Two of the candidates were petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo and private respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez. On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Crespo the duly elected Congressman, crediting him with 32,097 votes — a margin of 768 votes over Ocampo, who obtained 31,329 votes.

On May 31, 2001, Ocampo filed an electoral protest with the HRET, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-024, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the Sixth District on grounds of misreading of votes garnered by petitioner, falsification of election returns, substitution of election returns, use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots, and presence of ballots written by one person or two persons. He prayed for a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the contested precincts and for his proclamation as the duly elected Congressman. On June 18, 2001, Crespo filed his answer with counter-protest, denying that he engaged in massive vote-buying and opposing the revision and appreciation of ballots. After the preliminary conference on July 12, 2001, the HRET limited the issues to whether massive vote-buying was committed by Crespo and whether Ocampo could be proclaimed the duly elected Representative.

Meanwhile, in separate proceedings — HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 (Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo) and 01-023 (Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo) — the HRET issued Resolutions on March 6, 2003, declaring Crespo ineligible for the Office of Representative of the Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the district and ordering him to vacate his office. Crespo's motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 12, 2003, Ocampo filed a motion to implement Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, contending that since Crespo had been declared disqualified, the votes cast for him should not be counted and Ocampo, having garnered the second highest number of votes, should be declared the winner. Crespo opposed the motion on March 26, 2003.

On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding Crespo guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman. On the question of whether Ocampo could be proclaimed, the HRET ruled that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among remaining qualified candidates, reasoning that congressional elections afford voters no opportunity to elect a substitute and that the only recourse is to hold another election. The HRET denied Ocampo's motion to implement Section 6, R.A. No. 6646, by declaring the votes cast for Crespo as stray. Ocampo's partial motion for reconsideration was denied on June 2, 2003, prompting the present petition for certiorari. By the time the Court resolved the petition, the Twelfth Congress had adjourned on June 11, 2004, and on May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers had proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

• Ministerial Duty to Implement Section 6, R.A. No. 6646: Petitioner contended that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that it was unnecessary to rule on the recount and revision of ballots, maintaining that it is the HRET's ministerial duty to implement Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, which provides that any candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
• Entitlement to Proclamation as Second Placer: Petitioner argued that since private respondent was declared disqualified, the votes cast for him should not be counted, and petitioner, having garnered the second highest number of votes, should be declared the winner and proclaimed the duly elected Congressman.

• Final Judgment Before Election Required: Private respondent countered that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 requires that the disqualification by final judgment take place before the election, and that the HRET Resolutions disqualifying him were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections.
• Non-Finality of Disqualification: Private respondent claimed that the HRET Resolutions disqualifying him were not yet final and executory because they were subjects of certiorari proceedings before the Supreme Court, and therefore all his votes should be counted and none should be considered stray.

• Applicability of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646: Whether the votes cast in favor of private respondent should not be counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: Whether petitioner, a second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

• Applicability of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646: No. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment of disqualification before the election for votes cast for a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Private respondent was declared disqualified almost twenty-two months after the election, so the requisite final judgment before the election was absent.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: No. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. The second placer was repudiated by the electorate and cannot be considered the first among qualified candidates.

• Applicability of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646: The Court relied on Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, which emphasized that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." When a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray, as doing so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate. The rationale is that voters cast their ballots bona fide, in the honest belief that the candidate was qualified. In this case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost twenty-two months after the May 14, 2001 elections, so the condition of final judgment before the election was absent. Petitioner therefore could not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

• Proclamation of Second Placer: The Court reaffirmed settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second placer to be declared winner. This principle was reiterated in Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC, Domino vs. COMELEC, and as early as 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes. Drawing on Geronimo vs. Ramos, the Court explained that if the winning candidate is not qualified, a permanent vacancy is created. The second placer lost the election and was repudiated by the plurality of voters; he could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among qualified candidates. To rule otherwise would misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The proper recourse is to hold another election, with Article VI, Section 9 of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6645 allowing Congress to call a special election to fill the vacancy. The petition was also rendered moot and academic, as the Twelfth Congress had adjourned on June 11, 2004, and Bienvenido Abante had been proclaimed Congressman of the Sixth District on May 17, 2004 pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections, citing Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment.

• Final Judgment Before Election Requirement (Section 6, R.A. No. 6646) — For the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray" under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code, there must be a final judgment of disqualification rendered before the election. When a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray, as this would disenfranchise the electorate who voted bona fide in the honest belief that the candidate was qualified. In this case, the disqualification was rendered nearly twenty-two months after the election, so the requirement was absent and the votes could not be considered stray.

• Second Placer Rule (Non-Entitlement to Proclamation) — The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. The second placer is just that — a second placer who lost the election and was repudiated by the plurality of voters. He cannot be proclaimed winner because he cannot be considered the first among qualified candidates. The proper recourse upon disqualification of the winning candidate is to hold another election to ascertain the new choice of the electorate. This doctrine has been consistently applied from as early as 1912 (Topacio vs. Paredes) through Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC, Domino vs. COMELEC, Geronimo vs. Ramos, and Sunga vs. COMELEC.

• Moot and Academic Cases — A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts decline jurisdiction of moot cases, as a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. In this case, the petition was rendered moot by the adjournment of the Twelfth Congress and the proclamation of a new representative in the subsequent elections.

• "Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered 'stray.' Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on the temporal requirement for disqualification under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and is the ratio decidendi for the first issue.

• "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision, encapsulating the second placer doctrine in canonical form and frequently cited in subsequent election jurisprudence.

• "The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electroral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences." — This passage explains the democratic rationale behind the second placer rule, grounding it in the nature of the electoral process and voter psychology.

• Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639 — Controlling precedent on the application of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646; the Court relied on this case to establish that a final judgment of disqualification before the election is required for votes to be considered stray.
• Sunga vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125629, March 25, 1998, 288 SCRA 76 — Cited for the doctrine that the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle the second placer to be declared elected.
• Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 — Followed as part of the consistent line of jurisprudence holding that subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second placer to proclamation.
• Abella vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 253 — Followed as part of the same line of jurisprudence on the second placer rule.
• Benito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106053, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 436 — Followed as part of the same line of jurisprudence on the second placer rule.
• Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546 — Followed as part of the same line of jurisprudence on the second placer rule.
• Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) — Cited as the earliest authority for the principle that a candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is found ineligible.
• Geronimo vs. Ramos, G.R. Nos. L-60504, L-60591, 60732-39, May 14, 1985, 136 SCRA 435 — Cited for the principle that disqualification of the winning candidate creates a permanent vacancy and that the second placer cannot be proclaimed as the first among qualified candidates.
• Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004 — Cited for the doctrine that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
• Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033, April 14, 1997, 271 SCRA 204 — Cited for the principle that courts decline jurisdiction of moot cases and that a declaration on a moot issue would be of no practical use or value.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987) — Provides that any candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If a candidate is not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and may order suspension of proclamation if evidence of guilt is strong. The Court applied this provision by holding that its "final judgment before the election" requirement was not satisfied, as Crespo was disqualified nearly twenty-two months after the election.
• Section 72, Omnibus Election Code — Cited alongside Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 as likewise requiring a final judgment before the election for votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray.
• Article VI, Section 9, 1987 Constitution — Referenced by the HRET as allowing Congress to call a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives, providing the proper recourse when a winning candidate is disqualified.
• Republic Act No. 6645 — Referenced as allowing the calling of a special election to fill a congressional vacancy, reinforcing that the remedy is a new election rather than proclamation of the second placer.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug (on official leave), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Corona, Azcuna, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.