Obiedo vs. Hon. Soliman M. Santos, Jr.

A judge’s act of communicating extrajudicially with the counsel of both parties after promulgation of a decision—purporting to explain or justify the ruling, suggesting practical settlement, and making remarks that could cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality or competence—constitutes impropriety and gross misconduct in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and warrants suspension even in the absence of ill motive when the judge has a record of similar prior infractions.

Complainant Roberto L. Obiedo was the private complainant in an estafa case against the Spouses Nery, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2012-0426, which was tried before respondent Judge Santos. After trial, respondent Judge rendered a judgment acquitting the accused but ordering them to pay civil damages of P1,290,000.00 actual and P100,000.00 moral damages, with interest. Shortly after promulgation, respondent Judge sent the private prosecutor and defense counsel a text message that elaborated on the ruling, disclosed that his legal researcher had recommended conviction, suggested the parties work out a document to revoke the sale, and characterized the damages awarded as “consuelo de bobo.” The complainant deemed the text message improper and filed the present administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court.

• The Estafa Case and Judgment: Complainant Obiedo filed a criminal case for estafa against the Nery Spouses, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2012-0426, raffled to respondent Judge’s Branch 61, RTC Naga City. After trial, respondent Judge rendered a Judgment dated 17 December 2018 acquitting the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but ordering them to pay P1,290,000.00 actual damages and P100,000.00 moral damages, with 6% interest per annum from finality.

• The Text Message: After promulgation, respondent Judge sent a text message to the private prosecutor (Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo) and defense counsel (Atty. Edgar M. Abitria). The message stated, in part:

  • He was more than fair to the Nery spouses, acquitting them despite waiving their evidence presentation.
  • His legal researcher actually recommended a conviction for “other deceits” based on Nery’s assurances of a “clean title” to Obiedo and Turiano.
  • Conviction might become a possibility if Obiedo moved for reconsideration or appealed because the acquittal was not yet final.
  • He was banking on counsel to guide Nery to understand and accept the disposition.
  • For all intents and purposes, the sale was useless to Obiedo; if needed, a document to revoke the sale could be worked out by counsel.
  • Nery should pay the reduced actual damages and some moral damages to Obiedo, which were “consuelo de bobo.”

  • He exhorted counsel to be fair and end the matter, adding that he does not make “hometown decisions.”

  • The Administrative Complaint: Obiedo, through new counsel Atty. Epifanio Ma. J. Terbio, Jr., filed the administrative complaint alleging that respondent Judge committed gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the law. Obiedo contended that by sending the text message, respondent Judge appeared to be justifying his ruling and gave the impression something was erroneous with it, suggested the filing of a motion for reconsideration or appeal, and betrayed bias against Naga City residents by disclaiming “hometown decisions.” Obiedo invoked Rule 1.01, Rule 2.01, and Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

  • Respondent Judge’s Defense: Respondent Judge argued that his approach was “more practical” than “overly legalistic” and that attorneys list their cellphone numbers in pleadings for speedier communication. He claimed he was dissuading, not suggesting, a motion for reconsideration. He maintained the message was not prompted by uncertainty but by a desire to end litigation in the best interest of both parties. The statement about “hometown decisions” merely underscored his impartiality. He characterized the complaint as a vendetta by Atty. Terbio.

• Impropriety and Bias: Complainant argued that respondent Judge should have allowed his judgment to speak for itself; by sending a text message elaborating on his ruling and suggesting practical settlement, the judge appeared to be justifying a flawed decision and created the impression that the ruling needed to be made more palatable.
• Suggestion to Appeal: Complainant contended that respondent Judge’s mention of the possibility of conviction upon reconsideration or appeal effectively invited the private complainant to seek reversal, casting doubt on the correctness of the acquittal and creating an appearance that the judge was waiting for offers.
• Partiality: Complainant asserted that respondent Judge’s remark that he does not render “hometown decisions” disclosed a bias against Naga City residents like Obiedo himself.

• Practical Problem-Solving: Respondent Judge maintained that his text message was an extension of his preference for alternative dispute resolution and a pragmatic attempt to finally resolve the dispute, not an impropriety.
• No Suggestion of Appeal: He countered that the message actually discouraged the parties from moving for reconsideration or appealing and was intended to guide the accused to accept the civil liability imposed.
• Good Faith and Candor: He explained that he knew both counsel from private practice and felt he could communicate candidly; his mention of his legal researcher’s recommendation was merely an honest disclosure, not a sign of uncertainty.
• Impartiality: The phrase “hometown decisions” was meant to emphasize that his decisions rest solely on facts and law, without favor to local litigants or counsel.
• Vendetta: Respondent Judge argued the complaint was motivated by a personal grudge held by Obiedo’s new counsel, Atty. Terbio.

• Impropriety: Whether respondent Judge’s act of sending a text message to the parties’ counsel after promulgation of his decision that explained his ruling, disclosed his staff’s contrary recommendation, suggested practical settlement, and commented on his impartiality constitutes impropriety and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct warranting administrative sanction.

• Impropriety: Respondent Judge was found guilty of impropriety and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, constituting gross misconduct. The text message was unnecessary because the promulgated judgment already contained the legal and factual basis for the disposition; any further elaboration to counsel outside official proceedings cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality, integrity, and competence. The communication, even if sent after promulgation, fell within the prohibition of Canon 4, Sections 1 and 3, which require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to avoid situations that could give rise to suspicion of favoritism or partiality. The judge’s conduct also fell short of Canon 2, Section 1, demanding that a judge’s conduct be beyond reproach and perceived as such. The Court rejected respondent Judge’s justification of practical problem-solving, stressing that the mandate to encourage settlement does not grant an unbridled license to do so outside official proceedings at the risk of undermining judicial integrity. Because respondent Judge had two previous administrative infractions for similar improper out-of-court interactions (Elgar and Borromeo), the penalty of a P20,000.00 fine recommended by the OCA was deemed too light. However, finding no ill motive or bad faith, and treating good faith as a mitigating circumstance, the Court imposed a suspension of six months without pay and sternly warned against repetition.

• Doctrine of Judicial Propriety (Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct): Judges must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, not only during the pendency of a case but even after a decision has been promulgated or has become final. Any act that may reasonably raise suspicion that extrajudicial relations or communications influenced a judicial determination erodes public confidence in the judiciary. The termination of a case does not remove a judge from public scrutiny for acts that may render the disposition suspect.

• Integrity and Perception (Canon 2, Section 1): A judge’s conduct must not only be above reproach but must be perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. Extrajudicial communications with counsel that go beyond the formal proceedings undermine this perception, even when motivated by a desire to facilitate settlement.

• Mitigation by Good Faith in Administrative Penalties (Section 48, Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service): In determining the proper penalty for administrative offenses, the disciplining authority may consider mitigating circumstances such as good faith. Good faith may reduce but does not excuse the violation, especially where the respondent has a record of prior similar infractions.

• The text message itself: “GUD A.M. EDGAR, CC EDWIN, 2 REPEAT, I WAS MORE DEN FAIR WD NERY, ACQUITTING HIM DESPYT WANING HIS EVID PRESENTATN. MY LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTUALLY RECOMMENDED A CONVICTION 4 ‘OTHER DECEITS’ BASED ON NERY’S ASURANS OF HS ‘CLEAN TITLE’ TO OBIEDO & TURIANO. CONVICTN MYT BCOM A POSIBILITY F U MR & APPEAL KASI D PA FINAL C ACQUITAL. I AM BANKIN ON U 2 GYD NERY TO UNDERSTND & ACEPT MY DISPOSITN. LETS B PRACTICAL ABT D SALE KASI WALA NAMAN TRANSFR OF TITLE & POSESION 2 OBIEDO. 4 OL INTENTS & PURPOSES, IT S USELES 2 OBIEDO. IF NIDED, A DOC 2 REVOKED SALE KAN & SHD B WRKD OUT BY U & EDWIN. BUT NERY SHD PAY D ACTUAL DAMAGES NA REDUCD NA NGA, KASI NO REIMB SA COMISN & ATTY’S FEES, PLUS SOM MORAL DAMAGES NAMAN TO OBIEDO, ACTUALLY CONSUELO DE BOBO. B FAIR ON FD & END IT NA. DS WL B MY LAST WORD ON DIS. KAMO NA NI EDWIN AN MAGULAY AS 2 GUD SPECIMENS OF LEGAZP AND NAGA ATTYS. NEVERMIND D JUDG HU DAS NOT MAKE HOMTOWN DECISNS. TNX & MERI XMAS.” — This message is the centerpiece of the administrative charge, illustrating the type of extrajudicial communication that violates judicial propriety.

• “Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.” — Often-cited maxim in Philippine judicial ethics, reiterating that a judge’s conduct must be beyond reproach both in substance and in appearance.

• “The Code does not require that judges live in seclusion. However, a judge in pending or prospective litigation before him should be scrupulously careful to steer clear of any act that may reasonably tend to raise the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course.” — Articulates the standard of care imposed on judges to avoid suspicion of partiality.

• “Any effort to declog the court dockets, promote alternative dispute resolution, or otherwise improve court processes must be done not only with noble purpose, but pursued within the acceptable bounds of judicial conduct.” — Distinguishes legitimate judicial encouragement of settlement from improper extrajudicial interventions.

• Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799 (Resolution), 12 September 2003, 457 Phil. 796 — Followed; held that a judge having lunch with counsel of a party in a pending case was improper, reinforcing that any act that may raise suspicion of favoritism violates judicial conduct.

• In re Justice Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, 23 September 2014, 743 Phil. 622 — Followed; dismissed an Associate Justice for, among other things, visiting the office of the accused after acquittal, establishing that the duty to observe propriety continues even after a case is terminated.

• Tan v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, 08 September 2004, 481 Phil. 189 — Followed; meted a four-month suspension for a judge who met litigants and sent a staff member to talk to complainant outside office premises, cited as supporting the penalty.

• J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Hontanosas, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, 21 September 2004 — Followed; held a judge liable for meeting a litigant at his home and in a karaoke bar, used to illustrate gross misconduct in extrajudicial interactions.

• Tuldague v. Pardo, A.M. Nos. RTJ-05-1962, 05-2243-P & 05-10-661-RTC, 17 October 2013, 719 Phil. 658 — Followed; found gross misconduct for a judge drinking with a litigant who had a pending application for probation, and imposed a P40,000.00 fine on a repeat offender, relied upon for penalty calibration.

• Elgar v. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880, 04 February 2020 — Prior administrative case against same respondent Judge; found guilty of pressing parties into amicable settlement through improper means (texting and ex parte meeting), and fined P100,000.00 total for multiple violations; cited as basis for treating the current infraction as a third offense.

• Borromeo v. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1850, 04 February 2020 — Another prior case where respondent Judge was admonished for gross misconduct for initiating a conference to settle cases pending in other salas, demonstrating a pattern of similar improper conduct.

• Canon 4, Sections 1 and 3, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Applied; Section 1 requires judges to avoid impropriety in all activities; Section 3 requires judges to avoid situations with lawyers that might reasonably give rise to suspicion of favoritism or partiality. The text message sent to both counsel, explaining the judgment and suggesting settlement outside the official proceedings, violated these provisions because it risked creating an appearance of partiality and cast doubt on the decision’s integrity.

• Canon 2, Sections 1 and 2, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Applied; Section 1 exhorts judges to ensure their conduct is perceived as beyond reproach; Section 2 requires behavior that reaffirms the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Respondent Judge’s communication fell short of this standard, as it opened his impartiality to question.

• Section 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court (as amended) — Applied in determining the penalty for gross misconduct constituting a serious charge, providing for dismissal, suspension of more than three to six months, or a fine exceeding P20,000.00 up to P40,000.00. The Court imposed the mid-range suspension of six months.

• Section 48, Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Applied in considering mitigating circumstances; the Court treated respondent Judge’s good faith as a mitigating factor that prevented the imposition of dismissal despite a third offense.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Carandang, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred.