Nieto vs. People

Illegal possession of timber or other forest products under Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Revised Forestry Code is malum prohibitum; criminal intent is not an essential element, but the prosecution must prove animus possidendi, and actual or constructive possession without the required legal documents consummates the offense. The fact that the person in possession is not the owner of the forest products is irrelevant.

Petitioners Mark Anthony Nieto and Filemon Vicente were the helper and driver, respectively, of a ten-wheeler truck that they were hired by Norma Diza to drive from Cagayan to San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. The charge arose under Section 68 (now Section 77) of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, which penalizes, among other acts, the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. Republic Act No. 10951 later adjusted the penalties under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Forestry Code adopts for violations of Section 68 (now Section 77).

On 15 July 2012, at approximately 1:40 p.m., PO1 Ronald Garrido was guarding a checkpoint in Brgy. 13, Barit, Laoag City when he received a text message informing him that a green-colored Isuzu cargo truck with "CVG Trucking" mark was loaded with illegally cut logs and would pass by the checkpoint. After some time, a truck matching the description approached the checkpoint, and the police officers flagged it down. After the truck loaded with lumber stopped, the police officers requested documents pertaining to the truck's cargo and were shown several documents, including a Transport/Transhipment Clearance in the name of a certain Alfonso Bagasin. Finding the documents improper and insufficient, the police officers brought Vicente, the driver, Nieto, the helper, and the truck to a police station in Brgy. 1, Laoag City, and informed the local office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that they had apprehended persons transporting lumber without the appropriate and adequate documentation.

The Information dated 16 July 2020 charged Nieto and Vicente with violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Revised Forestry Code. It alleged that on or about 15 July 2012, in Laoag City, they, together with John Does and Jane Does, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without legal document and authority, had in their possession and in the process of transporting 409 pieces of Tanguile and White Lauan of assorted sizes, with a total volume of 8,425.96 board feet worth ₱416,298.00, and 154 pieces of coco lumber of assorted sizes, with a total volume of 2,181.32 board feet worth ₱26,104.00, loaded in a FUSO ten-wheeler truck with plate no. BVJ 433, registered under the name of Sps. Graciano and Ma. Corazon Valera as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 08435428, to be delivered to Pangasinan.

Subsequently, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) officers made an inventory and assessment of the value of the lumber being hauled by the truck in the presence of the apprehending police officers. The inventory and assessment revealed that there were 409 pieces of Tanguile and White Lauan, and 154 pieces of coco lumber loaded in the truck. The forest products confiscated were marked during the conduct of rescaling and reinventory done in the presence of Court Sheriff Nicomedes C. Cantorna. Based on the Sheriff's Report, several pieces of lumber had already deteriorated from the time of apprehension up to the time of the re-inventory due to sunlight exposure and heavy rains.

Vicente and Nieto denied the accusations. In his testimony, Vicente claimed that on 14 July 2012, he was approached by a neighbor named Norma Diza, who told him he would be paid to drive a ten-wheeler truck from Cagayan to San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte but was not informed of the truck's cargo. Vicente further claimed that Diza went with him and Nieto when they started their trip in Cagayan. In each checkpoint, Diza would alight from the truck and present documents to those guarding the checkpoints. However, Diza alighted just before they reached the checkpoint where they were apprehended. Vicente said he did not have any intention to violate the law as he was only asked to drive the truck for a fee. Nieto opted not to testify, claiming that he would merely be corroborating Vicente's testimony.

The RTC and CA both found that petitioners were on board the truck loaded with forest products when they were apprehended and that the documents presented for the cargo were improper and insufficient. The CA also found that the discrepancies in the lumber count were sufficiently explained by the deterioration of several pieces of lumber from the time of apprehension up to the time of re-inventory due to sunlight exposure and heavy rains.

• Possession and Control: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in presuming that Vicente, being the driver, exercised full control of the vehicle where the forest products were loaded and was therefore in possession over the same.
• Equipoise Rule and Discrepancies: Petitioners argued that the CA failed to appreciate the existence of the equipoise principle regarding the alleged data discrepancies in the tally sheet or inventory and in the sheriff's report.
• Lack of Intent and Non-Ownership: Petitioners maintained that they had no intent to violate the law because they were merely asked to drive the truck for a fee, that they were not the owners of the truck and the timber, and that the person who hired them showed some documents and they were able to pass through several checkpoints.

• Conviction for Illegal Possession: Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the conviction of petitioners for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Revised Forestry Code.
• Possession and Animus Possidendi: Whether petitioners had actual or constructive possession and animus possidendi over the forest products without the required legal documents.
• Equipoise Rule: Whether the alleged discrepancies in the lumber count or inventory and in the sheriff's report warranted application of the equipoise rule in favor of petitioners.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed should be modified in light of Republic Act No. 10951 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Conviction for Illegal Possession: No. The CA did not commit reversible error; the conviction for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Revised Forestry Code was affirmed, as the offense is malum prohibitum and the required possession was established.
• Possession and Animus Possidendi: Yes. Petitioners had actual possession and animus possidendi over the forest products without the required legal documents, having immediate physical control of the truck and its cargo when apprehended.
• Equipoise Rule: No. The equipoise rule does not apply because the evidence was not evenly balanced and the alleged discrepancies were explained by the deterioration of the lumber.
• Penalty: Modified. The penalty was recomputed under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, as modified by Republic Act No. 10951, and Article 310, resulting in an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

• Conviction for Illegal Possession: The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC, and findings of fact of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great respect and even finality by the Supreme Court when supported by the evidence on record. No showing was made that the trial and appellate courts overlooked facts or circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible, and petitioners raised the same arguments already passed upon and correctly resolved by the CA.
• Possession and Animus Possidendi: Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Revised Forestry Code penalizes three categories of acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest products from any forest land without authority; (2) cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without authority; and (3) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. Petitioners were charged under the third category. Illegal possession of timber or other forest products is malum prohibitum, so criminal intent is not an essential element; however, the prosecution must prove the intent to perpetrate the act, which is the intent to possess or animus possidendi. Animus possidendi is a state of mind that may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Possession includes actual and constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate physical control of the accused; constructive possession exists when the object is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Based on the common findings of the RTC and CA, petitioners had intent to possess and were in actual possession of the Tanguile, White Lauan, and coco lumber without the requisite legal documents. Vicente admitted that they were hired by Diza to drive a ten-wheeler truck from Cagayan to San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and it was established that petitioners were on board the truck loaded with forest products when apprehended. Vicente did not dispute that the truck he was driving was loaded with pieces of Tanguile, Lauan, and coco lumber; he only claimed that there was nothing illegal about it because the person who hired them showed some documents and they passed through several checkpoints. Thus, petitioners had actual possession because they had immediate physical control of the timber. Their defense that they had no intent to violate the law because they were merely asked to drive for a fee was inconsequential and incredible. The belief that there was nothing illegal about their possession and that they had some documentation, when the RTC and CA found otherwise, was in effect an assertion of good faith and mistake of law, which are not proper defenses. The attempt to present documentation showed that they knowingly and voluntarily possessed the products loaded in the truck; their possession was not merely temporary, incidental, casual, and harmless. Their argument that they were not the owners of the truck and timbers was without merit because mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal, and the fact that the person in possession is not the owner is irrelevant.
• Equipoise Rule: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. Petitioners' claim that the alleged discrepancies between the lumber count in the scaling and inventory done upon apprehension and done during trial should exonerate them was misplaced. The CA correctly found that the discrepancies were sufficiently explained by the deterioration of several pieces of lumber from the time of apprehension up to the time of re-inventory due to sunlight exposure and heavy rains, as reflected in the Sheriff's Report of Court Sheriff Nicomedes C. Cantorna. Even assuming that there were discrepancies, petitioners were found to be in possession of forest products without the proper documents, which by itself is sufficient to consummate the crime. The equipoise rule could not apply because the evidence submitted to and evaluated by the RTC and CA mounted high against petitioners' denial and ineffective and uncorroborated feigning of innocence; the total evidence was asymmetrical, with the prosecution's submissions indubitably demonstrating petitioners' guilt.
• Penalty: Violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is punished as qualified theft with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties under Article 309 have been modified by Republic Act No. 10951. Since the total value of the timber or forest products illegally possessed by petitioners is ₱442,402.00, the penalty under Article 309 is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Pursuant to Article 310, the prescribed penalty shall be increased by two degrees, or to prision mayor in its medium to maximum periods, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the lack of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper indeterminate penalty is five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. While the Court sympathized with petitioners who were merely following orders and were consequently caught in possession of the lumber, the law must still be applied in full force: dura lex sed lex. Considering the facts surrounding petitioners' participation and guided by jurisprudence on instances when the facts elicited the Court's compassion, executive clemency was recommended.

• Malum prohibitum — Illegal possession of timber or other forest products is an offense covered by special law and is malum prohibitum; criminal intent is not an essential element of the offense. The Court applied this rule to uphold the conviction notwithstanding petitioners' claim that they were merely hired to drive the truck for a fee.
• Animus possidendi — Although criminal intent is not essential in malum prohibitum offenses, the prosecution must prove the intent to perpetrate the act, which in this case is the intent to possess or animus possidendi. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case, and it may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. The Court found animus possidendi from petitioners' presence on board the loaded truck, their attempt to present documentation, and the surrounding circumstances.
• Actual and constructive possession — Possession, under law, includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate physical control of the accused; constructive possession exists when the object is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. The Court found petitioners in actual possession because they had immediate physical control of the timber loaded in the truck.
• Equipoise rule — Where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. The Court held the rule inapplicable because the prosecution's evidence was not evenly balanced with the defense and the alleged inventory discrepancies were explained by the deterioration of the lumber.
• Non-ownership as a defense — Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal; the fact that the person in possession is not the owner is irrelevant. The Court applied this to reject petitioners' argument that they could not be liable because they did not own the truck or the timber.
• Dura lex sed lex and executive clemency — The law must be applied in full force even if harsh. However, considering the facts surrounding petitioners' participation and guided by jurisprudence on instances when the facts elicited the Court's compassion, the Court recommended executive clemency under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "Illegal possession of timber or other forest products is an offense covered by special law and is malum prohibitum. Thus, criminal intent is not an essential element of the offense. However, the prosecution must prove the intent to perpetrate the act, which in this case is the intent to possess or animus possidendi." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the nature of the offense and the required mental element, distinguishing malum prohibitum from the need to prove animus possidendi.
• "Possession, under law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the object of the crime is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom." — This excerpt defines actual and constructive possession, the pivotal concepts used to affirm the conviction of the driver and helper.
• "The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused." — This passage states the equipoise rule, which the Court rejected because the prosecution's evidence was not evenly balanced and the discrepancies were explained.
• "Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. The fact that the person in possession thereof is not the owner is irrelevant." — This excerpt articulates the rule that non-ownership does not negate liability for illegal possession of forest products.

• Idanan vs. People, G.R. No. 193313, 16 March 2016 — Principal authority cited for the rule that illegal possession of timber or forest products is malum prohibitum, that animus possidendi must still be proved, and that non-ownership of the forest products does not negate liability.
• Villarin vs. People, G.R. No. 175289, 31 August 2011; 672 Phil. 155 (2011) — Cited alongside Idanan for the same principles on possession and malum prohibitum.
• Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 209387, 11 January 2016; 776 Phil. 653 (2016) — Cited on the requirement of animus possidendi and the nature of the offense.
• Jacaban vs. People, G.R. No. 184355, 23 March 2015; 756 Phil. 523 (2015) — Cited for the rule that animus possidendi may be inferred from prior or contemporaneous acts and surrounding circumstances.
• People vs. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055 (2017) — Cited for the settled rule that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great respect and finality.
• People vs. Jao, 810 Phil. 1028 (2017) — Cited to the same effect on deference to lower courts' factual findings.
• Fajardo vs. People, 654 Phil. 184 (2011) — Cited on actual and constructive possession.
• Revaldo vs. People, 603 Phil. 332 — Cited in connection with the penalty for violation of the Forestry Code as qualified theft.
• Reside vs. People, G.R. No. 210318, 28 July 2020; Mangulabnan vs. People, G.R. No. 236848, 08 June 2020 — Cited on the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the recomputation of penalties.
• Mendoza vs. People, 675 Phil. 759 (2011) — Cited on the Court's recommendation of executive clemency in appropriate cases.
• People vs. Neri, 224 Phil. 537 (1985) — Cited in relation to mistake of law as a defense.
• People vs. De Gracia, 304 Phil. 118 (1994) — Cited on possession and liability.

• Section 68 (now Section 77), Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines) — Penalizes cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest products without authority, and the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. Petitioners were charged under the third category, and the provision was applied to affirm their conviction.
• Article 309, Revised Penal Code, as modified by Republic Act No. 10951 — Provides the penalties for theft based on the value of the property stolen. Since the total value of the forest products was ₱442,402.00, the penalty was prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
• Article 310, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for qualified theft shall be increased by two degrees. Applied to raise the penalty to prision mayor in its medium to maximum periods.
• Article 5, Revised Penal Code — Allows the Court to transmit the case to the Chief Executive and recommend executive clemency. The Court recommended clemency for petitioners.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty after considering the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
• Constitutional presumption of innocence — Invoked through the equipoise rule; the Court held it did not tilt the scales in favor of petitioners because the evidence was not evenly balanced.
• Article 2, Civil Code — Cited in the discussion rejecting good faith and mistake of law as defenses.

Justice Leonen (Chairperson), Justice Rosario, and Justice Dimaampao concurred. Justice Carandang was on official leave.