Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals

The prosecution's failure to present the certificate of title of the land is not fatal to a conviction for squatting under Presidential Decree No. 772 where the accused's non-ownership of the property and the act of squatting are proven beyond reasonable doubt, the ownership of the land not being the crucial issue in the case. A demurrer to evidence filed without prior leave of court operates as a waiver of the accused's right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution's evidence, pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

The petitioner, Aniceto C. Ocampo, was charged with violating Presidential Decree No. 772, the Anti-Squatting Law, for constructing a house on land belonging to the University of the Philippines. The University of the Philippines maintained its own police force, including a Squatter's Relocation Team tasked with monitoring and addressing unauthorized constructions on U.P. property. The land in question, the U.P. Arboretum, was publicly known to be part of the U.P. grounds. The petitioner claimed to have purchased the land from a certain Roberto Pael, who was himself the subject of a criminal case for squatting on the same property.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 15, 1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received a telephone call reporting that somebody was constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum. Villanueva, Ladip, and Ernesto, members of the U.P. Police Force assigned to the U.P. Squatter's Relocation Team, were directed to investigate. The U.P. Arboretum is located at the back of the U.P. Petron, beside the U.P. Hydraulic Research Center. Upon arriving at the location, they saw people constructing a house. The carpenters told them that the owner was Aniceto Ocampo, who was present at the time. When asked whether he had a building permit, the accused admitted that he had none, although he claimed that he bought the parcel of land from a certain Roberto Pael.

The accused was informed that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines and was told to stop the construction, which he complied with. However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed construction. The prosecution witnesses reminded him that he was violating Presidential Decree No. 772 and again told him to stop, but the accused ignored the U.P. Police Squatter's Team and insisted that he bought the land from Mr. Pael. The team reported the matter to their Chief, Captain Madrigal, and executed an affidavit which they submitted to the U.P. Legal Department. A picture of the house constructed by the accused was also taken.

After the preliminary investigation, an information dated March 25, 1985 was filed against Aniceto Ocampo charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded "not guilty." After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove ownership of the land and that it failed to prove that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the absence of the title did not cripple the fact that the accused was not the owner of the property, and that since there was no showing that the accused occupied the lot with the knowledge or consent of the owner, he was a squatter within the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 772.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt on October 7, 1985. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. The prosecution's evidence showed that as early as May 1983, the petitioner was told that the area is U.P. property; that he began constructing his house without a permit from the owner; and that he had been informed that he was violating the Anti-Squatting Law. The petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased from Roberto Pael, and the building and sanitary permits he attached to his motion for reconsideration were both dated June 26, 1985—more than ten months after the illegal construction took place and three months after the case had been filed against him.

• Failure to Prove Ownership: Petitioner argued that the very essence of the case is the proof of ownership of the land involved, and that the prosecution's failure to present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines was a fatal defect in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of squatting.
• Demurrer as Bar to Presenting Evidence: Petitioner raised the issue of whether his motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) bars him from presenting his evidence, but did not endeavor to argue in his favor in the petition.
• Errors on Appeal: Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in (a) applying Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; (b) convicting him on the basis of evidence which does not measure to the degree of proof required by law; and (c) not applying the principle of presumption of innocence in his favor.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: The Solicitor General opined that "petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal, a gamble which he lost," referring to the petitioner's decision to file a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, which operated as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

• Proof of Ownership: Whether the failure of the prosecution to present evidence of ownership is a fatal defect in finding the accused-petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of squatting.
• Effect of Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the motion to dismiss filed by accused-petitioner is a bar for him to present evidence.

• Proof of Ownership: No. The failure of the prosecution to present the certificate of title to prove ownership by the University of the Philippines is not material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, as the ownership of U.P. is not in issue in the case and the crucial issue is the act of squatting and the petitioner's non-ownership of the property.
• Effect of Demurrer to Evidence: Yes. Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the accused files a motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

• Proof of Ownership: Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, the Anti-Squatting Law, embraces three elements: (a) the accused is not the owner of the land; (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat, or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. In this case, all three elements were established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence showed that the petitioner was not the owner of the land, that he constructed his house without a permit from the owner, and that he did so against the owner's will or without its consent. The petitioner had been told as early as May 1983 that the area is U.P. property, and he had been informed that he was violating the Anti-Squatting Law. The petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased from Roberto Pael, and the alleged sale was a defense he could have utilized but failed to substantiate with evidence at trial. Moreover, Roberto Pael was shown by testimonial evidence to be not the owner of the land and was himself the subject of a criminal case for squatting on the same property. The building and sanitary permits the petitioner attached to his motion for reconsideration were dated June 26, 1985—more than ten months after the illegal construction and three months after the case was filed—which undermined their evidentiary value. The property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the U.P. grounds, and the ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this case.
• Effect of Demurrer to Evidence: Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that after the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence on its own initiative or on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. However, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on October 1, 1988, but was given retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos vs. People. Well-settled is the rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. In this case, the record does not show that the accused-petitioner's demurrer to evidence was filed with prior leave of court, and the retroactive effect of the amendment therefore works against him. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the accused-petitioner waived his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Furthermore, the petitioner raised the issue of whether his motion to dismiss bars him from presenting evidence, but nowhere in his petition did he endeavor to argue in his favor, and such a question should have been raised in the court a quo and on appeal.

• Elements of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) — The offense of squatting under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772 embraces three elements: (a) the accused is not the owner of the land; (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat, or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. All three elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, all three elements were established: the petitioner was not the owner of the land, he constructed his house without a permit, and he did so against the owner's will or without its consent.
• Non-essentiality of Title in Squatting Cases — The prosecution's failure to present the certificate of title of the landowner is not material in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in a squatting case, as the ownership of the land is not the crucial issue. The crucial issue is the act of squatting and the accused's non-ownership of the property, both of which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence by Demurrer Without Leave of Court — Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the accused files a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If the court denies the motion, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense only if the motion was filed with prior leave of court.
• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on October 1, 1988, was given retroactive effect in Bonalos vs. People and therefore applied to the petitioner's case.

• "The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, which embraces three (3) elements, namely: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. In the case at bar, all three (3) elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage defines the elements of the offense of squatting under Presidential Decree No. 772 and states the Court's finding that all elements were proven in this case.
• "The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is the act of squatting of the petitioner and his non-ownership of the property, both of which have been proven beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage articulates the Court's ruling that the prosecution's failure to present the certificate of title is not fatal to the conviction, as the crucial issue is the act of squatting and the accused's non-ownership.
• "When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution." — This passage states the controlling rule on the effect of a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, which operated as a waiver of the petitioner's right to present evidence.
• "By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution." — This passage applies the rule on demurrer to the petitioner's specific conduct, explaining that his motion to dismiss constituted a waiver of his right to present his defense.

• Bonalos vs. People — Cited as the case that gave retroactive effect to the amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on October 1, 1988, thereby applying to the petitioner's case.
• People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784 — Cited for the well-settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
• Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522 — Cited alongside People vs. Sumilang for the same principle on the retroactive application of procedural laws.

• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) — Defines the offense of squatting and prescribes the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Court applied this provision in finding that all three elements of the offense were established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Section 15, Rule 119, Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended) — Provides that after the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence on its own initiative or on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the motion, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The Court applied this provision retroactively to hold that the petitioner's demurrer to evidence, filed without leave of court, operated as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., was on leave.