Nuguid vs. Nicdao

An acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically extinguish civil liability, but where the acquittal is based on a finding that the fact from which civil liability might arise did not exist—or where the obligation has been fully paid—no civil liability can be imposed. A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (preponderance of evidence); however, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

The case stemmed from two cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law). Petitioner Emma P. Nuguid lent money to respondent Clarita S. Nicdao and her husband, who operated the Vignette Superstore, in the aggregate amount of ₱1,150,000.00. As security for the loan, respondent gave petitioner several open-dated checks drawn against the Hermosa Savings Bank. The crime of violation of BP 22 has a dual character: as an offense against the State for disturbing social order, and as an offense against the private person injured by the crime. Civil liability ex delicto arises from the obligation of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

Petitioner Emma P. Nuguid lent money to respondent Clarita S. Nicdao and her husband, who operated the Vignette Superstore. Sometime in 1996, from April to August, respondent and her husband approached petitioner and asked to borrow money to settle obligations. Because of their close relationship, petitioner agreed, releasing ₱100,000.00 monthly until the total reached ₱1,150,000.00.

As security for the loan, respondent gave petitioner fourteen open-dated Hermosa Savings Bank checks totaling ₱1,150,000.00, with the assurance that if the entire amount was not paid within one year, petitioner could deposit the checks. The checks were in varying amounts: ₱100,000.00 (Check Nos. 7277, 12118, 12102, 7255, 8128, 7278, 7294), ₱150,000.00 (Check No. 7348), and ₱50,000.00 (Check Nos. 8812, 2286, 7254, 4540, 4523, 12103).

In June 1997, petitioner, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the sums, but respondent refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. On October 6, 1997, petitioner deposited all the checks in the bank of Samson Ching, totaling ₱1,150,000.00, since all the money given to respondent came from Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Verbal and written demands were made upon respondent to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail.

According to the Court of Appeals' findings, which the Supreme Court adopted, petitioner did not dispute that payments had already been made by respondent but argued that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous obligation. However, no evidence was presented by the prosecution to substantiate the claim of a previous obligation. Petitioner admitted having received cash payments from respondent on a daily basis but argued these were applied to interest payments only. The cash payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by petitioner in her own handwriting, as testified to by respondent and her employees Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. The daily cash payments marked as Exhibits 7 to 15 revealed that respondent had already paid her obligation to petitioner in the amount of ₱5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997, and she stopped making further payments when she realized she had already paid such amount. Respondent made a total payment of ₱6,980,000.00, inclusive of the ₱1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which was much more than the ₱1,150,000.00 she actually borrowed. No evidence was presented to prove a written stipulation for interest as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code.

• Civil Liability Despite Acquittal: Petitioner argued that respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum of ₱1,150,000.00, asserting that respondent obtained loans from her in that aggregate amount and that these loans have not been paid.
• Nature of Payments: Petitioner argued that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous obligation, not the loan in question, and that the daily cash payments were applied to interest payments only.

• Full Payment of Obligation: Respondent argued that her obligation had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment, having made total payments of ₱6,980,000.00, inclusive of the ₱1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which exceeded the ₱1,150,000.00 borrowed.
• Lack of Written Interest Stipulation: Respondent argued that no evidence was presented to prove a written stipulation for interest as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, and that the daily cash payments were recorded by petitioner herself in her own handwriting.

• Civil Liability After Acquittal: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner for the sum of ₱1,150,000.00 despite her acquittal from the criminal charges of violation of BP 22.

• Civil Liability After Acquittal: No. Respondent's civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The Court found no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent, as the Court of Appeals had found that her supposed civil liability had already been completely relieved by the total payments of ₱6,980,000.00, which exceeded the ₱1,150,000.00 borrowed.

• Civil Liability After Acquittal: The Court reasoned that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: as an offense against the State and as an offense against the private person injured by the crime. What gives rise to civil liability is the obligation of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

The Court noted that the gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment, and the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum. However, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.

A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.

In this case, the Court found no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent because her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The Court of Appeals' findings showed that respondent made total payments of ₱6,980,000.00, inclusive of the ₱1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which was definitely much more than the ₱1,150,000.00 she actually borrowed. These facts were never rebutted by petitioner. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove a written stipulation for interest as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code. The obligation of respondent had already been extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks.

• Civil Liability Ex Delicto — Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code (Article 1156). The Court applied this principle to determine whether the respondent, despite acquittal, could still be held civilly liable; however, because the obligation had been fully paid, no civil liability attached.
• Acquittal and Civil Liability — A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (preponderance of evidence). To be completely free from civil liability, the acquittal must be based on the fact that the accused did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable.
• Extinction of Penal Action and Civil Liability — Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
• Acquittal Not Barring Civil Action — Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
• Gravamen of BP 22 — The gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment, and the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum; why and to whom the check was issued, and the terms and conditions surrounding its issuance, are irrelevant in determining culpability.

• "Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." — This passage states the controlling principle on the relationship between criminal acquittal and civil liability, forming the basis for determining whether the respondent could still be held civilly liable.
• "A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence)." — This excerpt articulates the different standards of proof between criminal and civil liability, explaining why acquittal does not automatically extinguish civil liability.
• "By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]." — This passage from the Court of Appeals decision, adopted by the Supreme Court, establishes the factual basis for finding that respondent's civil liability had been fully extinguished by payment.

• Occena vs. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, January 22, 1990, 181 SCRA 328 — Cited for the principle that civil liability arises from the obligation to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
• Ngo vs. People, G.R. No. 155815, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 522 — Cited for the principle that the gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, and that the terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant in determining culpability.
• King vs. People, 377 Phil. 692 (1999) — Cited in support of the principle regarding the gravamen of BP 22 violations.
• Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, August 1, 1994, 234 SCRA 639 — Cited in support of the principle regarding the gravamen of BP 22 violations.

• Section 4, Rule 45, Rules of Court — The Court excluded the Court of Appeals as a respondent in the petition pursuant to this provision, which governs petitions for review on certiorari.
• Article 1156, Civil Code — Cited for the principle that crime is one of the five sources of obligations, forming the basis of civil liability ex delicto.
• Article 1956, Civil Code — Applied to the case to require that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing; the Court noted that no evidence was presented to prove a written stipulation for interest on the loan obligations.
• Article 29, Civil Code — Referenced in the context of civil liability existing despite acquittal on reasonable doubt.
• Article 2177, Civil Code — Referenced in the context of civil liability existing despite acquittal in criminal actions for negligence.
• Articles 31-34, Civil Code — Referenced in the context of independent civil actions where civil liability may exist despite acquittal.
• Article 101, Revised Penal Code — Referenced in the context of civil liability existing despite acquittal from a cause of nonimputability.
• Section 2, par. 4, Rule III, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited for the principle that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Checks Law) — The statute under which respondent was charged with fourteen counts of violation for issuing checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concurred.