Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.

A common carrier is not liable for injuries to passengers caused by dangerous articles brought into its conveyance by another passenger where the carrier's employees had no knowledge of the nature of the article and no reason to anticipate danger therefrom, the extraordinary diligence required by Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code being qualified by the phrase "according to all the circumstances of each case."

The defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is a common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers and goods by bus. As a common carrier, it is bound by Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods and for the safety of passengers transported by it, with a presumption of negligence in case of death or injuries to passengers unless it proves it observed such extraordinary diligence. The company had a service manual prohibiting its employees from allowing explosives, such as dynamite and firecrackers, to be transported on its buses, and instructing them to call the police if there were packages containing articles against regulations.

On December 5, 1960, appellee Herminio L. Nocum was a passenger in appellant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company's Bus No. 120, which was making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna. A co-passenger boarded the bus carrying a box, which was placed under a seat in the baggage compartment. The box was declared to the bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, as containing miscellaneous items and clothes. The conductor helped the owner load the baggage, which weighed about twelve kilos, and charged him twenty-five centavos for it pursuant to company regulation. From its appearance, there was no indication at all that the contents were explosives or firecrackers, and the conductor did not open the box because he relied on the word of the owner. The box's opening was "folded and tied with abaca."

The bus left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning. When the explosion occurred, Severino Andaya, a witness for the plaintiff who was also in the baggage compartment, was thrown out. The PC investigation report stated that thirty-seven passengers were injured. Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of the defendant company corroborated the testimony of Mendoza, stating that he was present when the box was loaded and that employees were not authorized to open the baggages of passengers because instruction from management was to call the police if there were packages containing articles which were against regulations.

There was no question that Bus No. 120 was roadworthy when it left its Manila Terminal for Lucena that morning. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers inside the bus which was loaded by a co-passenger. The trial court found that extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person was not observed by the defendant company, reasoning that if proper and rigid inspection were observed, the contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided, and that refusal by the passenger to have the package opened was no excuse since employees should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.

• Absolution from Liability: Appellant argued that based on the facts the lower court found as established, it erred as a matter of law in not absolving appellant from liability resulting from the explosion of firecrackers contained in a package, the contents of which were misrepresented by a passenger.
• Damages and Interest: Appellant argued that the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in awarding damages with legal interest in favor of the appellee.
• Dismissal of Complaint: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint, with costs against the appellee.

N/A — The appellee did not file any brief before the Supreme Court.

• Extraordinary Diligence: Whether the defendant bus company observed the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers under Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code, given that its conductor verbally inquired about the contents of the box and nothing indicated it contained explosives.
• Fortuitous Event: Whether the breach of contract was due to a fortuitous event, thereby relieving the defendant from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.

• Extraordinary Diligence: Yes. The bus company observed extraordinary diligence "according to all the circumstances of each case" as required by Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. The conductor made verbal inquiry as to the nature of the box's contents, and there was no outward indication of danger, so the presumption of negligence under Article 1756 was rebutted.
• Fortuitous Event: Not reached. Since the Court held that appellant succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers "according to the circumstances of the (each) case," it deemed it unnecessary to rule whether or not there was any fortuitous event in this case.

• Extraordinary Diligence: The Court disagreed with the trial court's view that the extraordinary diligence standard required the conductor to open the box or call the police upon the passenger's mere declaration of its contents. Article 1733 is not unbending, as it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of passengers to be "according to all the circumstances of each case." Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." The Court reasoned that fairness demands that allowance be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all passengers in regard to their common safety, and it is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers. Not to be lightly considered is the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled; he cannot be subjected to any unusual search when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. Inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to compel the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous items, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties. When there are sufficient indications that the representations of the passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and the constitutional rights of the passenger. The Court cited foreign jurisprudence, including Clarke vs. Louisville & N.R. Co., which stated that a railroad is liable to its passengers for injury done by another passenger only where the conduct of the latter had been such before the injury as to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to believe that there was reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger to the other passengers. The Court also cited the general rule that a carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom.
• Fortuitous Event: The Court did not rule on this issue because it had already held that appellant succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers "according to the circumstances of the (each) case."

• Extraordinary Diligence "According to All the Circumstances of Each Case" — The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers under Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code is not an absolute and unbending standard; it is qualified by the phrase "according to all the circumstances of each case." In this case, the Court applied this qualification to hold that a bus company's conductor who verbally inquired about the contents of a passenger's box, with nothing outwardly indicating danger, had satisfied the standard of extraordinary diligence.
• Carrier's Liability for Acts of Co-Passengers — A carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom. The cornerstone of liability is the failure of the carrier's employee to act in the face of evidence indicating cause for apprehension that the passenger's baggage is dangerous.
• Right to Privacy of Passengers — A passenger cannot be subjected to any unusual search when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. Verbal inquiry may be made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties.

• "Article 1733 is not as unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be 'according to all the circumstances of each case.'" — This passage articulates the central ratio decidendi of the case: the extraordinary diligence standard is qualified and must be applied flexibly based on the circumstances.
• "In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed." — This passage defines the limits of a common carrier's duty to inspect passengers' baggage, balancing safety concerns against constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.
• "Explosive or Dangerous Contents. — A carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom." — This passage states the general rule applied by the Court, drawn from American Jurisprudence, which the Court adopted as controlling in this case.

• Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 — Cited by the trial court for the proposition that a passenger has neither choice nor control in the exercise of the carrier's discretion in determining what is inside the packages of co-passengers. The Supreme Court distinguished this case, noting that fairness demands allowance for reliance on the sense of responsibility of all passengers.
• Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 — Cited by the trial court for Escriche's definition of caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted." The Supreme Court did not rule on the fortuitous event issue.
• Clarke vs. Louisville & N.R. Co., 20 Ky L. Rep. 839, 49 S.W. 1120 — Cited as controlling foreign authority for the principle that a carrier is liable to its passengers for injury done by another passenger only where the conduct of the latter had been such before the injury as to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to believe that there was reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger to the other passengers.
• Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. vs. Shields, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 652, 29 S. W. 652 — Cited with approval for the proposition that, in the absence of some intimation or circumstance indicating that a passenger's baggage contained something dangerous, it was not the duty of the carrier's employee to open the baggage and examine its contents.

• Article 1733, Civil Code — Provides that common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them, "according to all the circumstances of each case." The Court interpreted this qualification to mean that the extraordinary diligence standard is not absolute but must be applied flexibly.
• Article 1755, Civil Code — Provides that a common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, "with due regard for all the circumstances." The Court applied this qualification to hold that the bus company had met the standard.
• Article 1756, Civil Code — Creates a presumption that common carriers are at fault or negligent in case of death or injuries to passengers, unless they prove they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. The Court held that the bus company had rebutted this presumption.
• Article 1174, Civil Code — Relieves obligors from liability for fortuitous events. The Court deemed it unnecessary to rule on whether the explosion was a fortuitous event because it had already held that the bus company had rebutted the presumption of negligence.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Castro, J., concurred in the result. Teehankee, J., reserved his vote.

N/A — There were no dissenting opinions.