Nierras vs. Dacuycuy

A single act of issuing a dishonored check may give rise to two distinct offenses — a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code — and the prosecution of both does not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, because double jeopardy requires identity of offenses, that is, identity of elements, and not merely identity of the acts charged. Corollarily, the denial of a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy is an interlocutory order for which the remedy is trial on the merits and appeal, not certiorari.

Peter Nierras was a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, from which he purchased oil products. Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, approved on April 3, 1979, penalizes the making, drawing, and issuance of a check knowing at the time of issue that the drawer has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank, and Section 5 thereof provides that prosecution under the Act is without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code. Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, penalizes swindling committed by postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The case called for the reconciliation of these two penal provisions where the same dishonored checks formed the basis of both sets of criminal informations.

Peter Nierras was a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, from which he purchased oil products. Simultaneous with the delivery of those products, he issued nine checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, the checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already closed. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation thereafter repeatedly demanded of petitioner that he either deposit funds to cover his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased, but he failed and refused to do either.

Two sets of criminal informations followed. The first consisted of nine charges for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, pending before the lower court. The second consisted of nine informations for estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386, and 4387, all arising from the same dishonored checks.

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment in both sets of criminal cases. Immediately after his plea of not guilty in the estafa cases, he moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw that plea so that he could file a motion to quash, which he grounded on double jeopardy, contending that the offenses charged in the estafa cases were already included in the earlier Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases. Respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy denied the motion to quash in a resolution dated September 17, 1981, reasoning that the crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not committed by the mere issuance of a check, and that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 the mere issuance of a check without sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation, when dishonored upon presentation, constitutes the offense, while the drawer is at the same time also liable under the statute for issuing a check without sufficient funds.

The denial of the motion to quash prompted petitioner to seek relief directly from the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, asking for the annulment of the September 17, 1981 resolution. The Court was thus presented with the question whether the filing of the nine estafa informations after petitioner had already been charged with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for the same bouncing checks would place him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the same offenses.

• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that he would be placed in double jeopardy because all the elements of estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in the crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, namely (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.
• Prior Charge for the Same Act: Petitioner maintained that the estafa offenses were already included in the earlier Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, both sets of cases having arisen from the same bouncing checks.

• Distinct Offenses: Respondent maintained, through the memorandum for respondents, that the two sets of informations charge distinct and separate offenses, because deceit and damage are essential elements of estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code but are not required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and that the two laws differ in their elements, their penalties, and their classification.
• Legislative Intent to Permit Dual Prosecution: Respondent argued, citing the sponsorship speech of former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza as author of the bill, that where a check is issued in payment or contemporaneously with the incurring of an obligation, the drawer may be held liable not only for estafa but also for violation of the Act, whereas a check issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation exposes the drawer only to liability under the Act.
• Statutory Reservation: Respondent invoked Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, which provides that prosecution under the Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of the nine informations for estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, after petitioner had earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks, places him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the same offenses.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies to annul the denial of a motion to quash a criminal information on the ground of double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The two sets of informations charge distinct and separate offenses, and double jeopardy requires identity of elements in the two offenses; prosecution for the same act is not prohibited, only prosecution for the same offense.
• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order; the remedy is to proceed to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion and, if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

• Double Jeopardy: The elements of the two offenses are not identical. Under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, mere issuance of a check that is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or credit gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds, and hence is punishable, whereas under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code deceit and damage are essential elements. The Court enumerated the further differences: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315(2-d) such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; and (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are mala prohibita. Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 expressly provides that prosecution under the Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, confirming that the legislature contemplated the possibility of dual liability. Although the two sets of informations may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; where there is variance or difference between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, there is no double jeopardy, since what the rule prohibits is identity of elements in the two offenses. The mere filing of the two sets of informations does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court applied the rule that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion, and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. If the petitioner cannot appeal at that stage of the proceeding, it is because there is still a necessity for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions, and not because the remedy of appeal is unavailing.

• Double Jeopardy — Identity of Offenses, Not Identity of Acts — The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is violated only where there is identity of offenses, which means identity of elements between the offense first charged and the offense subsequently charged. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses, and where the elements of an offense defined in one law differ from those of an offense defined in another law, a subsequent prosecution under the other law does not constitute double jeopardy. In this case, the Court held that the filing of the estafa informations after the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charges had been filed did not place petitioner in double jeopardy because the elements of the two offenses are not identical.
• Estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code — The elements are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of this offense.
• Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Under Section 1 of the law, mere issuance of a check that is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or credit gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds, and hence is punishable. Deceit and damage are not required. A drawer may be convicted under the Act even if the check was issued for a pre-existing obligation.
• Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita — Violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, whereas violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are mala prohibita. This classification is one of the differences between the two offenses that negates identity of elements for purposes of double jeopardy.
• Crime Against Property vs. Crime Against Public Interest — Estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public interest, as it does injury to the entire banking system. The differing material objects of the two offenses reinforce the conclusion that they are distinct.
• Certiorari Not the Remedy from Denial of a Motion to Quash — When a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion, and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. The necessity for trial on the merits, where the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions, is the reason the remedy of appeal is not yet available.

• "What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code." — This passage supplies the core ratio: the elements of the two offenses are not identical, so no double jeopardy arises from the dual prosecution.
• "While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense." — This is the canonical formulation of the identity-of-elements test as applied to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, and is the passage most frequently invoked for that proposition.
• "Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code." — Quoted from Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, this provision is the statutory confirmation that the legislature contemplated and permitted separate liability under the Revised Penal Code.
• "when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law" — Quoted from Acharon vs. Purisima as adopted by the Court, this passage states the procedural ground for dismissing the petition independently of the double jeopardy question.

• People vs. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568 — Cited in the respondent judge's resolution for the elements of estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, namely the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued, lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check, and damage to the payee.
• People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 — Cited for the rule that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds, a presumption that does not obtain under the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570 — Cited for the proposition that the mere filing of two sets of informations does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
• Acharon vs. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309 — Cited as controlling on the remedy from the denial of a motion to quash: not certiorari, but trial on the merits without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses, and appeal from an adverse decision.
• People vs. Magdaluyo, 1 SCRA 990 — Cited as the source of the rule invoked in Acharon vs. Purisima regarding the proper remedy from the denial of a motion to quash.

• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Approved April 3, 1979) — Penalizes any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The penalty is imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The Court quoted the provision in full to show that the offense is complete upon mere issuance and dishonor, without need of deceit or damage.
• Article 315 (2-d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885 — Defines swindling (estafa) committed by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The provision requires that the false pretense or fraudulent act be executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The Court relied on the presence of deceit and damage as essential elements to distinguish estafa from the statutory offense.
• Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Provides that prosecution under the Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code. The Court cited this provision as the statutory basis for the conclusion that the filing of the two sets of informations does not give rise to double jeopardy.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Fernan, C.J., took no part.