Obiasca vs. Basallote

An appointment in the civil service takes effect immediately upon issuance by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes the duties of the position, and remains effective until disapproved by the CSC; an innocent appointee should not be penalized for the deliberate bad faith of appointing officials who prevent timely submission of the appointment to the CSC, and an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority — only the CSC may do so.

Respondent Jeane O. Basallote and petitioner Arlin B. Obiasca were each issued appointments to the same position of Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, at the Department of Education, Tabaco National High School in Albay. The dispute centered on the validity of competing civil service appointments, the effect of non-submission of an appointment to the CSC for attestation within the period prescribed by law, and the doctrine of immutability of final judgments as applied to CSC resolutions. The relevant legal framework included PD 807 (the Civil Service Decree), EO 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.

On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso appointed respondent Jeane O. Basallote to the position of Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, of the Department of Education, Tabaco National High School in Albay. Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated June 4, 2003, the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo, advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales that the papers of all applicants for the position, including respondent's, were being returned and that a school ranking should be accomplished and submitted for review, with only qualified applicants to be endorsed.

Respondent assumed the office of Administrative Officer II on June 19, 2003. She thereafter received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human Resource Management Officer I of the City Schools Division of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission because of her failure to submit the position description form duly signed by Gonzales. Respondent sought to obtain Gonzales' signature, but the latter refused despite repeated requests. When respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I, which she did.

On August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B. Obiasca to the same position of Administrative Officer II. Petitioner's appointment was sent to and properly attested by the CSC. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales, and Diaz. The Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from respondent on the status of her appointment and suspended them for three months; Diaz was absolved.

Respondent also filed a protest with CSC Regional Office V, which was initially dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the DepEd Grievance Committee. On motion for reconsideration, the protest was reinstated but eventually dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent's appeal to the CSC Regional Office was dismissed for failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested by the CSC. Respondent then elevated the matter to the CSC, which, in its November 29, 2005 resolution, granted the appeal, approved respondent's appointment, and recalled the approval of petitioner's appointment. The CSC found that respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position, that the vacancy had been properly published, and that the Personnel Selection Board had conducted a screening of applicants including both respondent and petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition on September 26, 2006, upholding respondent's appointment as effective immediately upon its issuance on May 26, 2003, because respondent had accepted the appointment upon assumption of her duties. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on February 8, 2007.

• Lack of CSC Attestation: Petitioner maintained that respondent was not validly appointed because her appointment was never attested by the CSC, rendering it incomplete and incapable of vesting a permanent title.
• 30-Day Submission Rule: Petitioner argued that under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, every appointment must be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from issuance; otherwise, it becomes ineffective. Because respondent's appointment was not transmitted to the CSC within the prescribed period, it ceased to be effective and the position was already vacant when petitioner was appointed.
• Due Process: Petitioner claimed he was deprived of his right to due process when he was not allowed to participate in the CSC proceedings, though the CA found that petitioner himself failed to exercise this right by not submitting a single pleading despite being furnished copies.

• Wrongful Non-Submission: Respondent countered that her appointment was wrongfully not submitted to the CSC for attestation by the proper officials, and that the reason given by Oyardo — the alleged failure to have the position description form signed by Gonzales — was not a valid reason because the PDF was not even required for attestation by the CSC.
• Qualifications and Compliance: Respondent pointed out that she possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position, and that the selection process had been properly observed.

• Finality of CSC Resolution: Whether the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 became final and executory due to petitioner's failure to file a petition for reconsideration before filing a petition for review in the CA.
• Effect of Non-Submission to CSC: Whether the deliberate failure of appointing officials to submit respondent's appointment to the CSC within 30 days from issuance rendered her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
• Amendment of PD 807 by EO 292: Whether Section 9(h) of PD 807 was amended by Section 12, Book V of EO 292, thereby deleting the 30-day submission requirement.
• Authority to Revoke Appointment: Whether the appointing authority could effectively revoke respondent's prior accepted appointment by appointing petitioner to the same position.

• Finality of CSC Resolution: Yes. The CSC resolution became final and executory because petitioner failed to file a petition for reconsideration as required by Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, rendering it immutable and no longer subject to amendment or modification.
• Effect of Non-Submission to CSC: No. The appointment was not rendered ineffective. An innocent appointee should not be prejudiced by the willful and deliberate bad faith of appointing officials who prevented timely submission; under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, the condition is deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
• Amendment of PD 807 by EO 292: Yes. Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that appointments be submitted to the CSC within 30 days, the deletion indicating legislative intent to change the meaning of the law.
• Authority to Revoke Appointment: No. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority; only the CSC possesses that power. Petitioner's subsequent appointment was therefore void, there being no vacancy to fill.

• Finality of CSC Resolution: Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules provide that the CSC decision is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed within 15 days from receipt. Petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in the CA. This fatal procedural lapse allowed the resolution to become final and executory. While Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides a mode of appeal from CSC decisions, Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules — a specific remedy for CSC decisions involving its administrative function on appointments — requires that a petition for reconsideration first be filed. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies, and none of the recognized exceptions are present. A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed.

• Effect of Non-Submission to CSC: The appointment took effect immediately upon issuance by the appointing authority on May 26, 2003, because respondent assumed her duties immediately, and it remained effective until disapproved by the CSC — which never happened. The non-submission was not due to any negligence on respondent's part but to the deliberate machinations of Gonzales, Oyardo, and Diaz, who conspired to prevent the appointment from reaching the CSC. The Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for willfully withholding information from respondent. Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, a condition is deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment; applying this principle, unless the appointee is negligent in following up the submission, he should not be prejudiced by bad faith acts of the appointing authority. Respondent was vigilant in pursuing her appointment, and the CSC subsequently approved it. The cases of Favis vs. Rupisan and Tomali vs. Civil Service Commission were distinguished: in Favis, the issue was the necessity of CSC approval, not the 30-day submission period, and there was an apparent lack of effort to procure approval; in Tomali, the appointee herself was not blameless and assumed office months after the appointment had lapsed. Neither situation obtained here. CSC vs. Joson and Chavez vs. Ronidel were cited as controlling: in both, the Court upheld appointments despite non-compliance with CSC rules because there were valid justifications, the non-compliance was beyond the appointee's control, and the appointee was not negligent.

• Amendment of PD 807 by EO 292: Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted within 30 days. As a rule, amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases indicates legislative intent to change the meaning of the law; the excised provision should be considered inoperative. While PD 807 and EO 292 are not inconsistent insofar as they require CSC action on appointments — evident from Section 12(14) and (15) of EO 292 — the restrictive 30-day period and its punitive effect (rendering appointments ineffective) were deliberately discarded by EO 292, which instead provides for periodic monitoring, inspection, and auditing of personnel actions. The historical development of civil service laws further supports this conclusion: earlier laws imposed no restrictive submission period, and it was only PD 807 that subjected submission to a 30-day deadline, which EO 292 lifted and abandoned. The CSC cannot restore by administrative rule what EO 292 deliberately removed.

• Authority to Revoke Appointment: Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the CSC. In De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that it is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved. By appointing petitioner to the same position, the appointing authority effectively usurped the CSC's exclusive power to revoke. Insisting on strict application of the 30-day submission rule would give the appointing authority the power to do indirectly what it cannot do directly — block the completion of an appointment through underhanded machinations. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position; the incumbent must first be legally removed or her appointment validly terminated before another can be appointed.

• Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments — A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed. Applied here to bar petitioner from challenging the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005, which had become final and executory due to his failure to file a petition for reconsideration as required by Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Applied here to require petitioner to file a petition for reconsideration with the CSC before elevating the matter to the CA.

• Amendment by Deletion — An amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change the meaning of the law. The word, phrase, or sentence excised should be considered inoperative. Applied here to conclude that EO 292's deletion of the 30-day submission requirement from PD 807 rendered that requirement no longer operative.

• Article 1186, Civil Code — Constructive Fulfillment of Condition — A condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. Applied by analogy to the civil service appointment process: unless the appointee is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent timely submission.

• Effectivity of Appointments — An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules takes effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting CSC approval. The appointment remains effective until disapproved by the CSC. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority; only the CSC may recall it.

• "When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another." — Opens the decision and frames the tension between strict statutory application and equitable considerations that animates the entire ruling.

• "An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC]." — Quoted from Section 9(h) of PD 807, this is the operative rule on appointment effectivity that the Court applied to uphold respondent's appointment.

• "Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, '[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.' Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC." — States the ratio decidendi for protecting an innocent appointee from the bad faith of appointing officials.

• "There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her." — States the rule rendering petitioner's appointment void, as respondent's prior appointment had not been validly terminated.

• Favis vs. Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, 19 May 1966, 17 SCRA 190 — Distinguished. Held that the tolerance, acquiescence, or mistake of proper officials does not render the legal requirement of CSC approval ineffective. Distinguished because the issue pertained to the necessity of CSC approval, not the 30-day submission period, and there was an apparent lack of effort to procure CSC approval.

• Tomali vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110598, 1 December 1994, 238 SCRA 572 — Distinguished. Held that an appointee's failure to secure CSC approval within the 30-day period rendered the appointment ineffective. Distinguished because the appointee was not blameless — she assumed office months after the appointment had lapsed — and there was no finding of bad faith by the appointing authority.

• Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 773 — Followed. Held that an appointment remains valid despite non-compliance with a CSC rule (inclusion in the ROPA) when there is a legitimate justification for the delay, the non-compliance is beyond the appointee's control, and the appointee is not negligent.

• Chavez vs. Ronidel, G.R. No. 180941, 11 June 2009 — Followed. Held that invalidation of an appointment based solely on a procedural lapse beyond the appointee's control — caused by the appointing authority's own inaction — is unwarranted, justifying relaxation of CSC rules on equitable considerations.

• De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 94 — Followed. Held that it is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable civil service laws and regulations.

• Orosa vs. Roa, G.R. No. 140423, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 22 — Cited for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: if an appeal or remedy is available within the administrative machinery, it should be resorted to before resort to the courts.

• Section 9(h), Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) — Provides that an appointment takes effect immediately upon issuance if the appointee assumes duties immediately and remains effective until disapproved by the CSC; also provided that appointments must be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise becoming ineffective. The Court held that the 30-day submission requirement was amended by deletion under EO 292.

• Section 12(14) and (15), Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Empowers the CSC to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters, and to inspect and audit personnel actions and programs periodically. Held to have amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the 30-day submission requirement and its punitive effect.

• Section 11, Rule V, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 — Provides that an appointment not submitted to the CSC within 30 days from issuance shall be ineffective. The Court questioned the authority of the CSC to impose this requirement, noting that EO 292 had already deliberately removed the 30-day period.

• Section 9, Rule V, Omnibus Rules — Provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the CSC. Applied to hold that only the CSC may revoke an accepted appointment.

• Section 1, Rule IV, Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions — Reinforces that an appointment takes effect immediately upon issuance and remains effective until disapproved by the CSC.

• Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI, Omnibus Rules — Provide that the CSC decision is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed within 15 days from receipt, and that failure to file within the prescribed period constitutes a waiver. Applied to hold that the CSC resolution became final and immutable.

• Article 1186, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that a condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. Applied by analogy to hold that the condition of timely submission to the CSC should be deemed fulfilled because appointing officials deliberately prevented it.

• Rule 43, Rules of Court — Provides the mode of appeal from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies including the CSC. Noted as an available remedy but held not to supplant the requirement under Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules to first file a petition for reconsideration.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, and Diosdado M. Peralta concurred in the decision. Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo took no part.

• Justice Lucas P. Bersamin — Dissented on multiple grounds. First, he argued that a petition for reconsideration was not a prerequisite to filing a petition for review under Rule 43, which has the force and effect of law and supersedes any CSC rule on the manner of appeal; the petitioner's petition for review was therefore timely filed. Second, he maintained that Section 12 of EO 292 did not amend Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the 30-day submission requirement, as the two provisions are not inconsistent — the broad authority to "take appropriate action on all appointments" does not dispense with the submission requirement, and the CSC itself continued to enforce it through the Omnibus Rules. Third, he insisted that without CSC attestation, respondent's appointment was incomplete and vested no permanent title, making it subject to recall by the appointing authority. He argued that Favis and Tomali remain authoritative: the mere failure to submit an appointment, regardless of the reason, renders it ineffective. He distinguished Joson and Chavez on the ground that the agencies involved were CSC-accredited agencies that could take final action on appointments without prior CSC approval, making the ROPA submission a mere ministerial duty rather than a condition for validity. Finally, he contended that De Rama actually supports the conclusion that the appointing authority could revoke respondent's appointment, because the prohibition against revocation presupposes that the appointment was already initially approved by the CSC — which never occurred here, as respondent's appointment was never submitted. He voted to grant the petition, reverse the CA decisions, and dismiss the protest against petitioner.