Noveras vs. COMELEC

Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code remains a valid ground for disqualification under Section 68 notwithstanding the express repeal of Section 261(d) by Republic Act No. 7890, and a candidate may be disqualified thereunder for indirect intimidation through moral and legal ascendancy over a subordinate who used government resources to produce the candidate's campaign materials.

Gerardo "Jerry" A. Noveras was the incumbent governor of Aurora who filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-governor in the May 9, 2022 elections. Narciso Dela Cruz Amansec was a private citizen who, as a registered voter, filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC. The dispute arose within the framework of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which enumerates election offenses in Section 261 and grounds for disqualification in Section 68, and Republic Act No. 7890, which amended Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code on grave coercion and expressly repealed Section 261(d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The interplay between these statutes had been previously construed in Javier vs. COMELEC, where the Supreme Court held that RA No. 7890 effected an express repeal of Section 261(d).

On October 6, 2021, Gerardo "Jerry" A. Noveras, then the incumbent governor of Aurora, filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-governor of Aurora in the May 9, 2022 general elections. In the late afternoon of March 30, 2022, respondent Narciso Dela Cruz Amansec and his wife visited the Aurora Training Center (ATC) compound to see a police officer friend stationed there. While walking toward the compound, which housed provincial government facilities, Amansec saw a tarpaulin with a red background bearing a certain image. Upon moving closer, he observed the same image and background being printed on tarpaulin sheets, which turned out to be campaign materials for Noveras's vice-gubernatorial campaign. Amansec discovered that the printing machine was being operated by Michael Tecuico, a casual employee of the Aurora Local Government Unit. When Amansec confronted Tecuico about the use of LGU premises for printing campaign materials, Tecuico became angry and defensive, forcibly removing Amansec from the premises and injuring his right elbow. Tecuico then locked the printing room, leaving all materials inside. Amansec filed a police report and applied for a search warrant.

On March 31, 2022, the executive judge of Branch 91, RTC of Baler, Aurora issued a search warrant for illegally printed election propaganda and campaign materials of Noveras and his brother Christian Noveras, the gubernatorial candidate, as well as the printing machines used in the offense. The search warrant was implemented on April 2, 2022, in the presence of an elected barangay official and three media representatives. Recovered from the ATC premises were one tarpaulin eco-solvent printer, one inkjet printer, a personal computer set with peripherals, a semi-automatic eyelet machine, and 41 pieces of tarpaulin campaign materials bearing the names of Noveras and other candidates for various provincial and municipal elective offices in Aurora. Photographic documentation of the seized items was prepared, and the search team's affidavits confirmed that the materials left behind by Tecuico were campaign materials for Noveras and his ticket. Amansec also submitted Tecuico's plantilla, service records, accomplishment reports, and daily time records proving his employment with the Aurora LGU.

On April 20, 2022, Amansec filed a criminal complaint against Noveras, Tecuico, and others for violation of Section 261(o) of the Omnibus Election Code and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. On April 26, 2022, Amansec petitioned the COMELEC to disqualify Noveras, attributing the tarpaulin printing incident to Noveras as a violation of Section 261(o). Noveras denied the allegations, argued that the petition should be dismissed for Amansec's failure to appear in the preliminary conference, and contended that violation of Section 261(o) is not among the grounds for disqualification under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code, and that a final judgment of conviction is necessary for disqualification. The May 9, 2022 elections proceeded with Noveras on the ballot, and he garnered the highest number of votes for vice-governor.

On March 8, 2023, the Aurora provincial prosecutor's office found probable cause to charge Noveras and five others with violation of Section 261(o), but on June 16, 2023, the DOJ modified the ruling and dismissed the charge against Noveras. On July 10, 2023, the COMELEC First Division granted Amansec's disqualification petition, resolving the case on the merits despite Amansec's non-appearance at the preliminary conference and disqualifying Noveras under Section 261(d)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division found that Tecuico, a casual LGU employee appointed by Noveras, was caught printing Noveras's campaign materials using LGU equipment on LGU premises, and concluded that Tecuico would not have done so absent the moral and legal ascendancy exercised by Noveras as governor. The First Division construed RA No. 7890 as a mere amendment removing only references to religious organizations, not a blanket repeal of Section 261(d). On September 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc denied Noveras's motion for reconsideration, sustaining the First Division's reasoning on Section 261(d) and adopting Commissioner Maceda's separate findings on the applicability of Section 261(e). Noveras filed the present petition for certiorari, and Amansec's daughter Naryne later moved to substitute for her deceased father.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Statutory Construction: Noveras accused the COMELEC of grave abuse of discretion in construing RA No. 7890 as a mere amendment of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, contrary to the ruling in Javier vs. COMELEC.
• Improper Disqualification Under Repealed Provision: Noveras argued that he could not be disqualified on the basis of Section 261(d) because it had been expressly repealed by RA No. 7890.
• Absence of Evidence of Coercion or Influence: Noveras maintained that disqualification under Section 261(e) was improper because there was no evidence showing that he actually coerced or influenced Tecuico to print his campaign materials.
• Entitlement to Preliminary Injunctive Relief: Noveras prayed for preliminary injunctive relief, arguing that the immediately executory character of the assailed rulings deprived him of the right to run for elective office, especially considering that he garnered the highest number of votes for vice-governor.
• Improper Substitution: Noveras moved for the denial and expunction of Naryne Amansec's motion for substitution, on the ground that she is not a real party-in-interest.

• Sufficiency of Evidence Under Section 261(e): The OSG argued that the COMELEC's ruling was supported by a preponderance of evidence showing that Noveras perpetrated a fraudulent scheme by unlawfully using government resources and premises to compel and induce Tecuico to print materials for his campaign, a prohibited act under Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Immateriality of DOJ Dismissal: The OSG countered that the DOJ's dismissal of the Section 261(o) charge was immaterial because the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the electoral aspect of the offense, which only requires a clear preponderance of evidence.
• Revisitation of Javier: The OSG asked the Court to revisit Javier vs. COMELEC, arguing that its construction of RA No. 7890 as an express and blanket repeal of Section 261(d) was inconsistent with the legislative history of RA No. 7890 and deprived the COMELEC of the power to act against clear cases of coercion and undue influence affecting the right of suffrage.
• Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief: The OSG argued against the grant of preliminary injunctive relief, as Noveras failed to show any clear legal right protectible by such a writ; his claimed rights to seek and hold public office are mere privileges subject to legal regulation, and he remained on the ballot and garnered the most votes.

• Substitution of Deceased Petitioner: Whether Amansec, who died during the pendency of the proceedings, may be substituted by his daughter in the disqualification case.
• Effect of RA No. 7890 on Section 261(d): Whether Republic Act No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, thereby rendering it unavailable as a ground for disqualification, as held in Javier vs. COMELEC.
• Validity of Section 261(e) as Disqualification Ground: Whether Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code remains a valid ground for disqualification under Section 68 notwithstanding the repeal of Section 261(d).
• Sufficiency of Evidence Under Section 261(e): Whether substantial evidence supports the finding that Noveras violated Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code through a fraudulent scheme and/or threats and intimidation.

• Substitution of Deceased Petitioner: Yes. Amansec may be substituted by his daughter Naryne, a registered voter, pursuant to the doctrine in Lanot vs. COMELEC and Rule 25, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Effect of RA No. 7890 on Section 261(d): Yes. RA No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code; the language of Section 2 of RA No. 7890 is clear and categorical, and Javier vs. COMELEC correctly so held.
• Validity of Section 261(e) as Disqualification Ground: Yes. Section 261(e) remains a valid and lawful ground to disqualify a candidate, as the abrogatory provisions of RA No. 7890 apply only to Section 261(d), leaving the other disqualificatory offenses in Section 68 unaffected.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Under Section 261(e): Yes. Substantial evidence supports the finding of violation of Section 261(e) under both classes of acts defined therein — fraudulent scheme and threats/intimidation — as the COMELEC's factual findings, supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-reviewable.

• Substitution of Deceased Petitioner: The Court applied the doctrine in Lanot vs. COMELEC, where the Court allowed substitution of an assassinated petitioner in a disqualification case and intervention by the third-placer in the election. The facts in Lanot were on all fours with the present case: the election proceeded despite the pendency of the disqualification petition, the challenged candidate remained on the ballot and garnered the highest number of votes, the final ruling on the electoral aspect came only after the election and proclamation, and the original petitioner died before resolution. Under Rule 25, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any voter or duly registered political organization has standing to file a petition for disqualification. Since the Court allowed Raymundo to substitute for Lanot, it likewise allowed Naryne, Amansec's daughter and a registered voter in Ipil, Dipaculao, Aurora, to substitute for Amansec. The case for disqualification survives the election and proclamation of the winning candidate because an outright dismissal would unduly reward the challenged candidate and encourage delaying tactics.

• Effect of RA No. 7890 on Section 261(d): The Court applied the first rule of statutory construction: where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for interpretation, and the literal meaning must be followed. Section 2 of RA No. 7890 states: "Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby repealed." This sentence can have no meaning other than the withdrawal of binding force and legal effect from Section 261(d)(1) and (2). The Court rejected the COMELEC's resort to legislative history, holding that such resort is proper only when the meaning of the statute is not apparent from a plain reading. The COMELEC itself admitted that the House Bill was amended at the bicameral level to include the blanket repeal of Section 261(d)(1) and (2) in response to objections from religious denominations, confirming that the legislature ultimately settled on a blanket repeal. The Court further explained that Section 261(d) contained mere "detailed enumerations" of acts of coercion already penalized by Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code; RA No. 7890 merely codified this relationship by including threats and intimidation as modes of committing grave coercion and then repealing the superfluous Section 261(d). Section 3 of RA No. 7890 reinforced the express repeal with an inconsistency clause directed at all other election laws and regulations. The effect of the express repeal was to remove Section 261(d) from among the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

• Validity of Section 261(e) as Disqualification Ground: The Court held that the abrogatory provisions of RA No. 7890 apply only to Section 261(d), leaving the other disqualificatory offenses in Section 68 unaffected. Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates, or actually causes violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss, or disadvantage upon any person or that person's immediate family, honor, or property, or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or induce registration or refraining from registration, participation or refraining from a campaign, or the casting or omission of any vote. The provision contemplates two general classes of acts: first, threats, intimidations, and actual violence; and second, fraudulent devices or schemes. Both classes may be committed directly or indirectly. Since RA No. 7890 did not repeal Section 261(e), it remains a valid ground for disqualification under Section 68.

• Sufficiency of Evidence Under Section 261(e): Section 68 disqualification proceedings before the COMELEC are administrative in nature, requiring a clear preponderance of evidence. Factual findings of the COMELEC are final and non-reviewable if supported by substantial evidence. Noveras put up only a defense of general denial, disavowing knowledge of the incident and presenting no evidence to refute the allegations. Under the first class of acts (fraudulent scheme), the Court found all three elements present: (1) the existence of a fraudulent device or scheme — Tecuico, a casual LGU employee, was caught operating a printing machine within LGU premises to print Noveras's campaign materials, constituting unlawful and unauthorized use of government resources, which constitutes fraud under Juan vs. People; (2) use of said scheme for the purpose of inducement or compulsion — Noveras exercised moral and legal ascendancy over Tecuico as governor and appointing authority; and (3) the inducement was intended to produce participation in a campaign — the printed tarpaulins contained exhortations for voters to vote for Noveras and his ticket. Under the second class of acts (threats/intimidation), the Court found the elements present because Noveras's position of power vis-à-vis Tecuico inherently carried an element of intimidation: as governor, Noveras had disciplinary authority and the power to terminate Tecuico's casual employment at will. The Court relied on the principle that "moral ascendancy substitutes for force and intimidation." Tecuico's hostile response to Amansec's discovery — calling someone he referred to as "boss" to report a "problem" — further evidenced that he would not have undertaken the printing without directive from a superior. Section 261(e) does not distinguish between direct and indirect participation; what matters is that Noveras was the ultimate beneficiary and exercised moral and legal ascendancy over Tecuico.

• Express Repeal by Statute — An express repeal occurs when a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed. Where the repealing language is clear and categorical, there is no occasion for interpretation, and the literal meaning must be followed. A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Section 2 of RA No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code, and that the COMELEC's resort to legislative history to construe the repeal as a mere amendment was erroneous.

• Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis) — From the words of a statute there should be no departure. Where the words are clear, plain, and unambiguous, the literal meaning must be followed without judicial addition or subtraction. Resort to statutory construction aids such as legislative history is proper only when the meaning of the statute is not apparent from a plain reading. The Court applied this rule to hold that Section 2 of RA No. 7890, which stated that Section 261(d)(1) and (2) "is hereby repealed," admitted of no other construction than express repeal.

• Substitution in Disqualification Proceedings — The electoral aspect of a disqualification case is not rendered inutile by the death of the petitioner, provided there is proper substitution or intervention of parties while the case is pending. Any citizen of voting age is competent to continue the action in the stead of a deceased petitioner. The case for disqualification survives the election and proclamation of the winning candidate because an outright dismissal would unduly reward the challenged candidate and may encourage delaying tactics. Established in Lanot vs. COMELEC and applied to allow Naryne Amansec to substitute for her deceased father.

• Moral Ascendancy as Constructive Coercion — Coercion can be implied, as either legal or constructive, where the relation of the parties is such that one is under subjection to the other and is thereby constrained to do what his free will would refuse. Moral ascendancy substitutes for force and intimidation. The Court applied this principle to hold that Noveras's position as governor and appointing authority over Tecuico, a casual employee terminable at will, inherently carried an element of intimidation sufficient to satisfy the first class of acts under Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code.

• Fraud in Unauthorized Use of Government Resources — The unlawful and unauthorized use of government resources by public officers constitutes fraud. The printing of campaign materials for the election campaign of an incumbent public official by a government employee within government premises is a fraudulent device or scheme involving the diversion of government resources to unauthorized ends. Applied under Section 261(e) to characterize the tarpaulin printing incident as a fraudulent scheme.

• Finality of COMELEC Factual Findings — Factual findings of the COMELEC are final and non-reviewable if supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court does not review the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence in a certiorari petition, except to determine if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. If substantial evidence exists, the COMELEC's findings are accorded respect, and any error amounts to mere error of judgment, not error of jurisdiction.

• "The first rule of statutory construction is that one should not resort to statutory construction. It is presumed that the legislature says what it means and means what it says when it passes laws. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for interpretation. The literal meaning of the statute must be followed without judicial addition or subtraction." — This passage states the foundational principle of statutory construction that the Court applied to reject the COMELEC's interpretive approach to RA No. 7890 and to affirm the express repeal of Section 261(d).

• "A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The discussion on implied repeals by the Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including the concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions between the two laws, were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express, as in this case." — This passage, quoted from Javier vs. COMELEC, defines the legal effect of an express repeal and explains why the COMELEC's implied-repeal analysis was misplaced, reinforcing the Court's holding that Section 261(d) was removed from the statute books.

• "The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the election and proclamation of the winning candidate because an outright dismissal will unduly reward the challenged candidate and may even encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the disqualification case until after he has been proclaimed." — This passage from Lanot vs. COMELEC articulates the rationale for the survival of disqualification proceedings after election and proclamation, and the basis for allowing substitution of a deceased petitioner.

• "While the COMELEC is the constitutionally-designated frontline interpreter of election laws and jurisprudence, it must nevertheless yield to the clear and categorical directives of the great branches of the government. When the Legislature and the Judiciary speak, quasi-judicial agencies like the COMELEC should listen." — This passage defines the hierarchical relationship between the COMELEC's interpretive authority and the Legislature's statutory directives and the Supreme Court's constructions, capping the Court's reasoning for dismissing the petition.

• Javier vs. COMELEC, 777 Phil. 700 (2016) — Controlling precedent on the express repeal of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code by RA No. 7890. The Court affirmed and applied its holding that the repeal was express, not implied, and that the COMELEC's contrary construction was erroneous. The OSG's request to revisit Javier was declined as to the express-repeal holding, though the Court agreed with the OSG's position only insofar as Section 261(e) subsists as an alternative ground.

• Lanot vs. COMELEC, 537 Phil. 332 (2006) — Controlling precedent on substitution and intervention in disqualification proceedings. The Court found the facts on all fours with the present case and applied the doctrine to allow Naryne Amansec to substitute for her deceased father.

• Juan vs. People, 379 Phil. 125 (2000) — Followed for the proposition that the unlawful and unauthorized use of government resources by public officers constitutes fraud, applied to characterize the tarpaulin printing incident as a fraudulent device or scheme under Section 261(e).

• Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 263590 & 263673, June 27, 2023 — Cited for the principle that the right of suffrage is a fundamental political right stemming from the right to liberty, and that any non-state interference thereon should be presumed to have been made without right or authority.

• Dela Cruz vs. People, 903 Phil. 801 (2021) — Cited for the principle that "moral ascendancy substitutes for force and intimidation," applied to establish constructive coercion in the governor-employee relationship between Noveras and Tecuico.

• Section 261(d)(1) and (2), Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Defined and penalized coercion and intimidation of subordinates, employees, members, or parishioners to aid, campaign, or vote for or against any candidate. The Court held that these provisions were expressly repealed by Section 2 of RA No. 7890 and could no longer serve as a ground for disqualification under Section 68.

• Section 261(e), Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Penalizes any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates, or actually causes violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss, or disadvantage upon any person, or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or induce registration, participation in a campaign, or the casting or omission of any vote. The Court held this provision remains valid and applicable as a ground for disqualification under Section 68, and that Noveras violated it under both classes of acts defined therein.

• Section 261(o), Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Prohibits the use of public funds, money deposited in trust, or equipment, facilities, or apparatus owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign. The Court noted that violation of Section 261(o) is not among the disqualificatory offenses under Section 68 and requires a final judgment of conviction for disqualification.

• Section 68, Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Enumerates the grounds for disqualification of candidates, including acts punished under Sections 261(d) and 261(e). The Court held that the express repeal of Section 261(d) removed it from the list of predicate offenses under Section 68, but Section 261(e) remains a valid disqualificatory ground.

• Section 2, Republic Act No. 7890 — Expressly repealed Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The Court held that this provision is clear and categorical, effecting an express repeal that removed Section 261(d) from the statute books and from the list of disqualificatory offenses under Section 68.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 7890 — Amended Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code by adding "threats or intimidation" as modes of committing grave coercion and increasing the penalty, including for coercions committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage. The Court held that this amendment codified the relationship between the Omnibus Election Code and the Revised Penal Code, rendering Section 261(d) superfluous.

• Article 286, Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended) — Defines and penalizes grave coercion. The Court discussed its elements and its relationship to Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, concluding that Section 261(d) contained mere detailed enumerations of acts already penalized by Article 286.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Allows intervention in disqualification proceedings even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered. Cited in Lanot vs. COMELEC and applied by analogy to support the allowance of substitution in the present case.

• Rule 25, Section 2, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that any voter or duly registered political organization has standing to file a petition for disqualification. Applied to confirm Naryne Amansec's standing to substitute for her deceased father.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., M. Lopez, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concurred. Zalameda, J., was on leave but left his concurring vote.

• Caguioa, J. — Authored the dissenting opinion. Justices Kho, Jr. and Singh joined the dissent. The dissenting opinion is referenced in the case caption and the voting notation, but its substantive reasoning is not set forth in the ponencia's text.