Noceda vs. Court of Appeals

A donation may be revoked by reason of ingratitude when the donee commits an offense against the property of the donor, and the action to revoke prescribes within one year counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. The one-year prescriptive period requires the concurrence of two conditions: (a) the donor had knowledge of the ingratitude, and (b) it was possible for the donor to bring the action; the burden of proving both conditions rests on the party alleging prescription.

The parties are heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, leaving a parcel of land known as Lot 1121 located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales. Private respondent Aurora Arbizo Directo is the daughter of Celestino Arbizo, petitioner Rodolfo Noceda is her nephew (the son of her deceased sister Carolina), and Maria Arbizo is the widow of Celestino Arbizo. The heirs extrajudicially settled the estate on two occasions—June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981—with the latter intended to supersede the former. The dispute arose from petitioner's occupation of portions of the land beyond what was allotted to him, including the portion donated to him by private respondent, and the subsequent revocation of that donation.

On June 1, 1981, Aurora Arbizo Directo, Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo—the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956—extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Directo's share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to Noceda, her nephew, being the son of her deceased sister Carolina. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by the same parties, whereby three-fifths of the land went to Maria Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition, as well as in Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters.

Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed three huts thereon. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts, and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. Directo demanded that Noceda vacate her land, but he refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation against Noceda before the lower court.

During the trial, the lower court ordered a relocation survey of Lot 1121 to be conducted by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. The trial court, in an Order dated June 8, 1987, gave both parties the chance to have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to determine the actual area of Lot 1121. Directo filed a motion/compliance suggesting that Quejada be commissioned to undertake the survey; the motion was sent to Noceda's counsel for comment, but no comment was filed within the given period. The trial court designated Quejada to undertake the survey. Noceda belatedly filed a comment without opposition to the appointment but proposed that Quejada be tasked solely to re-survey, determine and identify the metes and bounds of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 16-0032, identify the areas occupied by the parties, and conduct the re-survey with notice and in the presence of the parties and their counsels; the comment was not acted upon. Quejada conducted the survey with the conformity and in the presence of both parties, taking into consideration the extrajudicial partition dated August 17, 1981, the deed of donation dated June 1, 1981, the actual area occupied by the parties, the sketch plan, and the technical description of Lot 1121 taken from the Records Section of the Bureau of Lands, Manila. The report and survey plan were approved by the trial court in an Order dated December 7, 1987.

After the survey, Quejada reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121, which is 127,298 square meters. Quejada subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third persons known as Lot 8, the salvage zone, and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters, was the share of Noceda; Lot C, with the same area, was the share of Directo, a portion of which was donated to Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo. The survey plan showed that based on actual possession and the extrajudicial settlement, the portion denominated as Lot C was being occupied by Directo, and it was in Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by Directo to Noceda is located.

• Actual Area of Lot 1121: Petitioner claimed that Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 contains only an area of 29,845 square meters, and thus the respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained the lower court's findings that the subject property actually contains an area of 127,289 square meters.
• Non-Inclusion of Third Persons: Petitioner contended that the judicial determination improperly encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name of one Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was issued in her name; and that several residential houses are constructed on Lot 8 of Lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants should be joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to respondent's cause of action.
• Validity of Partition: Petitioner claimed that the subject property could not be partitioned based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the distributive shares and the area stated therein differed from the extrajudicial settlement executed on June 1, 1981; that the discrepancies indicated that the parties never intended either deed to be the final determination of their portions; and that the August 17, 1981 settlement could not effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845 square meters, not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
• Status of Maria Arbizo: Petitioner alleged that the partition tries to vest in favor of a third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the property notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir of the late Celestino Arbizo, since she was never impleaded as a party and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established.
• Adjudication of Lot C: Petitioner claimed that there exist no factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private respondent.
• Usurpation and Co-Ownership: Petitioner argued that he did not usurp the property of respondent since the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessor in interest are still undetermined, and hence they are still considered co-owners thereof; and that since there was no effective and real partition, there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence no basis for finding ingratitude against him.
• Prescription: Petitioner contended that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had already prescribed since respondent admitted that petitioner usurped her property in the first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than one year had passed from the alleged usurpation.

• Actual Area of Lot 1121: Respondent maintained that the relocation survey was ordered by the trial court to determine the actual area of Lot 1121, and such survey was conducted with the conformity and in the presence of both parties, showing a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration.
• Non-Inclusion of Third Persons: Respondent argued that the fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them indispensable parties; that Noceda merely presented tax declarations without the alleged free patent; that no evidence showed Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot 1121; and that Lot 8 was excluded by Quejada in determining the respective portions of the parties, so the result of the suit would not affect the occupants of Lot 8.
• Validity of Partition: Respondent argued that the discrepancies between the two extrajudicial settlements only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former; that Noceda's signature in the August 17, 1981 settlement showed his conformity to the new apportionment; and that the statement of area in the settlement is not conclusive because the relocation survey confirmed that the parties occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess.
• Status of Maria Arbizo: Respondent argued that Noceda knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and knew of the sale of the shares of Anacleto and Agripina; that Noceda was already an adult when he signed the extrajudicial settlement; and that Noceda failed to support his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child.
• Prescription: Respondent argued that under Article 769 of the New Civil Code, the action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one year counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action; that the concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by Noceda to bar the action; and that Noceda failed to prove that at the time Directo acquired knowledge of the usurpation, it was possible for her to institute the action.

• Actual Area of Lot 1121: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the subject property identified as Lot 1121 contains an area in excess of that stated in its tax declaration.
• Basis of Partition: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lot 1121 should be partitioned in accordance with the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981.
• Adjudication of Lot C: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in adjudicating and allotting Lot "C" as appearing in the survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Edilberto Quejada to the respondent.
• Usurpation: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner usurped an area adjudicated to the respondent.
• Revocation of Donation: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in revoking the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981.
• Prescription: Whether the action for revocation of donation had already prescribed.

• Actual Area of Lot 1121: No. The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court's findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square meters, as determined by the relocation survey conducted with the conformity and in the presence of both parties.
• Basis of Partition: No. The extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 was intended to supersede the June 1, 1981 settlement, and the survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir.
• Adjudication of Lot C: No. The relocation survey plan was based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties, and it was established that Lot C was being occupied by private respondent and that the donated portion is located therein.
• Usurpation: Yes. Petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent without her knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation, which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.
• Revocation of Donation: Yes. The Deed of Donation was properly revoked by reason of ingratitude, and the law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
• Prescription: No. The action for revocation had not prescribed because the one-year period is counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action, and petitioner failed to prove the concurrence of these two conditions.

• Actual Area of Lot 1121: The trial court ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine the actual area of Lot 1121, and such survey was done with the conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area based on the survey plan showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration, but such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation. The Court cited Director of Lands vs. Funtilar and Dolomite Mining Corporation vs. Montalbo in support. The respondent Court correctly held that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership of property, citing Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. The occupants of Lot 8 were not indispensable parties because their interest is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties, and the result of the suit would not affect them since private respondent is not claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only the portion adjudicated to her.

• Basis of Partition: The discrepancies between the two extrajudicial settlements only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. Noceda's signature in the August 17, 1981 settlement showed his conformity to the new apportionment, and his occupation of the portion allotted to him presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of his portion. The statement of area in the August 17, 1981 settlement is not conclusive because the relocation survey confirmed that the parties occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess. The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs, taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.

• Status of Maria Arbizo: The trial court found that Noceda knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and knew of the sale of the shares of Anacleto and Agripina. Noceda was already 41 years old in 1981 when he signed the extrajudicial settlement, and if he did not know all of these, he would not have agreed to the sharing and signed the document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. Noceda failed to support his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child.

• Adjudication of Lot C: The relocation survey plan prepared by Quejada was based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey plan that based on the actual possession of the parties and the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs, the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 was being occupied by private respondent, and it was also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by private respondent to petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.

• Usurpation and Co-Ownership: The source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong, and its purpose is to put an end to co-ownership. The heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest. The areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, and a partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. Since petitioner occupied not only the portion donated to him but also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent, his act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent without her knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation, which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

• Prescription: Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that the action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance and prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by the defendant to bar the action. Noceda reckoned the one-year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation in the first week of September 1985, and not from the time the latter had knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, Noceda failed to prove that at the time Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for her to institute an action for revocation of her donation. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, and he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; a mere allegation is not evidence.

• Finality of Factual Findings: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record, are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. No such showing was made in this case, and petitioner merely rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in the respondent Court.

• Revocation of Donation by Reason of Ingratitude — Under Article 765 of the Civil Code, a donation may be revoked at the instance of the donor by reason of ingratitude if the donee commits some offense against the person, the honor, or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner's act of fencing the entire area of Lot C belonging to private respondent, without her knowledge and consent, constituted an act of usurpation—an offense against the property of the donor—and thus an act of ingratitude warranting revocation of the donation. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

• Prescription of Action for Revocation by Reason of Ingratitude — Under Article 769 of the Civil Code, the action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance and prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the one-year prescriptive period requires the concurrence of two conditions: (a) the donor had knowledge of the ingratitude, and (b) it was possible for the donor to bring the action. The burden of proving both conditions rests on the party alleging prescription, and petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

• Partition as Termination of Co-Ownership — Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong, and its purpose is to put an end to co-ownership. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. There is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or where said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981, as confirmed by the relocation survey, effectively terminated co-ownership and vested in each heir exclusive ownership of their respective portions.

• Conclusiveness of Tax Declarations — Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership of property. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the actual area of Lot 1121, as determined by the relocation survey, prevails over the area stated in the tax declaration, since early tax declarations are often based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation.

• Indispensable Parties — A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the occupants of Lot 8 and Cecilia Obispo were not indispensable parties, since private respondent was not claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only the portion adjudicated to her.

• "The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action." — This passage, quoting Article 769 of the New Civil Code, defines the prescriptive period for revocation of donation by reason of ingratitude and establishes the two conditions that must concur: knowledge by the donor and the possibility of bringing the action.

• "It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the revocation of the donation, applying Article 765 of the Civil Code to the facts of the case.

• "There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners." — This passage articulates the doctrine that co-ownership ceases once portions are concretely determined and identifiable, even if not technically described or still covered by one title.

• "Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court." — This passage states the principle of finality of factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which the Court applied in declining to re-examine the evidence in this case.

• Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA 285 — Cited for the doctrine that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership of property; applied in ruling that the actual area of Lot 1121 prevails over the area stated in the tax declaration.
• Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57 — Cited for the proposition that differences between actual land area and area declared in tax declarations are not uncommon, as early tax declarations are often based on approximation or estimation; applied in sustaining the trial court's finding on the actual area of Lot 1121.
• Dolomite Mining Corporation vs. Montalbo, 217 SCRA 687 — Cited in support of the same proposition regarding discrepancies between actual area and tax declaration area.
• Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. CA, 251 SCRA 70 — Cited for the doctrine that a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties; applied in ruling that the occupants of Lot 8 were not indispensable parties.
• Villamor vs. CA, 162 SCRA 574 — Cited for the definition and purpose of partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common, putting an end to co-ownership.
• Dela Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 — Cited for the doctrine that there is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described.
• New Testament Church of God vs. CA, 246 SCRA 266 and Sapuan vs. CA, 214 SCRA 701 — Cited for the rule that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.
• P.T. Cerna Corporation vs. CA, 221 SCRA 19 — Cited for the rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and a mere allegation is not evidence.
• Meneses vs. CA, 246 SCRA 162 and Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. vs. CA, 267 SCRA 653 — Cited for the principle that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive on the parties.
• Navarro vs. CA, 209 SCRA 613; Remalante vs. Tibe, et. al., 158 SCRA 138; and Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. CA, 224 SCRA 477 — Cited for the rule that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to re-examine the evidence unless the findings of fact are not supported by the record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.
• BA Finance Corporation vs. CA, 229 SCRA 566; Lim vs. CA, 158 SCRA 307; and Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194 — Cited for the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.
• Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. CA, 227 SCRA 330 — Cited for the principle that no cogent reason exists for disturbing the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals when they had carefully considered the questions of fact raised below.

• Article 765, Civil Code — Provides that a donation may be revoked at the instance of the donor by reason of ingratitude if the donee commits some offense against the person, the honor, or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority. Applied in ruling that petitioner's usurpation of private respondent's property constituted an act of ingratitude warranting revocation of the donation.
• Article 769, Civil Code — Provides that the action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance and prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. Applied in ruling that the action for revocation had not prescribed because petitioner failed to prove the concurrence of the two conditions.
• Article 1078, Civil Code — Provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Cited in explaining the source of co-ownership among the heirs.
• Article 1079, Civil Code — Defines partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Cited in explaining the nature and purpose of partition.
• Article 1091, Civil Code — Provides that a partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. Cited in ruling that the extrajudicial settlement vested exclusive ownership in each heir.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner before the Supreme Court.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concurred.