Neyra vs. Neyra

A compromise agreement and will executed by a person suffering from Addison's disease is valid where the testatrix was compos mentis at the time of execution, as established by the testimony of credible witnesses who knew and conversed with her, and where her thumbmark was affixed in the presence of attesting witnesses who were capable of seeing the act.

Severo Neyra died intestate in Manila on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and children from two marriages. Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra were his daughters from his first marriage—sisters of the whole blood. Following their father's death, the two sisters developed serious dissensions over the division of his estate, resulting in two separate lawsuits in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Encarnacion, who remained single and had no ascendants, had executed a will on September 14, 1939, naming the Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria and certain relatives as beneficiaries, but deliberately excluding Trinidad. The Congregation initially declined the bounty, prompting Encarnacion to attempt a codicil, which was also rejected. These circumstances set the stage for the reconciliation and compromise that became the subject of the present controversy.

Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and children from two marriages. From the first marriage, he left two daughters—Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra—and there were other children from his second marriage. After Severo's death, the two sisters developed serious misunderstandings concerning the properties left by their father. Their dissensions were so severe that after March 31, 1939, they were engaged in two separate lawsuits in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In the first case, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, which was decided in favor of the defendants both in the CFI and in the Court of Appeals on December 21, 1943. The second case was the instant action, filed by Trinidad on October 25, 1939, for the recovery of one-half of the property left by their father and one-half of the rents collected thereon by Encarnacion. The CFI adjudicated one-half of the property to Trinidad but ordered her to pay Encarnacion ₱727.77 plus interest on counterclaims. Trinidad appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Encarnacion, who had remained single and had no ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, disposing of her properties in favor of the Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria and certain relatives—Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco—making no provision whatsoever for her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad, who had become her bitter enemy. When the will was brought to the attention of the Congregation's authorities, the religious organization declined the bounty, a decision duly communicated to Encarnacion. To overcome this difficulty, Encarnacion decided to make a new will and, about one week before her death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat, giving him instructions for its preparation. Atty. Sikat, however, merely prepared a draft of a codicil amending the September 14, 1939 will, again naming the religious organization as beneficiary; this was also rejected.

Encarnacion had become seriously ill with Addison's disease. On October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church, to make confession, and requested that holy mass be celebrated in her house so she might take communion. On November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house at No. 366 Raon Street by Father Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, and Encarnacion, though confined to bed, took communion. After the mass, Father Garcia advised reconciliation between the two sisters. Encarnacion accepted the advice and, at about noon that same day, sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch Trinidad, who arrived at about 2:30 in the afternoon. The sisters greeted each other affectionately and became reconciled. During a long and cordial conversation, they discussed the properties left by their father and their pending litigation in the Court of Appeals, and agreed to have the case dismissed on the condition that the property involved should be given exclusively to Trinidad, that Trinidad should waive her share in the rents collected by Encarnacion, and that Trinidad had no further indebtedness to Encarnacion.

They sent for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis to prepare the necessary document. Atty. Panis could come only on the afternoon of November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for both the compromise agreement and a new last will and testament naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza as beneficiaries. The two documents were prepared in duplicate and were ready for signature by the morning of November 3, 1942. In the afternoon of that day, Atty. Panis read the compromise agreement and the last will and testament to Encarnacion slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others. He then asked her whether their terms were in accordance with her wishes or whether she wanted any change. Encarnacion did not suggest any change; she asked for the pad and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each of the two documents in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses—Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis—who thereafter signed at the foot of the will in the presence of Encarnacion and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra as party and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza as witnesses. Father Teodoro Garcia was likewise present at the signing, at Encarnacion's request.

On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra died at the age of 48, allegedly from a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's disease, after an illness of about two years. On the same day, November 4, 1942, the compromise agreement was filed in the Court of Appeals case, and on November 10, 1942, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal pursuant to that agreement. On November 23, 1942, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent the deceased Encarnacion Neyra and other relatives, filed a petition for reconsideration, contending that the compromise could not have been understood by Encarnacion as she was at the threshold of death, that her thumbmark must have been affixed against her will by Trinidad's attorney, and that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the case when the agreement was filed on November 4 because Encarnacion was already dead. Teodora Neyra, half-sister of Encarnacion, and her daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, together with Presentacion Blanco, daughter of Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco—both named as beneficiaries in the September 14, 1939 will but eliminated from the November 3, 1942 will—testified that Encarnacion was sleeping when her thumbmark was affixed to the agreement and that the attesting witnesses were in the caida, not the sala. They further claimed that the thumbmark on the will was affixed only on the morning of November 4, 1942, when Encarnacion was already dead. The Court found these contentions absolutely devoid of truth, noting that Ceferina de la Cruz contradicted herself and her co-witnesses by admitting that the attesting witnesses signed the documents in the sala near Encarnacion's bed, and that the witnesses presented by Trinidad were all trustworthy men with no interest in the outcome, including two ministers of the Gospel and three professional men of irreproachable character.

• Lack of Testamentary Capacity: Petitioners argued that Encarnacion Neyra could not have understood the compromise agreement dated November 3, 1942, as she was already at the threshold of death, suffering from Addison's disease, and died the following day.
• Invalid Execution of Thumbmark: Petitioners maintained that if Encarnacion's thumbmark appeared on the document at all, it must have been affixed by Trinidad Neyra's attorney against Encarnacion's will, and that when the thumbmark was affixed to the agreement, Encarnacion was sleeping on her bed in the sala.
• Absence of Attesting Witnesses: Petitioners contended that the attesting witnesses were not present in the sala at the time the thumbmark was affixed, as they were in the caida.
• Post-Mortem Execution of Will: Petitioners claimed that Encarnacion's thumbmark was affixed to the will only on the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
• Loss of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals had no more jurisdiction over the case when the alleged agreement was filed on November 4, 1942, because Encarnacion was already dead at that time.
• Improbability of Reconciliation: Petitioners placed great emphasis on the fact that up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters were bitter enemies, arguing that reconciliation was improbable.

• Validity of Compromise Agreement: Respondent Trinidad Neyra maintained that the compromise agreement had been legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses.
• Testamentary Capacity: Respondent argued that Encarnacion was compos mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity at the time of execution, as demonstrated by her intelligent conversation with witnesses and her active participation in the reconciliation and execution of the documents.

• Validity of Compromise Agreement: Whether the compromise agreement dated November 3, 1942 was legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra.
• Testamentary Capacity: Whether Encarnacion Neyra possessed the necessary mental and testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the agreement and will, notwithstanding her suffering from Addison's disease.
• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: Whether the attesting witnesses were present at the time Encarnacion Neyra affixed her thumbmark to the documents, as required for valid execution.

• Validity of Compromise Agreement: Yes. The compromise agreement was legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and she was compos mentis at the time.
• Testamentary Capacity: Yes. Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity at the time of execution, notwithstanding her suffering from Addison's disease, as established by the testimony of credible witnesses who had known and conversed with her.
• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: Yes. The attesting witnesses were present in the sala where the testatrix was lying on her bed; the true test is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign had they chosen to do so.

• Validity of Compromise Agreement: The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, established that the reconciliation between the two sisters was genuine and natural. Encarnacion was a religious woman instructed in the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The approach of imminent death evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life, and as Trinidad was her only sister of the whole blood and nearest relative, it was most logical that Encarnacion would reconcile with her and make her the beneficiary of her generosity under the new will. The testimony of petitioners' witnesses—Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco, and Ceferina de la Cruz—to the effect that the thumbmark was affixed while Encarnacion was sleeping and that the will was thumbmarked after her death, was found to be absolutely devoid of truth, contrary to common sense, and violative of all sense of proportion. Ceferina de la Cruz contradicted herself and her co-witnesses by admitting that the attesting witnesses signed the documents in the sala near Encarnacion's bed. The petitioners' witnesses were all interested parties, being children of legatees named in the old will but eliminated from the new one. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus was applied to their testimony. The witnesses presented by Trinidad, by contrast, were all trustworthy men with no interest in the outcome, including two ministers of the Gospel and three professional men of irreproachable character.

• Testamentary Capacity: The Court relied on established jurisprudence holding that the testimony of witnesses who had known and talked to the testator is more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts who had never seen or talked to the testatrix. The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, the alleged medical expert presented by petitioners, was deemed absolutely unreliable because he had never seen or talked to Encarnacion. According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as ten years, and as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, but mental faculties remain unimpaired partly due to the sleep they enjoy and the resulting physical and mental rest. Presentacion Blanco herself admitted during cross-examination that on the morning and at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion talked to her and they understood each other clearly, demonstrating that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time of signing and execution. Precedents established that insomnia, tuberculosis, diabetes, weakness, and the need for assistance in signing do not invalidate a will where the testator's mind is in a perfectly sound condition. The logical conclusion was that Encarnacion was compos mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity at the time of execution.

• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: The contention that the attesting witnesses were in the caida and not present when Encarnacion thumbmarked the documents was found untenable. It was fully shown that the witnesses were present in the sala where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test, as established in Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, is not whether the attesting witnesses actually saw each other at the time of signing, but whether they might have seen each other sign had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. Furthermore, the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will is equivalent to her signature, as held in Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu.

• Testamentary Capacity — Preference for Lay Witness Testimony — The testimony of witnesses who had known and talked to the testator is more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts who had never seen or talked to the testatrix. The Court applied this principle by rejecting the testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, who had never seen or conversed with Encarnacion Neyra, and crediting instead the testimony of credible witnesses—including two ministers of the Gospel and three professional men—who confirmed that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time of execution.

• Soundness of Mind Despite Illness — Neither old age, ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide the testator's hand in signing is sufficient to invalidate a will where the mind is in a perfectly sound condition. The Court held that persons suffering from Addison's disease, like those suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia, or diabetes, preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death, partly due to the benefit of physical and mental rest from sleep.

• Presence of Attesting Witnesses — Capability Test — The true test for the presence of attesting witnesses is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of signing, but whether they might have seen each other sign had they chosen to do so. The Court found that the attesting witnesses actually saw the entire execution in this case.

• Thumbmark as Signature — A thumbmark placed by the testatrix on a will or agreement is equivalent to her signature. The Court applied this principle to uphold the validity of the documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra.

• Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus — A witness who testifies falsely on one material point is presumed to testify falsely on all points. The Court applied this legal aphorism to the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, who were found to have testified to deliberate falsehoods, including the claim that the will was thumbmarked after Encarnacion's death.

• "Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942." — This passage states the Court's ratio decidendi on testamentary capacity, synthesizing the application of multiple precedents to the facts of the case.

• "The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case." — This formulation of the capability test for the presence of attesting witnesses, drawn from Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, is the controlling rule on witness presence in the execution of wills.

• "Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief." — This passage illustrates the Court's application of the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus doctrine and its wholesale rejection of the petitioners' evidence as perjured and interested.

• "They had forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute." — This passage reflects the Court's reasoning on the probability of reconciliation between estranged relatives, grounding the factual finding of genuine reconciliation in the testatrix's religious character and the approach of death.

• Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil. 400 — Followed. Held that insomnia does not affect the full possession of mental faculties necessary for the execution of a will, notwithstanding testimony of two doctors to the contrary. Applied to support the finding that Encarnacion's illness did not impair her testamentary capacity.

• Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil. 579 — Followed. Held that a testatrix was compos mentis despite being in the last stage of tuberculosis, and that a thumbmark is equivalent to a signature. Both principles were applied in this case.

• Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil. 573 — Followed. Held that a physician's testimony that the deceased was in a comatose condition was insufficient to establish testamentary incapacity where credible witnesses stated he was conscious and able to communicate. Applied to reject the testimony of the alleged medical expert who never saw the testatrix.

• Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil. 485 — Followed. Held that where the testator's mind is sound, neither old age, ill health, nor the need for assistance in signing invalidates a will; and that intelligent conversation shortly before and after execution demonstrates sound mental condition. Applied to support the finding of testamentary capacity.

• Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541 — Followed. Established the true test for the presence of attesting witnesses: not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign had they chosen to do so. Applied to uphold the validity of the execution.

• Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil. 728 — Followed. Cited for the legal aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, applied to reject the testimony of petitioners' witnesses who testified to deliberate falsehoods.

• Section 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Provides for the substitution of heirs or representatives of a deceased party in pending litigation. The Court noted that the relatives of the deceased Encarnacion Neyra had appeared in accordance with this provision, but the petition for reconsideration was nevertheless denied on the merits.

Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concurred.