Nueno vs. Angeles

An elective officer's term expires at the time fixed by law regardless of whether the incumbent actually served the full term, and no right to hold over exists where the legislature has repealed the prior hold-over provisions and enacted a statutory scheme for filling vacancies.

Petitioners Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel de la Fuente, Eustaquio C. Balagtas, and Delia C. Diño were members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila; respondents Gerardo Angeles, Agaton Evangelista, Andres Santa Maria, Vicente G. Cruz, Amado V. Hernandez, and Felicidad Manuel were appointed by the President to the same Board. The dispute implicated the Charter of Manila, the Revised Administrative Code, and Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code), which fixed regular triennial elections and provided for filling vacancies in elective provincial, municipal, and city offices. Before Commonwealth Act No. 357, the Administrative Code had expressly allowed hold-over for provincial, municipal, and Manila elective officers; Commonwealth Act No. 357 repealed those provisions.

Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel de la Fuente, Eustaquio Balagtas, Carmen Planas, and six others were elected to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila in the general election of December 10, 1940, and qualified on January 1, 1941. Nueno and Planas later resigned to run for the House of Representatives in the national election of November 14, 1941, but were not elected. After that election, the President of the Commonwealth appointed Nueno to fill the vacancy created by his own resignation and Delia C. Diño to fill the vacancy left by Planas, both belonging to the same political party, "The Young Philippines."

On January 3, 1942, when the City of Manila was occupied by the Japanese Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army proclaimed military administration under martial law over all occupied districts, providing that, so far as military administration permitted, all laws in force in the Commonwealth and executive and judicial institutions would continue, and all public officials would remain in their posts and carry on their duties as before. By Order No. 1 of January 23, 1942, a central administrative organization called the Philippine Executive Commission was organized, with Jorge Vargas as Chairman; Vargas's Executive Order No. 4, section 9(b), approved by the Japanese Commander in Chief, provided that provincial boards and boards or councils of cities, municipalities, and specially organized local governments would merely serve in an advisory capacity to their respective governors and mayors. Under the so-called Republic of the Philippines inaugurated on October 14, 1943, no material change was introduced as far as the City of Manila was concerned.

The regular election that, under section 4 of Act No. 357 (Election Code), should have been held on the second Tuesday in December 1943 to elect members of the Municipal Board who were to assume office on January 1, 1944, could not be held because the city was still under Japanese military occupation. The special election provided for in section 16(c) of the same Act could not be held after the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government on February 27, 1945, due to physical impossibility. On July 18, 1945, the President of the Commonwealth appointed the six respondents and four of those elected in December 1940 as members of the Board.

The four petitioners—Nueno, De la Fuente, Balagtas, and Diño—instituted this quo warranto action against the six respondents, Gerardo Angeles, Agaton Evangelista, Andres Santa Maria, Vicente G. Cruz, Amado V. Hernandez, and Felicidad Manuel, on the ground that petitioners, having been elected in December 1940 for three years, had not served their full three-year term because of the Japanese occupation, and were entitled to hold over or continue in office until their successors were elected and qualified; consequently, respondents' appointments were null and void. Attorney Nicolas V. Villaluz intervened for the political party "Young Philippines" and incidentally for petitioner Diño, claiming that although Diño was not entitled under the law to hold over after the expired term of Carmen Planas, respondents' appointments contravened section 16(b) of Act No. 357 because none belonged to the "Young Philippines," and that the appointments became ineffective from September 18, 1945, the day after the adjournment of the second special session of Congress, because they had not been submitted to the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, represented by the Fiscal of the City of Manila, contended that petitioners had no right to the offices because their term expired on December 31, 1943, and they were not entitled to hold over; that whether they had served completely was immaterial because term of office must be distinguished from tenure; that because petitioners had no right to institute the action, the Court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of respondents' appointments; and that the appointments were legal and valid under emergency powers granted by Act No. 671. The record did not show which of the six respondents occupied the four seats formerly occupied by the four petitioners, nor whether respondents were appointed under section 16(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 357 or under emergency powers.

• Hold-Over and Unexpired Term: Petitioners argued that, having been elected in the general election of December 1940 for a three-year term, their term of office had not expired because they had not served three years completely due to the Japanese occupation, and that they were entitled to hold over or continue in office until their successors were elected and qualified.
• Nullity of Respondents' Appointments: Petitioners maintained that, because they remained entitled to the offices, the appointments of the six respondents as members of the Municipal Board of Manila were null and void.
• Political Party Representation and Commission on Appointments (Diño/Intervenor): The intervenor for "Young Philippines" and petitioner Diño claimed that, although Diño was not entitled to hold over after the expired term of Carmen Planas, the respondents' appointments violated section 16(b) of Act No. 357 because none of them belonged to the "Young Philippines," and that the appointments became ineffective from September 18, 1945, since they had not been submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

• Expiration of Term and No Hold-Over: Respondents contended that petitioners had no right to the public offices claimed because their term of office had already expired on December 31, 1943, and they were not entitled to hold over.
• Term Distinguished from Tenure: Respondents argued that whether petitioners had served completely for three years as members of the Municipal Board was immaterial, because the term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent.
• Lack of Right to Sue and Jurisdiction: Respondents asserted that, since petitioners had no right to institute the present action, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed and inquire into the validity of respondents' appointments.
• Validity of Appointments Under Emergency Powers: Respondents maintained that the appointments of the respondents were legal and valid under the emergency powers granted by Act No. 671 of the Congress of the Philippines upon the President of the Commonwealth.

• Hold-Over After Expiration: Whether petitioners, elected in 1940 for a term ending December 31, 1943, were entitled to hold over as members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila notwithstanding the expiration of their term.
• Effect of War on Term: Whether petitioners' term of office was extended because they had not completely served three years due to the Japanese occupation.
• Power to Appoint Successors: Whether the President had the power to appoint respondents to the offices after the expiration of petitioners' term.
• Right to Bring Quo Warranto: Whether petitioners had the legal right to institute quo warranto to oust respondents from the offices.
• Validity of Appointments and Commission on Appointments: Whether the validity of respondents' appointments under emergency powers, or their effectivity due to lack of submission to the Commission on Appointments, needed to be resolved.

• Hold-Over After Expiration: No. Petitioners were not entitled to hold over; their term expired on December 31, 1943, and Commonwealth Act No. 357 repealed the prior hold-over provisions and provided for filling vacancies.
• Effect of War on Term: No. The term of office is distinct from tenure; the term is fixed by law and is not extended by war or by the incumbent's failure to serve the full term.
• Power to Appoint Successors: Yes. The offices became vacant from January 1, 1944, due to the failure to hold the regular and special elections; under section 16(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 357, the President could appoint respondents to fill the temporary vacancy until permanent successors were elected or appointed.
• Right to Bring Quo Warranto: No. Because petitioners were not entitled to hold over, they had no right to bring the action under section 6, Rule 68.
• Validity of Appointments and Commission on Appointments: Not reached. The Court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the President appointed respondents under emergency powers or whether the appointments became ineffective for lack of submission to the Commission on Appointments.

• Hold-Over After Expiration: Under section 7 of Rule 68, a quo warranto complaint must set forth the name of the person claiming entitlement and the defendant unlawfully in possession, and an individual cannot sue to oust two or more persons unless entitled to all the offices; because four petitioners sued six respondents and the record did not show which respondents occupied the four seats, the action could have been dismissed on that ground, but the case was decided on the merits. On the merits, term of office was distinguished from tenure: term is the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which incumbents succeed one another; tenure is the period during which the incumbent actually holds office and may be shorter for reasons within or beyond the incumbent's power. The term is not affected by hold-over, and no principle, law, or doctrine extends it by reason of war. Although American decisions generally adopt the common-law hold-over rule absent express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the Philippine Legislature had expressly provided hold-over for provincial, municipal, and Manila elective officers in the Revised Administrative Code. Commonwealth Act No. 357 repealed those provisions and, through section 16, provided for filling all vacancies, temporary or otherwise, during and after the expiration of a term, thereby showing a manifest legislative intent to suppress hold-over. The President's message to Congress of June 9, 1945, could not support hold-over because it had no force of law and, if anything, worked against the claimed right: if officers were entitled to hold over, they would not need recall or appointment. Thus, petitioners were not entitled to hold over after December 31, 1943.
• Effect of War on Term: The contention that petitioners' term had not expired because they had not completely served three years due to the war was untenable even assuming they had not discharged their duties during the Japanese occupation. The term of office is fixed by law and is not affected by the incumbent's tenure; the tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the incumbent's power. There is no principle, law, or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. The term of petitioners, elected in 1940, ended on December 31, 1943.
• Power to Appoint Successors: After the expiration of petitioners' term on December 31, 1943, the offices of members of the Municipal Board of Manila became vacant from January 1, 1944, because the regular election on the second Tuesday of December 1943 and the special election were not held. The only vacancies that could occur in elective provincial or municipal offices, including those of the City of Manila, were those provided in section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and section 2440(e) of the Revised Administrative Code, and each could be filled in the manner provided. Section 16(a) empowered the President to appoint a person to fill a temporary vacancy or interregnum until the permanent successor was elected or appointed under subsections (c) and (d) for the unexpired term under subsection (f). Section 16(a) did not apply to sickness, absence, suspension, or temporary disability of a member of the Manila Municipal Board, because no vacancy is created when the office is not without an incumbent; that situation was covered by section 2439 of the Administrative Code, allowing a temporary appointment until the incumbent's return. But even if "temporary vacancy" were improperly applied to such cases, it would not exclude section 16(a)'s application to the proper temporary vacancy resulting from delay in the election or appointment of a successor under subsections (c) and (d). Election or appointment under subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) for the unexpired term under subsection (f) should not be confused with an appointment under subsection (a) to fill the temporary vacancy until the permanent incumbent for the unexpired term has been elected or appointed. Petitioners Nueno and Diño could not claim hold-over because they had held office by appointment under subsection (b) to fill vacancies caused by resignation, to hold for the unexpired term under subsection (f); Diño's claim rested on the incorrect assumption that respondents were appointed under subsection (b).
• Right to Bring Quo Warranto: Since petitioners were not entitled to hold over or continue in the offices after the expiration of their term, they had no right to bring the quo warranto action and impugn the validity of respondents' appointments under section 6, Rule 68. Section 7, Rule 68 also requires the complaint to identify the person entitled to the office and the usurper, and an individual cannot sue to oust two or more persons unless entitled to all the offices; the record did not show which of the six respondents occupied the four seats claimed by the four petitioners. Although this defect could have been a ground for dismissal, the case was resolved on the merits.
• Validity of Appointments and Commission on Appointments: The record did not show whether the President appointed respondents under section 16(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 357 or under the emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Having concluded that petitioners were not entitled to hold over and that the President could appoint respondents to fill the temporary vacancy under section 16(a), it was unnecessary to decide whether the President had authority under emergency powers or whether the appointments became ineffective from September 18, 1945, for lack of submission to Congress or the Commission on Appointments.

• Term of Office vs. Tenure of Office — The term is the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure is the period during which the incumbent actually holds the office; it may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the incumbent's power. This distinction was applied to hold that petitioners' term expired on December 31, 1943, even if war prevented them from serving the full three years.
• Hold-Over — Under the common-law rule, absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to hold office until a successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent not to permit holding over may be express or implied. The Court found that Commonwealth Act No. 357 repealed the prior hold-over provisions and enacted section 16 to fill all vacancies, temporary or otherwise, thereby manifesting the intent to suppress hold-over for provincial, city, and municipal elective officers.
• Legislative Suppression of Hold-Over — The repeal of all prior provisions for holding over by provincial, city, and municipal elective officers, coupled with a statutory scheme for filling vacancies during and after the expiration of a term, clearly shows the legislative intent to suppress hold-over. This was applied to deny petitioners' claim.
• Vacancy and Temporary Vacancy — An office is vacant where there is no incumbent elected or appointed to hold it; a temporary absence or temporary physical or mental disability of the incumbent does not create a vacancy. Section 16(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 357 authorizes the President to fill a temporary vacancy or interregnum resulting from delay in the election or appointment of a successor under subsections (c) and (d). This was applied to hold that the offices became vacant from January 1, 1944, and the President could appoint respondents to fill the temporary vacancy.
• Quo Warranto Standing — A petitioner in quo warranto must show entitlement to the office claimed. Under section 6, Rule 68, one who has no right to hold over has no right to bring the action to oust the incumbent. This was applied to dismiss the petition.
• Executive Message Not Law — A message of the President to Congress has no force and effect of law and is not a legislative interpretation of the law. The President's June 9, 1945 message could not be invoked to support a right to hold over.
• No Extension of Term by War — There is no principle, law, or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. This was applied to reject petitioners' claim that their term had not expired because of the Japanese occupation.

• "The term means that the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office." — This is the majority's canonical distinction between term and tenure, the basis for rejecting any extension of the term by reason of war or failure to serve.
• "There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war." — This states the ratio for denying petitioners' claim that the Japanese occupation extended their term.
• "This repeal of all provisions for holding over by the provincial, city and municipal elective officers by Commonwealth Act No. 357, and the enactment of section 16 thereof which provides for the filling of all vacancies, temporary or otherwise, which might occur during and after the expiration of a term of office, so as to avoid the necessity and even the occasion for holding over, clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to suppress the hold-over." — This is the core holding on legislative intent to abolish hold-over for elective local officers.
• "An office is said to be vacant where there is no incumbent elected or appointed to hold it." — This definition supports the conclusion that the offices became vacant after petitioners' term expired and that the President could fill the temporary vacancy.

• Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866 — Cited in the majority as recognizing and applying the common-law rule of hold-over to appointive officers; the Court distinguished its application to elective provincial, city, and municipal officers because the legislature had expressly provided for hold-over and later repealed it.
• Young vs. Morris, 47 Okl. 743 — Cited for the rule that a temporary absence will not result in a vacancy, supporting the distinction between temporary disability and an actual vacancy.

• Section 7, Rule 68, Rules of Court — Requires a quo warranto complaint to set forth the name of the person claiming entitlement to the office and the defendant unlawfully in possession; those claiming the same office may be made parties; an individual cannot sue to oust two or more persons unless entitled to all. The Court noted this defect but decided on the merits.
• Section 6, Rule 68, Rules of Court — Requires the petitioner in quo warranto to have a right to the office claimed. Because petitioners were not entitled to hold over, they had no right to bring the action.
• Section 2074, Revised Administrative Code — Formerly provided that a provincial elective officer whose successor was not inducted at the time appointed by law would hold over until a successor was duly qualified. It was repealed by Commonwealth Act No. 357.
• Section 2177, Revised Administrative Code — Formerly provided the same hold-over rule for municipal elective officers. It was repealed by Commonwealth Act No. 357.
• Section 2439, Revised Administrative Code (Charter of the City of Manila) — Originally provided that Municipal Board members would hold office for four years or until their successors were elected and qualified; amended by Act No. 2774 to a three-year term. The majority also referred to section 2439 as covering temporary appointment of a member of the Manila Municipal Board in case of sickness, absence, suspension, or temporary disability, until the incumbent's return.
• Section 2440, Revised Administrative Code — Provided that elected members of the Manila Municipal Board would take office on October 16 following their election and hold office until their successors were elected and qualified; section 2440(d), as amended by Act No. 233, made the Election Law applicable to the Board as if Manila were a province; section 2440(e) provided for vacancies applicable to the Board.
• Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code), Section 4 — Fixed regular elections on the second Tuesday of December 1940 and every three years thereafter, with officers assuming office on January 1 next following. Applied to show the term of petitioners ended on December 31, 1943, and the 1943 election was not held.
• Commonwealth Act No. 357, Section 16 — Provided for vacancies in elective provincial or municipal offices: (a) temporary vacancies filled by appointment; (b) vacancies from death, resignation, removal, or cessation filled by appointment of a person belonging to the political party of the replaced officer; (c) failure of election or failure to elect requires the President to call a special election; (d) officer-elect death, non-confirmation for disloyalty, or failure to qualify allows special election or appointment; (e) failure of special election requires appointment; (f) appointee or elected successor holds for the unexpired term. The Court applied section 16(a) to allow the President to appoint respondents to the temporary vacancy and distinguished it from appointments for the unexpired term under subsections (b)-(e).
• Commonwealth Act No. 357, Section 18 — Provided that a special election shall be called by the President by proclamation for a date not earlier than thirty days nor later than ninety days from the proclamation. Cited to show the possibility of an interregnum or temporary vacancy.
• Commonwealth Act No. 671 — Emergency powers granted by Congress to the President. Respondents invoked it as authority for the appointments; the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the appointments were made under it.
• Act No. 2774 — Amended section 2439 of the Revised Administrative Code, eliminating the hold-over provision for the Manila Municipal Board.
• Act No. 233 — Amended section 2440(d) of the Revised Administrative Code, making the Election Law applicable to members of the Manila Municipal Board as if the City of Manila were a province.

Justices Jaranilla, De Joya, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones concurred in the majority opinion. Justice Perfecto filed a separate concurring opinion, in which he reasoned that petitioners could not claim title by election because no regular or special election had been held in Manila since 1943; their 1940 election was for the 1941-1943 term, which could not be confused with the 1944-1946 term. Term of office is distinct from tenure, and expiration of the term removed the office from the occupant. He further opined that by accepting official positions under the Japanese military administration in January 1942, petitioners vacated their Commonwealth positions because such positions were incompatible with positions under a foreign state, and the Constitution prohibited accepting any office from a foreign state without Congress's consent. He characterized hold-over as a fiction and warned against elevating it to a judicial doctrine, noting that the Second National Assembly's hold-over was justified only by extreme necessity and was not a precedent. He also concluded that petitioners lacked legal personality to institute quo warranto under Lumontad vs. Cuenco, 41 Off. Gaz. 894, and voted for denial without costs.

• Justice Hilado (dissenting, joined by Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, and Paras, JJ.) — The dissent maintained that petitioners had the right to hold over under the general rule that, absent express or implied constitutional or statutory prohibition, public officers continue in office until their successors are duly elected or appointed and qualified; the law abhors a vacancy in government. The deletion of the hold-over phrase from section 2439 of the Revised Administrative Code did not imply a prohibition because section 2440 expressly provided hold-over for the Manila Municipal Board. Section 16(c) of the Election Code, which required the President to call a special election "as soon as practicable" when an election failed to take place, contemplated delay and therefore supported hold-over during the interval. The dissent disagreed that section 16(a) authorized a temporary appointment for the vacancy caused by expiration of term, arguing that such a vacancy is permanent and must be filled for the unexpired term, not temporarily. It also invoked the President's June 9, 1945 message as an executive construction supporting recall/hold-over of the 1940 elected officials. It concluded that petitioners legally retained their seats and needed no presidential appointment; the four seats claimed by petitioners were not vacant, and the last four of the six respondents, in the order of their appointments, should be ousted, with petitioners declared entitled to occupy their offices and receive emoluments.